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Abstract
This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the
nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as con-
cerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and
belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality relates to the compu-
tational theory of mind; metaphysical modality; deontic modality; the types
of mathematical modality; to the epistemic status of undecidable proposi-
tions and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the
apriori-aposteriori distinction; to the modal profile of rational propositional
intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a
modal mental state. Examining the nature of epistemic logic itself, I de-
velop a novel approach to conditions of self-knowledge in the setting of the
modal µ-calculus, as well as novel epistemicist solutions to Curry’s and the
liar paradoxes. Solutions to the Julius Caesar Problem, and to previously in-
transigent issues concerning the first-person concept, the distinction between
fundamental and derivative truths, and the unity of intention and its role in
decision theory, are developed along the way.
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Chapter 1
Methodological Forward
This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. The work aims
to advance our present understanding of the defining contours of epistemic
modal space. I endeavor, then, to develop the theory of epistemic modality,
by accounting for its interaction with metaphysical modality; deontic modal-
ity; the types of mathematical modality; the epistemic status of undecidable
propositions and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; the
apriori-aposteriori distinction; the modal profile of rational propositional in-
tuition; and the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a modal
mental state. In each chapter, I examine the philosophical significance of the
foregoing, by demonstrating its import to a number of previously intransigent
philosophical issues.
In Section 1, I provide a summary of each of the chapters. In Section 2, I
examine the limits of competing proposals in the literature, and outline the
need for a new approach.
1.1 Chapter Summary
In Chapter 2, I aim to vindicate the thesis that cognitive computational
properties are abstract objects implemented in physical systems. I avail of
the equivalence relations countenanced in Homotopy Type Theory, in order
to specify an abstraction principle for intensional, computational properties.
The homotopic abstraction principle for intensional mental functions provides
an epistemic conduit into our knowledge of cognitive algorithms as abstract
objects. I examine, then, how intensional functions in Epistemic Modal Al-
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gebra are deployed as core models in the philosophy of mind, Bayesian per-
ceptual psychology, the program of natural language semantics in linguistics,
and in quantum information theory, and I argue that this provides abduc-
tive support for the truth of homotopic abstraction. Epistemic modality can
thus be shown to be both a compelling and a materially adequate candidate
for the fundamental structure of mental representational states, comprising
a fragment of the Language of Thought.
In Chapter 3, I provide a mathematically tractable background against
which to model both modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. I argue
that epistemic modal algebras comprise a materially adequate fragment of
the language of thought. I demonstrate, then, how modal expressivism can
be regimented by modal coalgebraic automata, to which the above epistemic
modal algebras are dually isomorphic. I examine, in particular, the virtues
unique to the modal expressivist approach here proffered in the setting of
the foundations of mathematics, by contrast to competing approaches based
upon both the inferentialist approach to concept-individuation and the cod-
ification of speech acts via intensional semantics.
In Chapter 4, I endeavor to establish foundations for the interaction be-
tween hyperintensional semantics and two-dimensional indexing. I examine
the significance of the semantics, by developing three, novel interpretations
of the framework. The first interpretation provides a characterization of
the distinction between fundamental and derivative truths. The interaction
between the hyperintensional truthmaker semantics and modal ontology is
further examined. The second interpretation demonstrates how the elements
of decision theory are definable within the semantics, and provides a novel ac-
count of the interaction between probability measures and hyperintensional
grounds. The third interpretation concerns the contents of the types of in-
tentional action, and the semantics is shown to resolve a puzzle concerning
the role of intention in action.
In Chapter 5, I aim further to redress the contention that epistemic pos-
sibility cannot be a guide to the principles of modal metaphysics. I argue
that the interaction between the two-dimensional intensional framework and
intensional plural quantification enables epistemic possibilities to target the
haecceitistic properties of individuals. I outline the elements of plural logic,
and I specify, then, a two-dimensional intensional formula encoding the re-
lation between the epistemic possibility of haecceity comprehension and its
metaphysical possibility. I examine the Julius Caesar problem as a test case.
I conclude by addressing objections from the indeterminacy of ontological
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principles relative to the space of epistemic possibilities, and from the con-
sistency of epistemic modal space.
In Chapter 6, I argue that Chalmers’s (1996; 2010) two-dimensional con-
ceivability argument against the derivation of phenomenal truths from phys-
ical truths risks being obviated by a hyperintensional regimentation of the
ontology of consciousness. The regimentation demonstrates how ontological
dependencies between truths about consciousness and about physics cannot
be witnessed by epistemic constraints, when the latter are recorded by the
conceivability – i.e., the epistemic possibility – thereof. Generalizations and
other aspects of the philosophical significance of the hyperintensional regi-
mentation are further examined.
In Chapter 7, I aim to provide a precise account of the manner in which
the properties of phenomenal consciousness can be understood as possessing
accuracy-conditions. The account is restricted to an examination of sen-
sory phenomenal properties. I provide a critical discussion of an approach
to phenomenal content, which avails of the epistemic interpretation of two-
dimensional intensional semantics. I examine several general issues for the
foregoing approach, which I argue adduce against the sufficiency of the ac-
count as a theory of phenomenal representation. By contrast, I go on to pro-
vide a formally tractable account of the manner in which phenomenal proper-
ties can precisely compose via a category-theoretic semantics. The version of
category-theoretic semantics that I proffer is inspired by Russell’s (op. cit.)
and Pettigrew’s (ms) seminal work on the approach. I demonstrate how the
proposal is empirically adequate, by constitutively incorporating some of the
results concerning the kinds of attention and models of Bayesian perceptual
psychology; and I argue that this concatenation of phenomenal properties
into propositional form, assessable for accuracy or veridicality, explains the
nature of the correctness-conditions for phenomenal consciousness. The sec-
ond, central aim of the chapter is to explain how the phenomenological effects
of attention interact with phenomenal representations, and to examine how
the formal properties of phenomenal content relate to the logic of knowledge.
I argue (i) that the phenomenological effects of attention do not affect the
satisfaction of phenomenal knowledge, and thus do not affect the factivity
thereof, and (ii) that the value-altering effects of attention bear on phenome-
nal content only by targeting its component parts, in a manner similar to how
changes in the semantic values of sub-sentential expressions might affect the
truth-condition for the sentence that the component expressions comprise.
In Chapter 8, I provide a novel account of iterated epistemic states. I ar-
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gue that states of epistemic determinacy might be secured by countenancing
self-knowledge on the model of fixed points in monadic second-order modal
logic, i.e. the modal µ-calculus. Despite the epistemic indeterminacy wit-
nessed by the invalidation of modal axiom 4 in the sorites paradox – i.e.
the KK principle: φ → φ – an epistemic interpretation of the Kripke
functors of a µ-automaton permits the iterations of the transition functions
to entrain a principled means by which to account for necessary conditions
on self-knowledge.
In Chapter 9, I endeavor to provide a precise formulation of the de-
pendence relations between the apriori and aposteriori epistemic profiles of
mental states, beyond enabling and evidential conditions. I pursue an inten-
sional approach to countenancing the notion of apriority, and I argue that the
finer-grained dependence relations between the apriori and aposteriori can be
regimented using the logic of explanatory ground. I advance four methods for
countenancing the interaction between the intensional apriori and the apos-
teriori. The first method is witnessed by Bayesian confirmation measures,
where the probability operators figuring therein are defined on epistemically
possible worlds. The second method concerns the individuation-conditions
on intensions defined on epistemically possible worlds. The third method
targets the notion of the modally factive apriori. The fourth method tar-
gets iterations of the grounding operator, variably interpreted as expressing
epistemic and metaphysical explanatory dependence. I argue, then, that the
framework can be applied, in order to resolve two puzzles concerning the
contrasting etiology and epistemic profiles of mental states: (i) immunity to
error through misidentification, and (ii) the precise interaction between epis-
temic modality and deontic modality, as a test case for the relations between
the intensional apriori and explanatory method.
In Chapter 10, I aim to provide modal foundations for mathematical pla-
tonism. I examine Hale and Wright’s (2009) objections to the merits and
need, in the defense of mathematical platonism and its epistemology, of the
thesis of Necessitism. In response to Hale and Wright’s objections to the role
of epistemic and metaphysical modalities in providing justification for both
the truth of abstraction principles and the success of mathematical predicate
reference, I examine the Necessitist commitments of the abundant concep-
tion of properties endorsed by Hale and Wright and examined in Hale (2013);
examine cardinality issues which arise depending on whether Necessitism is
accepted at first- and higher-order; and demonstrate how a two-dimensional
intensional approach to the epistemology of mathematics, augmented with
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Necessitism, is consistent with Hale and Wright’s notion of there being epis-
temic entitlement rationally to trust that abstraction principles are true.
Epistemic and metaphysical modality may thus be shown to play a consti-
tutive role in vindicating the reality of mathematical objects and truth, and
in explaining our possible knowledge thereof.
In Chapter 11, I examine the philosophical significance of Ω-logic in
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice (ZFC). The dual isomorphism be-
tween algebra and coalgebra permits Boolean-valued algebraic models of ZFC
to be interpreted as coalgebras. The modal profile of Ω-logical validity can
then be countenanced within a coalgebraic logic, and Ω-logical validity can
be defined via deterministic automata. I argue that the philosophical signif-
icance of the foregoing is two-fold. First, because the epistemic and modal
profiles of Ω-logical validity correspond to those of second-order logical con-
sequence, Ω-logical validity is genuinely logical, and thus vindicates a neo-
logicist conception of mathematical truth in the set-theoretic multiverse. Sec-
ond, the foregoing provides a modal-computational account of the interpre-
tation of mathematical vocabulary, adducing in favor of a realist conception
of the cumulative hierarchy of sets.
In Chapter 12, I aim to contribute to the analysis of the nature of
mathematical modality, and to the applications of the latter to unrestricted
quantification and absolute decidability. Rather than countenancing the in-
terpretational type of mathematical modality as a primitive, I argue that
the interpretational type of mathematical modality is a species of epistemic
modality. I argue, then, that the framework of two-dimensional intensional
semantics ought to be applied to the mathematical setting. The framework
permits of a formally precise account of the priority and relation between
epistemic mathematical modality and metaphysical mathematical modality.
The discrepancy between the modal systems governing the parameters in
the two-dimensional intensional setting provides an explanation of the dif-
ference between the metaphysical possibility of absolute decidability and our
knowledge thereof.
In Chapter 13, I endeavor to define the concept of indefinite extensibility
in the setting of category theory. I argue that the generative property of in-
definite extensibility in the category-theoretic setting is identifiable with the
Kripke functors of modal coalgebraic automata, where the automata model
Grothendieck Universes and the functors are further inter-definable with the
elementary embeddings of large cardinal axioms. The Kripke functors de-
finable in Grothendieck universes are argued to account for the ontological
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expansion effected by the elementary embeddings in the category of sets. By
characterizing the modal profile of Ω-logical validity, and thus the generic in-
variance of mathematical truth, modal coalgebraic automata are further ca-
pable of capturing the notion of definiteness, in order to yield a non-circular
definition of indefinite extensibility.
In Chapter 14, I aim to provide a modal logic for rational intuition. Sim-
ilarly to treatments of the property of knowledge in epistemic logic, I argue
that rational intuition can be codified by a modal operator governed by the
axioms of a dynamic provability logic, which embeds GL within the modal
µ-calculus. If rational intuition is identical with cognitive phenomenal prop-
erties of representational states such as beliefs, then – via correspondence
results between modal logic and first-order logic [cf. van Benthem (1983;
1984/2003)] – a precise translation can be provided between the notion of
’intuition-of’, i.e., the cognitive phenomenal properties of thoughts whose
contents can concern the axioms of mathematical languages, and the modal
operators regimenting the notion of ’intuition-that’. I argue that intuition-
that can further be shown to entrain conceptual elucidation, by way of figur-
ing as a dynamic-interpretational modality which induces the reinterpreta-
tion of domains of quantification (cf. Fine, 2005; 2006). Modalized rational
intuition is therefore expressively equivalent to – and can crucially serve as a
guide to the interpretation of – the entities, such as mathematical concepts,
that are formalizable in monadic first- and second-order formal languages.
In Chapter 15, I target a series of potential issues for a modal resolu-
tion to the alethic paradoxes. I aim, then, to provide a novel, epistemicist
treatment of the alethic paradoxes. In response to Curry’s paradox, the epis-
temicist solution that I advance enables the retention of both classical logic
and the traditional rules for the alethic predicate: truth-elimination and
truth-introduction. By availing of epistemic modal logic, the epistemicist
approach permits, further, of a descriptively adequate explanation of the in-
determinacy that is exhibited by epistemic states concerning liar-paradoxical
sentences.
In Chapter 16, I argue that the types of intention can be modeled as a
type of modal operator. I delineate the intensional-semantic profiles of the
types of intention, and provide a precise account of how the types of inten-
tion are unified in virtue of both their operations in a single, encompassing,
epistemic modal space, and their role in practical reasoning. I endeavor to
provide reasons adducing against the proposal that the types of intention are
reducible to the mental states of belief and desire, where the former state
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is codified by subjective probability measures and the latter is codified by a
utility function. I argue, instead, that each of the types of intention – i.e.,
intention-in-action, intention-as-explanation, and intention-for-the-future –
has as its aim the value of an outcome of the agent’s action, as derived by
her partial beliefs and assignments of utility, and as codified by the value of
expected utility in evidential decision theory.
1.2 The Need for a New Approach
The proposal that mental representations can be defined as possibilities rela-
tive to states of information dates at least back to Wittgenstein (1921/1974),
although there are a number of precursors to the literature in the twentieth
century.1 While novel, the limits of these incipient proposals consists in that
they are laconic with regard to the explanatory foundations of the general
approach.
Wittgenstein writes: ’A picture is a fact. / The fact that the elements of a
picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things
are related to one another in the same way. / Let us call this connexion of
its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this
structure the pictorial form of the picture. / Pictorial form is the possibility
that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the
picture. A logical picture of facts is a thought. / ’A state of affairs is think-
able’: what this means is that we can picture it to ourselves. / The totality of
1For an examination of epistemic logic in, e.g., the late medieval period, see Boh (1993).
For the role of logical, rather than epistemic, modality in defining the modes of judgment,
see Buridan (2001: 5.6), Kant (1787/1998: A74/B99-A76/B101), and Bolzano (1810/2004:
15-16). For the synthetic apriori determination of which of the possible predicates com-
prising a disjoint union ought to be applied to objects – i.e., transcendental logic – see
Kant (op. cit: A53/B77-A57/B81; A571/B599-A574/B602). Anticipating Kripke (1980:
56), Husserl (1929/1999: §6) refers, in a section heading and the discussion therein, to
transcendental logic as pertaining to conditions on the ’contingent apriori’.
For the role of possibilities in accounting for the nature of subjective probability mea-
sures, i.e., partial belief, see Bernoulli (1713/2006: 211), Wittgenstein (op. cit.: 4.464,
5.15-5.152), and Carnap (1945). Bernoulli (op. cit.) writes: ’Something is possible if
it has even a very small part of certainty, impossible if it has none or infinitely little.
Thus something that has 1/20 or 1/30 of certainty is possible’. For subjective interpreta-
tions of probability, see Pascal (1654/1959), Laplace (1774/1986), Boole (1854), Ramsey
(1926/1960), de Finetti (1937/1964), and Koopman (1940). For the history of the devel-
opment of the theory of subjective probability, see Daston (1988; 1994) and Joyce (2011).
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true thoughts is a picture of the world. / A thought contains the possibility
of the situation of which it is the thought. What is thinkable is possible too’
(op. cit.: 2.141-2.151, 3-3.02). Wittgenstein notes, further, that ’The theory
of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology’ (4.1121), and inquires: ’Does
not my study of sign-language correspond to the study of thought processes
which philosophers held to be so essential to the philosophy of logic? Only
they got entangled for the most part in unessential psychological investiga-
tions, and there is an analogous danger for my method’ (op. cit.).2 Chapters
2 and 3 endeavor, as noted, to argue for a similar thesis, to the effect that
epistemic modality comprises a materially adequate fragment of the Lan-
guage of Thought, i.e., the computational structure and semantic values of
the mental representations countenanced in philosophy and cognitive science.
Modal analyses of the notions of apriority and of states of information
broadly construed are further proffered in Russell (1919), Lewis (1923), and
Peirce (1933). Russell (op. cit.: 345-346) contrasts the possible truth-value of
a propositional function (i.e., open formula) given an assignment of values to
the variables therein with an epistemic – what he refers to as the ‘ordinary’ –
interpretation of the modal according to which ‘when you say of a proposition
that it is possible, you mean something like this: first of all it is implied that
you do not know whether it is true or false, and I think it is implied; secondly,
that it is one of a class of propositions, some of which are known to be true.
When I say, e.g., ‘It is possible that it may rain to-morrow’ . . . We mean
partly that we do not know whether it will rain or whether it will not, but
also that we do know that that is the sort of proposition that is quite apt to
be true, that it is a value of a propositional function of which we know some
value to be true’ (op. cit.: 346). Lewis (op. cit.: 172) defines the apriority
of the laws of mathematical languages as consisting in their being ’true in all
possible worlds’. Peirce (op. cit.: §65) writes:
’[L]et me say that I use the word information to mean a state of knowl-
edge, which may range from total ignorance of everything except the mean-
ings of words up to omniscience; and by informational I mean relative to such
a state of knowledge. Thus, by ’informationally possible,’ I mean possible
so far as we, or the persons considered, know. Then, the informationally
possible is that which in a given information is not perfectly known not to be
true. The informationally necessary is that which is perfectly known to be
2The remarks are anticipated in Wittgenstein [1979: 21/10/14, 5/11/14, 10/11/14,
12/11/14 (pp. 16, 24-29)].
18
true. The informationally contingent, which in the given information remains
uncertain, that is, at once possible and unnecessary’.
The notion of epistemic modality was, finally, stipulated independently
by Moore (c.1941-1942/1962) in his commonplace book. According to Moore,
’epistemic’ possibilities include that ’Its possible that [for some individual,
a: a] is [glad] right now [iff] [a] may be [glad]’, where ’I know that he’s not’
contradicts’ the foregoing sentence (op. cit.: 187). Another instance of an
epistemic possibility is advanced – ’It’s possible that I’m not sitting down
right now’ – and analyzed as: ’It’s not certain that I am’ or ’I don’t know
that I am” (184).
In the contemporary literature, there is a paucity of works devoted to
the nature of epistemic modality and its relation to other modalities. Recent
books and edited volumes which examine aspects of epistemic modality in-
clude Gendler and Hawthorne (2002); Yablo (2008); Gendler (2010; Egan and
Weatherson (2011); and Chalmers (2012). While the present work is focused
on the foundations and philosophical significance of the epistemic interpre-
tation of modal logic and semantics, there is some convergence, as well, with
the literature on the epistemology of modality, i.e., on the conditions under
which knowledge of modal properties obtains. Chapters 4-5 accounts for the
relation between both epistemic and metaphysical modalities. For the sake
of completeness, a critical summary of the relevant literature is thus included
below.
The Gendler and Hawthorne volume includes seminal contributions to the
theory of the relationship between epistemic and metaphysical modality. By
contrast, this book provides foundations for the nature of epistemic modality,
when the modality concerns apriority and conceivability, as well as the logic
of knowledge and belief; makes contributions to our understanding of the
ontology of consciousness, by regimenting the ontology of consciousness using
hyperintensional grounding operators; examines the nature and philosophical
extensions of epistemic logic; and examines the relations between epistemic
modality and the variety of other modalities (e.g., metaphysical, deontic, and
mathematical modalities; the types of intention in the setting of evidential
decision theory; and the apriori-aposteriori distinction).
The papers on modal epistemology in Yablo (2008) predominantly con-
cern the relation between epistemic and metaphysical modalities, and, in
particular, non-trivial conditions on modal error. Issues for the epistemic
interpretation of two-dimensional intensional semantics are examined; e.g.,
the absence of conditions on ascertaining when an epistemic possibility is
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actual. The discussion is similar, in scope, to the discussions in the Gendler
and Hawthorne volume. This book aims to redress the limits mentioned in
the foregoing, and to proffer the positive proposals delineated above.
The Egan and Weatherson volume is comprised of papers which pre-
dominantly analyze epistemic modals in the setting of natural language se-
mantics. Only three papers in the volume target epistemic possibilities as
imaginable or conceptual possibilities; those by Chalmers (’The Nature of
Epistemic Space’), Jackson (’Possibilities for Representation and Credence’),
and Yalcin (’Non-factualism about Epistemic Modality’). Chalmers’ paper
examines some principles governing epistemic space and its interaction with
metaphysical modality, as well as Kaplan’s paradox. As mentioned, the book
endeavors, by contrast, further to explain the individuation-conditions on the
terms and intensions defined in epistemic modal space; examines the inter-
action between epistemic modality and various other types of modality; and
examines the role that epistemic modal logic plays in resolving the knowa-
bility paradox and the alethic paradoxes, as well as undecidable sentences
in the philosophy of mathematics. Jackson’s paper argues that conceptual
possibilities and metaphysical possibilities ought to be defined within a sin-
gle space, in order both to avoid cases in which a sentence is conceptually
possible although metaphysically impossible and to secure the representa-
tional adequacy of conceptually possible terms. Yalcin’s paper argues that
epistemic modal sentences in natural language semantics mirror the struc-
ture of the beliefs of speakers. Epistemic mental states are taken, then, to
be expressive rather than representational, because the communication of
epistemic modal and interrogative updates on an informational background
shared by speakers is not truth-conditional.3 The present approach contrasts
to the foregoing, by not taking the values of expressions in natural language
semantics to be a guide to the nature of mental states (cf. Evans, 1982).
Chalmers (2012) provides a book-length examination of the scrutability of
truth, and the apriori entailment relations between different types of truths.
The rigidity of intensions is availed of, in order to explain the relation be-
tween epistemic modality and metaphysical modality. By contrast, the book
aims to examine the interaction between mental imagery and propositional
imagination (i.e. the individuation of the intensions defined in epistemic
3The view that subject matters, broadly construed, have the form of an interrogative
update on a set of worlds is anticipated by Lewis (1988/1998) and further defended by
Yablo (2014 and Yalcin (2016). See Chapter 3, for further discussion.
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modal space), as well as the interaction between epistemic possibilities and
the apriori-aposteriori distinction. The book aims (i) to provide explanatory
foundations for the bare, two-dimensional semantic regimentation, as well as
(ii) to examine novel philosophical extensions of the framework.
Gendler (2010) is a rare, empirically informed study of the limits of repre-
sentational capacities, when they target counterfactual assignments of values
to variables in thought experiments – e.g., the conditions under which there
might be resistance attending the states of imagining that fictional characters
have variant value-theoretic properties – and when implicit biases and uncon-
scious sub-doxastic states affect the veridicality conditions of one’s beliefs.
One crucial distinction between Gendler’s approach and the one pursued in
this chapter, however, is that the former does not examine the interaction
between apriority, the imagination, and modal semantics and logic.
In the literature on modal epistemology, Hale (2013) argues that modal
knowledge ought to be pursued via the epistemology of essential definitions
which specify conditions on sortal membership. Apriori knowledge of essence
is explained in virtue of knowledge of the purely general terms – embedding
no singular terms – which figure in the definitions. Thus – by being purely
general – the essential properties and the objects falling in their extension
have necessary being. Aposteriori knowledge of essential definitions can be
pursued via theoretical identity statements, yet, because the terms figuring
therein are not purely general, both the essential properties and the objects
falling in their extension have contingent being. As mentioned, the book
redefines the extant proposals in the ontology of consciousness using hyper-
intensional grounding operators. The ground-theoretic interpretation of the
ontology of consciousness, and an examination of the bearing of the latter for
the relation between conceivability and metaphysical possibility is, as noted,
examined in Chapter 5. Hale’s higher-order Necessitist proposal is examined
in further detail, in Chapter 9.
Nichols (2006) features three essays on modal epistemology. Nichols’
’Imaginative Blocks and Impossibility’ examines introspection-based tasks
in developmental psychology, in order to account for the interaction between
imaginative exercises and counterfactual judgments. Hill’s ’Modality, Modal
Epistemology, and the Metaphysics of Consciousness’ examines the inter-
action between conceptual and metaphysical possibility, where conceptual
possibilities are construed as Fregean thoughts, and the relation between
conceivability and metaphysical possibility is then analyzed as the relation
between Fregean thoughts (augmented by satisfaction-conditions such as
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conceptual coherence) and empirical propositions. Sorensen’s paper, ’Meta-
conceivability and Thought Experiments’, argues that meta-conceivable thought
experiments are distinct from both conscious perceptual states and conceiv-
able possibilities. [Sorensen (1999) argues that (thought) experiments track
the consequences of reassignments of values to variables.] My approach differs
from Hill’s by arguing in favor of a possible worlds semantics for thoughts,
which is able to recover the virtues attending the Fregean model, as well as
in accounting for the relations between epistemic modal algebras and various
other interpretations of modality, including the mathematical (cf. Chapter
9 and 11 for further discussion). My approach is similar in methodology to
Nichols’, although it endeavors to provide a naturalistically adequate expla-
nation of the relationship between mental imagery (as a species of phenome-
nal property type) and the propositions entertained in imaginative exercises,
i.e. the possibilities comprising epistemic modal space. Finally, my approach
is similar to Sorensen’s, in targeting both a formal semantic analysis of epis-
temic and related modalities, as well as the operators of knowledge and belief
in the setting of epistemic modal logic.
Finally, a class of views in the epistemology of modality can be charac-
terized as being broadly empiricist. Stalnaker (2003) and Williamson (2007;
2013) refrain from countenancing the notion of epistemically possible worlds;
and argue instead either that the imagination is identified with cognitive pro-
cesses taking the form of counterfactual presupposition (Williamson, 2007);
that one’s choice of the axioms governing modal logic should satisfy abductive
criteria on theory choice (Williamson, 2013); or that metaphysical modali-
ties are properties of the actual world (Stalnaker, op. cit.). Vetter (2013)
argues for a reduction of modal notions to actual dispositional properties,
and Roca-Royes (2016) pursues a corresponding modal empiricist approach,
according to which knowledge of the de re possibilities of objects consists
in the extrapolation of properties from acquaintance with objects in one’s
surround to formally similar objects, related by reflexivity and symmetry.
Generally, according to the foregoing approaches, the method of modal epis-
temology proceeds by discerning the modal truths – captured, e.g., by ab-
ductively preferred theorems in modal logic; conditional propositions; and
dispositional and counterfactual properties – and then working backward to
the exigent incompleteness of an individual’s epistemic states concerning such
truths. By contrast, the approach advanced in this work both retains and
provides explanatory foundations for epistemic modal space, and augments
the examination by empirical research and an abductive methodology.
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The foregoing texts either examine epistemic modality via natural lan-
guage semantics; restrict their examination to the interaction between con-
ceivable possibilities and metaphysical possibilities; provide a two-dimensional
regimentation of formulas, on an epistemic interpretation, without providing
an explanation of the source of, and individuation-conditions on, epistemic
possibilities; eschew of epistemic possibilities; provide a naturalistic approach
to the analysis of the imagination, without drawing on formal methods; or
provide a formal analysis of the imagination, without drawing on empirical
results.
The book endeavors, by contrast, to examine the interaction between
epistemic modality and the computational theory of mind; metaphysical
modality; deontic modality; the types of mathematical modality; the apriori-
aposteriori distinction; the modal profile of rational intuition; and the types
of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a modal mental state.
The model structures developed here are of interest in their own right.
However, this work is principally concerned with, and examines, their philo-
sophical significance, as witnessed by the new distinctions and relations that
they induce. Beyond conditions on theoretical creativity, both formal reg-
imentation and empirical confirmation are the best methods available for
truth-apt philosophical inquiry into the constitutive role of computational
and phenomenal properties in comprising the space of epistemic modality
and the imagination; and the multiple points of convergence between apriori
and epistemically possible truth and the most general, fundamental structure
of the actual metaphysical world.
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Part I: A Framework for Epistemic Modality
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Chapter 2
Cognitivism about Epistemic
Modality
This essay aims to vindicate the thesis that cognitive computational prop-
erties are abstract objects implemented in physical systems.1 A recent ap-
proach to the foundations of mathematics is Homotopy Type Theory.2 In
Homotopy Type Theory, homotopies can be defined as equivalence relations
on intensional functions. In this essay, I argue that homotopies can thereby
figure in abstraction principles for intensional, cognitive computational prop-
erties.3 Homotopies for intensional functions thus comprise identity criteria
for some cognitive mechanisms. The philosophical significance of the forego-
ing is twofold. First, the proposal demonstrates how epistemic modality is a
viable candidate for a fragment of the Language of Thought.4 The identity
of intensional functions and epistemic modal operators can be witnessed via
a unique, epistemic interpretation of the algebraic semantics of modal logic.
Second, the proposal serves to delineate one conduit for our epistemic access
1Cf. Turing (1950); Putnam (1967); Newell (1973); Fodor (1975); and Pylyshyn (1978).
2Cf. The Univalent Foundations Program (2013).
3For the first proposal to the effect that abstraction principles can be used to define
abstracta such as cardinal number, see Frege (1884/1980: 68; 1893/2013: 20). For the
locus classicus of the contemporary abstractionist program, see Hale and Wright (2001).
4See, by contrast, Stalnaker (1984), who argues that possible worlds model theory
ought to model the pragmatics of intentional states, rather than internal representations
of agents, and who argues against the existence of epistemic possibilities (2003: ch. 11).
Given a metalanguage, a precedent to the current approach – which models thoughts and
internal representations via possible worlds model theory – can be found in Wittgenstein
(1921/1974: 2.15-2.151, 3-3.02).
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to cognitive algorithms as abstract objects.5
In Section 2, I provide an abstraction principle for cognitive algorithms,
by availing of the equivalence relations countenanced in Homotopy Type The-
ory. In Section 3, I define a topological boolean algebraic semantics for modal
logic, where the modalities defined on the algebra range over states of infor-
mation.6 In Section 4, I describe how models of Epistemic Modal Algebra are
5Bealer (1982) proffers a non-modal algebraic logic for intensional entities – i.e., proper-
ties, relations, and propositions – which avails of a λ-definable variable-binding abstraction
operator (op. cit.: 46-48, 209-210). Bealer reduces modal notions to logically necessary
conditions-cum-properties, as defined in his non-modal algebraic logic (207-209). The
present approach differs from the foregoing by: (i) countenancing a modal algebra, on an
epistemic interpretation thereof; (ii) treating the abstraction operator as a Fregean func-
tion from concepts to objects, rather than as a λ-operator; (iii) availing of the univalence
axiom in Homotopy Type Theory – which collapses identity and isomorphism – in order
to provide an equivalence relation for the abstraction principle pertinent to (ii); and (iv)
demonstrating how the model is availed of in various branches of the cognitive sciences,
such that Epistemic Modal Algebra may be considered a viable candidate for the Language
of Thought.
Katz (1998) proffers a view of the epistemology of abstracta, according to which the
propositions of the Language of Thought are abstract, and on which the syntax and the
semantics for the propositions are innate (35). Katz suggests that the proposal is consis-
tent with both a Fregean approach to propositions, according to which they are thoughts
formed by the concatenation of concepts, and a Russellian approach, according to which
they are structured tuples of non-conceptual entities (36). He endorses, ultimately, an ap-
proach to propositions which eschews Frege’s (1892/1997) distinction between sense and
reference, yet according to which they are ’abstract senses’, or thoughts, correlated to nat-
ural language sentence types (114-115). That propositions are abstract is argued, then, to
suffice for knowledge of abstract entities (op. cit.). One difference between Katz’s proposal
and the one here presented is that Katz rejects modal approaches to propositions, because
the latter cannot countenance reductio proofs based on counterfactuals with impossible
antecedents (38; cf. Lewis, 1973: I.6). Following, Lewis (op. cit.), the present approach
does not avail of impossible worlds, i.e., worlds at which true contradictions obtain; and
thus counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are vacuously true. If so, then Katz’s
argument against modal approaches to propositions can be circumvented. A second differ-
ence is that, on Katz’s approach, the necessity of mathematical truths is argued to consist
in reductio proofs, such that the relevant formulas will be true on all interpretations, and
thus true of logical necessity (39). However, the endeavor to reduce the necessity of math-
ematical truths to the necessity of logical consequence would result in the preclusion, both
of cases of informal proofs in mathematics, which can, e.g., involve diagrams (cf. Azzouni,
2004; Giaquinto, 2008: 1.2), and of mathematical truths which obtain in axiomatizable,
yet non-logical mathematical languages such as Euclidean geometry. Finally, Katz rejects
abstraction principles, and thus implicit definitions for abstract objects (105-106).
6The epistemic modality can be interpreted so as to target notions of conceivability
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availed of when perceptual representational states are modeled in Bayesian
perceptual psychology; when speech acts are modeled in natural language
semantics; when transformations are defined in quantum information the-
ory; and when knowledge, belief, intentional action, and rational intuition
are modeled in philosophical approaches to the nature of propositional atti-
tudes. This provides abductive support for the claim that Epistemic Modal
Algebra is both a compelling and materially adequate candidate for a frag-
ment of the Language of Thought. In Section 5, I argue that the proposal (i)
resolves objections to the relevant abstraction principles advanced by both
Dean (2016) and Linnebo and Pettigrew (2014), and (ii) reveals a commit-
ment to in re platonism in the appeal to cognitive mechanisms in Azzouni’s
(2004; forthcoming) version of nominalism. Section 6 provides concluding
remarks.
2.1 An Abstraction Principle for Cognitive
Algorithms
In this section, I specify a homotopic abstraction principle for intensional
functions. Intensional isomorphism, as a jointly necessary and sufficient con-
dition for the identity of intensions, is first proposed in Carnap (1947: §14).
The isomorphism of two intensional structures is argued to consist in their
logical, or L-, equivalence, where logical equivalence is co-extensive with the
notions of both analyticity (§2) and synonymy (§15). Carnap writes that:
’[A]n expression in S is L-equivalent to an expression in S’ if and only if
the semantical rules of S and S’ together, without the use of any knowledge
about (extra-linguistic) facts, suffice to show that the two have the same ex-
tension’ (p. 56), where semantical rules specify the intended interpretation
of the constants and predicates of the languages (4).7 The current approach
differs from Carnap’s by defining the equivalence relation necessary for an
abstraction principle for epistemic intensions on Voevodsky’s (2006) Univa-
lence Axiom, which collapses identity with isomorphism in the setting of
(⋄) and apriority ( ≡ ¬⋄¬); belief and knowledge; and psychophysical possibilities. See
Section 4, for further discussion.
7For criticism of Carnap’s account of intensional isomorphism, based on Carnap’s (1937:
17) ’Principle of Tolerance’ to the effect that pragmatic desiderata are a permissible con-
straint on one’s choice of logic, see Church (1954: 66-67).
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intensional type theory.8 In the following section, I define, then, a class of
models for Epistemic Modal Algebra.
Topological Semantics
In the topological semantics for modal logic, a frame is comprised of a set
of points in topological space, a domain of propositions, and an accessibility
relation:
F = 〈X,R〉;
X = (Xx)x∈X ; and
R = (Rxy)x,y∈X iff Rx ⊆ Xx x Xx, s.t. if Rxy, then ∃o⊆X, with x∈o s.t.
∀y∈o(Rxy),
where the set of points accessible from a privileged node in the space is said
to be open.9 A model defined over the frame is a tuple, M = 〈F,V〉, with V
a valuation function from subsets of points in F to propositonal variables
taking the values 0 or 1. Necessity is interpreted as an interiority operator
on the space:
M,x  φ iff ∃o⊆X, with x∈o, such that ∀y∈o M,y  φ.
Homotopy Theory
Homotopy Theory countenances the following identity, inversion, and
concatenation morphisms, which are identified as continuous paths in the
topology. The formal clauses, in the remainder of this section, evince how
homotopic morphisms satisfy the properties of an equivalence relation.10
8Note further that, by contrast to Carnap’s approach, epistemic intensions are here
distinguished from linguistic intensions (cf. Chapter 4, for further discussion), and the
current work examines the philosophical significance of the convergence between epistemic
intensions and formal, rather than natural, languages. For a translation from type theory
to set theory – which is of interest to, inter alia, the definability of epistemic intensions
in the setting of set theory (cf. Chapters 10 through 12, below) – see Linnebo and Rayo
(2012). For topological Boolean-valued models of epistemic set theory – i.e., a variant
of ZF with the axioms augmented by epistemic modal operators interpreted as informal
provability and having a background logic satisfying S4 – see Scedrov (1985), Flagg (1985),
and Goodman (1990).
9In order to ensure that the Kripke semantics matches the topological semantics, X
must further be Alexandrov; i.e., closed under arbitrary unions and intersections.
10The definitions and proofs at issue can be found in the Univalent Foundations Program
(op. cit.: ch. 2).
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p : [0,1] → X, with p(0) = x and p(1) = y;
f : X1 → X2;
g : X1 → X2;
H : X1 x {0,1} → X2, Hx,0 = f(x) and Hx,1 = g(x).
Reflexivity
∀x,y:A∀p(p : x =A y) : τ(x,y,p), with A and τ designating types, and U
designating a universe of elements, e:
∀α:A∃e(α) : τ(α, α, refα);
p,q : (x =A y)
∃r∈e : p =(x=Ay) q
∃µ : r = (p=(x=Ay)q) s.
The Induction Principle
If:
∀x,y:A∀p(p : x =A y)∃τ [τ(x,y,p)] ∧ ∀α:A∃e(α) : τ(α, α, refα)
Then:
∀x,y:A∃p(p : x =A y)∃e[ind=A(τ ,e,x,y,p) : τ(x,y,p), such that
ind=A(τ ,e,α,α,refα) ≡ e(α)].
Symmetry
∀A∀x,y:A∃HΣ(x=y → y=x)
HΣ := p 7→ p−1, such that
∀x:A(refx ≡ refx−1).
Transitivity
∀A∀x,y:A∃HT (x=y → y=z → x=z)
HT := p 7→ q 7→ p • q, such that
∀x:A[refx • refx ≡ refx].
Homotopic Abstraction
For all type families A,B, there is a homotopy:
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H := [(f ∼ g) :≡ ∏x:A(f(x) = g(x)], where∏
f :A→B[(f ∼ f) ∧ (f ∼ g → g ∼ f) ∧ (f ∼ g → g ∼ h → f ∼ h)],
such that, via Voevodsky’s (2006) Univalence Axiom, for all type families
A,B:U, there is a function:
idtoeqv : (A =U B) → (A ≃ B),
which is itself an equivalence relation:
(A =U B) ≃ (A ≃ B).
Abstraction principles for intensional computational properties take, then,
the form:
• ∃f,g[f(x) = g(x)] ≃ [f(x) ≃ g(x)].
2.2 Epistemic Modal Algebra
In Epistemic Modal Algebra, the topological boolean algebra, A, can be
formed by taking the powerset of the topological space, X, defined above; i.e.,
A = P(X). The domain of A is comprised of formula-terms – eliding propo-
sitions with names – assigned to elements of P(X), where the proposition-
letters are interpreted as encoding states of information. The top element of
the algebra is denoted ’1’ and the bottom element is denoted ’0’. We inter-
pret modal operators, f(x), – i.e., intensional functions in the algebra – as
both concerning topological interiority, as well as reflecting epistemic possi-
bilities. An Epistemic Modal-valued Algebraic structure has the form, F =
〈A, DP (X), ρ〉, where ρ is a mapping from points in the topological space to
elements or regions of the algebraic structure; i.e., ρ : DP (X) x DP (X) → A.
A model over the Epistemic-Modal Topological Boolean Algebraic structure
has the form M = 〈F, V〉, where V(a) ≤ ρ(a) and V(a,b) ∧ ρ(a, b) ≤ V(b).11
For all xx/a,φ,y∈A:
f(1) = 1;
f(x) ≤ x;
f(x ∧ y) = f(x) ∧ f(y);
f[f(x)] = f(x);
V(a, a) > 0;
V(a, a) = 1;
11See Lando (2015); McKinsey and Tarski (1944); and Rasiowa (1963), for further de-
tails.
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V(a, b) = V(b, a);
V(a, b) ∧ V(b, c) ≤ V(a, c);
V(a = a) = ρ(a, a);
V(a, b) ≤ f[V(a, b)];
V(¬φ) = ρ(¬φ) – f(φ);
V(⋄φ) = ρφ – f[– V(φ)];
V(φ) = f[V(φ)].
2.3 Examples in Philosophy, Cognitive Sci-
ence, and Quantum Information Theory
The material adequacy of epistemic modal algebras as a fragment of the the
Language of Thought is witnessed by the prevalence of possible worlds se-
mantics – the model theory for which is algebraic (cf. Blackburn et al., 2001:
ch. 5) – in cognitive psychology, and the convergences thereof with theoreti-
cal physics. Possible worlds model theory is availed of in the computational
theory of mind, Bayesian perceptual psychology, natural language semantics,
and the theory of quantum information.
Marcus (2001) argues that mental representations can be treated as alge-
braic rules characterizing the computation of operations on variables, where
the values of a target domain for the variables are universally quantified over
and the function is one-one, mapping a number of inputs to an equivalent
number of outputs (35-36). Models of the above algebraic rules can be de-
fined in both classical and weighted, connectionist systems: Both a single
and multiple nodes can serve to represent the variables for a target domain
(42-45). Temporal synchrony or dynamic variable-bindings are stored in
short-term working memory (56-57), while information relevant to long-term
variable-bindings are stored in registers (54-56). Examples of the foregoing
algebraic rules on variable-binding include both the syntactic concatenation
of morphemes and noun phrase reduplication in linguistics (37-39, 70-72),
as well as learning algorithms (45-48). Conditions on variable-binding are
further examined, including treating the binding relation between variables
and values as tensor products – i.e., an application of a multiplicative ax-
iom for variables and their values treated as vectors (53-54, 105-106). In
order to account for recursively formed, complex representations, which he
refers to as structured propositions, Marcus argues instead that the syntax
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and semantics of such representations can be modeled via an ordered set of
registers, which he refers to as ’treelets’ (108).
A strengthened version of the algebraic rules on variable-binding can be
accommodated in models of epistemic modal algebras, when the latter are
augmented by cylindrifications, i.e., operators on the algebra simulating the
treatment of quantification, and diagonal elements.12 By contrast to Boolean
Algebras with Operators, which are propositional, cylindric algebras define
first-order logics. Intuitively, valuation assignments for first-order variables
are, in cylindric modal logics, treated as possible worlds of the model, while
existential and universal quantifiers are replaced by, respectively, possibility
and necessity operators (⋄ and ) (Venema, 2013: 249). For first-order
variables, {vi | i < α} with α an arbitrary, fixed ordinal, vi = vj is replaced
by a modal constant di,j (op. cit: 250). The following clauses are valid, then,
for a model, M, of cylindric modal logic, with Ei,j a monadic predicate and
Ti for i,j < α a dyadic predicate:
M,w  p ⇐⇒ w∈V(p);
M,w  di,j ⇐⇒ w∈Ei,j ;
M,w  ⋄iψ ⇐⇒ there is a v with wTiv and M,v ⊢ ψ (252).13
Finally, a cylindric modal algebra of dimension α is an algebra, A = 〈A,
+, •, –, 0, 1, ⋄i, dij〉i,j<α, where ⋄i is a unary operator which is normal (⋄i0
= 0) and additive [⋄i(x + y) = ⋄ix + ⋄iy)] (257).
The philosophical interest of cylindric modal algebras to Marcus’ cog-
nitive models of algebraic variable-binding is that variable substitution is
treated in the modal algebras as a modal relation, while universal quantifi-
cation is interpreted as necessitation. The interest of translating universal
generalization into operations of epistemic necessitation is, finally, that – by
12See Henkin et al (op. cit.: 162-163) for the introduction of cylindric algebras, and for
the axioms governing the cylindrification operators.
13Cylindric frames need further to satisfy the following axioms (op. cit.: 254):
1. p → ⋄ip
2. p → i⋄ip
3. ⋄i⋄ip → ⋄ip
4. ⋄i⋄jp → ⋄j⋄ip
5. di,i
6. ⋄i(di,j ∧ p) → i(di,j → p)
[Translating the diagonal element and cylindric (modal) operator into, respectively,
monadic and dyadic predicates and universal quantification: ∀xyz[(Tixy ∧ Ei,jy ∧ Tixz
∧ Ei,jz) → y = z] (op. cit.)]
7. di,j ⇐⇒ ⋄k(di,k ∧ dk,j).
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identifying epistemic necessity with apriority – both the algebraic rules for
variable-binding and the recursive formation of structured propositions can
be seen as operations, the implicit knowledge of which is apriori.
In Bayesian perceptual psychology, the problem of underdetermination is
resolved by availing of a gradational possible worlds model. The visual system
is presented with a set of possibilities with regard, e.g., to the direction of a
light source. So, for example, the direction of light might be originating from
above, or it might be originating from below. The visual system computes
the constancy, i.e. the likelihood that one of the possibilities is actual.14
The computation of the perceptual constancy is an unconscious statistical
inference, as anticipated by Helmholtz’s (1878) conjecture.15 The constancy
places, then, a condition on the accuracy of the attribution of properties –
such as boundedness and volume – to distal particulars.16
In the program of natural language semantics in empirical and philosoph-
ical linguistics, the common ground or ’context set’ is the set of possibilities
presupposed by a community of speakers.17 Kratzer (1979: 121) refers to
cases in which the above possibilities are epistemic as an ’epistemic conversa-
tional background’, where the epistemic possibilities are a subset of objective
or circumstantial possibilities (op. cit.). Modal operators are then defined on
the space, encoding the effects of various speech acts in entraining updates on
the context set.18 So, e.g., assertion is argued to provide a truth-conditional
update on the context set, whereas there are operator updates, the effects of
which are not straightforwardly truth-conditional and whose semantic values
must then be defined relative to an array of intensional parameters (including
a context – agent, time, location, et al. – and a tuple of indices).
In quantum information theory, let a constructor be a computation de-
fined over physical systems. Constructors entrain nomologically possible
14Cf. Mamassian et al. (2002).
15For the history of the integration of algorithms and computational modeling into
contemporary visual psychology, see Johnson-Laird (2004).
16Cf. Burge (2010), and Rescorla (2013), for further discussion. A distinction ought to
be drawn between unconscious perceptual representational states – as targeted in Burge
(op. cit.) – and the inquiry into whether the properties of phenomenal consciousness
have accuracy-conditions – where phenomenal properties are broadly construed, so as to
include, e.g., color-phenomenal properties, as well as the property of being aware of one’s
perceptual states.
17Cf. Stalnaker (1978).
18Cf. Kratzer (op. cit.); Stalnaker (op. cit.); Lewis (1980); Heim (1992); Veltman
(1996); von Fintel and Heim (2011); and Yalcin (2012).
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transformations from admissible input states to output states (cf. Deutsch,
2013). On this approach, information is defined in terms of constructors, i.e.,
intensional computational properties. The foregoing transformations, as in-
duced by constructors, are referred to as tasks. Because constructors encode
the counterfactual to the effect that, were an initial state to be computed
over, then the output state would result, modal notions are thus constitutive
of the definition of the tasks at issue. There are, further, both topological
and algebraic aspects of the foregoing modal approach to quantum compu-
tation.19 The composition of tasks is formed by taking their union, where
the union of tasks can be satisfiable while its component tasks might not
be. Suppose, e.g., that the information states at issue concern the spin of
a particle. A spin-state vector will be the sum of the probabilities that the
particle is spinning either upward or downward. Suppose that there are two
particles which can be spinning either upward or downward. Both parti-
cles can be spinning upward; spinning downward; particle-1 can be spinning
upward while particle-2 spins downward; and vice versa. The state vector,
V which records the foregoing possibilities – i.e., the superposition of the
states – will be equal to the product of the spin-state of particle-1 and the
spin-state of particle-2. If the particles are both spinning upward or both
spinning downward, then V will be .5. However – relative to the value of each
particle vector, referred to as its eigenvalue – the probability that particle-1
will be spinning upward is .5 and the probability that particle-2 will be spin-
ning downward is .5, such that the probability that both will be spinning
upward or downward = .5 x .5 = .25. Considered as the superposition of
the two states, V will thus be unequal to the product of their eigenvalues,
and is said to be entangled. If the indeterminacy evinced by entangled states
is interpreted as inconsistency, then the computational properties at issue
might further have to be hyperintensional.20 Modal notions play, further,
an ineliminable role in physical ontology and in the theoretical and obser-
vational characterizations thereof. In the interpretation of physical theories,
Ruetsche (2011: 9) argues, further, that ’[T]o interpret a physical theory
is to characterize the worlds possible according to that theory’. She notes
that the interpretation of a physical theory falls into two phases, both of
19For an examination of the interaction between topos theory and an S4 modal axiom-
atization of computable functions, see Awodey et al. (2000).
20The nature of the indeterminacy in question is examined in Hawthorne (2010) and
Khudairi, ’Entanglement, Modality, and Indeterminacy’ (ms). For a thorough examination
of approaches to the ontology of quantum mechanics, see Arntzenius (2012: ch. 3).
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which constitutively involve modal notions. The first phase consists in the
specification of the possible states of the models at issue; the possible values
taken with regard to the observable kinematics thereof, e.g., the expectation
values of Hilbert operators; and then the laws comprising the dynamic trans-
formations therein (op. cit.). The second phase targets the nomologically
possible worlds in which the properties of the first phase of interpretation are
satisfied (op. cit.). In quantum field theory, unital algebras are availed of, as
well, where the algebras are closed under commutativity and associativity;
scalar multiplication by complex numbers, such that for all vectors A,B, and
complex numbers cn: c1(A + B) = c1A + c1B; (c1 + c2)A = c1A + c2A;
c1(c2A) = (c1c2)A; (c1A)B - A(c1B) = c1(AB); and multiplicative identity,
i.e., for an element I, AI = IA = A (74). Finally, Belot (2011) argues that
– in the dispute between relationalist and substantivalist conceptions of spa-
tial geometry – a relationalist proposal can be proffered, according to which
– by analogy with nomological possibilities – the different metric relations
that can be grounded in the intrinsic points comprising spatial regions are
geometric possibilities.
Finally, Epistemic Modal Algebra, as a fragment of the Language of
Thought, is able to delineate the fundamental structure of the propositional
attitudes targeted in 20th century philosophy; notably knowledge, belief, in-
tentional action, and rational propositional intuition. In Chapter 16, I argue,
e.g., that the types of intention – acting intentionally; referring to an inten-
tion as an explanation for one’s course of action; and intending to pursue a
course of action in the future – can be modeled as modal operators, whose
semantic values are defined relative to an array of intensional parameters.
Field (2001: 85-86) argues that – because possible worlds models of inten-
tional states entrain logical equivalence for contents that ought to be distinct
– such models underdetermine the identification of the intentions subserving
agents’ behavior . The objection can be answered, in virtue of there being
unique arrays of intensional parameters relative to which each of the types
of intention (modeled as modal operators) receive their value. E.g., an agent
can be said to act intentionally iff her ’intention-in-action’ receives a positive
semantic value, where a necessary condition on the latter is that there is at
least one world in her epistemic modal space at which – relative to a context
of a particular time and location, which constrains the admissibility of her
possible actions as defined at a first index, and which subsequently constrains
the outcome thereof as defined at a second index – the intention is realized:
JIntenton-in-Action(φ)Kw = 1 only if ∃w’JφKw′,c(=t,l),a,o = 1.
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The agent’s intention to pursue a course of action at a future time – i.e.,
her ’intention-for-the-future’ – can receive a positive value only if there is
a possible world and a future time, relative to which the possibility that a
state, φ, is realized can be defined. Thus:
JIntention-for-the-future(φ)Kw = 1 only if ∃w’∀t∃t’[t< t’ ∧ JφKw′,t′ = 1].
In the setting of epistemic logic, epistemic necessity can further be mod-
eled in a relational semantics encoding the property of knowledge, whereas
epistemic possibility might encode the property of belief (cf. Hintikka, 1962;
Fagin et al., 1995; Meyer and van der Hoek, 1995; Williamson, 2009). Finally,
in Chapter 13, I treat Gödel’s (1953) conception of rational propositional in-
tuition as a modal operator in the setting of a bimodal, dynamic provability
logic, and demonstrates how – via correspondence theory – the notion of
’intuition-of’, i.e. a property of awareness of one’s cognitive states, can be
shown to be formally equivalent to the notion of ’intuition-that’, i.e. a modal
operator concerning the value of the propositional state at issue.21
2.4 Objections and Replies
Dean (2016) raises two issues for a proposal similar to the foregoing, namely
that algorithms – broadly construed – can be defined via abstraction princi-
ples which specify equivalence relations between implementations of compu-
tational properties in isomorphic machines.22 Dean’s candidate abstraction
principle for algorithms as abstracts is: that the algorithm implemented by
21The correspondence results between modal propositional and first-order logic are ad-
vanced in van Benthem (1983; 1984/2003) and Janin and Walukiewicz (1996). Availing
of correspondence theory in order to account for the relationship between the notions of
’intuition-of’ and ’intuition-that’ resolves an inquiry posed by Parsons (1993: 233). As a
dynamic interpretational modality, rational intuition can further serve as a guide to pos-
sible reinterpretations both of quantifier domains (cf. Fine, 2005) and of the extensions
of mathematical vocabulary such as the membership-relation (cf. Uzquiano, 2015). This
provides an account of Gödel’s (op. cit.; 1961) suggestion that rational intuition can serve
as a guide to conceptual elucidation.
22Fodor (2000: 105, n.4) and Piccinini (2004) note that the identification of mental
states with their functional roles ought to be distinguished from identifying those func-
tional roles with abstract computations. Conversely, a computational theory of mind need
not be committed to the identification of abstract, computational operations with the
functional organization of a machine. Identifying abstract computational properties with
the functional organization of a creature’s mental states is thus a choice point, in theories
of the nature of mental representation.
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M1 = the algorithm implemented by M2 iff M1 ≃ M2.23 Both issues target
the uniqueness of the algorithm purported to be identified by the abstraction
principle.
The first issue generalizes Benacerraf’s (1965) contention that, in the re-
duction of number theory to set theory, there must be, and is not, a principled
reason for which to prefer the identification of natural numbers with von Neu-
mann ordinals (e.g., 2 = {∅,{∅}}), rather than with Zermelo ordinals (i.e.,
order-types of well-orderings).24 The issue is evinced by the choice of whether
to define algorithms as isomorphic iterations of state transition functions (cf.
Gurevich, 1999), or to define them as isomorphic recursions of functions
which assign values to a partially ordered set of elements (cf. Moschovakis,
op. cit.). Linnebo and Pettigrew (2014: 10) argue similarly that, for two
’non-rigid’ structures which admit of non-trivial automorphisms, one can de-
fine a graph which belies their isomorphism. E.g., let an abstraction principle
be defined for the isomorphism between S and S*, such that
∀S,S*[AS = AS* iff 〈S, R1 . . . Rn〉 ≃ 〈S*, R*1 . . . R*n〉].
However, if there is a graph, G, such that:
S = {v1, v2}, and R = {〈v1, v2〉, 〈v2, v1〉},
then one can define an automorphism, f : G ≃ G, such that f(v1) = v2
and f(v2) = v1, such that S* = {v1} while R* = {〈v*1, v*1〉}. Then S* has
one element via the automorphism, while S has two. So, S and S* are not,
after all, isomorphic.
The second issue is that complexity is crucial to the identity criteria of al-
gorithms. Two algorithms might be isomorphic, while the decidability of one
algorithm is proportional to a deterministic polynomial function of the size
of its input – with k a member of the natural numbers, N, and TIME refer-
ring to the relevant complexity class:
⋃
k∈NTIME(nk) – and the decidability
of the second algorithm will be proportional to a deterministic exponential
function of the size of its input –
⋃
k∈NTIME(2n
k
). The deterministic poly-
nomial time complexity class is a subclass of the deterministic exponential
time complexity class. However, there are problems decidable by algorithms
only in polynomial time (e.g., the problem of primality testing, such that,
for any two natural numbers, the numbers possess a greatest common divi-
sor equal to 1), and only in exponential time (familiarly from logic, e.g., the
23Cf. Moschovakis (1998).
24Cf. Zermelo (1908/1967) and von Neumann (1923/1967). Well-orderings are irreflex-
ive, transitive, binary relations on all non-empty sets, which define a least or distinguished
element in the sets.
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problem of satisfiability – i.e., whether, for a given formula, there exists a
model which can validate it – and the problem of validity – i.e. whether a
satisfiable formula is valid).25
Both issues can be treated by noting that Dean’s discussion targets ab-
straction principles for the very notion of a computable function, rather than
for abstraction principles for cognitive computational properties. It is a virtue
of homotopic abstraction principles for cognitive intensional functions that
both the temporal complexity class to which the functions belong, and the
applications of the model, are subject to variation. Variance in the cognitive
roles, for which Epistemic Modal Algebra provides a model, will crucially
bear on the nature of the representational properties unique to the inter-
pretation of the intensional functions at issue. Thus, e.g., when the inter-
nal representations in the Language of Thought – as modeled by Epistemic
Modal Algebra – subserve perceptual representational states, then their con-
tents will be individuated by both the computational constancies at issue
and the external, environmental properties – e.g., the properties of lightness
and distance – of the perceiver.26 A further virtue of the foregoing is that
variance in the coding of Epistemic Modal Algebras – i.e. in the types of in-
formation over which the intensional functions will be defined – by constrast
to a restriction of the Language of Thought to mathematical languages such
as Peano arithmetic, permits homotopic abstraction principles to circumvent
the Burali-Forti paradox for implicit definitions based on isomorphism.27
The examples of instances of Epistemic Modal Algebra – witnessed by
the possible worlds models in Bayesian perceptual psychology, linguistics,
quantum information theory, and philosophy of mind – provide abductive
support for the existence of the intensional functions specified in homotopic
abstraction principles. The philosophical significance of independent, ab-
ductive support for the existence of epistemic modalities in the philosophy
of mind and cognitive science is that the latter permits a circumvention of
the objections to the abstractionist foundations of number theory that have
accrued since its contemporary founding (cf. Wright, 1983). Eklund (2006)
suggests, e.g., that the existence of the abstract objects which are the refer-
25For further discussion, see Dean (2015).
26The computational properties at issue can also be defined over non-propositional infor-
mation states, such as cognitive maps possessed of geometric rather than logical structure.
See, e.g., O’Keefe and Nadel (1978); Camp (2007); and Rescorla (2009).
27Cf. Burali-Forti (1897/1967). Hodes (1984,a) and Hazen (1985) note that abstraction
principles based on isomorphism with unrestricted comprehension entrain the paradox.
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ents of numerical term-forming operators might need to be secured, prior to
assuming that the abstraction principle for cardinal number is true. While
Hale and Wright (2009) maintain, in response, that the truth of the relevant
principles will be prior to the inquiry into whether the terms defined therein
refer, they provide a preliminary endorsement of an ’abundant’ conception
of properties, according to which identifying the sense of a predicate will be
sufficient for predicate reference.28 One aspect of the significance of empiri-
cal and philosophical instances of models of Epistemic Modal Algebra is thus
that, by providing independent, abductive support for the truth of the ho-
motopic abstraction principles for cognitive algorithms, the proposal remains
neutral on the status of ’sparse’ versus ’abundant’ conceptions of properties.
Another aspect of the philosophical significance of possible worlds semantics
being availed of in Bayesian vision science, empirical linguistics, and quan-
tum information theory, is that it belies the purportedly naturalistic grounds
for Quine’s (1963/1976) scepticism of de re modality.
A final objection derives from the work of Azzouni (2004; forthcoming).
Azzouni (op. cit.) argues for a position which he refers to as ’quantifier neu-
tralism’, according to which the truth-conditions for quantifiers are sufficient
for identifying the latter, without requiring reference to domains. Thus, ref-
erence to the purported domains over which quantifiers range is a superfluous
and misleading metaphor. On this approach, the truth-conditions for quan-
tifiers will be theory-relative. In the absence of objects comprising domains
over which the quantifiers are purported to range, there is thus no reason
to believe that the truth-conditions in mathematical and scientific theories
are ontologically-committing. He suggests, then, that the explanation of the
belief that there are objects derives from the ’involuntary’ perception thereof
(forthcoming: 282). The experience as of objects is then attributed to ’in-
ternal cognitive mechanisms’ (286; see also pp. 8-9, 264, and the remainder
of section 7.5).29
Azzouni’s suggestion that there are ’internal cognitive mechanisms’ sub-
28For identity conditions on abundant properties – where the domain of properties, in
the semantics of second-order logic, is a subset of the domain of objects, and the properties
are definable in a metalanguage by predicates whose satisfaction-conditions have been fixed
– see Hale (2013). For a generalization of the abundant conception, such that the domain
of properties is isomorphic to the powerset of the domain of objects, see Cook (2014).
29For an examination of the psychological mechanisms necessary for object-perception,
see, inter alia, Treisman and Gelade (1980); Spelke and Kinzler (2007); and Scholl and
Flombaum (2010).
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serving apparent object perception might betray an ontological commitment
to there being abstracta; namely, the intensional, cognitive computational
properties countenanced in Bayesian perceptual psychology. Azzouni (op.
cit.: 7.8 - 7.9) anticipates and endeavors to counter the foregoing reply, by
noting that the optimality of theories proffered in logic, metaphysics, and
the natural sciences requires no commitment to the existence of the entities
mentioned therein.
Azzouni’s argument against the existence of objects – concreta and ab-
stracta alike – hinges on the individuation-conditions for quantifiers. He
argues, as noted, that objectual, first-order quantifiers can be defined via
metalinguistic truth-conditions (op. cit.: 10). The metalinguistic truth-
conditions take, e.g., the form: ∃x.(Px) iff ∃X.δX (op. cit.). However, the
foregoing theory of quantification is unduly restrictive. For example, the
truth-condition for probability quantifiers is given by the formula:
(Px ≥ r)[φx],
where x is a bound second-order variable; P(x) encodes the probability
that the set {x:φx} is less than or equal to r; r is an element of the intersection
between a subset of hereditarily countable sets and the real interval, [0,1]; and
the quantifier, (Px ≥ r), is closed under finite conjunctions and disjunctions
[cf. Keisler (1985: 509-510); Barwise and Feferman (1985: 507)]. Crucially,
the metalinguistic truth-condition for probability quantifiers makes explicit
reference to the real numbers.30 The claim, then, that quantifiers can be
defined without reference to domains of objects does not generalize. So, if
ontological commitment is generally to be eschewed of, the argument must
proceed via a different means.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
In this essay, the equivalence relations countenanced in Homotopy Type The-
ory were availed of, in order to specify an abstraction principle for intensional,
computational properties. The homotopic abstraction principle for inten-
sional mental functions provides an epistemic conduit into our knowledge of
cognitive algorithms as abstract objects. Because intensional functions in
30Note that, by contrast to Field’s (1980/2016: 55-56) approach, Azzouni’s eschewal
of ontological commitment to concrete objects would preclude redefining the reals as re-
lations of betweeness and congruence on points of spacetime. For further discussion of
individuation-conditions on concepts of the reals, see Chapter 4.
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Epistemic Modal Algebra are deployed as core models in the philosophy of
mind, Bayesian visual psychology, natural language semantics, and quantum
information theory, there is independent abductive support for the truth of
homotopic abstraction. Epistemic modality may thereby be recognized as
both a compelling and a materially adequate candidate for the fundamental
structure of mental representational states, and as thus comprising a frag-
ment of the Language of Thought.
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Chapter 3
Modal Cognitivism and Modal
Expressivism
This essay endeavors to reconcile two approaches to the intensional foun-
dations of thought: modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. The novel
contribution of the paper is its argument for a reconciliation between the
two positions, by providing a hybrid account in which both internal cogni-
tive architecture, on the model of epistemic possibilities, as well as modal
automata, are accommodated, while retaining what is supposed to be their
unique and inconsistent roles.
Modal cognitivism is the proposal that the internal representations com-
prising the language of thought can be modeled via a possible world seman-
tics. Modal expressivism has, in turn, been delineated in two ways. On the
first approach, the presuppositions shared by a community of speakers have
been modeled as circumstantial possibilities (cf. Kratzer, 1979; Stalnaker,
1978, 1984). Speech acts have in turn been modeled as modal operators, the
semantic values of which are then defined relative to an array of intensional
parameters (Stalnaker, op. cit.; Veltman, 1996; Yalcin, 2007). On the second
approach, the content of concepts is supposed to be individuated via the abil-
ity to draw inferences, and the pragmatic abilities of individuals have been
modeled as automata comprised of two transition functions. A counterfactual
transition functional – encoding the recognition of distal properties – deter-
mines the range of admissible values for another transition function encoding
the individual’s actions (cf. Brandom, 2008). Inferential conditions consti-
tutive of concept possession are then taken to have the same counterfactual
form as the foregoing functions (Brandom, 2014), while truth-evaluable de-
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scriptions of the automata are specified in a metalanguage (Brandom, 2008).
Both the modal approach to shared information and the speech acts which
serve to update the latter, and the modal-inferential approach to concept-
individuation – are thus consistent with mental states having semantic values
or truth-conditional characterizations.1
So defined, the modal cognitivist and modal expressivist approaches have
been assumed to be in constitutive opposition. While the cognitivist pro-
posal avails of modal resources in order to model the internal representations
comprising an abstract language of thought, the expressivist proposal targets
informational properties which extend beyond the remit of internal cognitive
architecture: both the form and the parameters relevant to determining the
semantic values of linguistic utterances, where the informational common
ground is taken to be reducible to circumstantial possibilities; and the indi-
viduation of the contents of concepts on the basis of inferential behavior.
In this paper, I provide a background mathematical theory, in order to
account for the reconciliation of the cognitivist and expressivist proposals. I
avail, in particular, of the dual isomorphism between Boolean-valued models
of epistemic modal algebras and coalgebras; i.e., labeled transition systems
defined in the setting of category theory.2 The functors of coalgebras permit
of flexible interpretations, such that they are able to characterize both modal
logics as well as discrete-state automata. I argue that the correspondence be-
1The notions of cognitivism and expressivism here targeted concern the role of internal
– rather than external – factors in countenancing the nature of thought and information (cf.
Fodor, 1975; Haugeland, 1978). Possible worlds semantics is taken then to provide the most
descriptively adequate means of countenancing the structure of the foregoing. Delineating
cognitivism and expressivism by whether the positions avail of internal representations is
thus orthogonal to the eponymous dispute between realists and antirealists with regard
to whether mental states are truth-apt, i.e., have a representational function, rather than
being non-representational and non-factive, even if real (cf. Dummett, 1959; Blackburn,
1984; Price, 2013). Whereas the type of modal cognitivism examined here assumes that
thoughts and information take exclusively the form of internal representations, the target
modal expressivist proposals assume that information states are exhaustively individuated
by both linguistic behavior and conditions external to the cognitive architecture of agents.
2For an algebraic characterization of dynamic-epistemic logic, see Kurz and Palmigiano
(2013). Baltag (2003) develops a colagebraic semantics for dynamic-epistemic logic, where
coalgebraic functors are intended to record the informational dynamics of single- and multi-
agent systems. The current approach differs from the foregoing by examining the dual
isomorphism between static epistemic modal algebras and coalgebraic automata, where
the functors in the latter are interpreted as expressive of the epistemic states comprising
the modal algebras.
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tween epistemic modal algebras and modal coalgebraic automata is sufficient
then for the provision of a mathematically tractable, modal foundation for
thought and action.3
In Section 2, I provide the background mathematical theory, in order to
account for the reconciliation of the cognitivist and expressivist proposals.
In Section 3, I outline an expressivist semantics for epistemic modals.
Modal coalgebraic automata are argued, finally, to be preferred as models
of modal expressivism, by contrast to the speech-act and inferentialist ap-
proaches, in virtue of the advantages accruing to the model in the philosophy
of mathematics. The interest in modal coalgebraic automata consists, in par-
ticular, in the range of mathematical properties that can be recovered on the
basis thereof.4 By contrast to the above competing approaches to modal
expressivism, the functors of modal coalgebraic automata are able both to
model and explain elementary embeddings in the category of sets; the in-
tensions of mathematical terms; as well as the modal profile of Ω-logical
consequence.
Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
3The proposal that possible worlds semantics comprises the model for thoughts and
propositions is anticipated by Wittgenstein (1921/1974: 2.15-2.151, 3-3.02); Chalmers
(2011); and Jackson (2011). Their approaches depart, however, from the one here exam-
ined in the following respects. (i) Wittgenstein (op. cit.: 1-1.1) has been interpreted as
endorsing an identity theory of propositions, which does not distinguish between internal
thoughts and external propositions (cf. McDowell, 1994: 27; and Hornsby, 1997: 1-3).
How the identity theory of propositions is able to accommodate Wittgenstein’s suggestion
that a typed hierarchy of propositions can be generated – only if the class of propositions
has a general form and the sense of propositions over which operations range is invariant
by being individuated by the possibilities figuring as their truth and falsity conditions (cf.
Wittgenstein, 1979: 21/11/16, 23/11/16, 7/11/17; and Potter, 2009: 283-285 for detailed
discussion) – is an open question. Wittgenstein (1921/1974: 5.5561) writes that ’Hierar-
chies are and must be independent of reality’, although provides no account of how the
independence can be effected. (ii) Jackson (2008: 48-50) distinguishes between personal
and subpersonal theories by the role of neural science in individuating representational
states (cf. Shea, 2013, for further discussion), and argues in favor of a ’personal-level im-
plicit theory’ for the possible worlds semantics of mental representations. (iii) Chalmers
(2012: 462-463) argues for a hybrid cognitivist-expressivist approach, according to which
epistemic intensions – i.e. functions from epistemically possible worlds to extensions – are
individuated by their inferential roles.
4See Wittgenstein (2001: IV, 4-6, 11, 30-31), for a prescient expressivist approach to
the modal profile of mathematical formulas.
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3.1 The Hybrid Proposal
3.1.1 Epistemic Modal Algebra
In Epistemic Modal Algebra, a topological Boolean algebra, A, can be formed
by taking the powerset of a topological space, X; A = P(X). The domain of
A is comprised of formula-terms – eliding propositions with names – assigned
to elements of P(X), where the formula-terms encode epistemic possibilities;
i.e., possibilities defined relative to states of information. The top element
of the algebra is denoted ’1’ and the bottom element is denoted ’0’. We
interpret the modal operators, f(x), – i.e., monotonic intensional functions in
the algebra – as both equivalent to concepts, as well as countenancing the
property of topological interiority. An Epistemic Modal-valued Algebraic
structure has the form, F = 〈A, DP (X), ρ〉, where ρ is a mapping from points
in the topological space to elements or regions of the algebraic structure;
i.e., ρ : DP (X) x DP (X) → A. A model over the Epistemic-Modal Topological
Boolean Algebraic structure has the form M = 〈F, V〉, where V(a) ≤ ρ(a)
and V(a,b) ∧ ρ(a, b) ≤ V(b).5 For all xx/a,φ,y∈A:
f(1) = 1;
f(x) ≤ x;
f(x ∧ y) = f(x) ∧ f(y);
f[f(x)] = f(x);
V(a, a) > 0;
V(a, a) = 1;
V(a, b) = V(b, a);
V(a, b) ∧ V(b, c) ≤ V(a, c);
V(a = a) = ρ(a, a);
V(a, b) ≤ f[V(a, b)];
V(¬φ) = ρ(¬φ) – f(φ);
V(⋄φ) = ρφ – f[– V(φ)];
V(φ) = f[V(φ)] (cf. Lando, op. cit.).
An abstraction principle for epistemic intensions can be defined as follows:
For all types, A,B, there is a homotopy:
H := [(f ∼ g) :≡ ∏x:A(f(x) = g(x)], where∏
f :A→B[(f ∼ f) ∧ (f ∼ g → g ∼ f) ∧ (f ∼ g → g ∼ h → f ∼ h)],
5See Lando (2015); McKinsey and Tarski (1944); and Rasiowa (1963), for further de-
tails.
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such that, via Voevodsky’s (2006) Univalence Axiom, for all type families
A,B:U, there is a function:
idtoeqv : (A =U B) → (A ≃ B),
which is itself an equivalence relation:
(A =U B) ≃ (A ≃ B).
Abstraction principles for intensional computational properties take, then,
the form:
• ∃f,g[f(x) = g(x)] ≃ [f(x) ≃ g(x)].
3.1.2 Modal Coalgebraic Automata
Modal coalgebraic automata can be thus characterized. Let a category C be
comprised of a class Ob(C) of objects and a family of arrows for each pair
of objects C(A,B) (Venema, 2007: 421). A functor from a category C to a
category D, E: C → D, is an operation mapping objects and arrows of C to
objects and arrows of D (422). An endofunctor on C is a functor, E: C → C
(op. cit.).
A E-coalgebra is a pair A = (A, µ), with A an object of C referred to
as the carrier of A, and µ: A → E(A) is an arrow in C, referred to as the
transition map of A (390).
As, further, a coalgebraic model of modal logic, A can be defined as
follows (407):
For a set of formulas, Φ, let ∇Φ :=  ∨ Φ ∧ ∧ ⋄Φ, where ⋄Φ denotes the
set {⋄φ | φ∈Φ} (op. cit.). Then,
⋄φ ≡ ∇{φ, T},
φ ≡ ∇∅ ∨ ∇φ (op. cit.).
Let, then, an E-coalgebraic modal model, A = 〈S,λ,R[.]〉, be such that
S,s  ∇Φ if and only if, for all (some) successors σ of s∈S, [Φ,σ(s)∈E(A)]
(op. cit.).
A coalgebraic model of deterministic automata can finally be thus defined
(391). An automaton is a tuple, A = 〈A, aI , C, δ, F〉, such that A is the
state space of the automaton A; aI∈A is the automaton’s initial state; C is
the coding for the automaton’s alphabet, mapping numerals to properties of
the natural numbers; δ: A X C → A is a transition function, and F⊆ A is
the collection of admissible states, where F maps A to {1,0}, such that F: A
→ 1 if a∈F and A → 0 if a/∈F (op. cit.).
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The crux of the reconciliation between algebraic models of cognitivism
and the formal foundations of modal expressivism is based on the dual iso-
morphism between categories of algebras and coalgebras: A = 〈A, α:A →
E(A)〉 is dually isomorphic to the category of algebras over the functor α
(417-418). For a category C, object A, and endofunctor E, define a new ar-
row, α, s.t. α:EA→ A. A homomorphism, f , can further be defined between
algebras 〈A, α〉, and 〈B, β〉. Then, for the category of algebras, the following
commutative square can be defined: (i) EA → EB (Ef); (ii) EA → A (α);
(iii) EB → B (β); and (iv) A → B (f) (cf. Hughes, 2001: 7-8). The same
commutative square holds for the category of coalgebras, such that the latter
are defined by inverting the direction of the morphisms in both (ii) [A→ EA
(α)], and (iii) [B → EB (β)] (op. cit.).6
The significance of the foregoing is twofold. First and foremost, the above
demonstrates how a formal correspondence can be effected between algebraic
models of cognition and coalgebraic models which provide a natural setting
for modal logics and automata. The second aspect of the philosophical sig-
nificance of modal colagebraic automata is that – as a model of modal ex-
pressivism – the proposal is able to countenance fundamental properties in
the foundations of mathematics, and circumvent the issues accruing to the
attempt so to do by the competing expressivist approaches.
3.2 Material Adequacy
The material adequacy of epistemic modal algebras as a fragment of the
representational theory of mind is witnessed by the prevalence of possible
worlds semantics – the model theory for which is algebraic (cf. Blackburn
et al., 2001: ch. 5) – in cognitive psychology, and the convergences thereof
with theoretical physics.
In Bayesian perceptual psychology, e.g., the visual system is presented
with a prior distribution of possibilities concerning the direction of a source
of light. The set of possibilities is pointed, as the visual system calculates the
likelihood that one of the possibilities is actual, and places a condition thereby
on the accuracy of the attribution of properties – such as boundedness and
6Note that the theory for the model will be a topological coalgebra – cf. Takeuchi,
1985 for further discussion – and that, unlike isomorphism, the property of being dually
isomorphic is not one-one (cf. Hughes, op. cit.: 13). Dual isomorphisms are thus more
akin to bisimulations (cf. Blackburn et al., 2001: 64-66).
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volume – to distal particulars (cf. Mamassian et al., 2000).
In the philosophy of physics, modal notions play, further, an ineliminable
role in physical ontology and in the theoretical and observational characteri-
zations thereof. Transition functions in quantum information theory can, for
example, be interpreted counterfactually, in order to countenance the possi-
ble transformations of systems, the inputs of which include the expectation
values of spin-state vectors (Deutsch, 2013). In the interpretation of physical
theories, Ruetsche (2011: 9) argues, further, that ’[T]o interpret a physical
theory is to characterize the worlds possible according to that theory’. She
notes that the interpretation of a physical theory falls into two phases, both
of which constitutively involve modal notions. The first phase consists in the
specification of the possible states of the models at issue; the possible values
taken with regard to the observable kinematics thereof, e.g., the expectation
values of Hilbert operators; and then the laws comprising the dynamic trans-
formations therein (op. cit.). The second phase targets the nomologically
possible worlds in which the properties of the first phase of interpretation are
satisfied (op. cit.). In quantum field theory, unital algebras are availed of, as
well, where the algebras are closed under commutativity and associativity;
scalar multiplication by complex numbers, such that for all vectors A,B, and
complex numbers cn: c1(A + B) = c1A + c1B; (c1 + c2)A = c1A + c2A;
c1(c2A) = (c1c2)A; (c1A)B - A(c1B) = c1(AB); and multiplicative identity,
i.e., for an element I, AI = IA = A (74). Finally, Belot (2011) argues that
– in the dispute between relationalist and substantivalist conceptions of spa-
tial geometry – a relationalist proposal can be proffered, according to which
– by analogy with nomological possibilities – the different metric relations
that can be grounded in the intrinsic points comprising spatial regions are
geometric possibilities.
Finally, in artificial intelligence, the subfield of knowledge representation
draws on epistemic logic, where possibility and necessity are interpreted as
belief and knowledge (Meyer and van der Hoeck, 1995; Fagin et al., 1995).
Possibility and necessity may receive other interpretations in mental terms,
such as that of conceivability and apriority (i.e. truth in all epistemic possi-
bilities, or inconceivability that not φ). The Language of Thought hypothesis
maintains that thinking occurs in a mental language with a computational
syntax and a semantics. The philosophical significance of cognitivism about
epistemic modality is that it construes epistemic intensions as abstract, com-
putational functions in the mind, and thus provides an explanation of the
relation that human beings bear to epistemic possibilities, rather than leaving
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questions of the ground of epistemic possibilities unexplained. Cognitivism
about epistemic modality argues that thoughts are comprised of intensions,
or functions from epistemic possibilities to extensions. Cognitivism about
epistemic modality provides a metaphysical explanation or account of the
ground of thoughts, arguing that they are grounded in epistemic possibilities
and intensions, which are themselves internal representations comprising the
semantics for a mental language. This is consistent with belief and knowledge
being countenanced in an epistemic logic for artificial intelligence. Epistemic
possibilities are constitutively related thoughts, and figure furthermore in the
analysis of notions such as apriority and conceivability, as well as belief and
knowledge in epistemic logic for artificial intelligence.
In the the remainder of the paper, I outline an expressivist semantics for
epistemic modals. I endeavor, then, to demonstrate the advantages accruing
to the present approach to countenancing modal expressivism via modal
colagebraic automata, via a comparison of the theoretical strength of the
proposal when applied to characterizing the fundamental properties of the
foundations of mathematics, by contrast to the competing approaches to
modal expressivism and the limits of their applications thereto.
3.2.1 Expressivist Semantics for Epistemic Modals
Let expressivism about a domain of discourse be the claim that an utter-
ance from that domain expresses a mental state, rather than states a fact
(Hawke and Steinert-Threlkeld, 2020). Hawke and Steinert-Threlkeld (op.
cit.) distinguish between semantic expressivism and pragmatic expressivism.
Expressivism about epistemic modality takes the property expressed by ⋄φ
to be {s⊆ W : s 1 ¬p}, where s is a state of information, W is a set of
possible worlds, and s  φ if and only if φ is assertible relative to s, if and
only if the state of information is compatible with φ. Semantic expressivism
incorporates a "psychologistic semantics" according to which the value of φ is
a partial function from information states to truth-values (op. cit.), such that
"the mental type expressed by φ is characterized in terms of the assertibility
relation " and "the definition of  is an essential part of that of J K" (op.
cit.). Pragmatic expressivism rejects the psychologistic semantics condition,
and "allows for a gap between the compositional semantic theory and " (op.
cit.).
Hawke and Steinert-Threlkeld (op. cit.) argue that satisfying the follow-
ing conditions is a desideratum of any expressivist account about epistemic
49
possibility:
(Weak) Wide-scope Free Choice (WFC):
⋄p ∨ ⋄¬p  ⋄p ∧ ⋄¬p
Disjunctive Inheritence (DIN):
(⋄p ∧ q) ∨ r  [⋄(p ∧ q) ∧ q] ∨ r
Disjunctive Syllogism and Schroeder’s Constraints:
DSF {⋄¬q, p ∨ q 1 p}
SCH {⋄¬p, p ∨ q 1 q}
DSF and SCH record the failure of disjunctive syllogism in the presence
of epistemic contradictions.
WFC is vindicated by the contention that when someone asserts p ∨ ¬p,
they neither believe p nor believe ¬p, and so are in a position to assert both
⋄p and ⋄¬p.
DIN is vindicated by the equivalence of the content of the utterances,
e.g.,
(1) Nataly is at home and might be watching a film.
(2) Nataly is at home and might be watching a film at home.
Hawke and Steinert-Threlkeld’s modal propositional assertibility seman-
tics is then as follows.
Reading t ⊆ s: JφKt 6= 1 as "s refutes φ":
• if p is an atom: JpKs = 1 iff s ⊆ V(p)
if p is an atom JpKs = 0 iff s refutes p
• J¬φKs = 1 iff JφKs = 0
J¬φKs = 0 iff JφKs = 1
• Jφ ∧ ψKs = 1 iff JφKs = 1 and JψKs = 1
Jφ ∧ ψKs = 0 iff s refutes φ ∧ ψ
• Jφ ∨ ψKs = 1 iff there exists s1, s2 such that s = s1 ∪ s2, JφKs1 = 1 and
JψKs2 = 1
Jφ ∨ ψKs = 0 iff s refutes φ ∨ ψ
• J⋄φKs = 1 iff JφKs 6= 0
J⋄φKs = 0 iff s refutes ⋄φ
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• φ := ¬⋄¬φ
Unlike Yalcin’s (2007) domain semantics, Veltman’s (1996) update se-
mantics, and Moss’ (2015, 2018) probabilistic semantic expressivism, Hawke
and Steinert-Threlkeld’s assertibility semantics satisfies WFC, DIN, DSF,
and SCH (op. cit.). As a preliminary, suppose
Proposition 1 If φ is ⋄-free, then s  ⋄φ holds iff there exists w∈s such
that: {w}  φ (op. cit.).
Proof: s  ⋄φ holds iff JφKs 6= 0. JφKs = 0 iff JφK{w} = 0 for every w∈s.
So, JφKs 6= 0 iff JφKw 6= 0 for some w∈s iff {w}  φ for some w∈s (op. cit.).
For WFC, suppose that s  ⋄p ∨ ⋄¬p. So, there exists s1, s2 that cover
s and s1  ⋄p and s2  ⋄¬p. By Proposition 1, there exist u,v∈s such that
{u}  p and {v}  ¬p. Thus, s  ⋄p and s  ⋄¬p (op. cit.).
For DIN, suppose that s  (⋄p ∧ q) ∨ r. So, there exists s1, s2, such
that s = s1 ∪ s2 with s1  ⋄p, s1  q, and s2  r. For every w∈s1, {w} 
q. There also exists u∈s1 such that {u}  p. Hence, {u}  p ∧ q and – by
Proposition 1 – s1  ⋄(p ∧ q). Thus s  [⋄(p ∧ q) ∧ q] ∨ r (op. cit.).
For DSF and SCH, suppose that there is an s such that every world in
s is either a p ∧ ¬q world or a ¬p ∧ q world. Suppose that there exists at
least one p ∧ ¬q world in s and at least one ¬p ∧ q world in s (op. cit.).
Relativists about epistemic modals either relativize content or relativize
truth to a context of assessment (Starr, 2012: 3; Egan and Weatherson, 2011:
11-14). According to content relativism, epistemic modals express different
propositions in different contexts of assessment (Starr, op. cit.). According
to truth relativism, epistemic modals express the same proposition, which is
true relative to some assessors and false relative to others, such that truth
is a three-place relation between a world, a judge, and a proposition, i.e. a
centered world and a proposition (Starr, op. cit.: 3, 5). Thus, X believes
that stealing is wrong is an ascription of belief in a centered proposition,
i.e. a de se belief (Beddor, forthcoming: 9). As Yalcin (2011: 307) points
out, utterances with epistemic modals on the truth relativist proposal thus
express second-order states, the ascription of a de se belief (cf. Beddor, op.
cit.).
That epistemic modal beliefs are second-order on the truth relativist pro-
posal adduces against the merits of the view. Yalcin (op. cit.: 308) argues
that non-human animals can entertain states expressed by epistemic modals,
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and we here follow him in thinking that, by taking epistemic modal beliefs to
be second-order de se ascriptions, the truth relativist proposal would preclude
young children and non-human animals from entertaining epistemic possibil-
ities. However, young children and non-human animals, while lacking the
capacity to entertain second-order states, nevertheless entertain epistemic
possibilities. The foregoing thus adduces in favor of the expressivist proposal
that epistemic modals express first-order states of mind.
3.3 Modal Expressivism and the Philosophy
of Mathematics
When modal expressivism is modeled via speech acts on a common ground of
presuppositions, the application thereof to the foundations of mathematics
is limited both (i) by the manner in which necessary propositions are char-
acterized, as well as (ii) by the metalinguistic – rather than, e.g., epistemic
– interpretation of the semantics.7
Because for example a proposition is taken, according to the proposal,
to be identical to a set of possible worlds, all necessarily true mathematical
formulas can only express a single proposition; namely, the set of all possible
worlds (cf. Stalnaker, 1978; 2003: 51). Thus, although distinct set-forming
operations will be codified by distinct axioms of a language of set theory,
the axioms will be assumed to express the same proposition: The axiom
of Pairing in set theory – which states that a unique set can be formed by
combining an element from each of two extant sets: ∃x∀u(u∈x ⇐⇒ u = a ∨
u = b) – will be supposed to express the same proposition as the Power Set
axiom – which states that a set can be formed by taking the set of all subsets
7See Chapter 11 for an application of the epistemic interpretation of two-dimensional
intensional semantics to account for the modal profile of Orey sentences; i.e. mathemat-
ical propositions that are undecidable relative to the axioms of a given language. (For
the origins of two-dimensional intensional semantics, see Kamp, 1967; Vlach, 1973; and
Segerberg, 1973.) The distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibilities, as
they pertain to the values of mathematical formulas, is anticipated by Gödel’s (1951:
11-12) distinction between mathematics in its subjective and objective senses, where the
former concerns decidable formulas, and the latter records the values of formulas defined,
owing to the incompleteness theorems, in a variant of the language augmented by stronger
axioms of infinity. Axioms of infinity take the form, ’∃x∅∈x ∧ ∀u(u∈x → {u}∈x)’, and
record closure on the singleton of a real in the cumulative hierarchy of sets, where the real
can be a large cardinal.
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of an extant set: ∃x∀u(u∈x ⇐⇒ u⊆a). However, that distinct operations
– i.e., the formation of a set by selecting elements from two extant sets, by
contrast to forming a set by collecting all of the subsets of a single extant set
– are characterized by the different axioms is readily apparent.
Stalnaker endeavors to redress the objection by availing of the metase-
mantic interpretation of two-dimensional intensional semantics, according to
which the necessarily true propositions comprising the common ground are
yet consistent with contingently valued speech acts – e.g., assertions – about
those propositions (2003: 54). Although it does record a difference in the
epistemic status of agents with regard to whether they know or believe the
propositions at issue, the proposal is yet not itself sufficient to distinguish
between the senses of distinct, albeit necessarily true formulas.
Further, the metalinguistic interpretation of the semantics places a re-
striction on the expressive capacity of the mathematical languages at issue.
By contrast to the objectual interpretation of the quantifiers, the metalinguis-
tic interpretation of two-dimensional intensional semantics – by restricting
itself to the remit of natural language semantics – is limited to substitutional
quantification; i.e. to quantification over only those objects for which a name,
in the natural language, has been specified (op. cit.). Given, however, the
above restriction, substitutional quantification cannot account for impred-
icative comprehension; i.e., for the specification of extensions of terms, with
reference to the totality of items of the type that the terms are intended to
designate.
By contrast to the limits of Stalnaker’s approach to modal expressivism,
differences in the senses of formulas can, as noted, be recorded by the corre-
spondence, in modal algebras, between modal operators and intensional func-
tions, such that the senses of materially equivalent propositions-as-possibilities
can shift when the possibilities are translated as intensions and figure within
hyperintensional contexts. Further, both epistemic modal algebras and their
dually corresponding modal coalgebraic automata permit of unrestricted ob-
jectual quantification, and are thus unconfined to the expressive limitations
of the substitutional quantifiers of natural language.
A variation of Stalnaker’s semantics is proffered in Yalcin (2016). Yalcin
(op. cit.) argues that concepts and beliefs can be modeled in the manner
of subject matters (cf. Lewis, 1998; Yablo, 2014), where the latter are inter-
rogative updates on a background set of epistemically possible worlds, and
the inquiry whether φ induces a focus on a subset of worlds which answer
whether φ. In the setting of philosophy of mathematics, however, it is un-
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clear how identifying subject matters with fragments of an epistemic modal
space induced by interrogative updates can model the nature of, inter alia,
Orey sentences such as the generalized continuum hypothesis (i.e., ℵαℵα =
ℵα + 1),
whose values are indeterminate relative to the present axioms of ZF set
theory with choice, and the reduction in the incompleteness of which depends
upon augmenting the relevant mathematical languages with stronger axioms
of infinity (cf. Woodin, 2010). In order to determine the truth-values of
Orey sentences, the space of epistemic modality might require an expanding
domain by way of which the new axioms and their corresponding theorems
can be accommodated. It is thus unclear how a treatment of subject mat-
ters as an induced restriction on the space of epistemic possibilities – i.e.,
as interrogative-induced operations from a set of possibilities to any partic-
ular subset thereof – could begin to account for the required expansion in
epistemic states.
Thomasson (2007) argues for a version of modal expressivism which she
refers to as ’modal normativism’, according to which alethic modalities are
to be replaced by deontic modalities taking the form of object-language,
modal indicative conditionals (op. cit.: 136, 138, 141). The modal indicative
conditionals serve to express constitutive rules pertaining, e.g., to ontological
dependencies which state that: ’Necessarily, if an entity satisfying a property
exists then a distinct entity satisfying a property exists’ (143-144), and gen-
eralizes to other expressions, such as analytic conditionals which state, e.g.,
that: ’Necessarily, if an entity satisfies a property, such as being a bachelor,
then the entity satisfies a distinct yet co-extensive property, such as being
unmarried’ (148). A virtue of Thomasson’s interpretation of modal indica-
tive conditionals as expressing both analytic and ontological dependencies is
that it would appear to converge with the ’If-thenist’ proposal in the phi-
losophy of mathematics. ’If-thenism’ is an approach according to which, if
an axiomatized mathematical language is consistent, then (i) one can either
bear epistemic attitudes, such as fictive acceptance, toward the target sys-
tem (cf. Leng, 2010: 180) or (ii) the system (possibly) exists [cf. Russell (op.
cit.: §1); Hilbert (1899/1980: 39); Menger (1930/1979: 57); Putnam (1967);
Shapiro (2000: 95); Chihara (2004: Ch. 10); and Awodey (2004: 60-61)].8
However, there are at least two issues for the modal normativist approach
8See Leng (2009), for further discussion. Field (1980/2016: 11-21; 1989: 54-65, 240-241)
argues in favor of the stronger notion of conservativeness, according to which consistent
mathematical theories must be satisfiable by internally consistent theories of physics. More
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in the setting of the philosophy of mathematics. One general issue for the
proposal is that the treatment of quantification remains unaddressed, given
that there are translations from modal operators, such as figure in modal
indicatives, into existential and universal quantifiers.9 A second issue for
the normative indicative conditional approach is that Thomasson’s norma-
tive modalities are unimodal. They are thus not sufficiently fine-grained to
capture distinctions such as Gödel’s (op. cit.) between mathematics in its
subjective and objective senses.10 Further distinctions between the types of
mathematical modality can be delineated which permit epistemic types of
mathematical possibility to serve as a guide as to whether a formula is meta-
physically mathematically possible.11 The convergence between epistemic
and metaphysical mathematical modalities can be countenanced via a two-
dimensional intensional semantics. Thus, by eschewing alethic modalities
for unimodal, normative indicatives, the normative modalities are unable to
account for the relation between the alethic interpretation of modality and,
e.g., logical mathematical modalities treated as consistency operators on lan-
guages (cf. Field, 1989: 249-250, 257-260; Leng: 2007; 2010: 258), or for the
generally, for a class of assertions, A, comprising a theory of fundamental physics, and a
class of sentences comprising a mathematical language, M, any sentences derivable from
A+M ought to be derivable from A alone. Another variation on the ’If-thenist’ proposal
is witnessed in Field (2001: 333-338), who argues that the existence of consistent forcing
extensions of set-theoretic ground models adduces in favor of there being a set-theoretic
pluriverse, and thus entrains indeterminacy in the truth-values of undecidable sentences.
For a similar proposal, which emphasizes the epistemic role of examining how instances
of undecidable sentences obtain and fail so to do relative to forcing extensions in the
set-theoretic pluriverse, see Hamkins (2012: §7).
9The formal correspondence between modalities and quantifiers is anticipated by Aris-
totle (De Interpretatione, 9; De Caelo, I.12), who defines the metaphysical necessity of a
proposition as its being true at all times. For detailed discussion of Aristotle’s theory, see
Waterlow (1982). For a contemporary account of the multi-modal logic for metaphysical
and temporal modalities, see Dorr and Goodman (ms). For contemporary accounts of
the correspondence between modal operators and quantifiers see von Wright (1952/1957),
where von Wright anticipates Kripke’s (1963) relational semantics for modal logic; Mon-
tague (1960/1974: 75); Lewis (1975/1998; 1981/1998); Kratzer (op. cit.; 1981/2012); and
Kuhn (1980).
10See footnote 7.
11See Author (ms), for further discussion. A precedent is Reinhardt (1974: 199-200),
who proposes the use of imaginary sets, classes, and projections, as ’imaginary experi-
ments’ (204), in order to ascertain the consequences of accepting new axioms for ZF which
might account for the reduction of the incompleteness of Orey sentences. See Maddy
(1988,b), for critical discussion.
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convergence between epistemic possibilities concerning decidability and their
bearing on the metaphysical modal status of undecidable sentences.
According, finally, to Brandom’s (op. cit.) modal expressivist approach,
terms are individuated by their rules of inference, where the rules are taken
to have a modal profile translatable into the counterfactual forms taken by
the transition functions of automata (cf. Brandom, 2008: 142). In order
to countenance the metasemantic truth-conditions for the object-level, prag-
matic abilities captured by the automata’s counterfactual transition states,
Brandom augments a first-order language comprised of a stock of atomic
formulas with an incompatibility function (141). An incompatibility func-
tion, I, is defined as the incoherence of the union of two sentences, where
incoherence is a generalization of the notion of inconsistency to nonlogical
vocabulary.
x ∪ y ∈ Inc ⇐⇒ x ∈ I(y) (141-142).
Incompatibility is supposed to be a modal notion, such that the union of
the two sentences is incompossible (126). A sentence, β is an incompatibility-
consequence, I , of a sentence, α, iff there is no sequence of sentences, <γ1,
. . . , γn>, such that it can be the case that α I <γ1, . . . , γn>, yet not
be the case that β I <γ1, . . . , γn> (125). To be incompatible with a
necessary formula is to be compatible with everything that does not entail
the formula (129-130). Dually, to be incompatible with a possible formula is
to be incompatible with everything compatible with something compatible
with the formula (op. cit.).
There are at least two, general issues for the application of Brandom’s
modal expressivism to the foundations of mathematics.
The first issue is that the mathematical vocabulary – e.g., the set-membership
relation, ∈ – is axiomatically defined. I.e., the membership relation is defined
by, inter alia, the Pairing and Power Set axioms of set-theoretic languages.
Thus, mathematical terms have their extensions individuated by the axioms
of the language, rather than via a set of inference rules that can be specified
in the absence of the mention of truth values. Even, furthermore, if one
were to avail of modal notions in order to countenance the intensions of the
mathematical vocabulary at issue – i.e., functions from terms in intensional
contexts to their extensions – the modal profile of the intensions is orthog-
onal to the properties encoded by the incompatibility function. Fine (2006)
avails, e.g., of a dynamic logic in order to countenance the possibility of rein-
terpreting the intensions at issue, and of thus accounting for variance in the
range of the domains of quantifier expressions. The dynamic possibilities are
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specified as operational conditions on tracking increases in the size of the
cardinality of the universe (Fine, 2005). Uzquiano (2015,a) argues that it is
always possible to reinterpret the intensions of non-logical vocabulary, as one
augments one’s language with stronger axioms of infinity and climbs thereby
farther up the cumulative hierarchy of sets. The reinterpretations of, e.g.,
the concept of set are effected by the addition of new large cardinal axioms,
which stipulate the existence of larger inaccessible cardinals. However, it is
unclear how the incompatibility function – i.e., a modal operator defined via
Boolean negation and a generalized condition on inconsistency – might simi-
larly be able to model the intensions pertaining to the ontological expansion
of the cumulative hierarchy.
The second issue is that the truth-conditional formulas in the metalan-
guage of Brandom’s modal expressivist semantics are not compositional.
I.e., it is not the case of the clauses in the metalanguage that their truth-
conditions are formed by the composition of the semantic values of their
component expressions. While the formulas are recursively formed – because
the decomposition of complex formulas into atomic formulas is decidable
although computationally infeasible – formulas in the language are not com-
positional, because they fail to satisfy the subformula property to the effect
that the value of a logically complex formula is calculated as a function of the
values of the component logical connectives applied to subformulas therein
(135).12
By contrast to the limits of Brandom’s approach to modal expressivism,
modal coalgebraic automata can circumvent both of the issues mentioned in
the foregoing. In response to the first issue, concerning the axiomatic indi-
viduation and intensional profiles of mathematical terms, functors of modal
coalgebraic automata can be interpreted in order to provide a precise delin-
eation of the intensions of the target vocabulary (cf. Chapter 11). In re-
sponse, finally, to the second of the above issues, the values taken by modal
coalgebraic automata are both decidable and computationally feasible, while
the dual isomorphism of colagebras to Boolean-valued models of modal al-
gebras ensures that the formulas therein retain their compositionality. The
decidability of colagebraic automata can further be witnessed by the role
of modal coalgebras in countenancing the modal profile of Ω-logical conse-
12Let a decision problem be a propositional function which is feasibly decidable, if it
is a member of the polynomial time complexity class; i.e., if it can be calculated as a
polynomial function of the size of the formula’s input (cf. Dean, 2015).
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quence, where – given a proper class of Woodin cardinals – the values of
mathematical formulas can remain invariant throughout extensions of the
ground models comprising the set-theoretic pluriverse (cf. Woodin, 2010;
Chapter 11). The individuation of large cardinals can further be charac-
terized by the functors of modal coalgebraic automata, when the latter are
interpreted so as to countenance the elementary embeddings constitutive of
large cardinal axioms in the category of sets.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
In this essay, I have endeavored to account for a mathematically tractable
background against which to model both modal cognitivism and modal ex-
pressivism. I availed, to that end, of the dual isomorphism between epistemic
modal algebras and modal coalgebraic automata. Epistemic modal algebras
were shown to comprise a materially adequate fragment of the language of
thought, given that models thereof figure in both the cognitive, as well as
in the interpretations of the physical, sciences. It was then shown how the
approach to modal expressivism here proffered, as regimented by the modal
coalgebraic automata to which the epistemic modal algebras are isomorphic,
avoids the pitfalls attending the competing modal expressivist approaches
based upon both the inferentialist approach to concept-individuation and
the approach to codifying the speech acts in natural language via intensional
semantics. The present modal expressivist approach was shown, e.g., to avoid
the limits of the foregoing in the philosophy of language, as they concerned
the status of necessary propositions; substitutional quantification; the in-
applicability of inferentialist-individuation to mathematical vocabulary; and
failures of compositionality. Countenancing modal expressivism via modal
coalgebraic automata was shown, then, to be able to account for both the
intensions of mathematical terms and possible reinterpretations thereof; for
the modal profile of Ω-logical consequence in the category of sets; and for the
elementary embeddings constitutive of large cardinal axioms in set-theoretic
languages.|
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Part II: Epistemic Modality and Conceivability
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Chapter 4
Conceivability and Haecceitism
4.1 Introduction
In this essay, I endeavor to provide an account of how the epistemic inter-
pretation of two-dimensional intensional semantics can be sensitive to de re
modalities. Let a model, M, be comprised of a set of epistemically possible
worlds C; a set of metaphysically possible worlds P; a domain, D, of terms
and formulas; binary relations defined on each of C and P; and a valuation
function mapping terms and formulas to subsets of C and P, respectively.
So, M = 〈C, P, D, RC , RP , V〉. A term or formula is epistemically neces-
sary or apriori iff it is inconceivable for it to be false ( ⇐⇒ ¬⋄¬). A
term or formula is negatively conceivable iff nothing rules it out apriori (⋄
⇐⇒ ¬¬). A term or formula is positively conceivable only if the term or
formula can be perceptually imagined. According to the epistemic interpre-
tation of two-dimensional intensional semantics, the semantic value of a term
or formula can then be defined relative to two parameters, a context and an
index. The context ranges over the set of epistemically possible worlds, and
the index ranges over the set of metaphysically possible worlds. The value of
the term or formula relative to the context determines the value of the term
or formula relative to the index. Thus, the epistemically possible value of
the term or formula constrains the metaphysically possible value of the term
or formula; and so conceivability might, given the foregoing, serve as a guide
to metaphysical possibility.
Roca-Royes (2011) and Chalmers (2010; 2011; 2014) note that, on the
above semantics, epistemic possibility cannot track the difference between the
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metaphysical modal profile of a non-essential proposition – e.g., that there is
a shooting star – and the metaphysical modal profile of an essential definition,
such as a theoretical identity statement – e.g., that water = H2O. Another
principle of modal metaphysics to which epistemic possibilities are purported
to be insensitive is haecceity comprehension; namely, that ∀x,y∃Φ(Φx
⇐⇒ x = y).
The aim of this note is to redress the contention that epistemic possibility
cannot be a guide to the principles of modal metaphysics. I will argue that
the interaction between the two-dimensional intensional framework and the
mereological parthood relation enables epistemic possibilities to target the
haecceitistic properties of individuals.
In Section 2, I examine a necessary condition on admissible cases of con-
ceivability entailing metaphysical possibility in the two-dimensional inten-
sional framework, focusing on the property of super-rigidity. I argue that –
despite the scarcity of properties which satisfy the super-rigidity condition –
metaphysical properties such as the parthood relation do so. In Section 3, I
address objections to two dogmas of the semantic rationalism underpinning
the epistemic interpretation of two-dimensional intensional semantics. The
first dogma states that distinctions can be delineated between linguistic in-
tensions and conceptual epistemic intensions, while the second dogma records
that there are criteria on the basis of which formal from informal domains,
unique to the extensions of various concepts, can be distinguished, such that
the modal profiles of those concepts would thus be determinate. I examine
the Julius Caesar problem as a test case. I specify, then, a two-dimensional
intensional formula encoding the relation between the epistemic possibility
of haecceity comprehension and its metaphysical possibility. In Section 4, I
address objections from the indeterminacy of ontological principles relative
to the space of epistemic possibilities, and from the consistency of epistemic
modal space. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
4.2 Super-rigidity
The interaction between mereological parthood and epistemic and metaphys-
ical possibility avoids one crucial issue for the epistemic interpretation of
two-dimensional intensional semantics. The issue is that, unless the semanic
value for a term is ’super-rigid’, i.e. maps to the same extension throughout
the sets of epistemic and metaphysical possibilities, the extension of the term
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in epistemic modal space risks diverging from the extension of the term in
metaphysical modal space.
There appear to be only a few expressions which satisfy the super-rigidity
condition. Such terms include those referring to the properties of phenome-
nal consciousness, to the parthood relation, and perhaps to the property of
friendship (Chalmers, 2012: 367, 374). Other candidates for super-rigidity
are taken to include metaphysical terms such as ’cause’ and ’fundamental’;
numerical terms such as ’one’; and logical constants such as ’∧’ (Chalmers,
op. cit.). However, there are objections to each of the other proposed candi-
dates.
Against the super-rigidity of ’fundamental’, Fine (2001: 3) argues that a
proposition is fundamental if and only if it is real, while Sider (2011: 112, 118)
argues that a proposition is fundamental iff it possesses a truth-condition (in
a ’metaphysical semantics’, stated in perfectly joint-carving terms) for the
sub-propositional entities – expressed by quantifiers, functions, predicates –
comprising the target proposition. The absolute joint-carving terms are taken
to include logical vocabulary (including quantifiers), metaphysical predicates
such as mereological parthood, and physical predicates.
Against the super-rigidity of ’cause’, Sider (op.cit.: 8.3.5) notes that a
causal deflationist might argue that causation is non-fundamental. By con-
trast, a causal nihilist might argue that causation is non-fundamental as well,
though for the distinct reason that there is no causation. So, while both the
deflationist and nihilist believe that ’cause’ does not carve at the joints –
the nihilist can still state that there is a related predicate, ’cause*’, such
that they can make the joint-carving claim that ’Nothing causes* anything’,
whereas the deflationist will remain silent, and maintain that no broadly
causal locutions carve at the joints.
Against the super-rigidity of ’one’, Benacerraf (1965) notes that, in the
reduction of number theory to set theory, there must be, and is not, a prin-
cipled reason for which to prefer the identification of natural numbers with
von Neumann ordinals (e.g., 2 = {∅, ∅}), rather than with Zermelo ordinals
(i.e., an order-type of a well-ordering 2 = {{∅}}).1
Against the super-rigidity of the logical connective, ∧, the proponent of
model-theoretic validity will prefer a definition of the constant according to
which, for propositions φ and ψ and a model, M, M validates φ ∧ ψ iff M
1Cf. Zermelo (1908/1967) and von Neumann (1923/1967). Well-orderings are irreflex-
ive, transitive, binary relations on all non-empty sets, defining a least element in the sets.
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validates φ and M validates ψ. By contrast, the proponent of proof-theoretic
validity will prefer a distinct definition which makes no reference to truth,
according to which ∧ is defined by its introduction and elimination rules:
φ,ψ ⊢ φ∧ψ; φ∧ψ ⊢ φ; φ∧ψ ⊢ ψ.
Finally, terms for physical entities such as ’tensor field’ might have a
rigid intension mapping the term to the same extension in metaphysical
modal space, and a non-rigid intension mapping the term to distinct ex-
tensions in epistemically possible space, such that what is known about the
term is contingent and might diverge from its necessary metaphysical pro-
file.2 That physical terms are not super-rigid might be one way to challenge
the soundness of the conceivability argument to the effect that, if it is epis-
temically possible that truths about consciousness cannot be derived from
truths about physics, then the dissociation between phenomenal and physical
truths is metaphysically possible (cf. Chalmers, 2010: 151).
Crucially for the purposes of this note, there appear to be no clear coun-
terexamples to the claim that mereological parthood is super-rigid. If this
is correct, then mereological parthood in the space of epistemic modality
can serve as a guide to the status of mereological parthood in metaphysical
modal space. The philosophical significance of the foregoing is that it be-
lies the contention proffered by Roca-Royes (op. cit.) and Chalmers (op.
cit.) concerning the limits of conceivability-based modal epistemology. The
super-rigidity of the parthood relation ensures that the interaction between
the conceivability of mereological parthood, which records the existence of
haecceities, can serve as a guide to the metaphysical modal profile of haec-
ceity comprehension.
4.3 Two Dogmas of Semantic Rationalism
The tenability of the foregoing depends upon whether objections to what
might be understood as the two dogmas of semantic rationalism can be cir-
cumvented.3
2A ’tensor field’ is a function from m ’1-forms’ at a spacetime point, p, and n vectors
at p, to the real numbers. A 1-form is a function, ω, s.t. ω maps four vectors to the real
numbers, and satisfies the condition that for vectors ≥ 2, µ, τ , and real numbers α and β:
ω(αµ + βτ) = αω(µ) + βω(τ). Cf. Arntzenius (2012): 72.
3Thanks to xx for the objections.
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4.3.1 The First Dogma
The first dogma of semantic rationalism mirrors Quine’s (1951) contention
that one dogma of the empiricist approach is the distinction that it records
between analytic and synthetic claims. The analogous dogma in the seman-
tic rationalist setting is that a distinction can be drawn between linguistic
epistemic intensions – witnessed by differences in the cognitive significance of
two sentences or terms which have the same extension, e.g., with x = 2, ’x2’
and ’2x’ – by contrast to conceptual epistemic intensions – e.g., those which
denote the properties of phenomenal consciousness. The distinction coincides
with two interpretations of two-dimensional intensional semantics. As noted,
the epistemic interpretation of two-dimensional intensional semantics takes
the value of a formula relative to a context ranging over epistemically possible
worlds to determine the extension of the formula relative to an index rang-
ing over metaphysically possible worlds (cf. Chalmers, op. cit.). According
to the metasemantic interpretation, a sentence, such as that ’water = H20’,
is metaphysically necessary, whereas assertions made about metaphysically
necessary sentences record the non-ideal epistemic states of agents and are
thus contingent (cf. Stalnaker, 1978, 2004). The first dogma is thus to the
effect that there are distinct sets of worlds – sets of non-linguistic conceptual
possibilities and of linguistic presuppositions, respectively – over which the
context ranges in the epistemic and metasemantic interpretations.
Two examples might be apposite. The physical law that force can be
identified by calculating the product of mass and acceleration, f = ma, has
a distinct linguistic intension than that for a reformulated version of the
law, according to which force can be identified by calculating the product
of mass and the independently calculated product of acceleration and the
second derivative of position, f = m(d2x/dt2) (cf. Hicks and Schaffer, 2015:
17). However, ’f = ma’ and ’f = m(d2x/dt2)’ have identical ideal conceptual
epistemic intensions. Similarly, the linguistic intension for the parthood re-
lation can vary while its conceptual intension remains constant. Thus, the
linguistic intension for the sentence that ’the class of renates is a part of the
class of cordates’ is distinct from the linguistic intension for the sentence that
’the class of entities with kidneys is a part of the class of entities with hearts’.
However, the ideal conceptual epistemic intensions for the two thoughts are
identical.
If no conditions on the distinctness between linguistic and conceptual
epistemic intensions can be provided, then variance in linguistic intension
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might adduce against the uniqueness of the conceptual intension. Because
of the possible proliferation of epistemic intensions, conditions on the super-
rigidity of the formulas and terms at issue might thereby not be satisfiable.
The significance of the first dogma of semantic rationalism is that it guards
against the collapse of conceptual and linguistic epistemic intensions, and
thus the collapse of language and thought.
A defense of the first dogma of semantic rationalism might, in response,
be proffered, in light of the status of higher-order distributive plural quan-
tification in natural language semantics. Plural quantifiers are distributive,
if the individuals comprising the plurality over which the quantifier ranges
are conceived of singly, rather than interpreting the quantifier such that it
ranges over irreducible collections. Natural language semantics permits plu-
ral quantification into both first and second-level predicate position. For all
second-order variables ranging over a domain of individuals, one can define
a predicate denoting a plurality of individuals at the first level (cf. Rayo,
2006). Subsequently, if there is an individual which satisfies the predicate,
then the individual is a part of the extension of the predicate, i.e., the relevant
plurality of individuals . For an example in English, the predicate can be in-
terpreted such that it denotes the plurality, ’the books’. Then, an individual
satisfies the predicate if and only if it is a part of the plurality of books. It is
similarly innocuous in English to avail of plural quantification into second-
level predicate position. For all third-order variables ranging over a domain
of individuals, one can define a predicate denoting a plurality of individuals
at the second level. E.g., the predicate might be interpreted such that it de-
notes the second-level plurality, the chamber pieces, in the sentence, ’These
quartets are among her chamber pieces’. Then, the first-level plurality, the
quartets, satisfies the predicate if and only if it is a part of the second-level
plurality of chamber pieces over which the third-order plural quantifier has
been defined to range (op. cit.).
Advancing to a higher order, for all fourth-order variables ranging over a
domain of individuals, one can define a predicate which denotes a plurality
of individuals at the third level. However, there are no examples of plural
quantification into third-level predicate position in empirical linguistics, de-
spite that examples thereof can be readily countenanced in intended models
of formal languages.
The philosophical significance of the foregoing is that it is conceptually
innocuous for plural terms of an arbitrary type, iα, to satisfy a polyadic pred-
icate at iα+2th-order which denotes pluralities of type iα+1, such that plural-
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ities of the iαth-type can be defined as parts of pluralities of the iα+1th-type.
Yet – for polyadic predicates at order > 3 – the above has, as just noted,
no analogue in natural language. As follows, higher-order plural quantifica-
tion might adduce in favor of the first dogma of semantic rationalism, to the
effect that linguistic and conceptual epistemic intensions can be sufficiently
distinguished.
4.3.2 The Second Dogma
The second dogma of semantic rationalism mirrors Quine’s (op. cit.) con-
tention that another dogma of empiricism is the reduction of the meaning of a
sentence to the empirical data which verifies its component expressions. The
analogous dogma in the semantic rationalist setting states that individuation-
conditions on concepts can be provided in order to distinguish between con-
cepts unique to formal and informal domains. The significance of the second
dogma of semantic rationalism is that whether the objects falling under a
concept belong to a formal domain of inquiry will subsequently constrain its
modal profile.
In the space of epistemic possibility, it is unclear, e.g., what reasons there
might be to preclude implicit definitions such as that the real number of the
x’s is identical to Julius Caesar (cf. Frege, 1884/1980: 56; Clark, 2007) by
contrast to being identical to a unique set of rational numbers as induced
via Dedekind cuts. It is similarly unclear how to distinguish, in the space
of epistemic possibility, between formal and informal concepts, in order to
provide a principled account of when a concept, such as the concept of ’set’,
can be defined via the axioms of the language in which it figures, by contrast
to concepts such as ’water’, where definitions for the latter might target the
observational, i.e. descriptive and functional, properties thereof.
The concept of mereological parthood provides a further borderline case.
While the parthood relation can be axiomatized so as to reflect whether it
is irreflexive, non-symmetric, and transitive, its status as a formal property
is more elusive. The fact, e.g., that an order-type is part of the sequence
of ordinal numbers impresses as being necessary, while yet the fact that a
number of musicians comprise the parts of a chamber ensemble might impress
as being contingent.
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The Julius Caesar Problem
The Julius Caesar problem, and the subsequent issue of whether there might
be criteria for delineating formal from informal concepts in the space of epis-
temic modality, may receive a unified response. The ambiguity with regard
to whether the parthood relation is formal – given that its relata can include
both formal and informal objects – is similar to the ambiguity pertaining to
the nature of real numbers. As Frege (1893/2013: 161) notes: ’Instead of
asking which properties an object must have in order to be a magnitude, one
needs to ask: how must a concept be constituted in order for its extension
to be a domain of magnitudes [. . . ] a thing is a magnitude not in itself but
only insofar as it belongs, with other objects, to a class that is a domain
of magnitudes’. Frege defines a magnitude as the extension of a relation on
arbitrary domains (op. cit.). The concept of a magnitude is then referred
to as a ’Relation’, and domains of magnitudes are defined as classes of Re-
lations (162). Bypassing the rational numbers, Frege defines, then, the real
numbers as relations on – namely, ratios of – magnitudes; and thus refers to
the real numbers as ’Relations on Relations’, because the extension of the
higher-order concept of real number is taken to encompass the extension of
the lower-order concept of classes of Relations, i.e., domains of magnitudes
(op. cit.). The interest of Frege’s definition of the concept of real number is
that explicit mention must be made therein to a domain of concrete entities
to which the number is supposed, as a type of measurement, to be applied.
In response: The following implicit definitions – i.e., abstraction principles
– can be provided for the concept of real number, where the real numbers
are defined as sets, or Dedekind cuts, of rational numbers. Following Shapiro
(2000), let F,G, and R denote rational numbers, such that concepts of the
reals can be specified as follows: ∀F,G[C(F) = C(G) ⇐⇒ ∀R(F≤R ⇐⇒
G≤R)]. Concepts of rational numbers can themselves be obtained via an
abstraction principle in which they are identified with quotients of integers
– [Q〈m,n〉 = Q〈p,q〉 ⇐⇒ n = 0 ∧ q = 0 ∨ n 6= 0 ∧ q 6= 0 ∧ m x q =
n x p]; concepts of the integers are obtained via an abstraction principle in
which they are identified with differences of natural numbers – [D(〈x,y〉) =
D(〈z,w〉) ⇐⇒ x + w = y + z]; concepts of the naturals are obtained via an
abstraction principle in which they are identified with pairs of finite cardinals
– ’∀x,y,z,w[〈x,y〉(=P) = 〈z,w〉(=P) ⇐⇒ x = z ∧ y = w]; and concepts of
the cardinals are obtained via Hume’s Principle, to the effect that cardinals
are identical if and only if they are equinumerous – ∀A∀B∃R[[Nx: A = Nx:
67
B ≡ ∃R[∀x[Ax → ∃y(By ∧ Rxy ∧ ∀z(Bz ∧ Rxz → y = z))] ∧ ∀y[By →
∃x(Ax ∧ Rxy ∧ ∀z(Az ∧ Rzy → x = z))]]].
Frege notes that ’we can never [. . . ] decide by means of [implicit] defini-
tions whether any concept has the number Julius Caesar belonging to it, or
whether that same familiar conqueror of Gaul is a number or not’ (1884/1980:
56). A programmatic line of response endeavors to redress the Julius Caesar
problem by appealing to sortal concepts, where it is an essential property of
objects that they fall in the extension of the concept (cf. Hale and Wright,
2001: 389, 395). In order further to develop the account, I propose to avail
of recent work in which identity conditions are interpreted so as to reflect
relations of essence and explanatory ground. The role of the essentiality op-
erator will be to record a formal constraint on when an object falls under a
concept ’in virtue of the nature of the object’ (Fine, 1995: 241-242). The
role of the grounding operator will be to record a condition on when two ob-
jects are the same, entraining a hyperintensional type of implicit definition
for concepts which is thus finer-grained and less susceptible to error through
misidentification.
In his (2015), Fine treats identity criteria as generic statements of ground.
By contrast to material identity conditions which specify when two objects
are identical, criterial identity conditions explain in virtue of what the two
objects are the same. Arbitrary, or generic, objects are then argued to be
constitutive of criterial identity conditions. Let a model, M , for a first-order
language, L, be a tuple, whereM = 〈I, A, R, V 〉, with I a domain of concrete
and abstract individuals, A a domain of arbitrary objects, R a dependence
relation on arbitrary objects, and V a non-empty set of partial functions
from A to I (cf. Fine, 1985). The arbitrary objects in A are reified variables.
The dependence relation between any a and b in A can be interpreted as a
relation of ontological dependence (op. cit.: 59-60). Informally, from a∈A
s.t. F (a), one can infer ∀x.F (x) and ∃x.F (x), respectively (57). Then, given
two arbitrary objects, x and y, with an individual i in their range, ’[(x =
i ∧ y = i) → x = y]’, such that x and y mapping to a common individual
explains in virtue of what they are the same (Fine, 2015).
Abstraction principles for, e.g., the notion of set, as augmented so as to
record distinctions pertaining to essence and ground, can then be specified
as follows:
• Given x,y, with Set(x) ∧ Set(y): [∀z(z∈x ≡ z∈y) ←x,y (x = y)]
(Intuitively, where the ’given’ expression is a quantifier ranging over the
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domain of variables-as-arbitrary objects: Given x, y, whose values are sets,
it is essential to x and y being the same that they share the same members);
and
• Given x,y, with Set(x) ∧ Set(y): [∀z(z∈x ≡ z∈y) →x,y (x = y)]
(Intuitively: Given arbitrary objects, x, y, whose values are sets, the fact
that x and y share the same members grounds the fact that they are the
same).
Combining both of the above directions yields the following hyperinten-
sional, possibly asymmetric, biconditional:
• Given x,y, with Set(x) ∧ Set(y): [∀z(z∈x ≡ z∈y) ↔x,y (x = y)].
A reply to the Julius Caesar problem for real numbers might then avail
of the foregoing metaphysical implicit definitions, such that the definition
would record the essentiality to the reals of the property of being necessarily
non-concrete:
• Given F,G[C(F) = C(G) ↔F,G ∀R(F≤R ⇐⇒ G≤R)], and
• ∀XX/F∃Y [¬E(Y) ∧ (X = Y)]
(Intuitively: Given arbitrary objects, F,G, whose values are the real num-
bers: It is essential to the F’s and the G’s that the concept of the Fs is
identical to the concept of the G’s iff (i) F and G are identical subsets of a
limit rational number, R, and (ii) with E(x) a concreteness predicate, neces-
sarily for all real numbers, X, necessarily there is a non-concrete object Y, to
which necessarily X is identical; i.e., the reals are necessarily non-concrete.
The foregoing is conversely the ground of the identification.)4
Heck (2011: 129) notes that the Caesar problem incorporates an epis-
temological objection: "Thus, one might think, there must be more to our
apprehension of numbers than a mere recognition that they are the refer-
ences of expressions governed by HP [Hume’s Principle – HK]. Any complete
4Rosen and Yablo (2020) also avail of real, or essential, definitions in their attempt
to solve the Caesar problem, although their real definitions do not target grounding-
conditions. The need for a grounding-condition is mentioned in Wright (2020: 314, 318).
The approach here developed, of solving the Caesar problem by availing of metaphysical
definitions, was arrived at independently of Rosen and Yablo (op.cit.) and Wright (op.
cit.).
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account of our apprehension of numbers as objects must include an account
of what distinguishes people from numbers. But HP alone yields no such
explanation. That is why Frege writes: ’Naturally, no one is going to confuse
[Caesar] with the [number zero]; but that is no thanks to our definition of
[number]’ (Gl, 62)".
The condition of being necessarily non-concrete in the metaphysical def-
inition for real numbers – which includes conditions of essence and ground –
provides a reply to the foregoing epistemological objection, i.e. the required
account, beyond the abstraction principle, of what distinguishes people from
numbers.
4.3.3 Mereological Parthood
The above proposal can then be generalized, in order to countenance the
abstract profile of the mereological parthood relation. By augmenting the
axioms for parthood in, e.g., classical mereological parthood with a clause
to the effect that it is essential to the parthood relation that it is necessarily
non-concrete, parthood can thus be understood to be abstract; and truths in
which the relation figures would thereby be necessary.
• Given x: Φ(x) ∧ ∀x∃y [¬E(y) ∧ (x = y)] ↔x Γ(x) where
• Γ(x) := x is the parthood relation, <, which is irreflexive, asymmetric,
and transitive, and where the relation satisfies the axioms of classical
extensional mereology codified by the predicate, Φ(x) (cf. Cotnoir,
2014):
Weak Supplementation: x < y → ∃z[(z < y ∨ z = y) ∧ ¬∃w(w < z ∨
w = z) ∧ (w < x ∨ w = x)], and
Unrestricted Fusion: ∀xx∃y[F(y,xx)],
with the axiom of Fusion defined as follows:
Fusion: F(t,xx) := (xx < t ∨ xx = t) ∧ ∀y[(y < t ∨ y = t) → (y < xx
∨ y = xx)]
Fusions are themselves abstracta, formed by a fusion-abstraction princi-
ple. The abstraction principle states that two singular terms – in which an
abstraction operator, σ, from pluralities to fusions figures as a subformula –
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are identical, if and only if the fusions overlap the same locations (cf. Cot-
noir, ms). Let a topological model be a tuple, comprised of a set of points in
topological space, µ; a domain of individuals, D; an accessibility relation, R;
and a valuation function, V, assigning distributive pluralities of individuals
in D to subsets of µ:
M = 〈µ,D,R,V〉;
R = R(xx,yy)xx,yy∈µ iff Rxx ⊆ µxx x µxx, s.t. if R(xx,yy), then ∃o⊆µ,
with xx∈o s.t. ∀yy∈oR(xx,yy), where the set of points accessible from a
privileged node in the space is said to be open; and V = f(ii∈D, m∈µ).5
Necessity is interpreted as an interiority operator on the space:
M,xx  φ iff ∃o⊆µ, with xx∈o, such that ∀yy∈o M,yy  φ.
The following fusion abstraction principle can then be specified:
Given xx,yy,F[σ(xx,F) = σ(yy,F) ↔xx,yy [f(xx,m1) ∩ f(yy,m1) ( 6= ∅)]].
(Intuitively, given arbitrary objects whose values are the pluralities, xx,yy:
It is essential to xx and yy that fusion-abstracts – formed by mapping the
pluralities to the abstracta – are identical, because the fusions overlap the
same nonstationary – i.e., 6= ∅ – locations. The converse is the determinative
ground of the identification.)
The foregoing constraints on the formality of the parthood relation –
both being necessarily non-concrete and figuring in pluralities which serve
to individuate fusions as abstract objects – are sufficient then for redress-
ing the objections to the second dogma of semantic rationalism; i.e., that
individuation-conditions are wanting for concepts unique to formal and in-
formal domains, which would subsequently render the modal profile of such
concepts indeterminate. That relations of mereological parthood are abstract
adduces in favor of the claim that the values taken by the relation are nec-
essary. The significance of both the necessity of the parthood relation, as
well as its being abstract rather than concrete and thus being in some sense
apriori, is that there are thus compelling grounds for taking the relation to
be super-rigid, i.e., to be both epistemically and metaphysically necessary.
Finally, a third issue, related to the second dogma is that, following Dum-
mett (1963/1978: 195-196), the concept of mereological parthood might be
taken to exhibit a type of ’inherent vagueness’, in virtue of being indefinitely
extensible. Dummett (1996: 441) defines an indefinitely extensible concept
as being such that: ’if we can form a definite conception of a totality all of
whose members fall under the concept, we can, by reference to that totality,
5µ is further Alexandrov; i.e., closed under arbitrary unions and intersections.
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characterize a larger totality all of whose members fall under it’. It will thus
be always possible to increase the size of the domain of elements over which
one quantifies, in virtue of the nature of the concept at issue; e.g., the con-
cept of ordinal number is such that ordinals can continue to be generated,
despite the endeavor to quantify over a complete domain, in virtue of iter-
ated applications of the successor relation, and the concept of real number is
such that the reals can continue to be generated via elementary embeddings.
Bernays’ (1942) theorem states that class-valued functions from classes to
sub-classes are not onto, where classes are non-sets (cf. Uzquiano, 2015a:
186-187). A generalization of Bernays’ theorem can be recorded in plural set
theory,6 where the cardinality of the sub-pluralities of an incipient plurality
will always be greater than the size of that incipient plurality. If one takes
the cardinal height of the cumulative hierarchy to be fixed, then one way of
tracking the variance in the cardinal size falling in the extension of the con-
cept of mereological parthood might be by redefining the intension thereof
(Uzquiano, 2015b). Because it would always be possible to reinterpret the
concept’s intension in order to track the increase in the size of the plural
universe, the intension of the concept would subsequently be non-rigid; and
the concept would thus no longer be super-rigid.
One way in which the objection might be countered is by construing the
variance in the intension of the concept of parthood as tracking temporal
modal properties, rather than metaphysical modal properties. Then, the
relation can be necessary while satisfying full S5 – i.e., modal axioms K [(φ
→ ψ) → (φ → ψ)], T (φ → φ), and E (¬φ → ¬φ) – despite
that there can be variations in the size of the quantifier domains over which
the relation and its concept are defined. Let ↑ be an intensional parameter
which indexes and stores the relevant formulas at issue to a particular world
(cf. Hodes, 1984). The ↓-symbol is an operator which serves to retrieve,
as it were, that indexed information. Adding multiple arrows is then akin
to multiple-indexing: The value of a formula, as indexed to a particular
world, will then constrain the value of that formula, as indexed – via the
addition of the new arrows – to different worlds. Interpreting the operators
temporally permits there to be multiple-indexing in the array of intensional
parameters relative to which a formula gets its value, while the underlying
6See Burgess (2004/2008), for an axiomatization of ’Boolos-Bernays’ plural set theory,
so named after the contributions of Bernays (op. cit.) and Boolos (1984, 1985). See
Linnebo (2007), for critical discussion.
72
logic for metaphysical modal operators can be S5, partitioning the space of
worlds into equivalence classes. Formally:
↑1 ∀x∃φ ↑2 ∃y[φ(x) ↓1 ∧ φ(y) ↓2].
The clause states that, relative to a first temporal parameter in which
all of the x’s satisfying the sethood predicate are quantified over, there is –
relative to a distinct temporal parameter – another element which satisfies
that predicate. Crucially, differences in the intensional temporal indices, as
availed of in order to record variance, at different times, in the size of the
cumulative hierarchy of elements falling in the range of the parthood relation,
is yet consistent with the cardinality of the elements in the domain falling in
the range of the relation being fixed, such that the valuation of the relation
can yet be necessary.
4.3.4 Summary
In this section, I addressed objections to two dogmas of the semantic rational-
ism underpinning the epistemic interpretation of two-dimensional intensional
semantics. In response to objections to the first dogma – according to which
no distinctions can be delineated between linguistic intensions and conceptual
epistemic intensions – I noted that higher-order plural terms are conceptually
tractable although they have no analogue in natural language semantics. In
response to objections to the second dogma – according to which criteria on
distinguishing formal from informal domains unique to the extensions of var-
ious concepts are lacking, which subsequently engenders indeterminacy with
regard to the modal profiles of those concepts – I availed of generic criterial
identity conditions, in which it is essential to identical arbitrary representa-
tives of objects that they satisfy equivalence relations which are conversely
ground-theoretically determinative of the identification, and further essen-
tial thereto that they satisfy the predicate of being necessarily non-concrete.
The extensions of indefinitely extensible concepts can further be redefined
relative to distinct temporal intensional parameters, despite that the back-
ground modal logic for the intensions of the concepts partitions the domain
of worlds into equivalence classes, and thus satisfies S5. Thus, parthood can
be deemed a necessary, because abstract, relation, despite (i) temporal vari-
ance in the particular objects on which the parthood relation is defined; and
(ii) variance in the cardinality of the domain in which those objects figure,
relative to which the concept’s intensions are defined.
When Φ = xxx, ∀x,y∃Φ(Φx ⇐⇒ x = y). By the super-rigidity of
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the parthood relation, the target two-dimensional intensional formula can,
finally, be stated as follows:
If it is epistemically possible that Φx, then it is metaphysically possible
that Φx. Formally:
∀c∈C,p∈PJΦxKc,p = 1 iff ∀c’∈C,p’∈PJΦxKc′ ,p′ = 1.
Thus, the epistemic possibility of haecceity comprehension constrains the
value of the metaphysical possibility of haecceity comprehension, and – in
response to Roca-Royes and Chalmers – there is a case according to which
conceivability is a guide to a principle of modal metaphysics.
In the remainder of the paper, I will examine issues pertaining to the
determinacy of epistemic possibilities.
4.4 Determinacy and Consistency
In his (2014), Chalmers argues for the law of excluded middle, such that it is
either apriori derivable using the material conditional – i.e. ’scrutable’ – that
p or scrutable that ¬p, depending on the determinacy of p. Chalmers refers to
the case in which p must be determinate, entailing determinate scrutability,
as the Hawthorne model, and the case in which it can be indeterminate,
entailing indeterminate scrutability, as the Dorr model (259).7 Chalmers
argues that, for any p, one can derive ’p iff it is scrutable that p’ from ’p iff
it is true that p’ (262). However, ’p iff it is scrutable that p’ is unrestrictedly
valid only on Dorr’s, and not Hawthorne’s, model (op. cit.).8
Chalmers suggests that the relevant notion of consistency might be a
property of epistemic possibilities rather than metaphysical possibilities. How-
7Cf. Dorr (2003: 103-4) and Hawthorne (2005: sec. 2).
8Chalmers rejects the epistemicist approach to indeterminacy, which reconciles the
determinacy in the value of a proposition with the epistemic indeterminacy concerning
whether the proposition is known (op. cit.: 288). Consider, e.g., a color continuum,
beginning with a determinate color hue of red and terminating with a determinate color
hue of orange. By transitivity, if the determinate hue of red, x, is phenomenally similar
to the next point in the continuum, y, and y is phenomenally similar to the next point, z,
then x is phenomenally similar to z. However, iterating transitivity would entail that the
terminal color hue is red and not orange. Thus, if the culprit in the sorites paradox is the
property of transitivity, then the modal axiom which encodes transitivity (namely 4: φ
→ φ) is false. The epistemic interpretation of the axiom states that if one knows that
φ, then one knows that one knows that φ. Thus, rejecting axiom 4 entails that the cut-off
points in a sorites series are knowable, although one cannot know that one knows them.
For further discussion, see Williamson (1994).
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ever, there are general barriers to establishing the consistency of the space
of epistemic modality.
One route to securing the epistemic interpretation of consistency is via
Chalmers’ conception of idealized epistemic possibility. Conceivability is
ideal if and only if nothing rules it out apriori upon unbounded rational
reflection (2012: 143). The rational reflection pertinent to idealized conceiv-
ability can be countenanced modally, normatively, and so as to concern the
notion of epistemic entitlement. An idealization is (i) modal iff it concerns
what it is metaphysically possible for an agent to know or believe; (ii) norma-
tive iff it concerns what agents ought to believe; and (iii) warrant-involving
iff it concerns the propositions which agents are implicitly entitled to believe
(2012: 63). It is unclear whether any of (i)-(iii) in the foregoing would either
mandate belief in the claim that ’p ∧ it is indeterminate whether p’ is true, or
explain in virtue of what the conjuncts are consistent. More general issues for
the consistency of epistemically possible worlds, even assuming that the ide-
alization conditions specified in (i)-(iii) are satisfied, include Yablo’s (1993)
paradox, and Gödel’s (1931) incompleteness theorems. Yablo’s paradox is as
follows:
(S1) For all k>1, Sk is false;
(S2) For all k>2, Sk is false;
...
(Sn) For all k>n, Sk is false;
(Sn+1) For all k>n+1, Sk is false.
(Sn) says that (Sn+1) is false. Yet (Sn+1) is true. Contradiction.9
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems can be thus outlined. Relative to a
choice of (i) coding for an ω-complete, recursively axiomatizable language,
L – i.e. a mapping between properties of numbers and properties of terms
and formulas in L; (ii) a predicate, phi; and (iii) a fixed-point construction:
Let phi express the property of ’being provable’, and define (iii) s.t., for any
consistent theory T of L, there are sentences, pphi, corresponding to each
formula, phi(x), in T, s.t. for ’m’ := pphi,
|–T pphi iff phi(m).
One can then construct a sentence, ’m’ := ¬phi(m), such that L is in-
complete (the first incompleteness theorem).
Crucially, moreover, L cannot prove its own consistency:
If:
9For further discussion, see Cook (2014).
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|–T ’m’ iff ¬phi(m),
Then:
|–T C → m.
So, L is consistent only if L is inconsistent (the second incompleteness
theorem).
Another issue concerning the consistency of ’p ∧ it is indeterminate
whether p’ – let alone the foregoing general issues concerning the consis-
tency of epistemic modal space – is that Chalmers (2009: 102) endorses
the indeterminacy of metaphysical proposals such as unrestricted fusion and,
presumably, the necessity of parthood, with regard to which the epistemic
interpretation of consistency would be irrelevant (264).
To redress the issue, the metaphysical indeterminacy of ontological pro-
posals might be treated as in Barnes and Williams (2011), for whom meta-
physical indeterminacy consists in there being an unpointed set of metaphys-
ically possible worlds; i.e., a set of metaphysical possibilities, P, such that
precisifications concerning the determinacy in the values of the elements of
P leave it unsettled which possibility is actual (116, 124). If so, then meta-
physical indeterminacy will provide no new objection to the viability of the
two-dimensional intensional framework, because the conditions on ascertain-
ing the actuality of the epistemic possibility in the context – relative to which
a formula receives a value, and thus crucially determines the value of the for-
mula relative to an index which ranges over metaphysically possible worlds
– are themselves indeterminate (cf. Yablo, 2008).
The more compelling maneuver might instead be to restrict the valid
apriori material entailments to determinately true propositions; and to ar-
gue, against Chalmers’s preferred ontological anti-realist methodology, that
the necessity of parthood is both epistemically and metaphysically determi-
nately true, if true at all. The (determinate) truth of the proposition might
then be corroborated both by the consistency of its augmentation to the logic
underlying the intensional semantics, and perhaps in virtue of other abduc-
tive criteria – such as strength, simplicitly, and compatability with what is
known – on the tenability of the proposal.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
One of the primary objections to accounting for the relationship between
conceivability and metaphysical possibility via the epistemic interpretation of
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two-dimensional intensional semantics is that epistemic possibilities are pur-
portedly insensitive to modal metaphysical propositions, concerning, e.g., the
haecceitistic properties of individuals. In this paper, I have endeavored to re-
dress the foregoing objection, by noting that it relies on an unduly restrictive,
propositional view of the elements of epistemic modal space, which ignores
the interaction between epistemic possibilities and the nature of higher-order
quantification. Further objections, from both the potential indeterminacy in,
and inconsistency of, the space of epistemic possibilities, were then shown to
be readily answered. In virtue of the super-rigidity of the parthood relation,
epistemic modal space can thus serve as a guide to haecceity comprehension
principles in modal metaphysics, and thus to de re modality.
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Chapter 5
Grounding, Conceivability, and
the Mind-Body Problem
This paper argues that Chalmers’s (1996; 2010) two-dimensional conceiv-
ability argument against the derivation of phenomenal truths from physical
truths risks being obviated by a hyperintensional regimentation of the ontol-
ogy of consciousness.
Chalmers (2010) provides the following argument against the identifica-
tion of phenomenal truths with physical and functional truths. Let M be a
model comprised of a domain D of formulas; C a set of epistemic possibili-
ties; W a set of metaphysical possibilities; Rc and Rw, accessibility relations
on C and W, respectively; and V a valuation function assigning formulas to
subsets of C and W. So, M = 〈D,C,W,Rc,Rw,V〉. Let P denote the subset
of formulas in the domain concerning fundamental physics, as well as both
neurofunctional properties such as oscillations of neural populations, and
psychofunctional properties such as the retrieval of information from mem-
ory stores. Let Q denote the subset of formulas in the domain concerning
phenomenal consciousness. A formula is epistemically necessary or apriori
(), if and only if it has the same value at all points in C, if and only if it
is impossible, i.e. inconceivable, for the formula to a variant value (¬⋄¬).
A formula is negatively conceivable (⋄) if and only if nothing rules it out
apriori (¬¬) (144). A formula is metaphysically necessary if and only if it
has the same value at all points in W. A formula is said to be ‘super-rigid’,
if and only if it is both epistemically and metaphysically necessary, and thus
has the same value at all points in epistemic and metaphysical modal space
(2012: 474).
78
The two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism pro-
ceeds as follows.
The physicalist thesis states that:
P → Q.
Suppose, however, that the physicalist thesis is false. Thus,
1. ¬(P → Q).
By the definition of the material conditional,
2. ¬(¬P ∨ Q).
By the De Morgan rules for negation,
3. ¬¬P ∧ ¬Q.
By double negation elimination,
4. P ∧ ¬Q.1
‘P ∧ ¬Q’ can receive a truth value relative to two parameters, a context,
C, and an index, W. In two-dimensional intensional semantics, the value of
the formula relative to the context determines the value of the formula rela-
tive to the index. Let the context range over a space of epistemic possibilities
and let the index range over a space of metaphysical possibilities. Then,
JP ∧ ¬QKc,w = 1 iff ∃c’∈C∃w’∈WJP ∧ ¬QKc′,w′ = 1.2
1For the formal equivalence, given the definition of the material conditional, see
Chalmers (2010: 169).
2For the clause for the two-dimensional intension, see Chalmers and Rabern (2014:
212). Chalmers’ informal characterization of the argument proceeds as follows:
1. P ∧ ¬Q is conceivable.
2. If P ∧ ¬Q is conceivable, P ∧ ¬Q is [epistemically, i.e.] 1-possible.
3. If P ∧ ¬Q is 1-possible, P ∧ ¬Q is [metaphysically, i.e.] 2-possible.
4. If P ∧ ¬Q is 2-possible, then materialism is false.
Thus,
5. Materialism is false (2010: 149).
The foregoing clause codifies the thought that, if it is epistemically possible that the
truths about physics and functional organization obtain while the truths about conscious-
ness do not, then the dissociation between P and Q is metaphysically possible as well. The
argument depends on the assumption that propositions about consciousness and physics
are super-rigid, such that the epistemic possibility concerning such truths can serve as a
guide to the metaphysical possibility thereof.
If the conceivability argument is sound, then the physicalist thesis – that all phenomenal
truths are derivable from physical and functional truths – is possibly false. The foregoing
argument entrains, thereby, the metaphysical possibility of a property-based version of
dualism between phenomenal consciousness and fundamental physics.
One of the standard responses to Chalmers’s conceivability argument is to endeavor to
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argue that there are ‘strong’ necessities, i.e. cases according to which the necessity of the
physical and phenomenal formulas throughout epistemic and metaphysical modal space
is yet consistent with the epistemic possibility that the formulas have a different value.3
Note, however, that strong necessities are ruled-out, just if one accepts the normal duality
axioms for the modal operators: i.e., it is necessary that φ if and only if it is impossible
for φ to be false: φ iff ¬⋄¬φ. Thus, the epistemic necessity of φ rules out the epistemic
possibility of not-φ by fiat. So, proponents of the strong necessity strategy are committed
to a revision of the classical duality axioms.
Another line of counter-argument proceeds by suggesting that the formulas and terms at
issue are not super-rigid. Against the super-rigidity of physical truths, one might argue, for
example, that our knowledge of fundamental physics is incomplete, such that there might
be newly discovered phenomenal or proto-phenomenal truths in physical theories from
which the truths about consciousness might be derived.4 More contentiously, the epistemic
profile of consciousness – as recorded by the concepts comprising our thoughts thereof, or
by the appearance of its instantiation – might be dissociable from its actual instantiation.
A variation on this reply takes our concepts of phenomenal consciousness still to refer
to physical properties (cf. Block, 2006). A related line of counter-argument relies on
the assumption that phenomenal concepts are entities which are themselves physically
reducible (cf. Balog, 1999).
Finally, a counter-argument to the conceivability argument that has yet to be advanced
in the literature is that its underlying logic might be non-classical. Thus, for example – by
relying on double negation elimination in the inference from line 3 to 4 above – the two-
dimensional conceivability argument is intuitionistically invalid. A novel approach might
further consist in arguing that epistemic modality might be governed by the Routley-Meyer
semantics for relevant logic.5 Relevant validity can be defined via a ternary relation, such
that Jφ → ψKα = 1 iff JφKβ ≤ JψKγ and R(α,β,γ), where the parameters, α, β, and γ,
range over epistemic possibilities. Then the irrelevant entailment, φ ∧ ¬φ → ψ, can be
avoided by setting JφKβ = 1; JφKγ = 0; JψKβ = 0; while JψKγ = 1. So, JφKβ = 1; JφKγ
= 0; and JψKβ = 0. The philosophical interest of relevant logic is that it eschews the
principle of disjunctive syllogism; i.e., ∀φ,ψ[[(φ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬φ] → ψ] and ∀φ,ψ[[φ ∧ (¬φ ∨ ψ)]
→ ψ]. Without disjunctive syllogism, logical entailment can no longer be identified with
the material conditional, and this would block the derivation of line 2 from line 1 in the
two-dimensional conceivability argument.
In this essay, I will pursue a line of argument which is novel and distinct from the
foregoing. I argue, in turn, that the conceivability argument can be circumvented, when
the relationship between the truths about fundamental physics and the truths about phe-
nomenal consciousness is analyzed in a classical, hyperintensional setting. Suppose, for
example, that the physicalist thesis is defined using hyperintensional, grounding operators
rather than metaphysical necessitation.6 Then, the epistemic and metaphysical possibil-
ity that ¬(P → Q) is classically valid, although targets a less fine-grained metaphysical
connection between physical and phenomenal truths. Even if P’s grounding Q still entails
the metaphysical necessitation of Q by P, the epistemic-intensional value of ‘¬(P → Q)’ –
will be an insufficient guide to the metaphysical-hyperintensional value of the proposition.
So, even if the intension for ‘consciousness’ is rigid in both epistemic and metaphysical
modal space, the epistemic intension recording the value of the proposition will be blind
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to its actual metaphysical value, because the latter will be hyperintensional.
In the remainder of this essay, I will outline the regimentation of the proposals in
the ontology of consciousness using hyperintensional grounding operators, rather than
the resources of modality and identity.7 By contrast to the modal approach underlying
the conceivability argument, the hyperintensional regimentation targets the properties of
reflexivity and bijective mappings, in order to countenance novel, ontological dependence
relations between the properties of consciousness and physics, which are finer-grained than
necessitation.8
Following Fine (2012a; 2012b), let a polyadic operator have a ground-theoretic inter-
pretation, only if the profile induced by the interpretation concerns the hyperintensional
truth-making connection between an antecedent set of truths or properties and the relevant
consequent. Let a grounding operator be weak if and only if it induces reflexive grounding;
i.e., if and only if it is sufficient for the provision of its own ground. A grounding operator
is strict if and only if it is not weak. A grounding operator is full if and only if it uniquely
provides the explanatory ground for a fact. A grounding operator is part if and only if it
- along with other facts - provide the explanatory ground for a fusion of facts.
Combinations of the foregoing explanatory operators may also obtain: x < y iff φ is a
strict full ground for ψ; x ≤ y iff φ is a weak full ground for ψ; x ≺ y iff φ is a strict part
ground for ψ; x  y iff φ is a weak part ground for ψ; x  y ∧ ¬(y  x) iff φ is a strict
partial ground for ψ; x ≺* y iff x1, ..., xn ≤ y, iff φ is a partial strict ground for ψ; x ≺’ z
iff [φ ≺* ψ ∧ ψ  µ] iff φ is a part strict ground for some further fact, µ.9
The proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness can then be regimented in the hy-
perintensional framework as follows.
• Functionalism (modally: truths about consciousness are identical to truths about
neuro- or psychofunctional role):
Functional truths (F) ground truths about consciousness (Q) if and only if the
grounding operator is:
-strict full, s.t. F < Q
-distributive (i.e. bijective between each truth-ground and grounded truth), s.t.
∃f1−1〈F, Q〉
• Phenomenal Realist Type Identity (modally: truths about consciousness are iden-
tical to truths about biological properties, yet phenomenal properties are – in some
sense – non-reductively real).10
Biological truths (B) ground truths about consciousness (Q) if and only if the
grounding operator is:
-strict partial, s.t. B  Q ∧ ¬ Q  B;
-distributive, s.t. ∃f1−1〈B, Q〉; and
-truths about consciousness are weak part (i.e. the set partly reflexively grounds
itself), s.t. Q  Q
• Property Dualism (modally: truths about consciousness are identical neither to
functional nor biological truths, yet are necessitated by physical truths):
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Physical truths (P) ground truths about consciousness (Q) if and only if the ground-
ing operator is:
-P  Q;
-non-distributive, s.t. ¬∃f1−1〈P, Q〉; and
-truths about consciousness are weak part, s.t. Q  Q
• Panpsychism (in Non-constitutive guise: Phenomenal properties are the intrinsic
realizers of extrinsic functional properties and their roles; in Constitutive guise:
(i) fundamental microphysical entities are functionally specified and they instanti-
ate microphenomenal properties, where microphenomenal properties are the realiz-
ers of the fundamental microphysical entity’s role/functional specification; and (ii)
microphenomenal properties constitute the macrophenomenal properties of macro-
physical entities):
Truths about consciousness (Q) ground truths about functional role (F) if and only
if the grounding operator is:
-strict full, s.t. Q < F; and
-non-distributive, s.t. ¬∃f1−1〈Q, F〉
The philosophical significance of the hyperintensional regimentation of the ontology of
consciousness is at least three-fold. First, the regimentation permits one coherently to
formulate Phenomenal Reality Type Identity. Leibniz’s law states that for all proposi-
tional variables x,y and for all properties R, x = y iff (Rx ⇐⇒ Ry). According to the
Phenomenal Realist Type Identity proposal, phenomenal properties are identicial to bi-
ological properties, while phenomenal properties are in some sense non-reductively real.
Thus, in the modal setting, Phenomenal Realist Type Identity belies Leibniz’s law, on the
assumption that the latter can be applied to intensional entities. One virtue of the hyper-
intensional regimentation is thus that it avoids this result, by providing a framework with
the expressive resources sufficient to formulate the non-reductive Type Identity proposal.
Second, the hyperintensional grounding regimentation evinces how functionalist ap-
proaches to the ontology of consciousness can be explanatory, because the identification
of phenomenal properties with functional organization can be defined via the foregoing
ground-theoretic explanatory properties. Block (2015) suggests that – by contrast to Phe-
nomenal Realist Type Identity – identifying phenomenal properties with functional roles
cannot sufficiently account for the ground-theoretic explanation of the identity. Block
distinguishes between metaphysical and ontological versions of physicalism. Block’s ‘on-
tological physicalism’ is a reductive, functionalist theory, and eschews of explanation by
restricting the remit of its theory to ‘what there is’; i.e. to specifying identity statements
between entities in the domain of quantification (114). By contrast, Block’s ‘metaphysical
physicalism’ – namely, Phenomenal Realist Type Identity – purports to account for the
nature of the entities figuring in theoretical identity statements via availing of relations of
explanatory, ontological dependence (op. cit.).
Block poses the following consideration against the functionalist (117). Suppose that
there is a counterpart of a human organism with isomorphic functional properties, but
comprised of distinct biological properties. Suppose that the functional isomorph in-
stantiates phenomenal properties. Block argues that the functional isomorph ‘is like us
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Part III: Epistemic Modality, Knowledge, and Apriority
superficially, but not in any deep property that can plausibly be one that scientists will
one day tell us is the physical ground of consciousness [. . . ] So there is a key question
that that kind of reductive physicalism – ontological physicalism – does not ask nor an-
swer: what is it that creatures with the same phenomenology share that grounds that
phenomenology’ (op. cit.)? The foregoing does not provide an argument that the neuro-
and psycho-functionalist must provide an account of in virtue of what phenomenal prop-
erties are instantiated. Rather, Block suggests only that functionalist proposals do not
sufficiently inquire into the realizers of the functional roles that they specify. He suggests
that this theoretical approach would be insufficient, if one were to seek an explanation
of the psychofunctional correlations between phenomenal property types and the relevant
functional roles.
The second theoretical virtue of the hyperintensional regimentation is thus that it
demonstrates how Block’s analysis might be circumvented. Functionalism can be regi-
mented within the logic of hyperintensional ground; and can therefore satisfy the formal
requirements on explaining in virtue of what phenomenal truths ontologically depend upon
functional truths [cf. Khudairi (op. cit.)].11
Third, and most crucially: The regimentation demonstrates how metaphysically pos-
sible relations between consciousness and physics cannot be witnessed by epistemic con-
straints, when the latter are recorded by the conceivability – i.e., the epistemic possibility
– thereof. Propositional epistemic modality is blind to the hyperintensional, metaphysical
dependencies holding between phenomenal and physical truths. Thus, the two-dimensional
conceivability argument against the derivation of phenomenal truths from physical truths
risks being obviated by a hyperintensional regimentation of the ontology of consciousness.
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Chapter 6
Attention, Phenomenal
Content, and Inexact
Knowledge
6.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to precisify the relations between the phenomenologi-
cal effects of attention and the veridicality-conditions of perceptual states.
Bayesian perceptual psychology provides a model which explains how per-
ceptual states can be understood as possessing conditions of accuracy or
veridicality. Once unconscious perceptual representational states have been
derived by the visual system, a further issue concerns the conditions that are
necessary and sufficient for the perceptual states to become phenomenally
conscious. The most promising candidate for at least a necessary condition
on the instantiation of phenomenal properties on perceptual representational
states is the operation of the mechanisms of attention. Problematically, how-
ever, the distribution of attentional mechanisms has been confirmed as en-
training an additional effect, according to which attention to features or
properties – such as color-saturation, contrastivity, gap size, and the size
of moving stimuli – significantly changes the perceived value of the target
property. The effect is prevalent, computationally tractable, and systematic.
Thus, one crucial question concerns whether the attentional effects entail
that the perceptual states are illusory. If so, then the effects of attention
in changing the perceived value of phenomenal properties raises a dilemma
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concerning whether the correctness-conditions on perceptual states are ever
normally satisfied.
In this chapter, I argue that the foregoing dilemma is not robust. Four is-
sues must be distinguished: (i) the first issue concerns the accuracy-conditions
of unconscious perceptual states; (ii) the second issue concerns the accuracy-
conditions of phenomenal properties; (iii) the third issue concerns how at-
tention alters the perceived value of phenomenal properties, once the per-
ceptual states have become conscious; and (iv) the fourth issue concerns
how the accuracy-conditions of perceptual states interact with the concept
of knowledge. Issue (i) is well-understood.1 There are promising approaches
to issue (ii).2 Issue (iii) has further been carefully documented.3 The re-
maining issue is therefore issue (iv); i.e. the question of how the satisfaction
of the constitutive-conditions for perceptual representations interacts with
the concept of knowledge. The concept of knowledge – and of phenomenal
knowledge, in particular – has been examined and made precise by avail-
ing of epistemic modal logic, with applications to subjective probability and
vagueness. I argue, then, that the concept of knowledge is not immediately
relevant to issue (i): Although they interact in philosophically significant
ways, Bayesian perceptual state space is distinct from epistemic logic. The
remaining question concerns, then, the epistemic status of the properties of
phenomenal consciousness, in virtue of the value-altering functions of at-
tention. I argue that phenomenal properties are low-level properties – such
as color-hue, shape, and orientation – and that accuracy-conditions for the
properties can be constructed via a category-theoretic semantics. When at-
tention alters the perceived value of a phenomenal property, then the typed
arrow that represents the property might subsequently not be able to figure
in the composition of the concatenation of arrows which ultimately maps to
the values, [0,1], in the co-domain. However, that result is consistent with
the value of the phenomenal property still being known, and thereby factive.
Thus, the phenomenological effects of attention affect neither the knowledge
nor the factivity of the phenomenal properties at issue; and a precise explana-
1For the loci classici, see Egan (2010) and Burge (2010). See Section 2, for further
discussion.
2See, inter alia, Dretske (1995); Tye (2000); Byrne (2009); Siegel (2010); and Chalmers
(2010). Chalmers’ approach is targeted, below, in Section 3.
3For a survey of the empirical results relevant to the phenomenological effects of at-
tention, see Carrassco (2011). For the locus classicus with regard to the philosophical
significance of the results, see Block (2010). See Section 4, for further discussion.
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tion can be provided of the manner in which the attentional effects indirectly
bear on the contents of phenomenal consciousness.
The chapter has, accordingly, two aims. The first is to provide a precise
account of the manner in which the properties of phenomenal consciousness
can be understood to possess accuracy-conditions. The present account will
be limited to examining sensory phenomenal properties. Whether phenom-
enal properties can also be unique to each of cognitive, conative, emotional
and ethical attitudes is a topic requiring separate treatment. The second aim
of the chapter is to examine how content relates to knowledge.
In Section 2, I detail the constitutive conditions for perceptual represen-
tational states. In Section 3, I provide a critical discussion of an approach to
phenomenal accuracy-conditions, which avails of the epistemic interpretation
of two-dimensional intensional semantics. I examine several general issues for
the the foregoing approach, which I argue adduce against the application of
the semantic framework to phenomenal representation. In turn, I provide
a novel proposal of the veridicality-conditions for phenomenal properties. I
demonstrate how the proposal is empirically adequate, by constitutively in-
corporating both the empirical results concerning the kinds of attention and
the model-theoretic properties availed of in vision science. I aim, thereby,
to provide a formally tractable account of the manner in which phenomenal
properties can precisely compose via a category-theoretic semantics; and I
argue that this concatenation of phenomenal properties into propositional
form – assessable for accuracy or veridicality – explains the nature of the
correctness-conditions for phenomenal consciousness. In Section 4, I exam-
ine how the formal properties of content relate to the logic of knowledge. I
argue that the phenomenological effects of attention affect neither the sat-
isfaction of phenomenal knowledge nor the factivity thereof, and that the
value-altering effects of attention bear on phenomenal content only by tar-
geting its component parts, in a manner similar to how changes in the seman-
tic values of sub-sentential expressions might affect the truth-condition for
the sentence that the component expressions comprise. Section 5 provides
concluding remarks.
6.2 Perceptual Representation
In order to explain the visual system’s derivation of representation-conditions,
the model availed of in contemporary vision science is a Bayesian frame or
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state space. (I will prescind, in what follows, from specifying a valuation
function for spaces, and focus just on frames.) The frame is Bayesian, be-
cause the probability measures defined on the frame satisfy the Kolmogorov
axioms.4 In a Bayesian frame, 〈Ω, Pr〉, the states at issue are possibilities
concerning the source of retinal, sensory information. The frame is closed
under complementation and intersection, such that a σ-algebra is defined
thereon. Crucially, the frame is pointed. The visual system computes which
of the possibilities in the state frame has the highest probability of being
actual.5 In the frame of possibilities, the state with the highest probability
of being actual is referred to as the constancy. The constancies – of, e.g.,
lightness and distance – comprise accuracy-conditions on the attribution of
spatial properties – e.g., volume and boundedness – to distal particulars. The
constancies are thus identified with the constitutive conditions of unconscious
perceptual representations.
It is a point of contention whether the representational properties en-
trained by the visual system’s computations entail that the computational
properties are constitutively representational (cf. Burge, op. cit.; Rescorla,
2013), or are only subsequently interpreted as specifying content (cf. Egan,
op. cit.; Chalmers, 2012). However, it is sufficient for the purposes of this
note that representational properties are at least entailed by the visual sys-
tem’s computational properties – i.e., the derivation of the constancies – as
modeled above.
In the following section, I will discuss two approaches to specifying the
accuracy-conditions for the properties of phenomenal consciousness, by con-
trast to those for unconscious perceptual states. The first avails of two-
dimensional semantics on its epistemic interpretation. I target several, gen-
eral issues for the two-dimensional approach, and – in turn – propose a novel
account of the accuracy-conditions which is based upon a category-theoretic
semantics.
4The axioms are normality – ’Pr(T) = 1’; non-negativity – ’Pr(φ) > 0’; additivity –
for disjoint φ and ψ, ’Pr(φ ∪ ψ) = Pr(φ) + Pr(ψ)’; and conditionalization – ’Pr(φ|ψ) =
Pr(φ ∩ ψ) / Pr(ψ)’.
5Cf. Mamassian et al (2002).
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6.3 Phenomenal Representation
6.3.1 The Two-stage Theory of Phenomenal Content
According to the two-dimensional intensional approach alluded to above, a
distinction can be drawn between perfect and imperfect correctness-conditions
for phenomenal properties. The approach has accordingly been termed the
’two-stage’ theory (cf. Chalmers, 2010: 402-418). I will argue that there are
reasons to believe that the theory is conceptually problematic and empiri-
cally implausible. I will then proceed to outline a positive proposal of the
accuracy-conditions for phenomenal properties, and I argue that the proposal
is able to circumvent the issues adumbrated for the two-stage account.
According to the two-stage theory, a relation of matching is stipulated to
exist between perfect and imperfect properties. The accuracy-conditions for
perfect properties are epistemically possible, although not metaphysically
actual (413). Via conceivability or exercises of the imagination, individu-
als are acquainted with perfect accuracy-conditions for possible phenome-
nal properties (op. cit.). The correctness-conditions are thus individuated
by intensions defined on a space of epistemically possible worlds. Perfect
contents are referred to as ’Edenic’ (op. cit.: 403), although – because of
the role of conceivability in acquaintance with such accuracy-conditions – I
will occasionally contrive to deploy the more evocative, ’Transcendent’ (Tr).
Transcendent acquaintance with non-actual, possibly satisfiable accuracy-
conditions for perfect phenomenal properties is thus purported to admit of
phenomenal presentation (406). By contrast, actually satisfiable, ordinary
accuracy-conditions for the imperfect, instantiated phenomenal properties –
sullied by noise and illusion – are claimed to constitute phenomenal repre-
sentation (op. cit.).
Ordinary phenomenal representations are themselves claimed to take two
distinct forms, Fregean (Fr) and Russellian (Rs). Fr is satisfiable if and
only if ’its object has the property that normally causes a phenomenally red
experience’ (403). Rs is satisfiable if and only if the accuracy-condition is
’object-involving’, s.t. ’it involves a specific object O, and its satisfaction
depends on the properties of O’ (385), if and only if ’its object has physical
redness’ (403).
Why stipulate that there are at least two types of accuracy-condition:
the ordinary and imperfect, by contrast to the transcendent and perfect?
Chalmers argues that ’phenomenally red experience is imperfectly veridical
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iff its object instantiates a property that matches perfect redness’ (404-5).
He avers that perfect accuracy-conditions – although epistemically and meta-
phyiscally possible but non-actual – are ’fundamental’ (405, 413). Thus,
as a transcendent though non-actually possible ’regulative ideal’, a perfect
accuracy-condition ’determines the ordinary [Fr accuracy-condition] of the
experience’ (405-406), where the Fr-condition itself bears a relation to the
Rs-condition.
The general framework for the foregoing proposal is the epistemic inter-
pretation of two-dimensional intensional semantics. According to the ap-
proach, the counterfactual assessment of the values taken by a term or for-
mula is determined by the value antecedently assigned to the term or for-
mula in an epistemically possible world, ascertained by various means as
being actual. Similarly, with regard to the foregoing ’two-stage’, pluralis-
tic approach to the accuracy-conditions of phenomenal consciousness: (i) a
function, ’∀x.fTr(x)’, is specified in an ideal or vindicated, non-actual epis-
temically possible world, mapping terms and formulas therein to; (ii) a dis-
tinct set of functions, fFr(x) – where the latter are intensions, i.e., functions
from a set of epistemic worlds designated as actual to extensions; and (iii)
the extension of the intension, fFr(x), is then fRs, i.e. itself a function from
metaphysically possible worlds to extensions.
The foregoing proposal is coherent, and possesses the virtue of simulta-
neously accommodating several kinds of accuracy-condition for phenomenal
properties. However, there are crucial issues for the approach that merit
mention.
The first issue concerns the empirical adequacy of the transcendental
method associated with the epistemic interpretation of two-dimensional in-
tensional semantics. By contrast to this aprioristic, top-down method, an
empirically adequate theory of accuracy-conditions might instead (i) demand
a (non-reductive) naturalistic explanation, in which the relevant conditions
of empirical adequacy first target the accuracy-conditions of unconscious per-
ceptual representations, as augmented by specifying the associated biological
property types and functional properties such as those of attention; and (ii)
only subsequently examine the instantiation- and correctness-conditions of
the phenomenal properties that are instantiated thereon. There is thus a
sharp distinction between:
(*) the transcendent method of stipulating ab initio that there are con-
ceivable accuracy-conditions for non-actual perfect properties – taking the
latter to be explanatorily fundamental and apriori determining of ordinary
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accuracy-conditions for phenomenal states; and
(**) the abductive method of endeavoring first to specify the interac-
tion between biological properties, functional organization, and unconscious
representation, and then examining how such empirical properties might con-
stitute phenomenal representation.
Consistently with naturalistic conditions on theory choice, I will pursue,
in Section 4 below, the method detailed on alternative (**).6
Chalmers argues that a perfect, conceivable accuracy-condition
(i) ’determines the ordinary content of the experience’ (405-406), and that
(ii) ’phenomenally red experience is imperfectly veridical iff its object
instantiates a property that matches perfect redness’ (404-5). To assess the
consistency of these claims, we must be more precise.
What are the relata of the matching-relation? The quotation cited in
(ii) claims that an ordinary phenomenal property possesses an imperfect
correctness-condition if and only if the ordinary phenomenal property matches
a non-actual conceivable perfect phenomenal property. The quotation in (i)
claims that ideally conceivable accuracy-conditions for perfect properties in
some way determine the ordinary accuracy-conditions of imperfect proper-
ties. So, by (ii), matching relates phenomenal properties, where matching
between perfect and imperfect properties grounds imperfect content. By (i),
perfect content determines imperfect content. So, imperfect content both is
determined by perfect content, and holds in virtue of the matching-relation
between perfect and imperfect properties.
How can a set of accuracy-conditions determine a distinct set of accuracy-
conditions? If ’determine’ in this setting is regimented as concerning func-
tions on intensions, then the proposal might be innocuous, modulo the em-
pirical adequacy of the suggestion.
How can the matching-relation between a non-actual epistemically possi-
ble phenomenal property and a metaphysically actual phenomenal property
explain in virtue of what an accuracy-condition is specified? What would ap-
pear to be required is an account of how the matching-relation between dis-
tinct properties (perfect and imperfect) explains the correctness-conditions
6The present, abductive approach may be compared to the ’method of phenomenal
contrast’ advanced by Siegel (op. cit.). By contrast to the method of phenomenal con-
trast, which examines the contrasting etiology between two phenomenal properties, the
present approach first targets the constitutive conditions of unconscious perceptual rep-
resentational states, and then the conditions necessary and sufficient for the instantiation
of phenomenal properties on such states.
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of one of the properties (imperfect) (op. cit.: 404). If imperfect content
is determined by perfect content, then it is unclear what could be gained
by endeavoring to explain in virtue of what the imperfect content is further
specified, and availing of some relation between two properties of which the
target content is relevant to only one of the properties.
What Chalmers does note about the proposed matching-relation is that
it is a function interpreted as expressing a causal dependence relation (430).7
However, even if one were to concede for the sake of argument that causation
ought generally to back explanation, it remains unclear how a causal relation
between distinct properties can explain the correctness-conditions for one of
them. Yet this is precisely what is claimed in the passage: ’phenomenally
red experience is imperfectly veridical iff its object instantiates a property
that [causally] matches perfect redness’ (404-5).
A final issue for the proposal concerns the very idea of the causal interpre-
tation of the matching-relation, as applied to perfect and imperfect phenom-
enal properties. Perfect phenomenal properties are ideally conceivable but
not-actual, and thus not actually instantiated. Imperfect phenomenal prop-
erties are actually instantiated. How then can a non-instantiated property
bear a causal relation to an instantiated property?8
In the following section, I will proffer a positive proposal, which aims to
circumvent the issues examined above. The proposal that I will develop: (i)
targets and explains the accuracy-conditions for phenomenal properties; and
(ii) is empirically adequate, by being consistent both with the functional and
phenomenological effects of attention and with the Bayesian model theory
availed of in vision science.
6.3.2 Category-theoretic Semantics for Phenomenal Rep-
resentation
In this section, I provide a precise account of the manner in which phenomenal
properties can be formally concatenated via a category-theoretic semantics,
in order to take propositional form. The general idea behind the semantics
is that phenomenal properties are represented by typed arrows, or functions.
Typed arrows can thereby be concatenated, via complex predication, and the
7’[A] property matches a given perfect property (for a given subject) if the property is
the normal cause of the associated phenomenal property (in that subject)’ (op. cit.).
8The objection is owing to Joshua Habgood-Coote (p.c.).
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concatenation of the arrows map to the values, {0,1}, in the co-domain. The
precise conditions for the category-theoretic semantics are as follows.With ⊢
encoding a representation relation,
c ⊢ ’being in pain’ iff ’ic → αi’, and
c ⊢ ’x is in pain’ iff [β]•αi: ’ic → b’
iff
c ⊢ ’being in pain’ denotes f1, and
c ⊢ ’x is in pain’ denotes [[β]• f1](x), where
b: (zn → z) = [β] = ’(ic∈C)n → ic’ as a T-function
= 〈 〉 → True, iff z = {0,1}, s.t.
b0(F) if z = 0, and
b1(T) if z = 1.
Int = IntC Jβf1K ⊆ [C ⊆ Ω], s.t.
βf1 → True
iff
M  βf1 iff Jβf1K = ic∈C, and
M  ic ⇐⇒ ic ⊆ C.
Attentional processing has been demonstrated as being a necessary con-
dition on the instantiation of phenomenal properties. Of the kinds of atten-
tion, however, the deployment of object-based attention has been challenged
as a necessary condition, because of cases in which the minimal resolution
of conscious object-based perception is greater than the minimal resolution
of object-based attention; such that more objects can be consciously per-
ceived than attended to (cf. Block, 2013). The necessity of endogenous,
or top-down, attention has been challenged, as well, conditional on the lo-
calization of the fundamental neural correlates of consciousness to occipito-
thalamic pathways (cf. Tsuchiya et al, 2012). However, exogenous atten-
tion, property-based attention, and spatial-based distributions of attention
remain plausible candidates for a necessary condition on the instantiation of
phenomenal properties. The attentional mechanisms at issue can be defined
psychofunctionally, by their role both in unifying the perception of distinct
properties, and in making information available to working memory. The
attentional mechanisms at issue can further be defined neurofunctionally, as
measured by timed, firing-rate oscillations of neural populations.
Taking stock: I have sought to provide a critical examination of the two-
stage theory of phenomenal representation, and subsequently endeavored to
outline a positive, alternative proposal. Phenomenal representations can
be specified via the category-theoretic construction outlined above, and the
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approach was shown both to retain the virtues, and to redress the pitfalls,
unique to the two-stage approach.
6.4 Attention and Inexact Knowledge
In this section, I examine, finally, how attention bears on the accuracy-
conditions of phenomenal properties, and how phenomenal content is related
to phenomenal knowledge.
Phenomenal content interacts with epistemic modal space in at least two
ways, depending on whether epistemic modality is interpreted as concerning
states of knowledge (the box operator) or belief (the diamond operator), or
whether epistemic modality is interpreted as concerning apriority (box) or
conceivable scenarios (diamond). In what follows, I will focus on the logic of
knowledge and belief, although the interpretation which targets conceivabil-
ity and apriority merits further discussion.
The foregoing category-theoretic semantics is governed by the modal sys-
tem, S4. S4 is obtained by the following axioms: K - ’(φ → ψ) → (φ →
ψ)’; T - ’φ → φ’; and 4 - ’φ → φ’. The topological interpretation is
sound and complete for propositional, first-, and higher-order S4 (cf. McKin-
sey and Tarski, 1944; Awodey and Kishida, 2007; Lando, 2010; and Awodey
et al., 2014). The logic of knowledge has similarly been shown at least not
to satisfy S5, on pain of sanctioning decidability for the consistency of the
subject’s epistemic theory of the world. It would be a virtue of the subject’s
epistemic theory, if the theory’s consistency were decidable. However, if the
theory were decidable, then it would entail its own consistency, in tension
with Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem to the effect that, for a first-
order, consistent, recursively axiomatizable language of arithmetic in which
a sentence attributing the property of unprovability to itself can be defined,
the language is consistent only if it is inconsistent (cf. Williamson, 2009).9
Thus, to avoid the condition that the subject’s consistent, epistemic theoriz-
ing exceeds the computational power of a Turing machine, the modal system
governing the subject’s epistemic theory cannot validate the conjunction of
axioms 4 and E, i.e. S5 and the sublogics thereof (Williamson, op. cit.).
Counterexamples to the transitivity of knowledge have also been witnessed
9For further discussion of the provability of consistency, and the justification to believe
that the background language of the theory is consistent, see Wang (1974: 317-321);
Reinhardt (1986: 465-472); Wright (1995); and Detlefsen (1995: 116).
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by the sorites paradox and by the phenomena of improbable knowing.10 In
the sorites paradox, suppose that there is a bounded continuum, beginning
with a determinate hue of orange and terminating with a determinate hue
of red. Transitivity in the model would entail that if one of the bounds of
the interval is a hue of orange, then – by transitivity – a matching relation
defined on the subsequent points would entail that the remainder of the con-
tinuum is orange, contrary to the hypothesis. Thus, transitivity is argued
not to hold in the model. On the epistemic interpretation of indeterminacy,
if transitivity does not hold, then knowledge of one’s epistemic status does
not hold, although one’s state of knowledge itself – as represented by a sole
instance of the box operator – remains unscathed. The example provides,
then, an instance of epistemic indeterminacy. Generalizing, one can con-
struct a model according to which transitivity does not hold. Let Mk be a
model, s.t. Wk = {a,b,c}; ak = {a,b}; bk ={a,b,c}; ck = {b,c}; Vk(φ), φ a
closed formula = {a,b}. Thus, 〈Mk,a〉  φ; but not 〈Mk,b〉  φ. So, it is
not the case that 〈Mk,a〉  φ; so transitivity does not hold in the model.
Thus, while the topological interpretation of the logic of phenomenal con-
tent is S4, the logic of knowledge is KT. Given the discrepancy between the
modal systems governing, respectively, the logic of knowledge and the cal-
culus of categories for phenomenal content, the foregoing provides a prelim-
inary argument that phenomenal knowledge is dissociable from phenomenal
content; and that the former is more fundamental – because more computa-
tionally basic –than the latter.
How, then, do the phenomenological effects of attention bear on the
accuracy-conditions for phenomenal properties? Phenomenal properties fall
into two types. The first type of phenomenal property is the property of
awareness of one’s perceptual states. The second type of phenomenal prop-
erty targets the secondary qualities; for example, pain, color-saturation, and
other low-level properties. Because the accuracy-conditions are computa-
tionally derived, it would thus be mistaken to argue that attention alters
the experience of unconscious perceptual states. Rather, attention alters the
perceived value of low-level phenomenal properties, such as color-saturation
and gap size.
Block (2010; 2015) has argued for a conclusion similar to the foregoing: no
misrepresentation is entrained when attention alters the perceived value of a
property. However, in the present framework, the proposal can be extended.
10See Williamson (1994) and Williamson (2014), for further discussion.
94
Block’s proposal converges with the idea that phenomenal properties – even
if not being assessable for accuracy – can still be known. So, the instantiation
of phenomenal properties, as modulated by the phenomenological effects of
attention, is not illusory, and is instead factive. The foregoing suggests that,
in the phenomenal setting, a constraint similar to Frege’s context principle
is belied. Thus, to ask how the value-altering effects of attention bear on
phenomenal properties is comparable to inquiring into the semantic values
of various lexical items. How variation in the semantic values bears on the
entire truth-condition for the sentence of which the component expressions
are only a part – and, similarly, how variation in the values of phenomenal
properties bears on the concatenation of the proxies for the properties via the
category-theoretic semantics outlined above – is a separate, and not entirely
contentious, issue. That the expressions have semantic values, and that phe-
nomenal properties can also have various values, can be known and is thus
factive. If so, then the variable effects of attention target only the component
parts which comprise the more complex states that are assessable for truth
or accuracy.
6.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I have endeavored to provide a precise account of the accuracy-
conditions of phenomenal consciousness, and to explain how the phenonomeno-
logical effects of attention interact with both phenomenal content and phe-
nomenal knowledge. Instantiation of a phenomenal property is consistent
with knowledge thereof, even if the perceived value of the property is altered
in virtue of the phenomenological effects of attention. I argued, finally, that
phenomenal properties do not themselves have accuracy-conditions, but are
only assessable for veridicality via a form of complex-predication that can
be captured by the category-theoretic framework. The derivative effects of
attention on the accuracy-conditions of phenomenal consciousness are thus
consistent with the inexact knowledge, and thus the factivity, thereof.
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Chapter 7
Non-Transitive Self-Knowledge:
Luminosity via Modal
µ-Automata
This essay provides a novel account of self-knowledge, which avoids the epis-
temic indeterminacy witnessed by the invalidation of modal axiom 4 in epis-
temic logic; i.e. the KK principle: φ→φ. The essay argues, by contrast,
that – despite the invalidation of modal axiom 4 on its epistemic interpreta-
tion – states of epistemic determinacy might yet be secured by countenancing
self-knowledge on the model of fixed points in monadic second-order modal
logic, i.e. the modal µ-calculus.
Counterinstances to modal axiom 4 – which records the property of tran-
sitivity in labeled transition systems, i.e., the relational semantics for modal
logic1 – have been argued to occur within various interpretations of the sorites
paradox. Suppose, e.g., that a subject is presented with a bounded contin-
uum, the incipient point of which bears a red color hue and the terminal
point of which bears an orange color hue. Suppose, then, that the cut-off
points between the points ranging from red to orange are indiscriminable,
such that the initial point, a, is determinately red, and matches the next
apparent point, b; b matches the next apparent point, c; and thus – by
transitivity – a matches c. Similarly, if b matches c, and c matches d, then
b matches d. The sorites paradox consists in that iterations of transitivity
would entail that the initial and terminal points in the bounded continuum
1Cf. Kripke (1963).
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are phenomenally indistinguishable. However, if one takes transitivity to be
the culprit in the sorites, then eschewing the principle would entail a rejection
of the corresponding modal axiom (4), which records the iterative nature of
the relation. Given the epistemic interpretation of the axiom – namely, that
knowledge that a point has a color hue entails knowing that one knows that
the point has that color hue – a resolution of the paradox which proceeds by
invalidating axiom 4 subsequently entrains the result that one can know that
one of the points has a color hue, and yet not know that they know that the
point has that color hue (Williamson, 1990: 107-108; 1994: 223-244; 2001:
chs. 4-5). The non-transitivity of phenomenal indistinguishability can then
provide a structural barrier to higher-order knowledge of one’s first-order
states. The foregoing result holds, furthermore, in the probabilistic setting,
such that the evidential probability that a proposition has a particular value
may be certain – i.e., be equal to 1 – while the iteration of the evidential
probability operator – recording the evidence with regard to that evidence –
is yet equal to 0. Thus, one may be certain on the basis of one’s evidence that
a proposition has a particular value, while the higher-order evidence with re-
gard to one’s evidence adduces entirely against that valuation (Williamson,
2014).
The argument eschews ’safety’ as a necessary condition on knowledge,
for which Williamson’s (2001) approach explicitly argues and as codified
by margin-for-error principles of the form: ∀x∀φ[Km+1φ(x) → Kmφ(x+1)]’
(Williamson, 2001: 128; Gómez-Torrente, 2002: 114); i.e., that if one knows
– relative to a margin which ranges over a world accessible from the ac-
tual world, m – that an object satisfies a property, then a distinct similar
object satisfies that property in the actual world. Intuitively, the safety con-
dition ensures that if one knows that a predicate is satisfied, then one knows
that the predicate is satisfied in relevantly similar worlds. Williamson tar-
gets the inconsistency of margin-for-error principles, the luminosity principle
[’∀x∀φ[φ(x) → Kφ(x)’], and the characterization of the sorites as occurring
when an object satisfies a property, such that similar objects would further
do so. The triad evinces, arguably, that the safety condition is not satisfied
in the sorites, s.t. knowledge does not obtain, and the luminosity principle
is false. In cases, further, in which conditions on knowledge are satisfied,
epistemic indeterminacy is supposed to issue from the non-transitivity of the
accessibility relation on worlds (1994: 242).
One of the primary virtues of the present proposal is thus that it targets
the property of transitivity directly, because transitivity both engenders the
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sorites paradox on the assumption that the states are known and the property
is codified by the epistemic modal axiom for transitivity, i.e., 4 or the KK
principle. By so doing, it permits a uniform interpretation of transitivity
in the sorites – as codified by the KK principle – such that it applies not
only to epistemic accessibility relations whose obtaining is relevant to the
safety condition, but further to the logical property and its explanatory role
in engendering the paradox.
A second virtue adducing in favor of the foregoing, ’epistemicist’ approach
to vagueness – which takes the latter to be a phenomenon of epistemic in-
determinacy – is that vagueness can be explained without having to revise
the underlying logic. The epistemicist approach is consistent with classical
logical laws, such as e.g. the law of excluded middle; and thus it can deter-
minately be the case that a point has a color hue; determinately be the case
that the next subsequent point has a distinguishable color hue; and one can
in principle know where in the continuum the cut-off between the two points
lies – yet vagueness will consist in the logical limits – i.e. the non-transitivity
– of one’s state of knowledge. Thus, one will not in principle be able to know
that they know the point at which the color hues are dissimilar.
In this essay, I endeavor to provide a novel account which permits the re-
tention of both classical logic as well as a modal approach to the phenomenon
of vagueness, while salvaging the ability of subjects to satisfy necessary con-
ditions on self-knowledge. I will argue that – despite the invalidity of modal
axiom 4, given the non-transitivity of the similarity relation – a distinct
means of securing an iterated state of knowledge concerning one’s first-order
knowledge that a particular state obtains is by availing of fixed point, non-
deterministic automata in the setting of coalgebraic modal logic. Propo-
sitional modal logic is equivalent to the bisimulation-invariant fragment of
fixed point monadic second-order logic.2 The fixed point higher-order modal
logic is referred to as the modal µ-calculus, where µ(x) is an operator record-
ing a least fixed point. Despite the non-transitivity of sorites phenomena
– such that, on its epistemic interpretation, the subsequent invalidation of
modal axiom 4 entails structural, higher-order epistemic indeterminacy – the
modal µ-calculus provides a natural setting in which a least fixed point can
be defined with regard to the states instantiated by non-deterministic modal
automata. In virtue of recording iterations of particular states, the least
fixed points witnessed by non-deterministic modal automata provide, then,
2Cf. Janin and Walukiewicz (1996).
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an escape route from the conclusion that the invalidation of the KK prin-
ciple provides an exhaustive and insuperable obstruction to self-knowledge.
Rather, the least fixed points countenanced in the modal µ-calculus provide
another conduit into subjects’ knowledge to the effect that they know that
a state has a determinate value. Thus, because of the fixed points defin-
able in the modal µ-calculus, the non-transitivity of the similarity relation
is yet consistent with necessary conditions on epistemic determinacy and
self-knowledge, and the states at issue can be luminous to the subjects who
instantiate them.
In the remainder of the essay, we introduce labeled transition systems,
the modal µ-calculus, and non-deterministic Kripke (i.e., µ-) automata. We
recount then the sorites paradox in the setting of the modal µ-calculus, and
demonstrate how the existence of fixed points enables there to be iterative
phenomena which ensure that – despite the invalidation of modal axiom 4 –
iterations of mental states can be secured, and can thereby be luminous.
A labeled transition system is a tuple comprised of a set of worlds, M;
a valuation, V, from M to its powerset, P(M); and a family of accessibility
relations, R. So LTS = 〈M,V,R〉 (cf. Venema, 2012: 7). A Kripke coalgebra
combines V and R into a Kripke functor, σR; i.e. the set of binary morphisms
from M to P(M) (op. cit.: 7-8). Thus for an s∈M, σ(s) := [σV (s), σR(s)]
(op. cit.). Satisfaction for the system is defined inductively as follows: For a
formula φ defined at a state, s, in M,
JφKM = V(s) 3
J¬φKM = S – V(s)
J⊥KM = ∅
JTKM = M
Jφ ∨ ψKM = JφKM ∪ JψKM
Jφ ∧ ψKM = JφKM ∩ JψKM
J⋄sφKM = 〈Rs〉JφKM
JsφK
M = [Rs]JφKM , with
〈Rs〉(φ) := {s’∈S | Rs[s’] ∩ φ 6= ∅} and
[Rs](φ) := {s’∈S | Rs[s’] ⊆ φ} (9).
In propositional dynamic logic (PDL), 〈π〉φ abbreviates that some exe-
cution of a non-deterministic computable program entrains the information
state contained in φ, where computability is here defined in accord with the
Church-Turing thesis that a function is effectively computable if and only if
3Alternatively, M,s  φ if s∈V(φ) (9).
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it is partial and recursive, as co-extensive with the class of λ-definable terms
and the class of finite, discrete-state automata such as Turing machines (cf.
Church, 1936; Turing, 1937). [π]φ abbreviates that all executions of a non-
deterministic computable program entrains the information state contained
in φ. Complex operations in propositional dynamic logics may then obtain
(cf. Blackburn and van Benthem, 2007: 59-61). A Choice principle states
that the union of π1 and π2 may be formed, such that the logic executes
either π1 or π2. A Composition principle states that there is an operation
π1;π1, such that the logic first executes π1 and then executes π2. An Iteration
principle defines a program, π*, where π* entrains the execution of π a finite
number of times. Finally, a Test principle defines a program, π?, where π?
can comprise the following algorithms: ’(π?;a) ∪ (¬π?;b)’, which states that
if a program π obtains, then a obtains, else b obtains; ’a;(¬π?;a)*;π?’, which
states that the logic will repeat the execution, a, a finite number of times
until the program π is tested; and ’(π?;a)*;¬π?’, which states that while a
program π is being executed a finite number of times, do a (op. cit.: 59-60).
The modal µ-calculus is then defined as follows. Recall again the foregoing
Iteration principle from PDL, 〈π*〉φ (Venema, op. cit.: 25). In our Kripke
colagebra, we thus have M,s  〈π*〉φ ⇐⇒ (φ ∨ ⋄s〈π*〉φ) (op. cit.). 〈π*〉φ
is thus said to be the fixed point for the equation, x ⇐⇒ φ ∨ ⋄x, where
the value of the formula is a function of the value of x conditional on the
constancy in value of φ (op. cit., 38). The smallest solution of the formula,
x ⇐⇒ φ ∨ ⋄x, is written µ.xφ ∨ ⋄x (25). The value of the least fixed point
is, finally, defined more specifically thus:
Jµ.xφ ∨ ⋄xK = V(φ) ∪ 〈R〉(Jµ.xφ ∨ ⋄xK) (38).
A non-deterministic automaton is a tuple A = 〈A, δ, Acc, aI〉, with
A a finite set of states, aI being the initial state of A; δ is a transition
function s.t. δ: A → P(A); and Acc ⊆ A is an acceptance condition which
specifies admissible conditions on δ (60, 66). A Muller acceptance condition
is defined as a subset of A, α ⊆ P(A), such that Accα := {s∈Aω | Inf(s) ∈ α)}
(intuitively: the admissible states are the infinite states in a deployment of
the transition function) (60). A Büchi condition is a subset β ⊆ A, such that
Accβ := {s∈Aω | Inf(s) ∩ β 6= ∅} (intuitively: an operation of the transition
function passes through the state s infinitely often) (op. cit.). Finally, a
parity condition is defined via a mapping, Ω: A → ω, such that AccΩ :=
{s∈Aω | max{Ω(s) | s ∈ Inf(s)} is an even number} (intuitively: Ω is the
largest natural number occurring infinitely often in the sequence of states
figuring as input to δ, and such that the automaton accepts a particular
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infinite state iff Ω is even (op. cit.).
Let two Kripke models A = 〈A, a〉 and S = 〈S, s〉, be bisimilar if and only
if there is is a non-empty binary relation, Z ⊆ A x S, which is satisfied, if:
(i) For all a∈Aand s∈S, if aZs, then a and s satisfy the same proposition
letters;
(ii) The forth condition. If aZs and R△a,v1 . . . vn, then there are v1 . . . v’n
in S, s.t.
• for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) viZv’i, and
• R’△s,v’1 . . . v’n;
(iii) The back condition. If aZs and R’△s,v’1 . . . v’n, then there are v1 . . .
vn in A, s.t.
• for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) viZv’i and
• R△a,v1 . . . vn (cf. Blackburn et al, 2001: 64-65).
Bisimulations may be redefined as relation liftings. We let, e.g., a Kripke
functor, K, be such that there is a relation K! ⊆ K(A) x K(A’) (17). Let Z
be a binary relation s.t. Z ⊆ A x A’ and P!Z ⊆ P(A) x P(A’), with
P!Z := {(X,X’) | ∀x∈X∃x’∈X’ with (x,x’)∈Z ∧ ∀x’∈X’∃x∈X with (x,x’)∈Z}
(op. cit.). Then, we can define the relation lifting, K!, as follows:
K! := {[(π,X), (π’,X’)] | π = π’ and (X,X’)∈P!Z} (op. cit.).
Finally, given the Kripke functor,K,K can be defined as the µ-automaton,
i.e., the tuple A = 〈A, δ, Ω, aI〉, with aI∈A defined again as the initial state
in the set of states A; Ω defined once more as the foregoing parity acceptance
condition; and δ defined as a mapping such that δ : A→ P∃(KA), where the
∃ subscript indicates that (a,s)∈A x S → {(a’,s) ∈ K(A) x S | a’ ∈ δ(a)} =
Ω(a), and (a’,s) ∈ K(A) x S if and only if {Z ⊆ A x S | [a’, σ(s)] ∈ K!(Z)}
= 0 (93).
The philosophical significance of the foregoing can now be witnessed by
defining the µ-automata on an alphabet; in particular, a non-transitive set
comprising a bounded real-valued, ordered sequence of chromatic properties.
Whereas Ω, in the above parity mapping, is identified with the largest even
number occurring infinitely often in the alphabet over which the automaton
is defined, the Muller acceptance condition would appear to be more suitable
for a background language of real-valued, chromatic properties. The Kripke
functor whose acceptance conditions are Muller permits us, subsequently, to
define fixed points relative to arbitrary points comprising the non-transitive
sequence. Thus, although the non-transitivity of the ordered sequence of
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color hues belies modal axiom 4, such that one can know that a particular
point in the sequence has a particular value although not know that one
knows that the point satisfies that value, the perceived constancy of the
chromatic values, φ, in the non-transitive set of colors nevertheless permits
every sequential input state in the µ-automaton to define a fixed point. With
δMx(x’) := 〈δ〉S[x 7→x′], the transition function can then satisfy the Muller
condition relative to each point in the continuum, such that δMx(x’) iff V(φ
∪ 〈R〉(x’) iff V(φ) ∪ 〈R〉(Jµ.xφ ∨ ⋄xK) (38).
The epistemicist approach to vagueness relies, as noted, on the epistemic
interpretation of the modal operator, such that the invalidation of transi-
tivity and modal axiom 4 (φ → φ) can be interpreted as providing a
barrier to a necessary condition on self-knowledge. Crucially, µ-automata
can receive a similar epistemic interpretation. Thus, interpreting the µ-
automaton’s Kripke functors epistemically permits the iterations of the set
of functions – as defined by the fixed points relative to the arbitrary points
in the ordered continuum – to provide a principled means – distinct from
the satisfaction of the KK principle – by which to account for the pertinent
iterations of epistemic states unique to an agent’s self-knowledge.
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Chapter 8
Bayesian Apriority
This chapter aims to provide a precise formulation of the dependence rela-
tions between the apriori and aposteriori epistemic profiles of mental states.
The significance of the result concerns the following. One delineation of the
distinction between the target notions individuates the aposteriori by its ev-
idential and enabling roles. An aposteriori truth satisfies the evidential role,
if its epistemic import is one of either justification or knowledge. An apos-
teriori truth satisfies the enabling role, if the relation to which it stands to
apriori truths is one of dependence, without entraining evidential justification
thereby. An argument against the robustness of the distinction between the
notions of the apriori and aposteriori can then proceed by arguing that the
aposteriori stands in some intermediate relation to the apriori. If the aposte-
riori bears this intermediate relation to the apriori, then, the argument runs,
’there is no significant epistemological difference between’ the two notions
(cf. Williamson, 2013: 300).
In this chapter, I endeavor to reverse the foregoing argument. I argue
that there is an alternative means of formally defining and understanding
the foregoing terms, and that it is a theoretical virtue of the account that it
is sufficient for capturing the intermediary conditions, between the enabling
and evidential. I demonstrate how precisifying the multiple relations of de-
pendence between the apriori and aposteriori: (i) can yield a better grasp of
the distinct epistemic contributions of each epistemic property; and (ii) can
further capture the properties of other notions pertinent to the resolution of
the puzzles which concern the varieties of epistemic source.
In Section 2, I provide definitions for the terms and proposals at issue,
and I discuss the properties of their interaction. In Section 3, I provide an in-
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formal characterization of the framework, as well as of the desiderata that the
model is intended to secure. In Section 4, I provide the formal regimentation
of the model characterized informally in 3. In Section 5, I demonstrate how
the framework can be applied, in order to provide a resolution to a puzzle
concerning the justification for immunity to error through misidentification.
Finally, a second extension of the model is examined, in order to account for
the precise interaction between epistemic modality and the semantic values
of deontic modality. The signficance of the last extension is a precise account
of the relations between apriority, explanation, and epistemic responsibility.
Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
8.1 Definitions
Williamson provides the following provisional definitions for the terms, ’apri-
ori’, ’aposteriori’, ’dependence’, and ’experience’ (op. cit.: 292-294).
The dependence relation holds (i) between the apriori and aposteriori
profiles, on the one hand, and instances of experience types; and (ii) between
the notions of the apriori and the aposteriori themselves.
With regard to the remit of (i): A means of generating an epistemic state
is apriori if and only if it is independent of experience. A means of generating
an epistemic state is aposteriori if and only if it depends on acquaintance with
instances of an experience type.
With regard to the remit of (ii): An apriori mental state, A, can depend
on an aposteriori mental state, M , if and only ifM satisfies the enabling role.
An aposteriori mental state enables an apriori mental state if and only if M
individuates the concepts comprising A, but is otherwise silent with regard
to the status of A as sufficiently comprising justification or knowledge (op.
cit.).
Finally, an entity is an instance of an experience type, either if the entity
is a token of ’outer’ sense and comprises sensory phenomenal properties and
perceptual intentional states, or if the entity is a token of ’inner’ sense and
comprises cognitive phenomenal properties unique to an agent’s cognitive
states of belief and introspection (op. cit.).
Williamson’s taxonomy provides a compelling approach to the delineation
of the notions of apriority and aposteriority. However, in the remainder of
the chapter, I will endeavor to outline and develop an alternative, precise
framework, which will aim to capture more of the defining theoretical con-
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tours of each notion. I will argue, then, that a more fine-grained approach is
necessary, in order to help illuminate the reasons for which a division between
the apriori and aposteriori is theoretically robust.
8.2 An Informal Characterization of the The-
ory
Let the 1-intension of a sentence be a function from the sentence at an epis-
temically possible world to its semantic value. The 2-intension of a sentence
is a function from the sentence at a metaphysically possible world to its
semantic value. A sentence is super-rigid if and only if it is individuated
relative to both the 1- and 2-parameters – i.e., its full 2D-intension – and is
then true in all epistemically possible worlds and true in all metaphysically
possible worlds. A sentence is conceivable if and only if it is epistemically
possible, true at some epistemically possible world. A sentence is apriori
if and only if it is epistemically necessary, true at all epistemically possible
worlds if and only if it is inconceivable for the sentence to be false. A sentence
is aposteriori if and only if it is either metaphysically possible, true at some
metaphysically possible world, or metaphysically necessary, and thus true at
all metaphysically possible worlds.
There are four crucial points at which the apriori can precisely depend
upon the aposteriori, so defined.
(I) The first crux concerns the second-order implicit definitions for the
first-order terms in epistemic and metaphysical logical space. Because they
define the extensions of terms through the whole of epistemic and meta-
physical logical space, second-order implicit definitions must themselves be
epistemically necessary (i.e., apriori) and metaphysically necessary. To cap-
ture this idea, second-order implicit definitions can be understood as being
modally factive apriori. A sentence is modally factive apriori if and only if
it is de iure epistemically necessary and further witnessed by metaphysically
possible worlds. Crucially, then, the condition precisifies a formal dependence
relation between the apriority of concepts and the metaphysical properties
which serve to individuate them. Working backward: At metaphysical worlds
where the sentence is false, this would entrain the falsity of the sentence’s
1-intension, and thereby compromise its apriori status.
(II) The second crux precisifies further the status of the modally fac-
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tive apriority of second-order implicit definitions, by introducing subjective
Bayesian confirmation measures and demonstrating the relevance thereof.
The subjective probability operators which figure in the confirmation rela-
tions are themselves defined on epistemically possible worlds. However, the
measures provide conditions for how second-order implicit definitions of first-
order terms can relate to evidential confirmation.
(III) The third crux concerns the individuation-conditions on the inten-
sions and propositions in epistemic modal space. Intensions are functions
from epistemically possible worlds to their extensions. However, one problem
with simply availing of this interpretation as it stands is that the extension
of terms and formulas in the space of an agent’s epistemic possibilities con-
sidered as actual has traditionally been taken to be a paradigm of narrow or
internal content (cf. Chalmers, 2012). To avoid this result, one can argue
that there are non-descriptive, externalist conditions on the intensions and
propositions comprising epistemic modality. On the approach here advanced,
the universe at issue is the cartesian product of (i) a Bayesian perceptual
state space, and (ii) the space of states of information comprising epistemic
modality.
(IV) The fourth crux concerns, finally, the status of hyperintensional op-
erators, when interpreted as concerning the epistemic explanatory connec-
tion between truths. Beyond the subjective Bayesian confirmation measures,
which again express the relation between second-order implicit definitions
and evidence, grounding operators express the epistemically explanatory con-
nection between epistemic norms and the confirmation measures for subjec-
tive probability. Grounding operators express, then, in virtue of what the
subjective Bayesian confirmation measures, which codify the relation between
evidence and second-order implicit definitions, are true epistemic norms.
The explanatory connection is epistemic, because the operator is defined
on the space of epistemic possibilities, i.e. global states of information. Epis-
temic explanatory ground coincides, in part, with the notion of the ’rela-
tivized apriori’, as advanced in Friedman (2001). Friedman (op. cit.) argues
that scientific theories are relativized apriori, if there is a plurality of distinct
sets of laws which figure as transcendentally ’presupposed’, constitutive con-
ditions in the models of the theory (as historically evinced by the advent of
non-Euclidean geometry). Hyperintensional operators defined on epistemi-
cally possible worlds capture the explanatory dependence among truths in
epistemic modal space. Epistemic hyperintensional dependence can thus be
defined as a species of the relativized apriori, given the multitude of logics
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and axioms one might endorse in constructing intended models which aim to
satisfy abductive conditions on theoretical adequacy.
An iterated grounding operator explains in virtue of what a previous
grounding operator is sufficiently explanatory. Once the epistemic explana-
tory bridge between, e.g., formal confirmation measures and epistemic norms
has been forged, an inquiry arises as to in virtue of what the epistemic norms
are valid. Thus, grounding operators at higher-order provide an explanation
of the first-order explanatory connection between epistemic norms and con-
firmation measures. For example, higher-order grounding operators target
the explanation with regard to which logic ought to govern the antecedent,
explanatory connection between confirmation measures and the epistemic
norms implicated by first-order grounding. Iterated grounding operators
serve to explain, e.g., which assignment of logical values to credences are
tautologous. The issue of which values in the inductive logical setting are
tautologies would potentially yield a revisionary bearing on other probabilis-
tic principles, such as Normality – which claims that certainty will map to 1
if the logic is classical, or .5 in three-valued paraconsistent and paracomplete
logics – and on the Regularity principle – which claims that a sentence, φ, is
epistemically possible only if it has a non-zero probability.
Suppose, then, that there is an epistemic explanatory connection, such
that the validity of an epistemic norm depends upon one’s choice of logic.
Validity provides an interesting test case. Field (2008) draws, for example, on
Curry’s Paradox, in order to argue against identifying validity with necessary
truth-preservation. The argument from Curry’s Paradox is such that – by
truth-introduction [’φ→ T(φ)’] and truth-elimination [’T(φ → φ’] – one can
derive the following.
φ ⇐⇒ [T(φ) → ⊥]
T(φ) ⇐⇒ [T(φ) → ⊥]
T(φ) → [T(φ) → ⊥]
[T(φ) ∧ T(φ)] → ⊥ (by importation)
T(φ) → ⊥
[T(φ) → ⊥] → T(φ)
T(φ)
⊥
The paradox is intended to demonstrate that necessary truth-preservation
entails contradiction. However, the argument need not be valid, if one retains
truth-introduction and truth-elimination, and yet opts for a weaker logic.
One can preserve truth-introduction and truth-elimination, by availing of
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the strong Kleene valuation scheme, such that the value of φ is ungrounded;
i.e. maps to .5.1 One can then add an indeterminacy operator, such that it
is not determinately true that φ and it is not determinately true that not φ;
so, it is indeterminate whether φ. Field argues, in virtue of the foregoing,
that validity ought not to be identified with necessary truth-preservation,
and ought instead to be taken as primitive.
The grounding operator comes in types and with distinct interpretations.
While the traditional interpretation has targeted the metaphysical interpre-
tation of the explanatory grounding operator, the above proposal is that the
operator can be interpreted as an epistemic explanatory connection. How-
ever, the two interpretations can interact. Thus, the validity of an epistemic
norm might fully depend, for its explanation, on one’s choice of logic. How-
ever, one’s choice of logic might partly depend for its explanation on con-
siderations from metaphysics. To complete the present example, suppose
that the epistemic norm in question concerns validity. As its epistemic ex-
planatory ground, grasp of the notion of validity will depend on one’s choice
of logic, e.g., K3 and indeterminacy. Beyond, though, its merits as a fix
to the alethic paradoxes, in virtue of what should one adopt K3? The in-
quiry targets an iteration of the grounding operator, concerned now with the
metaphysical explanation for adopting the logic. Here is one such metaphys-
ical consideration: Suppose that one distinguishes between fundamental and
derivative metaphysical states of affairs. The fundamental states of affairs
might concern the entities located in 3n-dimensional spacetime, such as the
field represented by the wavefunction. The derivative states of affairs might
concern the entities located in lower, 3-dimensional spacetime, such as the
clouds. One can then say that the fundamental states of affairs take the
classical values, [0,1]. In order to capture the priority of the fundamental to
the derivative, one can argue that the derivative states of affairs are governed
by K3 and indeterminacy, such that – while fundamental states are always
either true or false – it is not determinate that a derivative state of affairs
obtains, and it is not determinate that a derivative state of affairs does not
obtain.2
1Cf. Kleene (1952).
2Russell (2013: 12-14) advances a ’factuality’ operator, which nearly converges with
the metaphysical application of K3 and indeterminacy that I have proposed here. One
major difference between the approaches is that Russell does not provide a definition of
’It is factual that’, preferring to take the notion as primitive. He works, further, in a two-
valued setting. The application of the factuality operator is intended to capture both the
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In this manner, there can be an epistemic explanatory connection between
the status of an epistemic norm such as validity and the status of one’s choice
of logic. As evinced by the foregoing, there is, furthermore, a metaphysical
ground for the epistemic explanatory connection: One’s choice of logic can
be partly grounded by considerations of metaphysical dependence.3
In the following section, I will examine how the foregoing conditions can
be formally expressed. Section 5 examines one of two applications of the
model. The first extension of the model is to the puzzle of first-person im-
munity, and exploits the apparent tension between apriority and aposterior-
ity. I demonstrate how – by availing of the present framework – a resolution
to the puzzle can be forthcoming. The second extension of the model is to
an account of how the space of epistemic modality and the space of deontic
modality on various interpretations can precisely interact.
The significance of the framework is that it demonstrates how – rather
than undermining the distinction between the apriori and the aposteriori –
the multiple, fine-grained relations between evidential and enabling condi-
tions are crucial: (i) for a resolution of the various puzzles that derive from
notion of the qualitative and the types of objectivity: Factual propositions are qualitative,
and thus taken to supervene on perfectly natural properties. Thus, propositions mapping
to 1 can be ’factually defective’ and satisfy only deflationary conditions on their truth,
whereas there are also propositions mapping to 1 whose factuality is in some sense more
realistic. Russell argues, then, that there are possibilities that are not possible worlds,
because possibilities can be factual or non-factual depending on whether they supervene
on the qualitative, natural properties of the worlds in which they exist. By contrast, the
proposal that I have outlined is that K3-plus-indeterminacy is sufficient for capturing the
metaphysical distinction between fundamental states of affairs and derivative states of
affairs.
3Another example of how one’s choice of logic might depend upon considerations of
metaphysics is Fine’s (2013) truthmaker semantics for intuitionistic logic. Considerations
of how states and fusions thereof can provide an exact verification for derivative states
might vindicate, for this purpose, the adoption of intuitionist negation. A third example,
which is unique in targeting sub-structural logic, can be found in Cotnoir’s (2015) work
on Abelian intensional mereology. A mereological group is intensional if and only if two
groups with the same parts are distinct. Thus, in some sense, the parts can figure more
than once in the whole. This would be a violation of mereological ’Idempotence’, which
states that ’If x is a part of y, then the sum of x and y is identical to y’. There might, e.g.,
be distinct, admissible ways of counting the parts of a whole, such that the parts figure
more than once therein. Further, if the parts of a whole can be multiply located at a time,
then this might be an instance in which the parts of the whole can be witnessed more
than once. So, if mereological groups are intensional, then one’s logic ought to invalidate
Idempotence.
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the interaction between the apriori and aposteriori; and thus (ii) for wit-
nessing the epistemological significance of the distinction between the two
notions.
8.3 The Formal Regimentation
This section provides a formal account of the informal theory proffered in the
last section. I provide informal elucidations of the formal clauses, subsequent
to defining them precisely. The informal definitions adumbrated in the pre-
vious section are further intended to provide an intuititive characterization
of the formalism.
8.3.1 Epistemic Modality
• 1-Intension:
pri(x) = λv.JxKv,v
(the two parameters relative to which x obtains its value are epistemi-
cally possible worlds).
• 2-Intension:
secv@(x) = λw.JxK
v@,w
(the value of x is relative to a parameter for the space of epistemically
possible worlds, one of which is designated as actual. The value of x
relative to the first parameter determines the value of x relative to the
second parameter for the space of metaphysically possible worlds).
The foregoing conceivable intensions are individuated by mental images,
where the latter are a species of phenomenal property type. Phenomenal
properties are defined on a state space, Ω, which represents the possibilities
concerning, e.g., the direction of a light source.
• Phenomenal Properties
Comprehension:
Comp = λα∀x.α(x)⇐⇒ A
with α not free in A.
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Phenomenal properties are picked out by the concepts thereof.
• Phenomenal Concepts
Γ denotes a 2nd-order concept
Γ[λα1.[α1(v)]] = Γ[λα2.[α2(v)]] iff µ
where v is bound by a universal quantifer ranging over a domain of
individuals, D = {x1 . . . xn}; αi denotes a member of the domain of
phenomenal properties; and µ is a condition in which neither xi nor αi
occur free.
Concepts of phenomenal character can be defined by availing of the epis-
temic interpretation of two-dimensional intensional semantics. Phenomenal
concepts are individuated by double-indexed intensions, where the intensions
are de iure epistemically and subjunctively rigid, s.t.
• Super-rigidity (2D-Intension):
JΓKc,w = 1 ⇐⇒ ∀c’,w’JΓKc′,w′ = 1
The super-rigidity condition for phenomenal concepts is intended to se-
cure the idea that there is no gap between knowledge or the appearance of a
certain phenomenal property – e.g., pain – and the metaphysical instantiation
thereof.
Phenomenal properties do not merely float free of reality, possessed by
no-one and further unencumbered by empirically tractable instantiation-
conditions. The best candidate for a necessary condition on the instantiation
of phenomenal properties on Bayesian perceptual state space is the operation
of some kinds of attention. The kinds of attention include exogenous atten-
tion; endogenous attention; spatial-based attention; object-based attention;
and property-based attention. If the grain of attention is coarser than the
grain of conscious object-based perception, then object-based attention can-
not figure as a necessary condition (cf. Block, 2013). Endogenous attention
might, furthermore, fail to be a necessary condition, if the fundamental neu-
ral correlates of consciousness are ultimately localized to the operations of
attention and vectorwave activity restricted to occipito-thalamic pathways
(cf. Tsuchiya et al, 2013). Exogenous, spatial-based, and property-based
attention are thus the remaining candidates for being necessary conditions
on the instantiation of phenomenal properties. For the purposes of this note,
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the necessary functional properties of the relevant kinds of attention can be
targeted at the neurofunctional, rather than psychofunctional, level. They
can be captured, e.g., by the ’Normalization Model’, according to which ’re-
sponses of neurons are divided by a common factor that typically includes
the summed activity of a pool of neurons’ (Carandini and Heeger, 2011: 51.
See also Reynolds and Heeger, 2009; and Chirimuuta, 2014):
• Normalized Attention
E¯i(n) =
Ei(n)
s2+
∑
i
Ei(n)
4
A random variable maps the possibilities in Ω to the values in the [0,1]
interval. The random variable is interpreted as a probability density. The
probability density is governed by the Kolmogorov axioms: namely, normality
(which states that the probability of a tautology maps to 1); non-negativity
(which states that the probabilty operator must take a non-negative value),
and additivity (which states that for all disjoint probability densities, the
probability of their union is identical to the probability of the first density
added to the probability of the second). The phenomenal properties defined
on Bayesian perceptual state space provide a non-descriptive and potentially
externalist condition on the individuation of the intensions defined on epis-
temic worlds. The individuation can be codified by taking the cartesian
product of Ω and epistemic modal space, V.
• Normality
Pr(T) = 1
• Non-negativity
Pr(φ) ≥ 0
• Additivity
If φ and ψ are disjoint, then,
Pr(φ ∪ ψ) = Pr(φ) + Pr(ψ)
• Epistemic Necessity (Apriority):
JφKv,w = 1⇐⇒ ∀v′JφKv,v′ = 1
(φ is true at all points in epistemic modal space).
4Ei(n) denotes the firing-rate of a neural cell at certain oscillations, and s is a constant
which encodes response saturation, i.e. the strength of sensory inputs as encoded by Ei(n).
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• Epistemic Possibility
J⋄vφKiv 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ JPrφKiv 6= ∅ ∧ >.5, else 〈∅, Priv(φ | ∅)〉, where iv
designates an agent’s state of information in a context.
(φ might be true if and only if its value is not null and it is greater
than .5).
• Metaphysical (2-)Necessity:
JφKv,w = 1⇐⇒ ∀w′JφKv,w′ = 1
(φ is true at all points in metaphysical modal space).
• Super-rigidity (2D-Intension):
mat(φ) = JφKv,w = 1 ⇐⇒ JφKv′,w′ = 1
(the intension of φ is rigid in all points in epistemic and metaphysical
modal space).
• Modally Factive Apriority:
!(φ) = ∀v′JφKv′,v′ = 1 ∧ ∃w′JφKw,w′ = 1
(φ is true at all points in epistemic modal space, and is further true at
one metaphysically possible world).
8.3.2 Multidimensional-Intensional Implicit Definition
• ![’Γ(x) = Γ(y)’ iff •],
where • denotes the set of conditions jointly necessary and sufficient
for the identity and distinctness of Γ.
8.3.3 Evidential Confirmation
Let Φ denote the second-order implicit definition for the concept, Γ.
Let R denote the set of Bayesian confirmation relations between experi-
ence types, E, and Φ.
Then, R = {[Pr(Φ|E) - Pr(Φ)] ∨ [log[Pr(Φ|E)/Pr(Φ)]] ∨ [log[Pr(E|Φ)/Pr(E|¬Φ)]
∨ . . . }
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8.3.4 Grounding Structure
• G(Epstm, R)
An operator has a ground-theoretic interpretation, only if the profile in-
duced by the interpretation concerns the explanatory connection between an
antecedent set of truths and the relevant consequent.
We follow here the presentation in Fine (2012a, 2012b). Let a grounding
operator be weak if and only if it induces reflexive grounding. A grounding
operator is strict if and only if it is not weak. A grounding operator is
full if and only if it uniquely provides the explanatory ground for a truth.
A grounding operator is part if and only if a truth provides part of the
explanation for a larger set of truths in which it figures.
Let Ψ denote the set of epistemic norms. Then:
• Ψ < R
if and only if Ψ is a strict full ground for R
• Ψ ≤ R
if and only if Ψ is a weak full ground for R
• Ψ ≺ R
if and only if Ψ is a strict part ground for R
• Ψ  R
if and only if Ψ is a weak part ground for R
• Ψ  R ∧ ¬(R  Ψ)
if and only if Ψ is a strict partial ground for R
• Ψ ≺* R
if and only if Ψ1, . . . , Ψn ≤ R,
if and only if Ψ is a partial strict ground for R;
• Ψ ≺’ R
if and only if [Ψ ≺* µ ∧ µ  R],
if and only if Ψ is a part strict ground for R.
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8.3.5 Iterated Ground
• G3[G2[G1(Ψ, R)]] ⇐⇒ G2(L-truth, Ψ) and G3(•, L-truth),
where the interpretation of G1 and G2 concerns, as above, the epistemic
explanatory connection between the truths at issue, the interpretation
of G3 concerns the metaphysical explanatory connection, and • desig-
nates members of the set of metaphysical truths.
8.3.6 Apriority and Abduction
• φ ≺ ψ,
where φ := ’A’; and ψ := ’A ∧ B’
(suppose that A is apriori and A ∧ B is apriori. Then, A provides a
strict part explanatory ground for the conjunction of A and B).
The foregoing provides the formal clauses for the model that was infor-
mally characterized in Section 3 above. In the following sections, I endeavor
to demonstrate the philosophical significance of the model, by exploring
extensions of the framework, both to the conditions on immunity to error
through misidentification, and to the precise interaction between epistemic
and deontic modalities. The puzzles exploit a more coarse-grained approach
to the dependence relations between apriority and aposteriority. I examine,
in turn, how the more fine-grained approach developed here is able to provide
a resolution to each of the puzzles.
8.4 The First-Person Concept
8.4.1 The Empirical and Metaphysical Selves
In this section, I examine an extension of the present model to the resolution
of a puzzle – immunity to error through misidentification – which hinges on
the contrasting etiology and epistemic profiles of intentional states.
Fine (2005) distinguishes between two properties of subjectivity (312).
The first is the property of being a ’metaphysical self’. The second is the
property of being an ’empirical self’. A subject instantiates the property of
being an empirical self if and only if the subject instantiates empirical prop-
erties (313). A subject instantiates the property of being a metaphysical self
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if and only if a set of first-personal facts is indexed to that subject (314). The
empirical properties that are instantiated by the subject, and which individ-
uate their property of being an empirical self, are constitutive of the contents
individuating the property of being a metaphysical self (317). Thoughts in
which the first-person concept figures can thus be provisionally captured as
follows: The first-person concept has as its extension the property of be-
ing a metaphysical self, if and only if, and because, (i) the concept has as
its extension the set of first-personal facts that are indexed to a particular
individual, and (ii) the individual instantiates the empirical properties com-
prising the set of first-personal facts. Thus, in the thought, ’I am NN’, the
first-person concept picks out the property of being the ’subject at which the
egocentric facts obtain’ (316). Fine avers that, in a proper set of egocentric
facts, thoughts in which the first-person concept figures have the effect of
’restricting egocentric reality to the experience of experiences that only [a
unique individual] can have’ (318).
We can be more precise. The empirical self is the set of experiences: (i)
instantiated by an individual, and (ii) comprising the egocentric facts.
• ES
λη∃ιx.({w: i1, . . . , in} = η)](x)
The metaphysical self is the property of being the subject at which the
egocentric facts obtain, the second-order property of instantiating the first-
order property, η:
• MS
λMλη.[∃x[M(η)]](x).
I will take the set of egocentric facts to refer to an individual’s total phe-
nomenal evidence. Phenomenal evidence is comprised of phenomenal prop-
erties. Given the conditions on phenomenal properties that were specified in
Section 4, the first-person concept can, finally, be identified as follows:
• The First-Person Concept
I(x) = I(y) iff ληλM∃ιx.({w: i1, . . . , in} = η)](x) ∧ [M(η)](x)
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8.4.2 Super-Rigidity and Immunity
Evans (1985: 307) defines the first-person concept as follows:
• λγ.RI(γ, x, t),
if
• Identification:
γ = x.
γ denotes a primitive mode of presentation; x denotes the objctive profile
of an individual; and t denotes an instant of time.
Cases in which the satisfaction conditions on Identification are met
are standardly referred to as cases of ’immunity to error through misidenti-
fication’ (cf. Shoemaker, 1968; Evans, 1982: 215).5 Among the satisfaction
conditions that have been proffered are:
(*) a species of default, apriori entitlement to presuppose Identification
(cf. Wright, 2012); and
(**) the contrasting proposal that Evans’ primitive mode of presentation is
reducible to proprioceptive and other sensory properties, which are unique
to the individual who instantiates them (cf. Recanati, 2007: Ch. 6).
The formal and philosophical considerations adduced in Section 4 demon-
strate that both the defining contours of (*) and (**) are correct. Only
one, unique individual can satisfy the instantiation-conditions on the set of
sensory phenomenal properties, which individuate that unique individual’s
second-order property of being a metaphysical self.
With regard to (*):
The apriority of the entitlement to presuppose Identification is secured
by both the definition of apriority as epistemic necessity, and the modal
profile of phenomenal intentional properties. Phenomenal intentional states
are de iure epistemically rigid. Phenomenal concepts thus pick out the
same unique set of properties in all epistemically possible worlds.
5Cf. Pryor (1999), for a generalization of Evans’ principle and the Identification
component to all singular terms and the objects that they serve to designate.
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With regard to (**):
The epistemic rigidity of the constitutive properties falling under the
first-person concept is consistent with the evidential satisfaction conditions
on Identification, in virtue of the following. The precise mechanism by
which the set of phenomenal properties uniquely belongs to an individual,
and comprises the second-order property of being a unique metaphysical
self, just is the modal profile of phenomenal properties. Phenomenal
intentional states are subjunctively rigid. Phenomenal concepts thus denote
the same unique set of properties at all metaphysically possible worlds.
Hence, the first-person concept picks out the unique individual to whom
a unique set of constitutively de iure epistemically and metaphysically rigid,
phenomenal intentional properties can be attributed. The modal profile of
phenomenal properties – i.e., the property of being de iure epistemically
and metaphysically rigid – is not reducible to the empirical instantation-
conditions of the latter. Rather, the empirical properties availed of in the
foregoing possess an implicitly modal profile. The significance of examining
the relevant empirical instantiation-conditions – captured, e.g., by the precise
models of attentional mechanisms and the perceptual state space on which
phenomenal properties are defined – is a naturalistically adequate explana-
tion, both of the properties of empirical and metaphysical selfhood, and of the
manner in which an individual’s personal identity can be identical with their
epistemically modalized yet modally factive, total phenomenal evidence.
8.4.3 Immunity and Indeterminacy
In the foregoing, the points in the Bayesian state space on which phenome-
nal intentional properties are defined was assumed to take classical maximal
values. However, there are cases in which the truth of the Identification
principle exhibits a species of indeterminacy, both on its epistemic and meta-
physical interpretations.
One example of indeterminacy with regard to the extension of the first-
person concept might be Anscombe’s (1975) sensory deprivation scenario.
Anscombe writes:
’[I]magine that I get into a state of ’sensory deprivation’. Sight is cut
off, and I am locally anaesthetized everywhere, perhaps floated in a tank of
tepid water; I am unable to speak, or to touch any part of my body with any
other. Now I tell myself ’I won’t let this happen again!’ If the object meant
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by ’I’ is this body, this human being, then in these circumstances it won’t
be present to my senses; and how else can it be ’present to’ me? But have I
lost what I mean by ’I’? Is that not present to me? Am I reduced to, as it
were, ’referring in absence’ (op. cit., 57)?
Anscombe’s objection rests on the assumption that thoughts in which the
first-person concept figures are entertainable, only if the concept picks out
the subject of egocentric facts (i.e., a set of phenomenal properties) at the
instant of time that the thought is entertained. The present proposal rejects
such an assumption. The identity-conditions on the first-person concept are
the instantation, by an individual, of a set of phenomenal properties – i.e.,
the empirical self – and the second-order predication of that set of properties
to the individual – i.e. the metaphysical self. Immunity to error through
misidentification is justified because phenomenal properties have an implic-
itly modal profile. Knowledge and the concepts of phenomenal character
have the property of being de iure epistemically rigid. Knowledge and con-
cepts of phenomenal properties are also de iure subjunctively rigid. Thus,
there is no gap between the appearance of the phenomenal properties which
individuate the first-person concept and their actual metaphysical instantia-
tion. The extension of the concept is de iure epistemically and subjunctively
rigid, if and only if the individuation-conditions on the concept have, at
some time in the past, been satisfied. Thus, against Anscombe’s objection,
the subsequent deployment of the concept in thought does not require that
the individuation-conditions on the concept are perpetually being satisfied.
Another example of the interaction between immunity and indeterminacy
targets the phenomenon of indeterminate survival.6 van Inwagen (op. cit.)
presents the phenomenon via the following example:
’Suppose that a person, Alpha, enters a certain infernal philosophical
engine called the [Wardrobe]. Suppose that a person later emerges from the
[Wardrobe] and we immediately name him ’Omega’. Is Alpha Omega? [. . . ]
Alpha has entered and Omega has left. It is, therefore, not definitely true or
definitely false that Alpha is Omega’ (op. cit.: 243-244).
How does the de iure epistemic and subjunctive rigidity of the first-person
concept interact with the indeterminacy of the identity of Alpha with Omega?
Suppose that the indeterminacy at issue targets Identification, i.e. the
relation between the primitive first-person mode of presentation and the ob-
6The locus classicus is van Inwagen (1990). Cf. Williams (2014a; 2014b), and Moss
(2015), for further discussion.
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jective profile of the individual. Thus, it is not determinate that Alpha’s
first-person mode of presentation will uniquely pick out Alpha’s objective
profile, and it is not determinate that it is not the case that Omega’s first-
person mode of presentation will uniquely pick out Omega’s objective profile.
In virtue of the indeterminacy that is dramatized by van Inwagen’s example,
the identification component would appear to satisfy the strong Kleene val-
uation scheme, such that it takes the value ’neither true nor false’, governed
by a determinacy operator.
Suppose that determinacy tracks fundamentality. As argued in Section
3, one vindication of the strong Kleene valuation scheme as the semantics
for metaphysics is that it can be deployed to secure the distinction between
fundamental rather than derivative states of affairs. The fundamental states
of affairs will receive the classical values, [0,1]. By contrast, the derivative
states of affairs will receive the value, .5, corresponding to the alethic status
’neither true nor false’, s.t. that it is not determinately true that the state of
affairs obtains and not determinately true that the state of affairs does not
obtain.
Suppose that the first-person concept picks out the subject of egocentric
facts, i.e. a unique set of de iure epistemically and subjunctively rigid, phe-
nomenal intentional states. How would the foregoing approach interact with
the Wardrobe scenario?
If one believes that phenomenal property types are metaphysically fun-
damental, yet stand in some relation to physical truths – the position of the
property dualist – then the value of Identification will be either true or
false. This can be accommodated, if one were to argue that the indetermi-
nacy of the Wardrobe scenario consists in the non-rigidity of the extension of
the concept. Either the non-rigidity affects the result, at the level of meta-
physically possible worlds, with regard to whether Alpha is Omega; or the
non-rigidity affects the result, at the level of epistemically possible worlds,
with regard to whether Alpha is Omega.
However, under what conditions can an epistemically and subjunctively
rigid concept – e.g., the first-person concept – cease to be so? Barring neigh-
borhood functions, epistemic and metaphysical necessity are too uncompro-
mising to accommodate variations in their instantiation. If this is correct,
then the indeterminacy at issue will have to be secured by another means.
Thus, even if facts about phenomenal intentional properties are just as funda-
mental as facts about fundamental physical entities, the Wardrobe scenario
demonstrates that – in some way – the indeterminacy of the identity of in-
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dividuals must be secured.
If one takes phenomenal intentional properties to be fundamental, then
the indeterminacy evinced by the Wardrobe scenario might have to consist
in the failure of axiom 4 (on its epistemic interpretation) for the 1-intension
of phenomenal concepts, which would thereby entrain that the rigidity of the
1-intension for the first-person concept is not itself known.7 Axiom 4 states
that ’φ → φ’. Thus, on this approach, indeterminacy will be witnessed
by the failure, in the Wardrobe scenario, of second-order knowledge of the
first-order epistemic-rigidity of the first-person concept.
If one does not take phenomenal intentional properties to be fundamen-
tal, then propositions about the properties will be assigned the value .5, as
yielded by the strong Kleene valuation, [0,.5,1]. The indeterminacy evinced
by the Wardrobe scenario might, then, have to consist in the fact that phe-
nomenal properties are derivative metaphysical entities, for which it is not
determinately the case that states of affairs with regard to them obtain, and
it is not determinately the case that states of affairs with regard to them do
not obtain. Thus, the properties of consciousness, such as colors and pains,
have as indeterminate a metaphysical profile as do other entities that are
not metaphysically fundamental – e.g., the clouds – by contrast to the meta-
physically fundamental entities that are postulated by fundamental physics.
Thus, on this approach, indeterminacy will be witnessed by the extensional
invariance of the values assigned to propositions which specify the extensions
of phenomenal concepts in metaphysically possible worlds; namely, the third
value corresponding to the status that it is not determinately the case that
the concept picks out the property and not determinately not the case that
the concept picks out the property.
8.5 Epistemic Modality and Deontic Modal-
ity
In this final section, I will examine the interaction between the semantic
values of epistemic modal operators specified in the foregoing, and the va-
rieties of deontic modal operators. This extension of the present framework
is of crucial relevance for the following reasons. Work on the core of issues
7For the foundations of the epistemic approach to indeterminacy, see Sorensen (1988),
and Williamson (1990/2013; 1994; forthcoming).
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surrounding the notions of epistemic responsibility and the requirements of
rationality, have drawn on both the resources of epistemic and deontic modal-
ity, without clearly delineating the properties of each notion or the properties
of their interaction. The issue on which I will here focus concerns the jus-
tification concerning the correctness of belief-forming methods, in virtue of
practical considerations which take the form of obligations on an agent to
engage in certain explanatory tasks (cf. Enoch and Schechter, 2008).
The semantic values for the varieties of deontic modality are as follows:
A subjective deontic modal (taking scope over distinct atoms) maps to 1
– relative to context (agent, time), c, and index, i, on which a state space (of
states of information) with preference-ranking and probabilistic structure is
built:
JOS(x,y)K[c=(a,t)];id = 1, where
id = 〈V, Pr, Pref〉, s.t. {v ∈ V: i1 . . . in}; Pr is the probability density
for the random variable mapping in to the [0,1] interval; and Pref is a strong
ordering, s.t. for any ix, iy, and iz, Pref is irreflexive, anti-symmetric, and
transitive.
An objective deontic modal (taking scope over distinct atoms) maps to 1
– relative to context (agent, time), c, and index, i, on which a state space (of
facts) with grounding structure is built:
JOO(x,y)Kc=(a,t);id = 1, where
id = 〈W, G〉, s.t. {w ∈ W: G(wx, wy)}
In the deliberative setting – concerning whether a particular agent ought
to φ – subjective deontic modals take explanatory priority to objective de-
ontic modals. Subjective deontic modals concern, then, the target rational
projects, engagement in which is a practical obligation, where the practical
obligation codified by the deontic modal provides default epistemic justifi-
cation for the correctness of the methods at issue. These projects include
explaining one’s surrounding phenomena, either by inference to the best ex-
planation or via Bayesian confirmation, and the project of conditional pre-
supposition with regard to future-planning (cf. Enoch and Schechter, op.
cit.: 558).
In the evaluative setting – unrestricted to the states of information pos-
sessed by particular agents; and so concerning, e.g., how slavery ought to
be forbidden, and how there ought to be unrestricted peace in 3- and 3n-
dimensional spacetime – objective deontic modals take explanatory priority
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to subjective deontic modals.8 The explanatory priority between subjective
and objective deontic modals in the evaluative and deliberative settings can,
furthermore, be codified, by availing of the grounding structure for explana-
tory dependencies as detailed in Section 4, above.
Thus, on the present proposal, epistemic possibility plays a constitutive
role in subjective deontic modality, because it constitutes the space of states
of information on the index in the array of intensional parameters, relative
to which the subjective deontic modal maps to 1. Epistemic justification
by default is a species of the apriori; and apriority is here represented by
epistemic necessity.9 Deontic modalities can provide default epistemic justi-
fication with regard to the correctness of belief-forming methods if and only if
what the agent ought to do is governed by the modal system KT. O(φ) states
that ’It ought to be the case that φ’, and P(φ) states that ’It is permitted
that it be case that φ’. Axiom K states, then, that ’O[φ → ψ] → [O(φ) →
O(ψ)]’. Axiom T states that ’O(φ)→ φ’. T can be understood as regimenting
the thought, familiar from Leibniz (1714/1998: 53-60), that ’ought implies
is’. Axiom T has appeared problematic in the setting of deontic modality.
One reason adducing in favor of the avoidance of endorsing T in the deon-
tic setting is that the actual prevalence of abhorrant cruelty and criminality
8See Schroeder (2011), for the distinction between evaluative and deliberative settings
for the interpretation of the deontic modal. Barcan (1966) proffers a distinction between
evaluative and prescriptive interpretations for the deontic modal, where the latter inter-
pretation motivates the eliminability of iterated deontic operators; and thus presumably
axiom 4, ’Oφ → OOφ’.
9The present examination targets thoughts expressing states of epistemic modality,
rather than update-conditions on sentences in natural language semantics. Yablo (2011)
proffers an approach to the interaction between epistemic and deontic modality, on the
model of his extrapolation-based semantics for intentional states. [Cf. Yablo, 2014, for
the foundations of his approach.] Yablo motivates the extension of his semantics for inten-
tionality to epistemic and deontic modals, by targeting several issues for their interaction
in the setting of an update semantics for natural language. By focusing on the semantic
values of epistemic and deontic modal judgments rather than context-change potentials for
sentences (hostage to the ambiguity and exigency of linguistic data), the present approach
circumvents the linguistic concerns adducing in favor of Yablo’s alternative proposal.
Extensions of the present model to decision theory can also be secured, by adding further
indices on which states of spaces of acts and of outcomes can be defined. Some loci classici
for the interaction between deontic modality and decision theory include Thomason (1981);
Horty and Belnap (1995); Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010); Dowell (2013); and Cariani,
Kaufmann, and Kaufmann (2013). For an approach to deontic modality which targets the
evaluative interpretation of the modal, within an update semantics ordered by a global
preference relation, see Starr (forthcoming).
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should not be entailed by what ought to be the case. Axiom D, according to
which ’O(φ) → P(φ)’ would appear to be more innocuous: ’If it ought to be
the case that φ, then it is permissible that φ’ is occasionally true; e.g., that
an agent ought to turn the other cheek is consistent with the permissibility
of so acting, whereas that an agent ought to tear the fascist down might not
be consistent with the permissibility of so acting.
However, a restricted version of axiom T is precisely what is needed, in
order to complete the present account of how the interaction of epistemic
and deontic modality is of relevance to an agent’s epistemic responsibility,
with regard to the justification for the correctness of their belief-forming
methods. The restriction is formally induced by augmenting the model, M
= 〈V, R, g〉 – where V denotes the space of epistemically possible worlds
– with a neighborhood frame, 〈F,N〉 – where F is a subset of V, and N is
a neighborhood function. Intuitively, N maps a subset of V to a particular
world in V. Thus, ’O(φ)’ in V if and only if ’N: φ → v∈V’, such that φ
is necessarily true in the neighborhood structure, v, although not in the
remainder of the full set of worlds comprising V.
An agent is therefore justified by default in pursuing a belief-forming
method, because they are practically rationally obligated so to act. The
agent is practially rationally obligated so to act, because pursuing the ra-
tional projects of explanatory and deliberative inquiry and self-evaluation is
constitutive of being a reflective agent. (This is an instance of restricted T.)
Thus, an agent possesses practical obligations with regard to the pursuit of
belief-forming methods if and only if, and because, the agent does pursue
projects of reason-governed inquiry. The agent does pursue the foregoing
belief-forming methods, in virtue of their states of information and the facts
comprising the cognitive psychological basis thereof.
A virtue of the present approach is its generality. The approach is general
enough to accommodate several choice points, with regard to constraints on
the array of intensional parameters for the values of the deontic and epis-
temic modals. These include, inter alia: (i) the normative weight of sociolog-
ical properties in the setting of subjective deontic modality; (ii) restrictions
of the axioms (such as T) in the deontic interpretation, in order to avoid
the counterintuitive consequences entrained by their unrestricted versions;
(iii) varying accounts of the dependence of ought-judgments on other value-
theoretic considerations, such as e.g. the utility of certain acts or rules; (iv)
either internalist or externalist conditions on the accessibility of information
encoded by the state space of epistemic possibilities, relative to which the
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values of subjective deontic modals are specified; and (v) the ontological de-
pendencies between the space of facts, comprising the index relative to which
the semantic values of objective deontic modality are specified.
8.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I have endeavored to delineate the precise contours of the
various dependence relations – beyond the enabling and evidential – which
hold between an intensional understanding of apriority and the notions of
the aposteriori. The formally precise convergences between the apriori and
aposteriori were intended to secure three, theoretical aims. First, the con-
vergences demonstrate the ineliminable import of each notion. Because both
formal measures of evidential confirmation and epistemically explanatory
connections are definable on epistemically possible worlds, they provide the
resources for explaining the manner in which the modally factive apriority
of implicit definitions can depend upon evidential properties unique to the
domain of the aposteriori. Second, the precise convergence yet ineliminable
import of the apriori and aposteriori provide the resources necessary for an
account of the phenomenon of conceptual fit, where the notion of conceptual
fit arguably figures in the resolution of the puzzles concerning the contrasting
etiology and epistemic profile of intentional states; e.g., the puzzle of first-
person immunity. Third, I demonstrated the manner in which the proposal
developed in the foregoing provides the resources necessary for a formally pre-
cise account, concerning the interaction between epistemic possibility and the
distinct interpretations of deontic modal operators in the evaluative and de-
liberative settings. The philosophical significance of the interaction between
the semantic values of epistemic and deontic modal operators was then ex-
amined, and was shown to explain in part the justification for the correctness
of the belief-forming methods constitutive of reflective inquiry.
Rather than undermining the epistemological significance of the apriori
and aposteriori divide, the multiple, formal points of intersection between the
apriori and aposteriori are crucial (i) for a resolution of the various puzzles
that derive from the interaction between the two notions, and thus (ii) for
motivating the theoretical significance of their distinctness. By closing the
formal gap between the apriori and aposteriori, while demonstrating the
import of their distinctness to the conditions on intentional content, the
reasons adducing in favor of the robust significance of the distinction may
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thus be found to stand on firmer grounds.
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Part IV: Epistemic Modality and the Philosophy of Mathematics
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Chapter 9
Epistemic Modality,
Necessitism, and
Abstractionism
Modal notions have been availed of, in order to argue in favor of nominalist
approaches to mathematical ontology. Field (1989) argues, for example, that
mathematical modality can be treated as a logical consistency operator on
a set of formulas comprising an empirical theory, such as Newtonian me-
chanics, in which the mathematical vocabulary has been translated into the
vocabulary of physical geometry.1 Putnam (1967), Parsons (1983), Chihara
(1990), and Hellman (1993) argue that intensional models both of first- and
second-order arithmetic and of set theory motivate an eliminativist approach
to mathematical ontology. On this approach, reference to mathematical ob-
jects can be eschewed, and possibly the mathematical structures at issue are
nothing.2
This essay aims to provide modal foundations for mathematical platon-
ism, i.e., the proposal that mathematical terms for sets; functions; and the
natural, rational, real, and imaginary numbers refer to abstract – neces-
sarily non-concrete – objects. Intensional constructions of arithmetic and
set theory have been developed by, inter alia, Fine (1981); Parsons (op.
cit.); Shapiro (1985); Myhill (1985); Reinhardt (1988); Nolan (2002); Lin-
1For a generalization of Field’s nominalist translation scheme to the differential equa-
tions in the theory of General Relativity, see Arntzenius and Dorr (2012).
2For further discussion of modal approaches to nominalism, see Burgess and Rosen
(1997: II, B-C) and Leng (2007; 2010: 258).
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nebo (2013); and Studd (2013). Williamson (2013; 2014) emphasizes that
mathematical languages are extensional, although in Williamson (2016) he
argues that Orey sentences, such as the generalized continuum hypothesis
– 2ℵα = ℵα+1 – which are currently undecidable relative to the axioms of
the language of Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory with choice as augmented by
large cardinal axioms, are yet possibly decidable.3 Chapters 9 and 11 argue
that the epistemic interpretation of two-dimensional intensional semantics
provides a novel approach to the epistemology of mathematics, such that if
the decidability of mathematical axioms is epistemically possible, then their
decidability is metaphysically possible.4 Epistemic mathematical modality,
suitably constrained, can thus serve as a guide to metaphysical mathematical
modality.5 Hamkins and Löwe (2007; 2013) argue that the modal logic of
set-forcing extensions and the corresponding logic for their ground models
satisfy at least S4.2, i.e., axioms K [(φ → ψ) → (φ → ψ)]; T (φ →
φ); 4 (φ →φ); and G (⋄φ → ⋄φ). While the foregoing approaches
are consistent with realism about mathematical objects, they are neverthe-
less not direct arguments thereof. The aim of this essay is to redress the
foregoing lacuna, and thus to avail of the resources of modal ontology and
epistemology in order to argue for the reality of mathematical entities and
truth.
In Section 2, I outline the elements of the abstractionist foundations of
mathematics. In Section 3, I examine Hale and Wright (2009)’s objections to
the merits and need, in the defense of mathematical platonism and its epis-
temology, of the thesis of Necessitism, underlying the thought that whatever
can exist actually does so. The Necessitist thesis is codified by the Barcan
formula (cf. Barcan, 1946; 1947), and states that possibly if there is some-
thing which satisfies a condition, then there is something such that it possibly
satisfies that condition: ⋄∃xφx → ∃x⋄φx. I argue that Hale and Wright’s
3Compare Reinhardt (1974) on the imaginative exercises taking the form of counter-
factuals concerning the truth of undecidable formulas. See Maddy (1988,b), for critical
discussion.
4The epistemic interpretation of two-dimensional intensional semantics is first advanced
in Chalmers (1996; 2004).
5See Section 4, for further discussion. Gödel (1951: 11-12) anticipates a similar dis-
tinction between epistemic and metaphysical readings of the determinacy of mathematical
truths, by distinguishing between mathematics in its subjective and objective senses. The
former concerns decidable formulas, while the latter records the values of formulas defined,
owing to the incompleteness theorems, in a variant of the language augmented by stronger
axioms of infinity.
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objections to Necessitism as a requirement on admissible abstraction can be
answered; and I examine both the role of the higher-order Necessitist pro-
posal in their endorsement of an abundant conception of properties, as well as
cardinality issues that arise depending on whether Necessitism is accepted at
first- and higher-order. In Section 4, I provide an account of the role of epis-
temic and metaphysical modality in explaining the prima facie justification
to believe the truth of admissible abstraction principles, and demonstrate
how it converges with both Hale and Wright’s (op. cit.) and Wright’s (2012;
2014) preferred theory of default entitlement rationally to trust the truth of
admissible abstraction. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
9.1 The Abstractionist Foundations of Math-
ematics
The abstractionist foundations of mathematics are inspired by Frege’s (1884/1980;
1893/2013) proposal that cardinal numbers can be explained by specifying
an equivalence relation, expressible in the signature of second-order logic and
identity, on lower-order representatives for higher-order entities. Thus, e.g.,
in Frege (1884/1980: 64), the direction of the line, a, is identical to the di-
rection of the line, b, if and only if lines a and b are parallel. In Frege (op.
cit.: 68) and Wright (1983: 104-105), the cardinal number of the concept,
A, is identical to the cardinal number of the concept, B, if and only if there
is a one-to-one correspondence between A and B, i.e., there is an injective
and surjective (bijective) mapping, R, from A to B. With Nx: a numerical
term-forming operator,
• ∀A∀B∃R[[Nx: A = Nx: B ≡ ∃R[∀x[Ax → ∃y(By ∧ Rxy ∧ ∀z(Bz ∧
Rxz→ y = z))] ∧ ∀y[By→ ∃x(Ax ∧ Rxy ∧ ∀z(Az ∧ Rzy→ x = z))]].
The foregoing is referred to as ’Hume’s Principle’.6 Frege’s Theorem states
that the Dedekind-Peano axioms for the language of arithmetic can be de-
6Frege (1884/1980: 68) writes: ’the Number which belongs to the concept F is the
extension of the concept ’[equinumerous] to the concept F’ (cf. op. cit.: 72-73). Boolos
(1987/1998: 186) coins the name, ’Hume’s Principle’, for Frege’s abstraction principle for
cardinals, because Frege (op. cit.: 63) attributes equinumerosity as a condition on the
concept of number to Hume (1739-1740/2007: Book 1, Part 3, Sec. 1, SB71), who writes:
’When two numbers are so combin’d, as that the one has always an unite answering to
every unite of the other, we pronounce them equal . . . ’. Frege notes that identity of number
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rived from the Hume’s Principle, as augmented to the signature of second-
order logic and identity.7 Abstraction principles have further been specified
both for the real numbers (cf. Hale, 2000a; Shapiro, 2000; and Wright,
2000), and for sets (cf. Wright, 1997; Shapiro and Weir, 1999; Hale, 2000b;
and Walsh, 2016).
The philosophical significance of the abstractionist program consists pri-
marily in its provision of a neo-logicist foundation for classical mathematics,
and in its further providing a setting in which to examine constraints on the
identity conditions constitutive of mathematical concept possession.8 The
philosophical significance of the abstractionist program consists, furthermore,
in its circumvention of Benacerraf’s (1973) challenge to the effect that our
knowledge of mathematical truths is in potential jeopardy, because of the
absence of naturalistic, in particular causal, conditions thereon. Abstraction
principles provide an epistemic conduit into our knowledge of abstracta, be-
cause a grasp of the right-hand side of the principles – i.e., the equivalence
relation on lower-order entities, such as the equinumerosity of two, distinct
objects – is explanatory of the left-hand side of the principles – i.e., a grasp of
the identity of the numbers of the higher-order entities (the concepts) under
which those objects fall. Both Wright (1983: 13-15) and Hale (1987: 10-15)
argue, then, that the abstraction principles are epistemically tractable, only
if (i) the surface syntax of the principles – e.g., the term-forming operators
referring to objects – are a perspicuous guide to their logical form; and (ii)
the principles satisfy Frege’s (1884/1980: X) context principle, such that the
truth of the principles is secured prior to the reference of the terms figuring
therein.
via bijections is anticipated by the mathematicians, Ernst Schröder and Ernst Kossak, as
well Cantor (1883/1996: Sec. 1), who writes: ’[E]very well-defined set has a determinate
power; two sets have the same power if they can be, element for element, correlated with
one another reciprocally and one-to-one’, where the power [Anzahl] of a set corresponds
to its cardinality (cf. Cantor, 1895/2007: 481).
7Cf. Dedekind (1888/1996) and Peano (1889/1967). See Wright (1983: 154-169) for a
proof sketch of Frege’s theorem; Boolos (1987) for the formal proof thereof; and Parsons
(1964) for an incipient conjecture of the theorem’s validity.
8Shapiro and Linnebo (2015) prove that Heyting arithmetic can be recovered from
Frege’s Theorem. Criteria for consistent abstraction principles are examined in, inter alia,
Hodes (1984,a); Hazen (1985); Boolos (1990/1998); Heck (1992); Fine (2002); Weir (2003);
Cook and Ebert (2005); Linnebo and Uzquiano (2009); Linnebo (2010); and Walsh (op.
cit.).
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9.2 Abstraction and Necessitism
9.2.1 Hale andWright’s Arguments against Necessitism
One crucial objection to the abstractionist program is that – while abstraction
principles might provide a necessary and sufficient truth-condition for our
grasp of the concepts of mathematical objects – an explanation of the actual
truth of the principles has yet to be advanced (cf. Eklund, 2006; 2016). In
response, Hale and Wright (2009: 197-198) proffer a tentative endorsement
of an ‘abundant’ conception of properties, according to which fixing the sense
of a predicate will be sufficient for predicate reference. Eklund (2006: 102)
suggests, by contrast, that one way for the truth of the abstraction principles
to be explained is by presupposing what he refers to as a ‘Maximalist’ position
concerning the target ontology.9 According to the ontological Maximalist
position, if it is possible that a term has a certain extension, then actually
the term does have the designated extension.
Hale and Wright (op. cit.) raise two issues for the ontological Maximalist
proposal. The first is that ontological Maximalism is committed to a pro-
posal that they take to be independently objectionable, namely ontological
Necessitism (185). Hale and Wright (op. cit.) raise a similar contention to
the effect that actual, and not merely possible, reference is what the abstrac-
tionist program intends to target; and that Maximalism and Necessitism,
so construed, are purportedly silent on the status of ascertaining when the
possibilities at issue are actual.
The second issue that Hale and Wright find with Maximalism is that it
misconstrues the demands that the abstractionist program is required to ad-
dress. The abstractionist program is supposed to be committed to ontological
Maximalism, because the possibility that a term has a certain extension will
otherwise not be sufficient for the success of the term’s reference. It is further
thought that, without an appeal to Maximalism, and despite the actuality of
successful mathematical predicate reference, there are yet possible situations
in which the mathematical predicates still do not refer (193). In response,
they note that no ‘collateral metaphysical assistance’ – such as ontological
Maximalism would be intended to provide – is necessary in order to explain
the truth of abstraction principles (op. cit.). Rather, there is prima facie,
default entitlement rationally to trust that the abstraction principles are ac-
9For further discussion of ontological Maximalism, see Hawley (2007) and Sider (2007:
IV).
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tually true, and such entitlement is sufficient to foreclose upon the risk that
possibly the mathematical terms therein do not refer (192).
In the remainder of this section, I will argue that Hale and Wright’s objec-
tions to Necessitism and the ontological Maximalist approach to admissible
abstraction both can be answered, and in any case are implicit in their en-
dorsement of the abundant conception of properties. In the following section,
I address their second contention, and I argue for the fundamental role that
Maximalism and Necessitism can play in warranting the truth of candidate
abstractions and mathematical platonism.
The principle of the necessary necessity of being (NNE) can be derived
from the Barcan formula.10 NNE states that necessarily everything is nec-
essarily such that there is something to which it is identical; ∀x∃y(x =
y). Informally, necessarily everything has necessary being, i.e. everything
is something, even if contingently non-concrete. Williamson (2013: 6.1-6.4)
targets issues for haecceity comprehension, if the negations of the Barcan
formula and NNE are true at first-order, and thus for objects. With regard
to properties and relations at higher-order, Williamson’s arguments have tar-
geted closure conditions, given a modalized interpretation of comprehension
principles (op. cit.). The latter take the form, ∃X∀x(Xx ⇐⇒ φ), with x
an individual variable which may occur free in φ and X a monadic first-order
predicate variable which does not occur free in φ (262).11 He targets, in par-
ticular, the principle of mathematical induction – with s a successor function
and the quantifier ranging over the natural numbers: ∀X[[X0 ∧ ∀n(Xn →
Xsn)] → ∀n(Xn)] – and notes that instances of mathematical induction –
e.g., for a an individual constant, ∃R[[Ra0 ∧ ∀n(Ran → Rasn)] → ∀n(Ran)]
– presuppose, for their derivation, the validity of instances of the higher-
order modal comprehension scheme: e.g., ∃X∀n(Xn ⇐⇒ Ran) (283-284).
The foregoing provides prima facie abductive support for the requirement
of Necessitism in the practice of mathematics. The constitutive role of the
Necessitist modal comprehension scheme in the principle of mathematical
induction answers Hale and Wright’s first contention against the Necessitist
commitments of ontological Maximalism.
Williamson refers to the assignments for models in the metaphysical set-
ting as universal interpretations (59). The analogue for logical truth occurs
10Cf. Williamson (2013: 38).
11The contingentist, by contrast, can – by rejecting the Barcan formula – countenance
only ‘intra-world’ comprehension principles in which the modal operators and iterations
thereof take scope over the entire formula; e.g. ⋄∀x∃X(Xx ⇐⇒ φ) (cf. Sider, 2016: 686).
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when a truth is metaphysically universal, i.e., if and only if its second-order
universal generalization is true on the intended interpretation of the metalan-
guage (200). The connection between truth-in-a-model and truth simpliciter
is then that – as Williamson puts it laconically – when ’the framework at
least delivers a condition for a modal sentence to be true in a universal in-
terpretation, we can derive the condition for it to be true in the intended
universal interpretation, which is the condition for it to be true simpliciter’
(op. cit.).
One of the crucial interests of the metaphysical universality of formulas is
that the models in the class need not be pointed, in order to countenance the
actuality of the possible formulas defined therein.12 Rather, the class of true,
possible propositions generated by the metaphysically universal possible for-
mulas is sufficient for the formulas actually to be true (268-269). To see this,
let the quantifier for worlds in modal formulas which are true simpliciter
range over real metaphysically possible worlds. Suppose that the Barcan
formula is true such that, possibly if there is something which satisfies a con-
dition then there is something such that possibly it satisfies that condition.
Then, because there is something which possibly does so, Williamson writes
that ’since whatever is is, whatever is actually is: if there is something, then
there actually is such a thing’ (23). When the quantifier ranges, then, over
possible worlds treated as objects, the worlds are thus actual. So – by con-
trast to modal formulas which are true-in-a-model – the objects, i.e. actual
worlds, which fall within the range of the quantifiers in the metaphysically
universal formulas which are true simpliciter can explain why such formulas
are actual.
The constitutive role of metaphysical universality in bridging the neces-
sary necessity of being with the actuality thereof answers Hale and Wright’s
contention that the interaction between the possible and actual truth of ab-
straction principles has yet to be accounted for.13
12That the models are unpointed is noted in Williamson (2013: 100).
13Cook (2016: 398) demonstrates how formally to define modal operators within Hume’s
Principle, i.e. the consistent abstraction principle for cardinal numbers. Necessitist Hume’s
Principle takes the form: ∀X,Y[#(X) = #(Y) ⇐⇒ X ≈ Y], where X and Y are second-
order variables, # is a numerical term-forming operator, ≈ is a bijection, and for variables,
x,y, of arbitrary type ‘x = y ⇐⇒ ∃z[z = x ∧ z = y ∧ ∃w(w = z)]’. See Cook (op. cit.)
for further discussion.
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9.2.2 Hale on the Necessary Being of Purely General
Properties and Objects
Note, further, that the abundant conception of properties endorsed by Hale
and Wright depends upon the Necessitist Thesis, and the truth of ontological
Maximalism thereby. Hale writes: ‘[I]t is sufficient for the actual existence
of a property or relation that there could be a predicate with appropriate
satisfaction conditions . . . purely general properties and relations exist as
a matter of (absolute) necessity’, where a property is purely general if and
only if there is a predicate for which, and it embeds no singular terms (Hale,
2013b: 133, 135; see also 2013a: 99-100).14
Hale argues for the necessary necessity of being for properties and propo-
sitions as follows (op. cit.: 135; 2013b: 167). Suppose that p refers to the
proposition that a property exists, and that q refers to the proposition that a
predicate for the property exists. Let the necessity operator be defined as a
counterfactual with an unrestricted, universally quantified antecedent, such
that, for all propositions, ψ: [ψ ⇐⇒ ∀φ(φ → ψ)] (135).15 On the abun-
dant conception of properties, [p ⇐⇒ ⋄q]. Intuitively: Necessarily, there
is a property if and only if possibly there is a predicate for that property.
Given the counterfactual analysis of the modal operator: For all propositions
about a property, if there were a proposition specifying a predicate s.t. the
property is in the predicate’s extension, then there would be that property.
Conversely, for all propositions specifying a predicate s.t. a property is in
the predicate’s extension, if there were that property, then there would be a
predicate which refers to that property.
From ‘[p ⇐⇒ ⋄q]’, one can derive both ‘p ⇐⇒ ⋄q’, and – by
the rule, RK – the necessitation thereof, ‘p ⇐⇒ ⋄q’ (op. cit.). By
the B axiom in S5, ⋄q ⇐⇒ ⋄q (op. cit.). So, ‘⋄q ⇐⇒ ⋄q’; ‘⋄q
⇐⇒ p’; and ‘⋄q ⇐⇒ p’. Thus – by transitivity – ‘p ⇐⇒ p’ (op.
cit.); i.e., all propositions about properties are necessarily true, such that the
corresponding properties have necessary being. By the 4 axiom in S5, p
⇐⇒ p; so, the necessary being of properties and propositions is itself
14Cook (op. cit.: 388) notes the requirement of Necessitism in the abundant conception
of properties, although does not discuss points at whichWilliamson’s and Hale’s Necessitist
proposals might be inconsistent. The points of divergence between the two variations on
the proposal are examined below.
15Proponents of the translation from modal operators into counterfactual form include
Stalnaker (1968/1975), McFetridge (1990: 138), and Williamson (2007).
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necessary. Given the endorsement of the abundant conception of properties
– Hale and Wright are thus committed to higher-order necessitism, i.e., the
necessary necessity of being.
Hale (2013b) endeavors to block the ontological commitments of the Bar-
can formula and its converse by endorsing a negative free logic. Thus, in the
derivation:
Assumption,
1. ∀x[F(x)].
By -elimination,
2. ∀x[F(x)].
By ∀-elimination,
3. F(x).
By -introduction,
4. [F(x)].
By ∀-introduction,
5. ∀[F(x)].
By →-introduction,
6. ∀x[F(x) → ∀[F(x)],
Hale imposes an existence-entailing assumption in the inference from lines
(2) to (3), i.e.
’(Free∀-Elimination) From ∀x[A(x)], together with an existence-entailing
premise F(t), we may infer A(t) where t can be any term’ (op. cit.: 208-209).
Because the concept of, e.g., cardinal number is defined by abstraction
principles which are purely general because they embed no singular terms,
the properties – e.g., the concepts – of numbers are argued to have neces-
sary being. The necessary being of the essential properties of number – i.e.,
higher-order Necessitism about purely general properties – is argued then to
explain in virtue of what abstract objects such as numbers and functions have
themselves necessary being (176-177). Thus the necessary being of predicate
sense for the concept of number can both suffice for and explain the necessary
being of predicate reference, i.e. the necessary existence of numbers.
By contrast, essential properties defined by theoretical identity state-
ments, which if true are necessarily so, do embed singular terms and are
thus not purely general. So, the essential nature of water, i.e., the property
’being comprised of one oxygen and two hydrogen molecules’, has contingent
being, explaining in virtue of what samples of water have contingent being
(216-217).
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Objections
One argument against the above approach is that there is an asymmetry in
the order of explanation with regard to whether properties or objects are
the source of the contingency with which the lower- and higher-order entities
have being. Concrete individuals susceptible to being defined via theoreti-
cal identity statements have, as noted, contingent being because the identity
statements characterizing the essential properties – e.g., the concepts – of
those individuals are not purely general, because they embed singular terms
(op. cit.). However, for concrete individuals which cannot be defined via
theoretical identity statements, the order of explanation is reversed. The
contingency of the essential properties of concrete individuals, such as stars,
depends upon the existence-entailing premise noted above (217). Thus, be-
cause concrete first-order objects such as stars can be rendered non-concrete,
they have contingent being. Higher-order Contigentism is argued, then, to
take into effect, because the essential properties thereof exist only when their
corresponding objects do so. An explanation of the asymmetry in the forego-
ing order of explanation of first-and higher-order Contingentism is, however,
wanting.
The necessary being of purely general properties – e.g., the possible pred-
icate sense for the concept of number – is argued to hold with absolute
modality, as the consequent of a counterfactual with an unrestrictedly general
antecedent. As Hale notes, absolute modalities are therefore logical modal-
ities (100). Thus, a crucial virtue of the logical necessity with which the
concept of number – and thus the numbers themselves – have being, is that
it provides a further vindication of the Neo-logicist thesis, that second-order
logic and identity as augmented by the purely general abstraction principles
is sufficient to derive the axioms of mathematical languages such as Peano
arithmetic. The Neo-logicist thesis is qualified, however, by the caveat that
abstraction principles are non-logical truths, i.e., they are not true on all
interpretations of the values of the variables comprising their syntactic form.
By arguing that purely general properties have necessary being and defining
the necessity of being of purely general properties as logical necessity, ab-
straction principles – while not themselves logically true – can thus still hold
of logical necessity. The logical necessity of abstraction principles – owing to
the purely general predicates comprising their form – can thus serve to ex-
plain another sense in which the abstractionist foundations provide a logical
reduction of mathematical truths. Mathematical truths will, on the above
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approach, be derivable from second-order logic with identity and implicit
definitions which are true of logical necessity.
A second objection to the foregoing is that Hale takes the modal status
of the being with which both logical and non-logical properties exist to be
equivalent. Following Fine (2005), he notes that there is a distinction between
’unworldly’ or ’transcendental’ truths about individuals, which are true, in
Fine’s phrasing, ’on the basis of [their] logical form alone and without regard
to the circumstances’ (Fine, op. cit.: 324). An example of a transcendental
truth is that ’Hypatia is self-identical’, i.e., ’∃x(x = H ∧ x = x)’. A
’worldly’ or ’necessary’ truth is, by contrast, one whose truth-value is defined
in a world; e.g., that ’water = H20’ or – if one were to augment one’s language
with an existence predicate beyond the quantifiers – that ’Socrates exists or
does not exist’ (op. cit.).
However, Hale draws, as noted, no similar distinction between the modal
status of a sentence true in virtue of its logical form, and a worldly sentence
whose truth depends on non-logical values of its constituent variables, e.g., a
truth of physics (Hale, op. cit.: 215). Hale (2000/2001: 415) notes Wright’s
(2001: 315) argument that the conjunction of two predicates, e.g., being blue
and being self-identical, is equivalent to one of the conjuncts, e.g., being blue.
Thus, the predicate for the property, being self-identical, cannot be purely
general. He argues, thus, that the truth of ’this star is self-identical’ depends
on the concrete existence of the star, such that the logical property, being
self-identical, has contingent being. Thus, the status of the being of logical
properties is contingent, in the same manner that the essential property,
being, e.g., H20, depends on concrete instances of water.
A problematic consequence of the foregoing is that the logical necessity
of a formula will thus depend on whether the predicates therein are purely
general by embedding no singular terms, rather than on whether the formula
at issue is a logical truth. It might be replied that Hale is following Frege
in defining one of the constitutive marks of logical truths as consisting in
their generality – e.g., the generality of their application (1893/2013: XV;
1897/1997), as well as whether the formula is a true universal generalization
(op. cit.: §8-9) – rather than Tarski’s (1936/1983: 415-417) definition of a
logical truth as a formula true in virtue of its logical form and thus whose
truth is invariant under permutation of the values of the variables which
replace the non-logical constants therein. However – even if not a purely
general property because it embeds singular terms – the reflexivity of identity
is a logical law, because – as Frege himself writes of reflexivity – ’the value
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of this function is always the True, whatever we take as argument’ (Frege,
1891/1997: 23).16
A final objection concerns the necessary being of different types of num-
bers. While an abstraction principle for cardinal numbers can be specified
using only purely general predicates – i.e., Hume’s Principle –abstraction
principles for imaginary and complex numbers have yet to be specified.
Shapiro (2000) provides an abstraction principle for the concepts of the re-
als by simulating Dedekind cuts, where abstraction principles are provided
for the concepts of the cardinals, natural numbers, integers, and rational
numbers, from which the reals are thence defined: Letting F,G, and R de-
note rational numbers, ∀F,G[C(F) = C(G) ⇐⇒ ∀R(F≤R ⇐⇒ G≤R)].
17 Hale’s (2000/2001) own definition of the concept of the reals is provided
relative to a domain of quantities. The quantities are themselves taken to
be abstract, rather than physical, entities (409). The quantitative domain
can thus be comprised of both rational numbers as well as the abstracts for
lengths, masses, and points.18 The reals are then argued not to be numbers,
but rather quantities defined via an abstraction principle which states that
a set of rational numbers in one quantitative domain is identical to a set
of rational numbers in a second quantitative domain if and only if the two
domains are isomorphic (407).19 Hale argues, then, that it is innocuous for
the real abstraction principle to be conditional on the existence of at least
one quantitative domain, because the rational numbers can be defined, sim-
ilarly as on Shapiro’s approach, via cut-abstractions and abstractions on the
integers, naturals, and cardinals. Thus, the reals can be treated as abstracts
derived from purely general abstraction principles, and are thus possessed
of necessary being. However, abstraction principles for imaginary numbers
such as i =
√−1, and complex numbers which are defined as the sum of a
16For further discussion of Frege’s treatment of logic as a ’purely general science’,
see Dummett (1991: 224-225); MacFarlane (2002); Burge (2005: 133, 137-138); and
Blanchette (2012: 1.1, 1.22, 3.6). For further discussion of Tarski’s account of logical
truth, see Etchemendy (1990), McGee (1992, 1996), Gómez-Torrente (1996), Chihara
(1998), Feferman (1999), and Sher (2008).
17See Dedekind (1872/1996: Sec. 4), for the cut method for the definition of the reals.
18An abstraction principle for lengths, based on the equivalence property of congruence
relations on intervals of a line, or regions of a space, is defined in Shapiro and Hellman
(2015: 5, 9). Shapiro and Hellman provide, further, an abstraction principle for points,
defined as comprising, respectively, the left- and right-ends of intervals (op. cit.: 5, 10-12).
19Cf. Hale (op. cit.: 406-407), for the further conditions that the domains are required
to satisfy.
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real number and a second real multiplied by i, have yet to be accounted for.
The provision of an abstraction principle for complex numbers would, in any
case, leave open the inquiry into how, e.g., complex-valued wave functions
might interact with physical ontology; e.g., whether such functions might be
metaphysically fundamental entities which serve to represent physical fields
in higher-dimensional spacetime, and whether or how the domain of the func-
tions, i.e., a real-valued configuration space for particles, might relate to the
higher-dimensional, complex-valued wave function (cf. Simons, 2016; Ney,
2013; Maudlin, 2013).
The modality in the Barcan-induced Necessitist proposal at first- and
higher-order is, as noted, interpreted metaphysically rather than logically,
and thus incurs no similar issues with regard to the interaction between
purely general properties, logical properties, and concrete entities. Further,
because true on its second-order universal generalization on its intended,
metaphysical interpretation, the possible truth-in-a-model of the relevant
class of formulas is, as discussed in Section 3.1, thus sufficient for entraining
the actual truth of the relevant formulas.
9.2.3 Cardinality and Intensionality
An interesting residual question concerns the status of the worlds, upon
the translation of modal first-order logic into the non-modal first-order lan-
guage.20 Fritz (op. cit.) notes that a world can be represented by a predi-
cate, in the latter.21 However, whether objects satisfy the predicate can vary
from point to point, in the non-modal first-order class of points.22 Another
issue is that modal propositional logic is equivalent only to the bisimulation-
invariant fragments of both first-order logic and fixed-point monadic second-
order logic, rather than to the full variants of either logic (cf. van Benthem,
1983; Janin and Walukiewicz, 1996). Thus, there cannot be a faithful trans-
lation from each modal operator in modal propositional logic into a predicate
of full first- or monadic higher-order logic.
One way to mitigate the foregoing issues might be by arguing that the
20Thanks here to xx, for discussion.
21For further discussion of the standard translation between propositional modal and
first-order non-modal logics, see Blackburn et al. (2001: 84).
22Suppose that the model is defined over the language of second-order arithmetic, such
that the points in the model are the ordinals. A uniquely designated point might then be
a cardinal number whose height is accordingly indexed by the ordinals.
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language satisfies real-world rather than general validity, such that necessar-
ily the predicate will be satisfied only at a designated point in a model –
intuitively, the analogue of the concrete rather than some merely possible
world, simulating thereby the translation from possibilist to actualist dis-
course (cf. Fine, op. cit.: 211,135-136, 139-140, 154, 166-168, 170-171) – by
contrast to holding of necessity as interpreted as satisfaction at every point in
the model.23 The reply would be consistent with what Williamson refers to
as ‘chunky-style necessitism’ which validates the following theorems: where
the predicate C(x) denotes the property of being grounded in the concrete
and P(x) is an arbitrary predicate, (a) ‘∀x⋄C(x)’, yet (b) ‘∀x[P(x1, . . . ,
xn) → (Cx1, . . . , Cx1)]’ (325-332). Williamson (33, fn.5) argues, however,
in favor of general, rather than real-world validity. A second issue for the
reply is that principle (b), in the foregoing, is inconsistent with Williamson’s
protracted defense of the ‘being constraint’, according to which ∀x[P(x1,
. . . , xn) → ∃y(x = y)], i.e. if x satisfies a predicate, then x is something,
even if possibly non-concrete (148).
A related issue concerns the translation of modalized, variable-binding,
generalized quantifiers of the form:
‘there are n objects such that . . . ’,
‘there are countably infinite objects such that . . . ’,
‘there are uncountably infinite objects such that . . . ’ (Fritz and Goodman,
2017).
The generalized quantifiers at issue are modalized and consistent with
first-order Necessitism, because the quantifier domains include all possible –
including contingently non-concrete – objects. It might be argued that the
translation is not of immediate pertinence to the ontology of mathematics,
because the foregoing first-order quantifiers can be restricted such that they
range over only uncountably infinite necessarily non-concrete objects – i.e.
abstracta – by contrast to ranging unrestrictedly over all modal objects, in-
cluding the contingently non-concrete entities induced via the Barcan formula
– i.e., the ‘mere possibilia’ that are non-concrete as a matter of contingency;
e.g., the possible star and the possible nubula which are both actual objects
and yet are such that a carpenter actually cannot, as a matter of pairwise
incompossibility, render both concrete. However, the Necessitist thesis can
be valid even in the quantifier domain of a first-order language restricted
to necessarily non-concrete entities. If, e.g., a mathematician takes, despite
23See ftn. 15.
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iterated applications of set-forming operations, the cumulative hierarchy of
sets to have a fixed cardinal height, then the first-order Necessitist thesis will
still be valid, because all possible objects will actually be still something.
The first-order Necessitist proposal engendered by taking the height of
the cumulative hierarchy to be fixed is further consistent with the addition
to the first-order language of additional intensional operators – such as those
introduced by Hodes (1984b) – in order to characterize the indefinite exten-
sibility of the concept of set; i.e., that despite unrestricted universal quan-
tification over all of the entities in a domain, another entity can be defined
with reference to, and yet beyond the scope of, that totality, over which the
quantifier would have further to range.24 First-order Necessitism is further
consistent with the relatively expanding domains induced by Bernays’ (1942)
Theorem. Bernays’ Theorem states that class-valued functions from classes
to sub-classes are not onto, where classes are non-sets (cf. Uzquiano, 2015a:
186-187). So, the cardinality of a class will always be less than the cardinal-
ity of its sub-classes. Suppose that that there is a generalization of Bernays’
theorem, such that the non-sets are interpreted as possible objects. Thus,
the cardinality of the class of possible objects will always be less than the
cardinality of the sub-classes in the image of its mapping. Given iterated
applications of Bernays’ theorem, the cardinality of a domain of non-sets is
purported then not to have a fixed height.
In both cases, however, the addition of Hodes’ intensional operators per-
mits there to be multiple-indexing in the array of parameters relative to
which a cardinal can be defined, while the underlying logic for metaphysical
modality can be S5, partitioning the space of worlds into equivalence classes.
So, both the intensional characterization of indefinite extensibility and the
generalization of Bernays’ Theorem to possible objects are consistent with
the first-order Necessitist proposal that all possible objects are actual, and
so the cardinality of the target universe is fixed.25
24The concept of indefinite extensibility is introduced by Dummett (1963/1978), in the
setting of a discussion of the philosophical significance of Gödel’s (1931) first incomplete-
ness theorem. See the essays in Rayo and Uzquiano (2006); Studd (op. cit.); Dever (ms);
and Author (ms), for further discussion.
25Note that the proposal that the cardinality of the cumulative hierarchy of sets is fixed,
despite continued iterated applications of set-forming operations, is anticipated by Cantor
(1883/1996: Endnote [1]). Cantor writes: ‘I have no doubt that, as we pursue this path
ever further, we shall never reach a boundary that cannot be crossed, but that we shall
also never achieve even an approximate conception of the absolute [. . . ] The absolutely
infinite sequence of numbers thus seems to me to be an appropriate symbol of the absolute;
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Fritz and Goodman suggest that a necessary condition on the equivalence
of propositions is that they define the same class of models (op. cit.: 1.4).
The proposed translation of the modalized generalized quantifiers would be
Contingentist, by taking (NNE) to be invalid, such that the domain in the
translated model would be comprised of only possible concrete objects, rather
than the non-concrete objects as well (op. cit.).
Because of the existence of non-standard models, the generalized quanti-
fier that ‘there are countably infinitely many possible . . . ’ cannot be defined
in first-order logic. Fritz and Goodman note that generalized quantifiers
ranging over countably infinite objects can yet be simulated by enriching
one’s first-order language with countably infinite conjunctions. On the lat-
ter approach, finitary existential and universal quantifiers can be defined as
the countably infinite conjunction of formulas stating that, for all natural
numbers n, ‘there are n possible ...’ (2.3).
Crucially, however, there are some modalized generalized quantifiers that
cannot be similarly paraphrased – e.g., ‘there are uncountably infinite possi-
ble objects s.t. . . . ’ – and there are some modalized generalized quantifiers
that cannot even be defined in first-order languages – e.g. ‘most possible
objects s.t. . . . ’ (2.4-2.5)
In non-modal first-order logic, it is possible to define generalized quan-
tifiers which range over an uncountably infinite domain of objects, by aug-
menting finitary existential and universal quantifiers with an uncountably
infinite stock of variables and an uncountably infinite stock of conjunctions
of formulas (2.4).26 Fritz and Goodman note, however, that the foregoing
in contrast the infinity of the first number-class (I) [i.e., the first uncountable cardinal, ℵ0
– HK], which has hitherto sufficed, because I can I consider it to be a graspable idea (not
a representation), seems to me to dwindle into nothingness by comparison’ (op. cit.; cf.
Cantor, 1899/1967).
26Uncountable cardinals can be defined as follows. For cardinals, x,a,C, let C⊆a be
closed unbounded in a, if it is closed [if x < C and
⋃
(C∩a) = a, then a∈C] and unbounded
(
⋃
C = a) (Kanamori, 2012: 360). A cardinal, S, is stationary in a, if, for any closed
unbounded C⊆a, C∩S 6= ∅ (op. cit.). An ideal is a subset of a set closed under countable
unions, whereas filters are subsets closed under countable intersections. A cardinal κ is
regular if the cofinality of κ – comprised of the unions of sets with cardinality less than
κ – is identical to κ. For models A,B, and conditions φ, an elementary embedding, j:
A → B, is such that φ〈a1, . . . , an〉 in A if and only if φ〈j(a1), . . . , j(an)〉 in B (363).
A measurable cardinal is defined as the ordinal denoted by the critical point of j, crit(j)
(Koellner and Woodin, 2010: 7). Measurable cardinals are inaccessible (Kanamori, op.
cit.). Uncountable regular limit cardinals are weakly inaccessible (op. cit.). A strongly
inaccessible cardinal is regular and has a strong limit, such that if λ < κ, then 2λ < κ
143
would require that the quantifiers bind the uncountable variables ‘at once’,
s.t. they must have the same scope. The issue with the proposal is that,
in the setting of modalized existential quantification over an uncountably
infinite domain, the Contingentist paraphrase requires that bound variables
take different scopes, in order to countenance the different possible sets that
can be defined in virtue of the indefinite extensibility of cardinal number (op.
cit.).
In order to induce the Contingentist paraphrase, Fritz and Goodman
suggest defining ‘strings of infinitely many existential and universal quanti-
fiers’, such that a modalized, i.e. Necessitist, generalized quantifier of the
form, ‘there are uncountably infinite possible . . . ’ can be redefined by an un-
countably infinite sequence of finitary quantifiers with infinite variables and
conjunction symbols of the form:
‘Possibly for some x1, possibly for some x2, etc.: x1,x2,etc. are pairwise
distinct and are each possibly . . . ’,
where etc. denotes an uncountable sequence of, respectively, ‘an uncount-
able string of interwoven possibility operators and existential quantifiers’,
and an ‘uncountable string of variables’ (op. cit.).
An argument against the proposed translation of the quantifier for there
being uncountably infinite possible objects is that it is contentious whether
an uncountable sequence of operators or quantifiers has a definite meaning
[cf. Williamson (2013: 7.7)]. Thus, e.g., while negation can have a deter-
minate truth condition which specifies its meaning, a string of uncountably
infinite negation operators will similarly have determinate truth conditions
and yet not have an intuitive, definite meaning (357). One can also define
a positive or negative integer, x, such that sx is interpreted as the successor
function, x+1, and px is interpreted as the inverse function, x-1. However,
an infinitary expression consisting in uncountable, alternating iterations of
the successor and inverse functions – spsps. . . x – will similarly not have a
definite meaning (op. cit.). Finally, one can define an operator Oi map-
ping truth conditions for an arbitrary formula A to the truth condition, p,
of the formula ⋄∃xi(Cxi ∧ A), with Cx being the predicate for being con-
crete (258). Let the operators commute s.t. such that OiOj iff OjOi, and
be idempotent such that OiOi iff Oi (op. cit.). A total ordering of truth
conditions defined by an infinite sequence of the operators can be defined,
(op. cit.). For the foregoing and further definitions, see Koellner and Woodin (op.cit.);
Kanamori (op. cit.), and Woodin (2009, 2010).
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s.t. that the relation is reflexive, anti-symmetric, transitive, and connected
[∀x,y(x≤y ∨ y≤x)] (op. cit.). However, total orders need not have a least
upper bound; and the sequence, OiOiOi. . . (p), would thus not have a non-
arbitrary, unique value (op. cit.). The foregoing might sufficiently adduce
against Fritz and Goodman’s Contingentist paraphrase of the uncountable
infinitary modalized quantifier.
The philosophical significance of the barrier to a faithful translation from
modal first-order to extensional full first-order languages, as well as a faithful
translation from modalized, i.e. Necessitist, generalized quantifiers to Con-
tingentist quantification, is arguably that the modal resources availed of in
the abstractionist program might then be ineliminable.
9.3 Epistemic Modality, Metaphysical Modal-
ity, and Epistemic Utility and Entitle-
ment
In this section, I address, finally, Hale and Wright’s second issue with the
role of Necessitism in guaranteeing that the possible truth of abstraction
principles provides warrant for the belief in their actual truth. As noted,
Hale and Wright argue, against the foregoing approach, that there is non-
evidential entitlement rationally to trust that acceptable abstraction prin-
ciples are true, and thus that the terms defined therein actually refer. In
response, I will proceed by targeting the explanation in virtue of which there
is such epistemic, default entitlement. I will outline two proposals concerning
the foregoing grounding claim – advanced, respectively, in Chapter 11 and
by Wright (2012; 2014) – and I will argue that the approaches converge.
Wright’s elaboration of the notion of rational trust, which is intended to
subserve epistemic entitlement, appeals to a notion of ‘expected epistemic
utility’ in the setting of decision theory (2014: 226, 241). In order better
to understand this notion of expected epistemic utility, we must be more
precise.
There are two, major interpretations of (classical) expected utility.27 A
27For an examination of non-classical utility measures, see Buchak (2014). Non-classical
utility measures are intended to describe the innocuous rationality with which an agent’s
expected utility might diminish with the order of the bets she might pursue. In the latter
case, her expected utility will then be sensitive to her propensity to take risks relative to
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model of decision theory is a tuple 〈A,O,K,V〉, where A is a set of acts; O is
a set of outcomes; K encodes a set of counterfactual conditionals, where an
act from A figures in the antecedent of the conditional and O figures in the
conditional’s consequent; and V is a function assigning a real number to each
outcome. The real number is a representation of the value of the outcome. In
evidential decision theory, the expected utility of an outcome is calculated as
the product of the agent’s credence, conditional on her action, by the utility
of the outcome. In causal decision theory, the expected utility of an outcome
is calculated as the product of the agent’s credence, conditional on both her
action and background knowledge of the causal efficacy thereof, by the utility
of the outcome.
First, because background knowledge concerning the causal efficacy of
one’s choice of acts is presumably orthogonal to the non-evidential rational
trust to believe that mathematical abstraction principles are true, I will as-
sume that the notion of expected epistemic utility theory that Wright (op.
cit.) avails of relies only on the subjective credence of the agent, multiplied
by the utility that she assigns to the outcome of the proposition in which
she’s placing her rational trust. Thus expected epistemic utility in the setting
of decision-theory will be calculated within the (so-called) evidential, rather
than causal, interpretation of the latter.
Second, there are two, major interpretations concerning how to measure
the subjective credences of an agent. The philosophical significance of this
choice point is that it bears directly on the very notion of the epistemic
utility that an agent’s beliefs will possess. So, e.g., according to pragmatic
accounts of the accuracy of one’s partial beliefs, one begins by defining a
preference ordering on the agent’s space of acts and outcomes. If the prefer-
ence ordering is consistent with the Kolmogorov axioms28, then one can set
up a representation theorem from which the agent’s subjective probability
and utility measures (i.e., their expected utility measure) can be derived.29
the total ordering of the gambles, such that she can have a preference for a sure-gain of .5
units of value, rather than prefer a bet with a 50 percent chance of winning either 0 or 1
units of value.
28Namely: normality (which states that the probability of a tautology maps to 1); non-
negativity (which states that the probabilty operator must take a non-negative value);
additivity (which states that for all disjoint probability densities, the probability of their
union is equal to the probability of the first density added to the probability of the second);
and conditionalization [which states that the probability of φ conditional on ψ equals the
probability of the intersection of φ and ψ, divided by the probability of ψ].
29Cf. Ramsey (1926); Savage (1954); and Jeffrey (1965).
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The epistemic utility associated with the pragmatic approach is, generally,
utility maximization.
By contrast to the pragmatic approach, the epistemic approach to mea-
suring the accuracy of one’s beliefs is grounded in the notion of dominance
(cf. Joyce, 1998; 2009). According to the epistemic approach, there is an
ideal, or vindicated, probability concerning a proposition’s obtaining, and if
an agent’s subjective probability measure does not satisfy the Kolmogorov
axioms, then one can prove that it will always be dominated by a distinct
measure; i.e. it will always be the case that a distinct subjective probability
measure will be closer to the vindicated world than one’s own. The epistemic
utility associated with the epistemic approach is thus the minimization of in-
accuracy (cf. Pettigrew, 2014).30
Wright notes that rational trust subserving epistemic entitlement will be
pragmatic, and makes the intriguing point that ‘pragmatic reasons are not
a special genre of reason, to be contrasted with e.g. epistemic, prudential,
and moral reasons’ (2012: 484). He provides an example according to which
one might be impelled to prefer the ‘alleviation of Third world suffering’ to
one’s own ‘eternal bliss’ (op. cit.); and so presumably has the pragmatic
approach to expected utility in mind. The intriguing point to note, however,
is that epistemic utility is variegated; one’s epistemic utility might consist,
e.g., in both the reduction of epistemic inaccuracy and in the satisfaction
of one’s preferences. Wright concludes that there is thus ‘no good cause to
deny certain kinds of pragmatic reason the title ‘epistemic’. This will be the
case where, in the slot in the structure of the reasons for an action that is
to be filled by the desires of the agent, the relevant desires are focused on
epistemic goods and goals’ (op. cit.).
Third, and most crucially: The very idea of expected epistemic utility in
the setting of decision theory makes implicit appeal to the notion of possible
30The distinction between the epistemic (also referred to as the alethic) and the prag-
matic approaches to epistemic utility is anticipated by Clifford (1877) and James (1896),
with Clifford endorsing the epistemic approach, and James the pragmatic. The distance
measures comprising the scoring rules for the minimization of inaccuracy are examined in,
inter alia, Fitelson (2001); Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010); and Moss (2011). A generaliza-
tion of Joyce’s argument for probabilism to models of non-classical logic is examined in
Paris (2001) and Williams (2012). A dominance-based approach to decision theory is ex-
amined in Easwaran (2014), and a dominance-based approach to the notion of coherence –
which can accommodate phenomena such as the preface paradox, and is thus weaker than
the notion of consistency in an agent’s belief set – is examined in Easwaran and Fitelson
(2015).
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worlds. The full and partial beliefs of an agent will have to be defined on
a probability distribution, i.e. a set of epistemically possible worlds. The
philosophical significance of this point is that it demonstrates how Hale and
Wright’s appeal to default, rational entitlement to trust that abstraction
principles are true converges with the modal approach to the epistemology
of mathematics advanced in Chapter 11. The latter proceeds by examining
undecidable sentences via the epistemic interpretation of two-dimensional in-
tensional semantics. The latter can be understood as recording the thought
that the semantic value of a proposition relative to a first parameter (a con-
text) which ranges over epistemically possible worlds, will constrain the se-
mantic value of the proposition relative to a second parameter (an index)
which ranges over metaphysically possible worlds. The formal clauses for
epistemic and metaphysical mathematical modalities are as follows:
Let C denote a set of epistemically possibilities, such that JφKc ⊆ C;
(φ is a formula encoding a state of information at an epistemically possible
world).
-pri(x) = λc.JxKc,c;
(the two parameters relative to which x – a propositional variable – ob-
tains its value are epistemically possible worlds. The function from possible
formulas to values is thus an intension).
-sec(x) = λw.JxKw,w
(the two parameters relative to which x obtains its value are metaphysi-
cally possible worlds).
Then:
• Epistemic Mathematical Necessity (Apriority)
JφKc,w = 1⇐⇒ ∀c′JφKc,c′ = 1
(φ is true at all points in epistemic modal space).
• Epistemic Mathematical Possibility
J⋄cφKc 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ JPrφKc 6= ∅ ∧ >.5, else 〈∅, Prc(φ | ∅)〉.
(φ might be true if and only if its value is not null and it is greater
than .5).
Epistemic mathematical modality is constrained by consistency, and the
formal techniques of provability and forcing. A mathematical formula is
metaphysically impossible, if it can be disproved or induces inconsistency in
a model.
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• Convergence
∀c∃wJφKc,w = 1
(the value of x is relative to a parameter for the space of epistemically
possible worlds. The value of x relative to the first parameter deter-
mines the value of x relative to the second parameter for the space of
metaphysical possibilities).
According, then, to the latter, the possibility of deciding mathematical
propositions which are currently undecidable relative to a background math-
ematical language such as ZFC should be two-dimensional. The epistemic
possibility of deciding Orey sentences can thus be a guide to the metaphysical
possibility thereof.31
The convergence between Wright’s and my approaches consists, then, in
that – on both approaches – there is a set of epistemically possible worlds.
In the former case, the epistemically possible worlds subserve the preference
rankings for the definability of expected epistemic utility. Epistemic mathe-
matical modality is thus constitutive of the notion of rational entitlement to
which Hale and Wright appeal, and – in virtue of its convergence with the
two-dimensional intensional semantics here proffered – epistemically possi-
ble worlds can serve as a guide to the metaphysical mathematical possibility
that mathematical propositions, such as abstraction principles for cardinals,
reals, and sets, are true.
9.4 Concluding Remarks
In this essay, I have endeavored to provide an account of the modal foun-
dations of mathematical platonism. Hale and Wright’s objections to the
idea that Necessitism cannot account for how possibility and actuality might
converge were shown to be readily answered. In response, further, to Hale
and Wright’s objections to the role of epistemic and metaphysical modali-
ties in countenancing the truth of abstraction principles and the success of
mathematical predicate reference, I demonstrated how my two-dimensional
modal approach to the epistemology of mathematics, augmented with Ne-
cessitism, is consistent with Hale and Wright’s conception of the epistemic
31See Kanamori (2008) and Woodin (2010), for further discussion of the mathematical
properties at issue.
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entitlement rationally to trust that abstraction principles are true. Epistemic
and metaphysical modality may thus be shown to play a constitutive role in
vindicating the reality of mathematical objects and truth, and in explaining
our possible knowledge thereof.
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Chapter 10
Ω-Logicism: Automata,
Neo-Logicism, and
Set-theoretic Realism
This essay examines the philosophical significance of the consequence rela-
tion defined in the Ω-logic for set-theoretic languages. I argue that, as with
second-order logic, the modal profile of validity in Ω-Logic enables the prop-
erty to be epistemically tractable. Because of the dual isomorphism between
algebras and coalgebras, Boolean-valued models of set theory can be inter-
preted as coalgebras. The modal profile of Ω-logical validity can then be
countenanced within a coalgebraic logic, and Ω-logical validity can further
be defined via automata (Section 2). The philosophical significance of the
foregoing is two-fold: First, that it vindicates a type of neo-logicism with
regard to mathematical truth in the set-theoretic multiverse (Section 3.1);
and second, that it provides a modal and computational account of formal
grasp of the concept of ’set’, adducing in favor of a realist conception of the
cumulative hierarchy of sets (Section 3.2). Section 4 provides concluding
remarks.
10.1 Definitions
In this section, I define the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice.
I define the mathematical properties of the large cardinal axioms to which
ZFC can be adjoined, and I provide a detailed characterization of the proper-
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ties of Ω-logic for ZFC. Because Boolean-valued algebraic models of Ω-logic
are dually isomorphic to coalgebras, a category of coalgebraic logic is then
characterized which models both modal logic and deterministic automata.
Modal coalgebraic models of automata are then argued to provide a precise
characterization of the modal and computational profiles of Ω-logical validity.
10.1.1 Axioms1
• Empty set:
∃x∀u(u/∈x)
• Extensionality:
x = y ⇐⇒ ∀u(u∈x ⇐⇒ u∈y)
• Pairing:
∃x∀u(u∈x ⇐⇒ u = a ∨ u = b)
• Union:
∃x∀u[u∈x ⇐⇒ ∃v(u∈v ∧ v∈a)]
• Separation:
∃x∀u[u∈x ⇐⇒ u∈a ∧ φ(u)]
• Power Set:
∃x∀u(u∈x ⇐⇒ u⊆a)
• Infinity:
∃x∅∈x ∧ ∀u(u∈x → {u}∈x)
• Replacement:
∀u∃!vψ(u,v) → ∀x∃y(∀u∈x)(∃v∈y)ψ(u,v)
• Choice:
∀u[u∈a→∃v(v∈u)] ∧ ∀u,x[u∈a ∧ x∈a→∃v(v∈u ⇐⇒ v∈x) ∨ ¬v(v∈u
∧ v∈x)] → ∃x∀u[u∈a → ∃!v(v∈u ∧ u∈x)]
1For a standard presentation, see Jech (2003). For detailed, historical discussion, see
Maddy (1988,a).
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10.1.2 Large Cardinals
Borel sets of reals are subsets of ωω or R, closed under countable intersections
and unions.2 For all ordinals, a, such that 0 < a < ω1, and b < a, Σ0a denotes
the open subsets of ωω formed under countable unions of sets in Π0b, and
Π0a denotes the closed subsets of ωω formed under countable intersections of
Σ0b.
Projective sets of reals are subsets of ωω, formed by complementations
(ωω – u, for u⊆ωω) and projections [p(u) = {〈x1, . . . , xn〉∈ωω | ∃y〈x1, . . . , xn,
y〉∈u}]. For all ordinals a, such that 0 < a < ω, Π10 denotes closed subsets
of ωω; Π1a is formed by taking complements of the open subsets of ωω, Σ1a;
and Σ1a+1 is formed by taking projections of sets in Π1a.
The full power set operation defines the cumulative hierarchy of sets, V,
such that V0 = ∅; Va+1 = P (V0); and Vλ =
⋃
a<λVa.
In the inner model program (cf. Woodin, 2001, 2010, 2011; Kanamori,
2012), the definable power set operation defines the constructible universe,
L(R), in the universe of sets V, where the sets are transitive such that a∈C
⇐⇒ a⊆C; L(R) = Vω+1; La+1(R) = Def(La(R)); and Lλ(R) = ⋃a<λ(La(R)).
Via inner models, Gödel (1940) proves the consistency of the generalized
continuum hypothesis, ℵaℵa = ℵa+1, as well as the axiom of choice, relative
to the axioms of ZFC. However, for a countable transitive set of ordinals,
M, in a model of ZF without choice, one can define a generic set, G, such
that, for all formulas, φ, either φ or ¬φ is forced by a condition, f , in G.
Let M[G] =
⋃
a<κMa[G], such that M0[G] = {G}; with λ < κ, Mλ[G] =⋃
a<λMa[G]; and Ma+1[G] = Va ∩ Ma[G].3 G is a Cohen real over M, and
comprises a set-forcing extension of M. The relation of set-forcing, , can
then be defined in the ground model, M, such that the forcing condition,
f , is a function from a finite subset of ω into {0,1}, and f  u∈G if f(u)
= 1 and f  u/∈G if f(u) = 0. The cardinalities of an open dense ground
model, M, and a generic extension, G, are identical, only if the countable
chain condition (c.c.c.) is satisfied, such that, given a chain – i.e., a linearly
ordered subset of a partially ordered (reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive) set
– there is a countable, maximal antichain consisting of pairwise incompatible
forcing conditions. Via set-forcing extensions, Cohen (1963, 1964) constructs
a model of ZF which negates the generalized continuum hypothesis, and thus
2See Koellner (2013), for the presentation, and for further discussion, of the definitions
in this and the subsequent paragraph.
3See Kanamori (2012,a: 2.1; 2012,b: 4.1), for further discussion.
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proves the independence thereof relative to the axioms of ZF.4
Gödel (1946/1990: 1-2) proposes that the value of Orey sentences such as
the GCH might yet be decidable, if one avails of stronger theories to which
new axioms of infinity – i.e., large cardinal axioms – are adjoined.5 He writes
that: ’In set theory, e.g., the successive extensions can be represented by
stronger and stronger axioms of infinity. It is certainly impossible to give
a combinatorial and decidable characterization of what an axiom of infinity
is; but there might exist, e.g., a characterization of the following sort: An
axiom of infinity is a proposition which has a certain (decidable) formal
structure and which in addition is true. Such a concept of demonstrability
might have the required closure property, i.e. the following could be true:
Any proof for a set-theoretic theorem in the next higher system above set
theory . . . is replaceable by a proof from such an axiom of infinity. It is
not impossible that for such a concept of demonstrability some completeness
theorem would hold which would say that every proposition expressible in
set theory is decidable from present axioms plus some true assertion about
the largeness of the universe of sets’.
For cardinals, x,a,C, C⊆a is closed unbounded in a, if it is closed [if x
< C and
⋃
(C∩a) = a, then a∈C] and unbounded (⋃C = a) (Kanamori, op.
cit.: 360). A cardinal, S, is stationary in a, if, for any closed unbounded
C⊆a, C∩S 6= ∅ (op. cit.). An ideal is a subset of a set closed under countable
unions, whereas filters are subsets closed under countable intersections. A
cardinal κ is regular if the cofinality of κ – comprised of the unions of sets
with cardinality less than κ – is identical to κ. Uncountable regular limit
cardinals are weakly inaccessible (op. cit.). A strongly inaccessible cardinal
is regular and has a strong limit, such that if λ < κ, then 2λ < κ (op. cit.).
Large cardinal axioms are defined by elementary embeddings.6 Elemen-
tary embeddings can be defined thus. For models A,B, and conditions φ, j: A
→ B, φ〈a1, . . . , an〉 in A if and only if φ〈j(a1), . . . , j(an)〉 in B (363). A mea-
surable cardinal is defined as the ordinal denoted by the critical point of j,
crit(j) (Koellner and Woodin, 2010: 7). Measurable cardinals are inaccessible
4See Kanamori (2008), for further discussion.
5See Kanamori (2007), for further discussion. Kanamori (op. cit.: 154) notes that
Gödel (1931/1986: fn48a) makes a similar appeal to higher-order languages, in his proofs
of the incompleteness theorems. The incompleteness theorems are examined in further
detail, in Section 3.2, below.
6The definitions in the remainder of this subsection follow the presentations in Koellner
and Woodin (2010) and Woodin (2010, 2011).
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(Kanamori, op. cit.).
Let κ be a cardinal, and η > κ an ordinal. κ is then η-strong, if there
is a transitive class M and an elementary embedding, j: V → M, such that
crit(j) = κ, j(κ) >η, and Vη⊆M (Koellner and Woodin, op. cit.).
κ is strong if and only if, for all η, it is η-strong (op. cit.).
If A is a class, κ is η-A-strong, if there is a j: V → M, such that κ is
η-strong and j(A∩Vκ)∩Vη = A∩Vη (op. cit.).
κ is a Woodin cardinal, if κ is strongly inaccessible, and for all A⊆Vκ,
there is a cardinal κA < κ, such that κA is η-A-strong, for all η such that κη,
η < κ (Koellner and Woodin, op. cit.: 8).
κ is superstrong, if j: V → M, such that crit(j) = κ and Vj(κ)⊆M, which
entails that there are arbitrarily large Woodin cardinals below κ (op. cit.).
Large cardinal axioms can then be defined as follows.
∃xΦ is a large cardinal axiom, because:
(i) Φx is a Σ2-formula;
(ii) if κ is a cardinal, such that V |= Φ(κ), then κ is strongly inaccessible;
and
(iii) for all generic partial orders P∈Vκ, VP |= Φ(κ); INS is a non-stationary
ideal; AG is the canonical representation of reals in L(R), i.e. the interpreta-
tion of A in M[G]; and L(R)Pmax |= 〈H(ω2), ∈, INS, AG〉 |= ’φ’. P is a homoge-
neous partial order in L(R), such that the generic extension of L(R)P inherits
the generic invariance, i.e., the absoluteness, of L(R). Thus, L(R)Pmax is
(i) effectively complete, i.e. invariant under set-forcing extensions; and (ii)
maximal, i.e. satisfies all Π2-sentences and is thus consistent by set-forcing
over ground models (Woodin, ms: 28).
Assume ZFC and that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals; A∈P(R)
∩ L(R); φ is a Π2-sentence; and V(G), s.t. 〈H(ω2), ∈, INS, AG〉 |= ’φ’: Then,
it can be proven that L(R)Pmax |= 〈H(ω2), ∈, INS, AG〉 |= ’φ’, where ’φ’ :=
∃A∈Γ∞〈H(ω1), ∈, A〉 |= ψ.
The axiom of determinacy (AD) states that every set of reals, a⊆ωω is
determined, where κ is determined if it is decidable.
Woodin’s (1999) Axiom (*) can be thus countenanced:
ADL(R) and L[(Pω1)] is a Pmax-generic extension of L(R),
from which it can be derived that 2ℵ0 = ℵ2. Thus, ¬CH; and so CH is
absolutely decidable.
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10.1.3 Ω-Logic
For partial orders, P, let VP = VB, where B is the regular open completion
of (P).7 Ma = (Va)M and MBa = (VBa)M = (VaM
B
). Sent denotes a set of
sentences in a first-order language of set theory. T∪{φ} is a set of sentences
extending ZFC. c.t.m abbreviates the notion of a countable transitive ∈-
model. c.B.a. abbreviates the notion of a complete Boolean algebra.
Define a c.B.a. in V, such that VB. Let VB0 = ∅; VBλ = ⋃b<λVBb, with λ
a limit ordinal; VBa+1 = {f: X → B | X ⊆VBa}; and VB = ⋃a∈OnVBa.
φ is true in VB, if its Boolean-value is 1B, if and only if
VB |= φ iff JφKB = 1B.
Thus, for all ordinals, a, and every c.B.a. B, VBa ≡ (Va)V B iff for all
x∈VB, ∃y∈VBJx = yKB = 1B iff Jx∈VBKB = 1B.
Then, VBa |= φ iff VB |= ’Va |= φ’.
Ω-logical validity can then be defined as follows:
For T∪{φ}⊆Sent,
T |=Ω φ, if for all ordinals a and c.B.a. B, if VBa |= T, then VBa |= φ.
Supposing that there exists a proper class of Woodin cardinals and if
T∪{φ}⊆Sent, then for all set-forcing conditions, P:
T |=Ω φ iff VT |= ’T |=Ω φ’,
where T |=Ω φ ≡ ∅ |= ’T |=Ω φ’.
The Ω-Conjecture states that V |=Ω φ iff VB |=Ω φ (Woodin, ms). Thus,
Ω-logical validity is invariant in all set-forcing extensions of ground models
in the set-theoretic multiverse.
The soundness of Ω-Logic is defined by universally Baire sets of reals. For
a cardinal, e, let a set A be e-universally Baire, if for all partial orders P of
cardinality e, there exist trees, S and T on ω X λ, such that A = p[T] and if
G⊆P is generic, then p[T]G = RG – p[S]G (Koellner, 2013). A is universally
Baire, if it is e-universally Baire for all e (op. cit.).
Ω-Logic is sound, such that V ⊢Ω φ→ V |=Ω φ. However, the completeness
of Ω-Logic has yet to be resolved.
Finally, in category theory, a category C is comprised of a class Ob(C)
of objects a family of arrows for each pair of objects C(A,B) (Venema, 2007:
421). A functor from a category C to a category D, E: C→ D, is an operation
mapping objects and arrows of C to objects and arrows of D (422). An
endofunctor on C is a functor, E: C → C (op. cit.).
7The definitions in this section follow the presentation in Bagaria et al. (2006).
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A E-coalgebra is a pair A = (A, µ), with A an object of C referred to
as the carrier of A, and µ: A → E(A) is an arrow in C, referred to as the
transition map of A (390).
A = 〈A, µ: A → E(A)〉 is dually isomorphic to the category of algebras
over the functor µ (417-418). If µ is a functor on categories of sets, then
Boolean-algebraic models of Ω-logical validity are isomorphic to coalgebraic
models.
The significance of the foregoing is that coalgebraic models may them-
selves be availed of in order to define modal logic and automata theory.
Coalgebras provide therefore a setting in which the Boolean-valued models
of set theory, the modal profile of Ω-logical validity, and automata can be
interdefined. In what follows, A will comprise the coalgebraic model – dually
isomorphic to the complete Boolean-valued algebras defined in the Ω-Logic
of ZFC – in which modal similarity types and automata are definable. As a
coalgebraic model of modal logic, A can be defined as follows (407):
For a set of formulas, Φ, let ∇Φ :=  ∨ Φ ∧ ∧ ⋄Φ, where ⋄Φ denotes the
set {⋄φ | φ∈Φ (op. cit.). Then,
⋄φ ≡ ∇{φ, T},
φ ≡ ∇∅ ∨ ∇φ (op. cit.).
Let an E-coalgebraic modal model, A = 〈S,λ,R[.]〉, such that S,s  ∇Φ
if and only if, for all (some) successors σ of s∈S, [Φ,σ(s)∈E(A)] (op. cit.).
A coalgebraic model of deterministic automata can finally be thus defined
(391). An automaton is a tuple, A = 〈A, aI , C, δ, F〉, such that A is the
state space of the automaton A; aI∈A is the automaton’s initial state; C is
the coding for the automaton’s alphabet, mapping numerals to properties
of the natural numbers; δ: A X C → A is a transition function, and F⊆
A is the collection of admissible states, where F maps A to {1,0}, such
that F: A → 1 if a∈F and A → 0 if a/∈F (op. cit.). The determinacy
of coalgebraic automata, the category of which is dually isomorphic to the
Set category satisfying Ω-logical consequence, is secured by the existence of
Woodin cardinals: Assuming ZFC, that λ is a limit of Woodin cardinals,
that there is a generic, set-forcing extension G ⊆ the collapse of ω < λ, and
that R* =
⋃
{RG[a] | a < λ}, then R* |= the axiom of determinacy (AD)
(Koellner and Woodin, op. cit.: 10).
Thus, A is the coalgebraic category for modal, deterministic automata,
dually isomorphic to the complete Boolean-valued algebraic models of Ω-
logical validity, as defined in the category of sets.
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10.2 Discussion
This section examines the philosophical significance of the foregoing, and
argues that, similarly to second-order logical consequence, (i) the ’mathe-
matical entanglement’ of Ω-logical validity does not undermine its status as
a relation of pure logic; and (ii) both the modal profile and model-theoretic
characterization of Ω-logical consequence provide a guide to its epistemic
tractability.8 I argue, finally, that there are several considerations adducing
in favor of the claim that the interpretation of the concept of set constitutively
involves modal notions. The role of the category of modal coalegebraic de-
terministic automata in (i) characterizing the modal profile of Ω-logical con-
sequence, and (ii) being constitutive of the formal understanding-conditions
for the concept of set, provides, then, support for a realist conception of the
cumulative hierarchy.
10.2.1 Neo-Logicism
Frege’s (1884/1980; 1893/2013) proposal – that cardinal numbers can be
explained by specifying an equivalence relation, expressible in the signature
of second-order logic and identity, on lower-order representatives for higher-
order entities – is the first attempt to provide a foundation for mathematics
on the basis of logical axioms rather than rational or empirical intuition. In
Frege (1884/1980. cit.: 68) and Wright (1983: 104-105), the number of the
concept, A, is argued to be identical to the number of the concept, B, if and
only if there is a one-to-one correspondence between A and B, i.e., there is
a bijective mapping, R, from A to B. With Nx: a numerical term-forming
operator,
• ∀A∀B∃R[[Nx: A = Nx: B ≡ ∃R[∀x[Ax → ∃y(By ∧ Rxy ∧ ∀z(Bz ∧
Rxz→ y = z))] ∧ ∀y[By→ ∃x(Ax ∧ Rxy ∧ ∀z(Az ∧ Rzy→ x = z))]]].
Frege’s Theorem states that the Dedekind-Peano axioms for the language
of arithmetic can be derived from the foregoing abstraction principle, as
augmented to the signature of second-order logic and identity.9 Thus, if
8The phrase, ’mathematical entanglement’, is owing to Koellner (2010: 2).
9Cf. Dedekind (1888/1963) and Peano (1889/1967). See Wright (1983: 154-169) for a
proof sketch of Frege’s theorem; Boolos (1987) for the formal proof thereof; and Parsons
(1964) for an incipient conjecture of the theorem’s validity.
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second-order logic may be counted as pure logic, despite that domains of
second-order models are definable via power set operations, then one aspect
of the philosophical significance of the abstractionist program consists in its
provision of a foundation for classical mathematics on the basis of pure logic
as augmented with non-logical implicit definitions expressed by abstraction
principles.
There are at least three reasons for which a logic defined in ZFC might not
undermine the status of its consequence relation as being logical. The first
reason for which the mathematical entanglement of Ω-logical validity might
be innocuous is that, as Shapiro (1991: 5.1.4) notes, many mathematical
properties cannot be defined within first-order logic, and instead require the
expressive resources of second-order logic. For example, the notion of well-
foundedness cannot be expressed in a first-order framework, as evinced by
considerations of compactness. Let E be a binary relation. Let m be a well-
founded model, if there is no infinite sequence, a0, . . . , ai, such that Ea0, . . . ,
Eai+1 are all true. If m is well-founded, then there are no infinite-descending
E-chains. Suppose that T is a first-order theory containing m, and that, for
all natural numbers, n, there is a T with n + 1 elements, a0, . . . , an, such
that 〈a0, a1〉, . . . , 〈an, an−1〉 are in the extension of E. By compactness,
there is an infinite sequence such that that a0 . . . ai, s.t. Ea0, . . . , Eai+1 are
all true. So, m is not well-founded.
By contrast, however, well-foundedness can be expressed in a second-order
framework:
∀X[∃xXx → ∃x[Xx ∧ ∀y(Xy → ¬Eyx)]], such that m is well-founded
iff every non-empty subset X has an element x, s.t. nothing in X bears E
to x.
One aspect of the philosophical significance of well-foundedness is that
it provides a distinctively second-order constraint on when the membership
relation in a given model is intended. This contrasts with Putnam’s (1980)
claim, that first-order models mod can be intended, if every set s of reals
in mod is such that an ω-model in mod contains s and is constructible,
such that – given the Downward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem10 – if mod is
non-constructible but has a submodel satisfying ’s is constructible’, then the
model is non-well-founded and yet must be intended. The claim depends
10For any first-order model M , M has a submodel M ′ whose domain is at most denu-
merably infinite, s.t. for all assignments s on, and formulas φ(x) in, M ′, M ,s φ(x) ⇐⇒
M ′,s φ(x).
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on the assumption that general understanding-conditions and conditions on
intendedness must be co-extensive, to which I will return in Section 3.2
The second reason for which Ω-logic’s mathematical entanglement might
not be pernicious is that first-order models of arithmetic and ZFC themselves
include non-logical, mathematical vocabulary. For example, first-order ω-
logic has domains comprised of ordinal-definable natural numbers, and –
crucially – first-order β-logic has domains comprised of well-founded ordinal-
definable natural numbers (Koellner, 2010: 11-12).
Finally, a third reason for which the consequence relation specified in
the Ω-logic of set theory is genuinely logical may again be appreciated by
its comparison with second-order logic. Shapiro (1998) defines the model-
theoretic characterization of logical consequence as follows:
’(10) Φ is a logical consequence of [a model] Γ if Φ holds in all possibilities
under every interpretation of the nonlogical terminology which holds in Γ’
(148).
A condition on the foregoing is referred to as the ’isomorphism property’,
according to which ’if two models M, M’ are isomorphic vis-a-vis the non-
logical items in a formula Φ, then M satisfies Φ if and only if M’ satisfies Φ’
(151).
Shapiro argues, then, that the consequence relation specified using second-
order resources is logical, because of its modal and epistemic profiles. The
epistemic tractability of second-order validity consists in ’typical soundness
theorems, where one shows that a given deductive system is ’truth-preserving’
(154). He writes that: ’[I]f we know that a model is a good mathematical
model of logical consequence (10), then we know that we won’t go wrong
using a sound deductive system. Also, we can know that an argument is a
logical consequence . . . via a set-theoretic proof in the metatheory’ (154-155).
The modal profile of second-order validity provides a second means of
accounting for the property’s epistemic tractability. Shapiro argues, e.g.,
that: ’If the isomorphism property holds, then in evaluating sentences and
arguments, the only ’possibility’ we need to ’vary’ is the size of the universe.
If enough sizes are represented in the universe of models, then the modal
nature of logical consequence will be registered . . . [T]he only ’modality’ we
keep is ’possible size’, which is relegated to the set-theoretic metatheory’
(152).
Shapiro’s remarks about the considerations adducing in favor of the log-
icality of non-effective, second-order validity generalize to Ω-logical validity.
In the previous section, the modal profile of Ω-logical validity was codified
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by the dual isomorphism between complete Boolean-valued algebraic mod-
els of Ω-logic and the category, A, of coalgebraic modal logics. As with
Shapiro’s definition of logical consequence, where Φ holds in all possibilities
in the universe of models and the possibilities concern the ’possible size’ in
the set-theoretic metatheory, the Ω-Conjecture states that V |=Ω φ iff VB
|=Ω φ, such that Ω-logical validity is invariant in all set-forcing extensions of
ground models in the set-theoretic multiverse.
Finally, the epistemic tractability of Ω-logical validity is secured, both –
as on Shapiro’s account of second-order logical consequence – by its sound-
ness, but also by its isomorphism to the coalgebraic category of deterministic
automata, where the determinacy thereof is again secured by the existence
of Woodin cardinals.
10.2.2 Set-theoretic Realism
In this section, I argue, finally, that the modal profile of Ω-logic can be availed
of in order to account for the understanding-conditions of the concept of set,
and thus crucially serve as part of the argument for set-theoretic realism.
Putnam (op. cit.: 473-474) argues that defining models of first-order
theories is sufficient for both understanding and specifying an intended in-
terpretation of the latter. Wright (1985: 124-125) argues, by contrast, that
understanding-conditions for mathematical concepts cannot be exhausted by
the axioms for the theories thereof, even on the intended interpretations of
the theories. He suggests, e.g., that:
’[I]f there really were uncountable sets, their existence would surely have
to flow from the concept of set, as intuitively satisfactorily explained. Here,
there is, as it seems to me, no assumption that the content of the ZF-axioms
cannot exceed what is invariant under all their classical models. [Benacerraf]
writes, e.g., that: ’It is granted that they are to have their ’intended interpre-
tation’: ’e’ is to mean set-membership. Even so, and conceived as encoding
the intuitive concept of set, they fail to entail the existence of uncountable
sets. So how can it be true that there are such sets? Benacerraf’s reply
is that the ZF-axioms are indeed faithful to the relevant informal notions
only if, in addition to ensuring that ’E’ means set-membership, we inter-
pret them so as to observe the constraint that ’the universal quantifier has
to mean all or at least all sets’ (p. 103). It follows, of course, that if the
concept of set does determine a background against which Cantor’s theorem,
under its intended interpretation, is sound, there is more to the concept of
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set that can be explained by communication of the intended sense of ’e’ and
the stipulation that the ZF-axioms are to hold. And the residue is contained,
presumably, in the informal explanations to which, Benacerraf reminds us,
Zermelo intended his formalization to answer. At least, this must be so if the
’intuitive concept of set’ is capable of being explained at all. Yet it is notable
that Benacerraf nowhere ventures to supply the missing informal explanation
– the story which will pack enough into the extension of ’all sets’ to yield
Cantor’s theorem, under its intended interpretation, as a highly non-trivial
corollary’( op. cit).
In order to provide the foregoing explanation in virtue of which the con-
cept of set can be shown to be associated with a realistic notion of the
cumulative hierarchy, I will argue that there are several points in the model
theory and epistemology of set-theoretic languages at which the interpreta-
tion of the concept of set constitutively involves modal notions. The aim
of the section will thus be to provide a modal foundation for mathematical
platonism.
One point is in the coding of the signature of the theory, T, in which
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems are proved (cf. Halbach and Visser, 2014).
Relative to,
(i) a choice of coding for an ω-complete, recursively axiomatizable lan-
guage, L, of T – i.e. a mapping between properties of numbers and properties
of terms and formulas in L;
(ii) a predicate, phi; and
(iii) a fixed-point construction:
Let phi express the property of ’being provable’, and define (iii) such that,
for all consistent theories T of L, there are sentences, pphi, corresponding to
each formula, phi(x), in T, s.t. for ’m’ := pphi,
|–T pphi iff phi(m).
One can then construct a sentence, ’m’ := ¬phi(m), such that L is in-
complete (the first incompleteness theorem).
Moreover, L cannot prove its own consistency:
If:
|–T ’m’ iff ¬phi(m),
Then:
|–T C → m.
Thus, L is consistent only if L is inconsistent (the second incompleteness
theorem).
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In the foregoing, the choice of coding bridges the numerals in the language
with the properties of the target numbers. The choice of coding is therefore
intensional, and has been marshalled in order to argue that the very notion
of syntactic computability – via the equivalence class of partial recursive
functions, λ-definable terms, and the transition functions of discrete-state
automata such as Turing machines – is constitutively semantic (cf. Rescorla,
2015). Further points at which intensionality can be witnessed in the phe-
nomenon of self-reference in arithmetic are introduced by Reinhardt (1986).
Reinhardt (op. cit.: 470-472) argues that the provability predicate can be de-
fined relative to the minds of particular agents – similarly to Quine’s (1968)
and Lewis’ (1979) suggestion that possible worlds can be centered by defining
them relative to parameters ranging over tuples of spacetime coordinates or
agents and locations – and that a theoretical identity statement can be estab-
lished for the concept of the foregoing minds and the concept of a computable
system.
In the previous section, intensional computational properties were defined
via modal coalgebraic deterministic automata, where the coalgebraic cate-
gories are dually isomorphic to the category of sets in which Ω-logical validity
was defined. Coalgebraic modal logic was shown to elucidate the modal pro-
file of Ω-logical consequence in the Boolean-valued algebraic models of set
theory. The intensionality witnessed by the choice of coding may therefore
be further witnessed by the modal automata specified in the foregoing coal-
gebraic logic.
A second point at which understanding-conditions may be shown to be
constitutively modal can be witnessed by the conditions on the epistemic
entitlement to assume that the language in which Gödel’s second incom-
pleteness theorem is proved is consistent (cf. Dummett, 19; Wright, 1985).
Wright (op. cit.: 91, fn.9) suggests that ’[T]o treat [a] proof as establishing
consistency is implicitly to exclude any doubt . . . about the consistency of
first-order number theory’. Wright’s elaboration of the notion of epistemic en-
titlement, appeals to a notion of rational ’trust’, which he argues is recorded
by the calculation of ’expected epistemic utility’ in the setting of decision
theory (2004; 2014: 226, 241). Wright notes that the rational trust subserv-
ing epistemic entitlement will be pragmatic, and makes the intriguing point
that ’pragmatic reasons are not a special genre of reason, to be contrasted
with e.g. epistemic, prudential, and moral reasons’ (2012: 484). Crucially,
however, the very idea of expected epistemic utility in the setting of deci-
sion theory makes implicit appeal to the notion of possible worlds, where the
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latter can again be determined by the coalgebraic logic for modal automata.
A third consideration adducing in favor of the thought that grasp of the
concept of set might constitutively possess a modal profile is that the concept
can be defined as an intension – i.e., a function from possible worlds to exten-
sions. The modal similarity types in the coalgebraic modal logic may then
be interpreted as dynamic-interpretational modalities, where the dynamic-
interpretational modal operator has been argued to entrain the possible rein-
terpretations both of the domains of the theory’s quantifiers (cf. Fine, 2005,
2006), as well as of the extensions of terms expressing the membership rela-
tion (cf. Uzquiano, 2015,a).
The fourth consideration avails directly of the modal profile of Ω-logical
consequence. While the above dynamic-interpretational modality will suffice
for possible reinterpretations of mathematical terms, the absoluteness and
generic invariance of the consequence relation is such that, if the Ω-conjecture
is true, then Ω-logical validity is invariant in all possible set-forcing exten-
sions of ground models in the set-theoretic multiverse. The truth of the
Ω-conjecture would thereby place an indefeasible necessary condition on a
formal understanding of the intension for the concept of set.
10.3 Concluding Remarks
In this essay I have examined the philosophical significance of the isomor-
phism between Boolean-valued algebraic models of modal Ω-logic and modal
coalgebraic models of automata. I argued that – as with the property of va-
lidity in second-order logic – Ω-logical validity is genuinely logical, and thus
entails a type of neo-logicism in the foundations of mathematics. I argued,
then, that modal coalegebraic deterministic automata, which characterize the
modal profile of Ω-logical consequence, are constitutive of the interpretation
of mathematical concepts such as the membership relation. The philosophi-
cal significance of modal Ω-logic is thus that it can be availed of to vindicate
both a neo-logicist foundation for set theory and a realist interpretation of
the cumulative hierarchy of sets.
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Chapter 11
Epistemic Modality and
Absolute Decidability
This essay aims to contribute to the analysis of the nature of mathematical
modality, and to the applications of the latter to unrestricted quantification
and absolute decidability. I argue that mathematical modality falls under
at least three types; the interpretational, the metaphysical, and the logical.
The interpretational type of mathematical modality has traditionally been
taken to concern the interpretation of the quantifiers (cf. Linnebo, 2009,
2010, 2013; Studd, 2013); the possible reinterpretations of the intensions of
the concept of set (Uzquiano, 2015,a); and the possibility of reinterpreting
the domain over which the quantifiers range, in order to avoid inconsistency
(cf. Fine, 2005, 2006, 2007). The metaphysical type of modality concerns
the ontological profile of abstracta and mathematical truth. Abstracta are
thus argued to have metaphysically necessary being, and mathematical truths
hold of metaphysical necessity, if at all (cf. Fine, 1981; Williamson, 2016).
Instances, finally, of the logical type of mathematical modality might concern
the properties of consistency (cf. Field, 1989: 249-250, 257-260; Rayo, 2013:
50; Leng: 2007; 2010: 258), and can perhaps be further witnessed by the
logic of provability (cf. Boolos, 1993) and the modal profile of forcing (cf.
Kripke 1965; Hamkins and Löwe, 2008).
The significance of the present contribution is as follows. (i) Rather than
countenancing the interpretational type of mathematical modality as a prim-
itive, I argue that the interpretational type of mathematical modality is a
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species of epistemic modality.1 (ii) I argue, then, that the framework of
two-dimensional intensional semantics ought to be applied to the mathemat-
ical setting. The framework permits of a formally precise account of the
priority and relation between epistemic mathematical modality and meta-
physical mathematical modality. I target, in particular, the modal axioms
that the respective interpretations of the modal operator ought to satisfy.
The discrepancy between the modal systems governing the parameters in
the two-dimensional intensional setting provides an explanation of the dif-
ference between the metaphysical possibility of absolute decidability and our
knowledge thereof. (iii) Finally, I examine the application of the mathemati-
cal modalities beyond the issues of unrestricted quantification and indefinite
extensibility. As a test case for the two-dimensional approach, I investigate
the interaction between the epistemic and metaphysical mathematical modal-
ities and large cardinal axioms. The two-dimensional intensional framework
permits of a formally precise means of demonstrating how the metaphysi-
cal possibility of absolute decidability and the continuum hypothesis can be
accessed by their epistemic-modal-mathematical profile. The logical math-
ematical modalities – of consistency, provability, and forcing – provide the
means for discerning whether mathematical truths are themselves epistemi-
cally possible. I argue that, in the absence of disproof, large cardinal axioms
are epistemically possible, and thereby provide a sufficient guide to the meta-
physical mathematical possibility of determinacy claims and the continuum
hypothesis.
In Section 2, I define the formal clauses and modal axioms governing
the epistemic and metaphysical types of mathematical modality. In Section
3, I discuss how the properties of the epistemic mathematical modality and
metaphysical mathematical modality converge and depart from previous at-
1A precedent to the current approach is Parsons (1979-1980; 1983: p. 25, chs.10-11;
2008: 176), who argues that intuition is both a species of the imagination and can be
formalized by a mathematical modality. The mathematical modality is governed by S4.2,
and concerns possible iterations of the successor operation in arithmetic and possible ex-
tensions of the set-theoretic cumulative hierarchy. Among the differences between Parsons’
approach and the one here outlined is (i) that, by contrast to the current proposal, Par-
sons notes that his notion of mathematical modality is not epistemic (2008: 81fn1); and
(ii) that Parsons (1997: 348-351; 2008: 98-100) suggests that the intuitional mathemati-
cal modality concerning computable functions is an idealization insensitive to distinctions
such as those captured by computational complexity theory, rather than being defined
relative to an epistemic modal space comprising the computational theory of mind. (See
Chapters 2-3, for further discussion.)
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tempts to delineate the contours of similar notions. Section 4 extends the
two-dimensional intensional framework to the issue of mathematical knowl-
edge; in particular, to the modal profile of large cardinal axioms and to the
absolute decidability of the continuum hypothesis. Section 5 provides con-
cluding remarks.
11.1 Mathematical Modality
11.1.1 Metaphysical Mathematical Modality
A formula is a logical truth if and only if the formula is true in an intended
model structure, M = <W, D, R, V>, where W designates a space of meta-
physically possible worlds; D designates a domain of entities, constant across
worlds; R designates an accessibility relation on worlds; and V is an assign-
ment function mapping elements in D to subsets of W. A formula in M is
a modal truth if and only if a faithful interpretation maps the formula to a
metaphysically universal proposition (cf. Williamson, 2013.: 106). A formula
satisfies conditions on metaphysically universality if and only if the formula
is true on its universal generalization (cf. Williamson, op. cit.: 93).
11.1.2 Epistemic Mathematical Modality
In order to accommodate the notion of epistemic possibility, we enrich M
with the following conditions: M = <C, W, D, R, V>, where C, a set of
epistemically possibilities, is constrained as follows:
Let JφKc ⊆ C;
(φ is a formula encoding a state of information at an epistemically possible
world).
-pri(x) = λc.JxKc,c;
(the two parameters relative to which x – a propositional variable – ob-
tains its value are epistemically possible worlds. The function from possible
formulas to values is thus an intension).
-sec(x) = λc.JxKw,w
(the two parameters relative to which x obtains its value are metaphysi-
cally possible worlds).
Then:
• Epistemic Mathematical Necessity (Apriority)
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JφKc,w = 1⇐⇒ ∀c′JφKc,c′ = 1
(φ is true at all points in epistemic modal space).
• Epistemic Mathematical Possibility
J⋄cφKin 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ JPrφKin 6= ∅ ∧ >.5, else 〈∅, Prin(φ | ∅)〉, where in
designates an agent’s state of information i in a context n.
(φ might be true if and only if its value is not null and it is greater
than .5).
Crucially, epistemic mathematical modality is constrained by consistency,
and the formal techniques of provability and forcing. A mathematical formula
is false, and therefore metaphysically impossible, if it can be disproved or
induces inconsistency in a model.
11.1.3 Interaction
• Convergence
∀c∃wJφKc,w = 1
(the value of x is relative to a parameter for the space of epistemically
possible worlds. The value of x relative to the first parameter deter-
mines the value of x relative to the second parameter for the space of
metaphysical possibility).
• Super-rigidity (2D-Intension):
JφKw,c = 1 ⇐⇒ ∀w’,c’JφKw′,c′ = 1
(the intension of φ is rigid in all points in metaphysical and epistemic
modal space).
11.1.4 Modal Axioms
• Metaphysical mathematical modality is governed by the modal system
KTE, as augmented by the Barcan formula and its Converse (cf. Fine,
1981).
K: [φ → ψ] → [φ → ψ]
T: φ → φ
168
E: ¬φ → ¬φ
Barcan: ⋄∃xFx → ∃x⋄Fx
Converse Barcan: ∃x⋄Fx → ⋄∃xFx
• Epistemic mathematical modality is governed by the modal system,
KT4, as augmented by the Barcan formula and the Converse Barcan
formula.2
K: [φ → ψ] → [φ → ψ]
T: φ → φ
4: φ → φ
Barcan: ∃xFx → ∃xFx
Converse Barcan: ∃xFx → ∃xFx
11.2 Departures from Precedent
The approach to mathematical modality, according to which it yields a rep-
resentation of the cumulative universe of sets, has been examined by Fine
(2005; 2006) and Uzquiano (op. cit.). Fine argues that the mathematical
modality should be interpretational; and thus taken to concern the reinter-
pretation of the domain over which the quantifiers range, in order to avoid
inconsistency. Uzquiano argues similarly for an interpretational construal of
mathematical modality, where the cumulative hierarchy of sets is fixed, yet
2Reasons adducing against including the Smiley-Gödel-Löb provability formula among
the axioms of epistemic mathematical modality are examined in Section 5. GL states
that ’[φ → φ] → φ’. For further discussion of the properties of GL, see Löb (1955);
Smiley (1963); Kripke (1965); and Boolos (1993). Löb’s provability formula was formulated
in response to Henkin’s (1952) problem concerning whether a sentence which ascribes
the property of being provable to itself is provable. (Cf. Halbach and Visser, 2014,
for further discussion.) For an anticipation of the provability formula, see Wittgenstein
(1933-1937/2005: 378). Wittgenstein writes: ’If we prove that a problem can be solved,
the concept ’solution’ must somehow occur in the proof. (There must be something in the
mechanism of the proof that corresponds to this concept.) But the concept mustn’t be
represented by an external description; it must really be demonstrated. / The proof of the
provability of a proposition is the proof of the proposition itself’ (op. cit.). Wittgenstein
contrasts the foregoing type of proof with ’proofs of relevance’ which are akin to the
mathematical, rather than empirical, propositions, discussed in Wittgenstein (2001: IV,
4-13, 30-31).
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what is possibly reinterpreted is the non-logical vocabulary of the language,
in particular the membership relation.3
On Fine’s approach, the interpretational modality is both postulational,
and ’prescriptive’ or imperatival. The prescriptive element consists in the
rule:
’Introduction: !x.C(x)’,
such that one is enjoined to postulate, i.e. to ’introduce an object x
conforming to the condition C(x)’ (2005: 91; 2006: 38).
In the setting of unrestricted quantification, suppose, e.g., that there is
an interpretation for the domain over which a quantifier ranges. Fine writes
that an interpretation ’I is exten[s]ible – in symbols, E(I) – if possibly some
interpretation extends it, i.e. ⋄∃J(I⊂J)’ (2006: 30). Then, the interpretation
of the domain over which the quantifier ranges is extensible, if ’∀I.E(I)’. The
interpretation of the domain over which the quantifier ranges is indefinitely
extensible, if ’∀I.E(I)’ iff ’∀I⋄∃J(I⊂J)’, where the reinterpretation is in-
duced via the prescriptive imperative to postulate the existence of a new
object by the foregoing ’Introduction’ rule (2006: 30-31; 38). Fine clari-
fies that the interpretational approach is consistent with a ’realist ontology’
of the set of reals. He refers to the imperative to postulate new objects,
and thereby reinterpret the domain for the quantifier, as the ’mechanism’ by
which epistemically to track the cumulative hierarchy of sets (2007: 124-125).
In accord with Fine’s approach, the epistemic mathematical modality
defined in the previous section was taken to have a similarly representational
interpretation, and perhaps the postulational property is an optimal means
of inducing a reinterpretation of the domain of the quantifier. However, the
present approach avoids a potential issue with Fine’s account, with regard
to the the introduction of deontic modal properties of the prescriptive and
imperatival rules that he mentions.4 It is sufficient that the interpretational
modalities are a species of epistemic modality, i.e. possibilities that are
relative to agents’ spaces of states of information.
Developing Fine’s program, Linnebo (2013) outlines a modalized version
of ZF. Similarly to the modal axioms for the epistemic mathematical modal-
ity specified in the previous section, Linnebo argues that his modal set theory
ought to be governed by the system S4.2, the Converse Barcan formula, and
3Compare Gödel, 1947; Williamson, 1998; and Fine, 2005.
4For an analysis of the precise interaction between the semantic values of epistemic and
deontic modal operators, see Author (ms).
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(at least a restricted version of) the Barcan formula. However – rather than
being either interpretational or epistemic – Linnebo deploys the mathemat-
ical modality in order to account for the notion of ’potential infinity’, as
anticipated by Aristotle.5 The mathematical modality is thereby intended
to provide a formally precise answer to the inquiry into the extent of the
cumulative set-theoretic hierarchy; i.e., in order to precisify the answer that
the hierarchy extends ’as far as possible’ (2013: 205).6
Thus, Linnebo takes the modality to be constitutive of the actual ontol-
ogy of sets; and the quantifiers ranging over the actual ontology of sets are
claimed to have an ’implicitly modal’ profile (2010: 146; 2013: 225). He
suggests, e.g., that: ’As science progresses, we formulate set theories that
characterize larger and larger initial segments of the universe of sets. At any
one time, precisely those sets are actual whose existence follows from our
strongest, well-established set theory’ (2010: 159n21). However – despite
his claim that the modality is constitutive of the actual ontology of sets –
Linnebo concedes that the mathematical modality at issue cannot be inter-
preted metaphysically, because sets exist of metaphysical necessity if at all
(2010: 158; 2013: 207). In order partly to allay the tension, Linnebo re-
marks, then, that set theorists ’do not regard themselves as located at some
particular stage of the process of forming sets’ (2010: 159); and this might
provide evidence that the inquiry – concerning at which stage in the process
of set-individuation we happen to be, at present – can be avoided.
Another distinction to note is that both Linnebo (op. cit.) and Uzquiano
(op. cit.) avail of second-order plural quantification, in developing their
primitivist and interpretational accounts of mathematical modality. By con-
trast to their approaches, the epistemic and metaphysical modalities defined
in the previous section are defined with second-order singular quantification
over sets.
Finally, Linnebo and Uzquiano both suggest that their mathematical
5Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Book III, Ch. 6.
6Precursors to the view that modal operators can be availed of in order to countenance
the potential hierarchy of sets include Hodes (1984,a). Intensional constructions of set the-
ory are further developed by Reinhardt (1974); Parsons (op. cit.); Myhill (1985); Scedrov
(1985); Flagg (1985); Goodman (1985); Hellman (1990); Nolan (2002); and Studd (2013).
(See Shapiro (1985) for an intensional construction of arithmetic.) Parsons (19Chihara
(2004: 171-198) argues that ’broadly logical’ conceptual possibilities can be used to rep-
resent imaginary situations relevant to the construction of open-sentence tokens. The
open-sentences can then be used to define the properties of natural and cardinal numbers
and the axioms of Peano arithmetic.
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modalities ought to be governed by the G axiom; i.e. ⋄φ → ⋄φ. The
present approach eschews, however, of the G axiom, in virtue of the follow-
ing. Williamson (2009) demonstrates that – because KT4G is a sublogic of
S5 – an epistemic operator which validates the conjunction of the 4 axiom of
positive introspection and the E axiom of negative introspection will be incon-
sistent with the condition of ’recursively enumerable quasi-conservativeness’.
Recursively enumerable quasi-conservativeness is a computational constraint
on an epistemic agent’s theorizing, according to which the intended mod-
els of the agent’s theory are both maximally consistent and conservatively
extended by addition of the ’box’-operator, interpreted as expressing the
agent’s state of knowledge. As axioms of an agent’s consistent, recursively
axiomatizable theorizing about the theory of its own states of knowledge
and belief, the conjunction of 4 and E would entail that the agent’s theory
is both consistent and decidable, in conflict with Gödel’s (1931) second in-
completeness theorem. The modal system, KT4, avoids the foregoing result.
In the present setting, the circumvention is innocuous, because the undecid-
ability – yet recursively enumerable quasi-conservativeness – of an epistemic
agent’s consistent theorizing about its epistemic states is consistent with the
epistemic mathematical possibility that large cardinal axioms are absolutely
decidable.
11.3 Knowledge of Absolute Decidability
Williamson (2016) examines the extension of the metaphysically modal pro-
file of mathematical truths to the question of absolute decidability. In this
section, I aim to extend Williamson’s analysis to the notion of epistemic
mathematical modality that has been developed in the foregoing sections.
The extension provides a crucial means of witnessing the significance of the
two-dimensional intensional approach for the epistemology of mathematics.
Williamson proceeds by suggesting the following line of thought. Sup-
pose that A is a true interpreted mathematical formula which eludes present
human techniques of provability; e.g. the continuum hypothesis (op. cit.).
Williamson argues that mathematical truths are metaphysically necessary
(op. cit.). From there, he suggests that knowledge of A satisfies the condition
of safety from error, as codified via a reflexive and symmetric accessibility
relation from worlds at which A is known. Thus, there is either no, or a
small risk of, not believing that A, relative to a world in which A is known –
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although the safety condition is not itself sufficient for mathematical knowl-
edge that A. Williamson then enjoins one to consider the following scenario:
It is metaphysically possible that there is a species which can prove that A.
Therefore, A is absolutely provable; that is, A ’can in principle be known
by a normal mathematical process’ such as derivation in an axiomatizable
formal system with quantification and identity.
Williamson’s scenario evinces one issue for the ’back-tracking’ approach
to modal epistemology, at least as it might be applied to the issue of possible
mathematical knowledge. On the back-tracking approach, the method of
modal epistemology is taken to proceed by first discerning the metaphysical
modal truths – normally by natural-scientific means – and then working
backward to the exigent incompleteness of an individual’s epistemic states
concerning such truths (cf. Stalnaker, 2003; Vetter, 2013).
The issue for the back-tracking method that Williamson’s scenario illumi-
nates is that the metaphysical mathematical possibility that CH is absolutely
decidable must in some way converge with the epistemic possibility thereof.
However, the normal mathematical techniques that Williamson specifies – i.e.
proof and forcing – fall within the remit of what is mathematically possible
relative to agents’ states of information; i.e. what is epistemically mathemat-
ically possible. Thus, whether CH is metaphysically necessary – and thus, as
Williamson claims, metaphysically possible and absolutely decidable thereby
– can only be witnessed by the epistemic means of demonstrating that its
absolute decidability is not impossible. It may thus be epistemically pos-
sible that Williamson’s technically advanced species, which can absolutely
decide CH, exist – following Williamson (2013), they actually exist, albeit
non-concretely – but the metaphysical necessity of the absolute decidability
of CH needs still to be corroborated.
The significance of the two-dimensional intensional framework outlined in
the foregoing is that it provides an explanation of the discrepancy between
metaphysical mathematical modality and epistemic mathematical modality.
The metaphysical mathematical modality is taken to be more fundamental
than the epistemic, as witnessed by the order of the parameters specified in
the Convergence property in Section 2. Further and crucially, metaphysical
mathematical modality is governed by the system S5, the Barcan formula,
and its Converse, whereas epistemic mathematical modality is governed by
KT4, the Barcan formula, and its Converse. Thus, epistemic mathematical
modality figures as the mechanism, which enables the tracking of metaphys-
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ically possible mathematical truth.7
Leitgeb (2009) endeavors similarly to argue for the convergence between
the notion of informal provability – countenanced as an epistemic modal
operator, K – and mathematical truth. Availing of Hilbert’s (1923/1996: ¶18-
42) epsilon terms for propositions, such that, for an arbitrary predicate, C(x),
with x a propositional variable, the term ’ǫp.C(p)’ is intuitively interpreted
as stating that ’there is a proposition, x(/p), s.t. the formula, that p satisfies
C, obtains’ (op. cit.: 290). Leitgeb purports to demonstrate that ∀p(p →
Kp), i.e. that informal provability is absolute; i.e. truth and provability are
co-extensive. He argues as follows. Let A(p) abbreviate the formula ’p ∧
¬K(p)’, i.e., that the proposition, p, is true while yet being unprovable. Let
K be the informal provability operator reflecting knowability or epistemic
necessity, with 〈K〉 its dual.8 Then:
1. ∃p(p ∧ ¬Kp) ⇐⇒ ǫp.A(p) ∧ ¬Kǫp.A(p).
7A provisional definition of large cardinal axioms is as follows.
∃xΦ is a large cardinal axiom, because:
(i) Φx is a Σ2-formula;
(ii) if κ is a cardinal, such that V |= Φ(κ), then κ is strongly inaccessible, where a
cardinal κ is regular if the cofinality of κ – comprised of the unions of sets with cardinality
less than κ – is identical to κ, and a strongly inaccessible cardinal is regular and has a
strong limit, such that if λ < κ, then 2λ < κ (Cf. Kanamori, 2012: 360); and
(iii) for all generic partial orders P∈Vκ, VP |= Φ(κ); INS is a non-stationary ideal, where
an ideal is a subset of a set closed under countable unions, whereas filters are subsets
closed under countable intersections. (Cf. Kanamori, op. cit.: 361); AG is the canonical
representation of reals in L(R), i.e. the interpretation of A in M[G]; H(κ) is comprised
of all of the sets whose transitive closure is < κ (cf. Rittberg, 2015); and L(R)Pmax |=
〈H(ω2), ∈, INS , AG〉 |= ’φ’. P is a homogeneous partial order in L(R), such that the generic
extension of L(R)P inherits the generic invariance, i.e., the absoluteness, of L(R). Thus,
L(R)Pmax is (i) effectively complete, i.e. invariant under set-forcing extensions; and (ii)
maximal, i.e. satisfies all Π2-sentences and is thus consistent by set-forcing over ground
models (Woodin, ms: 28).
Assume ZFC and that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals; A∈P(R) ∩ L(R); φ
is a Π2-sentence; and V(G), s.t. 〈H(ω2), ∈, INS , AG〉 |= ’φ’: Then, it can be proven that
L(R)Pmax |= 〈H(ω2), ∈, INS , AG〉 |= ’φ’, where ’φ’ := ∃A∈Γ∞〈H(ω1), ∈, A〉 |= ψ.
The axiom of determinacy (AD) states that every set of reals, a⊆ωω is determined,
where κ is determined if it is decidable.
Woodin’s (1999) Axiom (*) can be thus countenanced:
ADL(R) and L[(Pω1)] is a Pmax-generic extension of L(R),
from which it can be derived that 2ℵ0 = ℵ2. Thus, ¬CH; and so CH is absolutely
decidable.
8See Section 5, for further discussion of the duality of knowledge, and its relation to
doxastic operators.
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By necessitation,
2. K[∃p(p ∧ ¬Kp)] ⇐⇒ K[ǫp.A(p) ∧ ¬Kǫp.A(p)].
Applying modal axioms, KT, to (1), however,
3. ¬K[ǫp.A(p) ∧ ¬Kǫp.A(p)].
Thus,
4. ¬K∃p(p ∧ ¬Kp).
Leitgeb suggests that (4) be rewritten
5. 〈K〉∀p(p → Kp).
Abbreviate (5) by B. By existential introduction and modal axiom K,
both
6. B → ∃p[K(p → B) ∨ K(p → ¬B) ∧ p], and
7. ¬B → ∃p[K(p → B) ∨ K(p → ¬B) ∧ p].
Thus,
8. ∃p[K(p → B) ∨ K(p → ¬B) ∧ p].
Abbreviate (8) by C(p). Introducing epsilon notation,
9. [K(ǫp.C(p) → B) ∨ K(ǫp.C(p) → ¬B)] ∧ ǫp.C(p).
By K,
10. [K(ǫp.C(p) → KB) ∨ K(ǫp.C(p) → K¬B)].
From (9) and necessitation, one can further derive
11. Kǫp.C(p).
By (10) and (11),
12. KB ∨ K¬B.
From (5), (12), and K, Leitgeb derives
13. KB.
By, then, the T axiom,
14. ∀p(p → Kp) (291-292).
Rather than accounting for the coextensiveness of epistemic provability
and truth, Leitgeb interprets the foregoing result as cause for pessimism
with regard to whether the formulas countenanced in epistemic logic and via
epsilon terms are genuinely logical truths if true at all (292).
In response to the attending pressure on the status of epistemic logic as
concerning truths of logic, one can challenge the derivation, in the above
proof, from lines (12) to (13). The inference depends on line (5), i.e., the
epistemic possibility of completeness: 〈K〉∀p(p → Kp). One can question
how, from (4), i.e. the unprovability of the unprovability of a proposition
[¬K∃p(p ∧ ¬Kp)], one can derive (5), i.e. that it is epistemically possible
that all propositions are informally provable. Assume, however, that line
(5) is valid. Then, the validity of the inference from (12) to (13) can be
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challenged by the restriction on the quantifier on worlds in the Knowability
Principle expressed by (5). The epistemic operator in lines (12) and (13)
records, by contrast, the epistemic necessity, rather than the possibility, of
the truth of the formulas and subformulas therein. Thus, from (12) either
the provability of the provability of propositions or the provability of the
unprovability of propositions, one cannot derive (13) the provability of the
provability of propositions, because – by (5) – it is only epistemically possible
that all true propositions are provable.
11.4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have endeavored to delineate the types of mathematical
modality, and to argue that the epistemic interpretation of two-dimensional
intensional semantics can be applied in order to explain, in part, the epis-
temic status of large cardinal axioms and the decidability of Orey sentences.
The formal constraints on mathematical conceivability adumbrated in the
foregoing can therefore be considered a guide to our possible knowledge of
unknown mathematical truth.
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Chapter 12
Epistemic Modality,
Grothendieck Universes, and
Indefinite Extensibility
This essay endeavors to provide a characterization of the notion of definite-
ness, in order to provide a non-circular definition of the concept of indefinite
extensibility. The concept of indefinite extensibility is introduced by Dum-
mett (1963/1978), in the setting of a discussion of the philosophical signifi-
cance of Gödel’s (1931) first incompleteness theorem. Gödel’s theorem can be
characterized as stating that – relative to a coding defined over the signature
of first-order arithmetic, a predicate expressing the property of provability,
and a fixed point construction which is non-trivial, such that the formula in
which the above predicate figures precludes interpretations such as ’0=1’ –
the formula can be defined as not satisfying the provability predicate. Dum-
mett’s concern is with the conditions on our grasp of the concept of natural
number, given that the latter figures in a formula whose truth appears to
be satisfied despite the unprovability – and thus non-constructivist profile –
thereof (186). His conclusion is that the concept of natural number ’exhibits
a particular variety of inherent vagueness, namely indefinite extensibility’,
where a ’concept is indefinitely extensible if, for any definite characterisa-
tion of it, there is a natural extension of this characterisation, which yields a
more inclusive concept; this extension will be made according to some gen-
eral principle for generating such extensions, and, typically, the extended
characterisation will be formulated by reference to the previous, unextended,
characterisation’ (195-196). Elaborating on the notion of indefinite extensi-
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bility, Dummett (1996: 441) redefines the concept as follows: an ’indefinitely
extensible concept is one such that, if we can form a definite conception of a
totality all of whose members fall under the concept, we can, by reference to
that totality, characterize a larger totality all of whose members fall under it’.
Subsequent approaches to the notion have endeavored to provide a more pre-
cise elucidation thereof, either by providing an explanation of the property
which generalizes to an array of examples in number theory and set theory (cf.
Wright and Shapiro, 2006), or by availing of modal notions in order to cap-
ture the properties of definiteness and extendability which are constitutive of
the concept (cf. Fine, 2006; Linnebo, 2013; Uzquiano, 2015,a). However, the
foregoing modal characterizations of indefinite extensibility have similarly
been restricted to set-theoretic languages. Furthermore, the modal notions
that the approaches avail of are taken to belong to a proprietary type which
is irreducible to either the metaphysical or the logical interpretations of the
operator.
The aim of this essay is to redress the foregoing, by providing a modal
characterization of indefinite extensibility in the setting of category theory,
rather than number or set theory. One virtue of the category-theoretic,
modal definition of indefinite extensibility is that it provides for a robust ac-
count of the epistemological foundations of modal-structuralist approaches
to the ontology of mathematics. A second aspect of the philosophical signif-
icance of the examination is that it can serve to redress the lacuna noted in
the appeal to an irreducible type of mathematical modality, which is argued
(i) to be representational, (ii) still to bear on the ontological expansion of
domains of sets, and yet (iii) not to range over metaphysical possibilities.
By contrast to the latter approach, the category-theoretic characterization
of indefinite extensibility is able to identify the functors of coalgebraic non-
deterministic automata with elementary embeddings and the modal proper-
ties of set-theoretic, Ω-logical consequence.
In Section 2, I examine the extant approaches to explaining both the
property and the understanding-conditions on the concept of indefinite ex-
tensibility. In Section 3, I outline the elements of the category theory of sets
and define Grothendieck Universes. In Section 4, I identify Grothendieck
Universes with modal coalgebraic automata, and define the notion of indefi-
nite extensibility in the category-theoretic setting. I argue that the category-
theoretic definition of indefinite extensibility, via Grothendieck Universes as
modal coalgebraic automata, yields an explanation of the generative prop-
erty of indefinite extensibility, as well as of the notion of definiteness which
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figures in the definition. I argue that the generative property of indefinite
extensibility can be captured by identifying Kripke functors of colagebras
with elementary embeddings. I argue, then, that the notion of definiteness
can be captured by the role of Grothendieck Universes-as-modal coalgebraic
automata in characterizing the modal profile of Ω-logical consequence, where
the latter accounts for the absoluteness of mathematical truths throughout
the set-theoretic multiverse. The category-theoretic definition is shown to
circumvent the issues faced by rival attempts to define indefinite extensibil-
ity via extensional and intensional notions within the setting of set theory.
Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
12.1 Indefinite Extensbility in Set Theory: Modal
and Extensional Approaches
Characterizations of indefinite extensibility have so far occurred in the lan-
guage of set theory, and have availed of both extensional and intensional
resources. In an attempt to define the notion of definiteness, Wright and
Shapiro (op. cit.) argue, for example, that indefinite extensibility may be
intuitively characterized as occurring when there is a function which falls
under a first-order concept; for a sub-concept of the first-order concept, an
application of the function on the sub-concept does not fall within that sub-
concept’s range; however, a new sub-concept can be formed, and defined as
the set-theoretic union of the initial sub-concept and the function applied
thereon (266).
Formally, let Π be a higher-order concept of type τ . Let P be a first-order
concept falling under Π of type τ . Let f be a function from entities to entities
of the same type as P. Finally, let X be a sub-concept of P. P is indefinitely
extensible with respect to Π, if and only if:
ǫ(P) = f(X),
ǫ(X) = ¬[f(X)], and
∃X’[Π(X’) = (X∪{fX})] (op. cit.).
The notion of definiteness is then defined as the limitless preservation of
’Π-hood’ by sub-concepts thereof ’under iteration of the relevant operation’,
f (269).
The foregoing impresses as a necessary condition on the property of indefi-
nite extensibility. Wright and Shapiro note, e.g., that the above formalization
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generalizes to an array of concepts countenanced in first-order number theory
and analysis, including concepts of the finite ordinals (defined by iterations
of the successor function); of countable ordinals (defined by countable order-
types of well-orderings); of regular cardinals (defined as occurring when the
cofinality of a cardinal, κ – comprised of the unions of sets with cardinality
less than κ – is identical to κ); of large cardinals (defined by elementary em-
beddings from the universe of sets into proper subsets thereof, which specify
critical points measured by the ordinals); of real numbers (defined as cuts of
sets of rational numbers); and of Gödel numbers (defined as natural numbers
of a sequence of recursively enumerable truths of arithmetic) (266-267).
As it stands, however, the definition might not be sufficient for the defini-
tion of indefinite extensibility, by being laconic about the reasons for which
new sub-concepts – comprised as the union of preceding sub-concepts with
a target operation defined thereon – are presumed interminably to gener-
ate. In response to the above desideratum, concerning the reasons for which
indefinite extensibility might be engendered, philosophers have recently ap-
pealed to modal properties of the formation of sets. Fine (2006) argues,
e.g., that – in order to avoid the Russell property when quantifying over all
sets – there are interpretational modalities which induce a reinterpretation
of quantifier domains, and serve as a mechanism for tracking the ontological
inflation of the hieararchy of sets via, e.g., the power-set operation (2007).
Fine (2005) suggests that the interpretational modality at issue might be a
species of dynamic modality, which defines modalities as concerning the infor-
mation entrained by program executions. Reinhardt (1974) and Williamson
(2007) argue that modalities are inter-definable with counterfactuals. While
Williamson (2016) argues both that imaginative exercises take the form of
counterfactual presuppositions and that it is metaphysically possible to de-
cide propositions which are undecidable relative to the current axioms of
extensional mathematical languages such as ZF – Reinhardt (op. cit.) ar-
gues that large cardinal axioms and undecidable sentences in extensional ZF
can similarly be imagined as obtaining via counterfactual presupposition. In
an examination of the iterative hierarchy of sets, Parsons (1977/1983) notes
that the notion of potential infinity, as anticipated in Book 3, ch. 6 of Aristo-
tle’s Physics, may be codified in a modal set theory by both a principle which
is an instance of the Barcan formula (namely, for predicates P and rigidifying
predicates Q, ∀x(Px ⇐⇒ Qx) ∧ {∀x(Qx ∨ ¬Qx) ∧ ∀R[∀x(Qx →
Rx) → ∀x(Qx → Rx)]} (fn. 24), as well as a principle for definable set-
forming operations (e.g., unions) for Borel sets of reals (∀x)⋄(∃y)[y=x ∪
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{x}) (528). The modal extension is argued to be a property of the imagina-
tion, or intuition, and to apply further to iterations of the successor function
in an intensional variant of arithmetic (1979-1980).
Hellman (1990) develops the program intimated in Putnam (1967), and
thus argues for an eliminativist, modal approach to mathematical structural-
ism as applied to second-order plural ZF. The possibilities at issue are taken
to be logical – concerning both the consistency of a set of formulas as well as
the possible satisfiaction of existential formulas – and he specifies, further,
an ’extendability principle’, according to which ’every natural model [of ZF]
has a proper extension’ (421).
Extending Parsons’ and Fine’s projects, Linnebo (2009, 2013) avails of a
second-order, plural modal set theory in order to account for both the no-
tion of potential infinity as well as the notion of definiteness. Similarly to
Parsons’ use of the Barcan formula (i.e., ∀φ → ∀φ), Linnebo’s principle
for the foregoing is as follows: ∀u(u ≺ xx → φ) → ∀u(u ≺ → φ) (2013:
211). He argues, further, that the logic for the modal operator is S4.2, i.e. K
[(φ → ψ) → (φ → ψ)], T (φ → φ), 4 ((φ → φ), and G (⋄φ →
⋄φ). Studd (2013) examines the notion of indefinite extensibility by avail-
ing of a bimodal temporal logic. Uzquiano’s (2015) approach to defining the
concept of indefinite extensibility argues that the height of the cumulative
hierarchy is in fact fixed, and that indefinite extensibility can similarly be
captured via the use of modal operators in second-order plural modal set
theory. The modalities are taken to concern the possible reinterpretations of
the intensions of the non-logical vocabulary – e.g., the set-membership rela-
tion – which figures in the augmentation of the theory with new axioms and
the subsequent climb up the fixed hierarchy of sets (cf. Gödel, 1947/1964).
In chapter 11, I proffered a novel epistemology of mathematics, based on
an application of the epistemic interpretation of two-dimensional intensional
semantics in set-theoretic languages to the values of large cardinal axioms and
undecidable sentences. Modulo logical constraints such as consistency and
generic absoluteness in the extensions of ground models of the set-theoretic
multiverse, the epistemic possibility that an undecidable proposition receives
a value may serve, then, as a guide to the metaphysical possibility thereof.
Finally, in chapters 10 and 12, I argued that the modal profile of the conse-
quence relation, in the Ω-logic defined in Boolean-valued models of set-theory,
can be captured by coalgebraic modal automata, and provides a necessary
condition on the formal grasp of the concept of ’set’.
The foregoing accounts of the metaphysics and epistemology of indefinite
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extensibility are each defined in the languages of number and set theory.
In the following section, I examine the nature of indefinite extensibility in
the setting of category theory, instead. One aspect of the philosophical sig-
nificance of the examination is that it can serve to provide an analysis of
the mathematical modality at issue, by availing only of model-theoretic re-
sources. By contrast to Hellman’s approach, which takes the mathematical
modality at issue to be logical (cf. Field, 1989: 37; Rayo, 2013), and Fine’s
(op. cit.) approach, which takes the mathematical modality to be dynamic,
I argue in the following sections that the mathematical modality can be cap-
tured by the functors of coalgebraic modal automata, where the latter are
identifiable with Grothendieck Universes.
12.2 Grothendieck Universes
We work within a two-sorted language in which the Eilenberg - Mac Lane
Axioms of category theory are specified. Types are labeled A,B,C for ob-
jects and x,y,z for arrows. The relevant operators are the domain operator,
Dom, which takes arrows to objects; the codomain operator, Cod, which oper-
ates similarly, and the identity operator, 1α, which takes objects to arrows.
Finally, a composition relation, C(x,y; z), is defined on arrows, where the
open formula reads z is the composite of x and y (McLarty, 2008: 13). The
Eilenberg - Mac Lane axioms can then be defined as follows:
• Axioms of Domain and Codomain:
∀f,g,h, if C(f,g,h), then Domf = Domh and Codf = Domg and Codg = Codh
• Axioms of Existence and Uniqueness of Composites:
∀f,g, if Codf = Domg, then ∃!h, s.t. C(f,g; h)
• Axioms for Identity Arrows:
∀A, Dom1A = Cod1A = A
∀f, C(1(Domf),f; f)
∀f, C(f,1(Domf); f)
• Axiom of Associativity of Composition:
∀f,g,h,i,j,k, if C(f,g; i) and C(g,h; j) and C(f,j; k), then C(i,h; k) (op.
cit.).
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Categorical Set Theory is defined by augmenting the Eilenberg - Mac Lane
axioms with the axioms of Lawvere’s Elementary Theory for the Category
of Sets (ETCS) (op. cit.; Lawvere, 2005). Following McLarty, we define the
singleton of a set as one for which ’every set has exactly one function to it’
(op. cit.: 25). An element of a set A, x∈A, is a function x: 1→ A (op. cit.).
Composition occurs if and only if, for two arrows, f,g, and object x, (gf)(x)
= g(f(x)) (26) The axioms are then defined as follows (op. cit.). Finally,
an equalizer e: E → A for a pair of functions f,g: A → B is defined as ’a
universal solution to the equaltion fe = ge’ (29):
• Every pair of sets, A,B, has a product:
∀T,f,g, with f: T → A, g: T → B, ∃!〈f,g〉: T → AxB
• Every parallel pair of functions, f,g: A → B, has an equalizer:
∀T,h, with fh = gh, ∃! u: T → E
• There is a function set from each set A to each set B:
∀C and g: CxA → B, ∃!g’: C → BA
• There is a truth value true: 1 → 2:
∀A and monic S 7→A, ∃!χi, such that S is an equalizer
• There is a natural number triple, N, 0, s:
∀T and x: 1 → T and f: T → T, ∃! u: ⋉ → T
• Extensionality
∀f 6= g: A → B, ∃x: 1 → A, with f(x) 6= g(x)
• Non-triviality
∃false: 1 → 2, s.t. false 6= true
• Choice
∀ onto functions f: A → B, ∃h: B → A, s.t. fh = 1A.
From the axioms of ETCS, only a version of the ZF separation axiom
with bounded quantifiers can be recovered (37). The axiom of separation
states that ∃x∀u[u∈x ⇐⇒ u∈a ∧ φ(u)]. In order to redress the restriction
to bounded quantifiers, we work within a stronger category theory for sets,
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i.e. the ’category of categories as foundation’ (CCAF). The axioms of the
CCAF build upon those of both ETCS and Eilenberg - Mac Lane category
theory, by augmenting them with the following (53):
• Every category C has a unique functor, C → 1
• The category 2 has exactly two functors from 1 and three to itself
• Let a pushout be defined such that if f: A → C and g: B → C, then
a: C → A and b: C → B (Pettigrew, ms: 19). The category 3 is a
pushout, and there is a functor γ: 2 → 3, with γ0 = α0 and γ1 = β1
• Arrow Extensionality
∀F,G: A → B, if F 6= G then ∃f: 2 → A with Ff 6= Gf.
A Grothendieck Universe may finally be defined as a set, U, which satisfies
the axioms of ZF set theory without choice, yet as augmented by at least
strongly inaccessible large cardinals. The axioms of ZF are:
• Empty set:
∃x∀u(u/∈x)
• Extensionality:
x = y ⇐⇒ ∀u(u∈x ⇐⇒ u∈y)
• Pairing:
∃x∀u(u∈x ⇐⇒ u = a ∨ u = b)
• Union:
∃x∀u[u∈x ⇐⇒ ∃v(u∈v ∧ v∈a)]
• Separation:
∃x∀u[u∈x ⇐⇒ u∈a ∧ φ(u)]
• Power Set:
∃x∀u(u∈x ⇐⇒ u⊆a)
• Infinity:
∃x∅∈x ∧ ∀u(u∈x → {u}∈x)
184
• Replacement:
∀u∃!vψ(u,v) → ∀x∃y(∀u∈x)(∃v∈y)ψ(u,v).
Large cardinal axioms are defined by elementary embeddings.1 Elemen-
tary embeddings can be defined thus. For models A,B, and conditions φ, j:
A→ B, φ〈a1, . . . , an〉 in A if and only if φ〈j(a1), . . . , j(an)〉 in B (Kanamori,
2012: 363). A cardinal κ is regular if the cofinality of κ – comprised of the
unions of sets with cardinality less than κ – is identical to κ (op. cit.: 360).
Uncountable regular limit cardinals are weakly inaccessible (op. cit.). A
strongly inaccessible cardinal is regular and has a strong limit, such that if
λ < κ, then 2λ < κ (op. cit.).
By augmenting languages of the theory of CCAF with Grothendiek Uni-
verses, U, CCAF proves thereby that:
CCAF ⊢ ∀n∈N, ∃{ℵ0, ℵ1, . . . , ℵn}, in the category of Sets, U-Set (37-38).
12.3 Modal Coalgebraic Automata and In-
definite Extensibility
This section examines, finally, the reasons for which Grothendieck Universes
provide a more theoretically adequate model of the understanding-conditions
for mathematical concepts than do competing approaches such as the Neo-
Fregean epistemology of mathematics. According, e.g., to the Neo-Fregean
program, concepts of number in arithmetic and analysis are definable via im-
plicit definitions which take the form of abstraction principles. Abstraction
principles specify biconditionals in which – on the left-hand side of the for-
mula – an identity is taken to hold between numerical term-forming operators
from second-order entities to abstract objects, and – on the right-hand side
of the formula – an equivalence relation on lower-order entities is assumed to
hold.
In the case of cardinal numbers, the relevant abstraction principle is re-
ferred to as Hume’s principle, and states that, for all x and y, the number of
the x’s is identical to the number of the y’s if and only if the x’s and the y’s
can be put into a one-to-one correspondence, i.e., there is a bijection from the
x’s onto the y’s. Abstraction principles for the concepts of other numbers
have further been specified. Thus, e.g., Shapiro (2000: 337-340) specifies
1Cf. Koellner and Woodin (2010); Woodin (2010).
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an abstraction principle for real numbers, which proceeds along the method
of Dedekind’s definition of the reals (cf. Wright, 2007: 172). According to
the latter method, one proceeds by specifying an abstraction principle which
avails of the natural numbers, in order to define pairs of finite cardinals:
’∀x,y,z,w[〈x,y〉 = 〈z,w〉 ⇐⇒ x = z ∧ y = w]. A second abstraction princi-
ple is defined which takes the differences of the foregoing pairs of cardinals,
identifying the differences with integers: [Diff(〈x,y〉) = Diff(〈z,w〉) ⇐⇒ x
+ w = y + z]. One specifies, then, a principle for quotients of the integers,
identifying them subsequently with the rational numbers: [Q〈m,n〉 = Q〈p,q〉
⇐⇒ n = 0 ∧ q = 0 ∨ n 6= 0 ∧ q 6= 0 ∧ m x q = n x p]. Finally, one specifies
sets of rational numbers, i.e. the Dedekind cuts thereof, and identifies them
with the reals: ∀F,G[Cut(F) = Cut(G) ⇐⇒ ∀r(F≤r ⇐⇒ G≤r)].
The abstractionist program faces several challenges, including whether
conditions can be delineated for the abstraction principles, in order for the
principles to avoid entraining inconsistency2; whether unions of abstraction
principles can avoid the problem of generating more abstracts than concepts
(Fine, 2002); and whether abstraction principles can be specified for math-
ematical entities in branches of mathematics beyond first and second-order
arithmetic (cf. Boolos, 1997; Hale, 2000; Shapiro, op. cit.; andWright, 2000).
I will argue that the last issue – i.e., being able to countenance definitions
for the entities and structures in branches of mathematics beyond first and
second-order arithmetic – is a crucial desideratum, the satisfaction of which
remains elusive for the Neo-Fregean program while yet being satisfiable and
thus adducing in favor of the modal platonist approach that is outlined in
what follows.
One issue for the attempt, along abstractionist lines, to provide an im-
plicit definition for the concept of set is that doing so with an unrestricted
comprehension principle yields a principle identical to Frege’s (1893/2013)
Basic Law V; and thus – in virtue of Russell’s paradox – entrains inconsis-
tency. However, two alternative formulas can be defined, in order to provide
a suitable restriction to the inconsistent abstraction principle. The first, con-
ditional principle states that ∀F,G[[Good(F) ∨ Good(G)]→ [{x|Fx} = {Gx}
⇐⇒ ∀x(Fx ⇐⇒ Gx)]]. The second principle is an unconditional version
of the foregoing, and states that ∀F,G[{x|Fx} = {Gx} ⇐⇒ [Good(F) ∨
2Cf. Hodes (1984,a); Hazen (1985); Boolos (1990); Heck (1992); Fine (2002); Weir
(2003); Cook and Ebert (2005); Linnebo and Uzquiano (2009); Linnebo (2010); and Walsh
(forthcoming).
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Good(G)→ ∀x(Fx ⇐⇒ Gx)]]. Following von Neumann’s (1925/1967: 401-
402) suggestion that Russell’s paradox can be avoided with a restriction of
the set comprehension principle to one which satisfies a constraint on the
limitation of its size, Boolos (1997) suggests that the ’Good’ predicate in the
above principles is intensionally isomorphic to the notion of smallness in set
size, and refers to the principle as New V. However, New V is insufficient for
deriving all of the axioms of ZF set theory, precluding, in particular, both the
axioms of infinity and the power-set axiom (cf. Wright and Hale, 2005: 193).
Further, there are other branches of number theory for which it is unclear
whether acceptable abstraction principles can be specified. Wiles’ proof of
Fermat’s Last Theorem (i.e., that, save for when one of the variables is 0, the
Diophantine equation, xn = yn = zn, has no solutions when n >2; cf. Hardy
and Wright, 1979: 190) relies, e.g., on both invariants and Grothendieck
universes in cohomological number theory (cf. McLarty, 2009: 4).
The foregoing issues with regard to the definability of abstracta in number
theory, algebraic geometry (McLarty, op. cit.: 6-8), set theory, et al., can be
circumvented in the category-theoretic setting; and in particular by colage-
bras. In the remainder of this section, I endeavor to demonstrate how modal
coalgebraic automata are able to countenance two, fundamental mathemat-
ical concepts. The first is the target concept in this essay, namely indefinite
extensibility. The second concerns the epistemic and modal properties of the
concept of logical consequence, in the Ω-logic in axiomatic set theory.
A labeled transition system is a tuple, LTS, comprised of a set of worlds,
M; a valuation, V, from M to its powerset, P(M); and a family of accessibility
relations, R. So LTS = 〈M,V,R〉 (cf. Venema, 2012: 7). A Kripke coalgebra
combines V and R into a Kripke functor, σR; i.e. the set of binary morphisms
from M to P(M) (op. cit.: 7-8). Thus, for an s∈M, σ(s) := [σV (s), σR(s)]
(op. cit.). Satisfaction for the system is defined inductively as follows: For a
formula φ defined at a state, s, in M,
JφKM = V(s) 3
J¬φKM = S – V(s)
J⊥KM = ∅
JTKM = M
Jφ ∨ ψKM = JφKM ∪ JψKM
Jφ ∧ ψKM = JφKM ∩ JψKM
J⋄sφKM = 〈Rs〉JφKM
3Equivalently, M,s  φ if s∈V(φ) (9).
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JsφK
M = [Rs]JφKM , with
〈Rs〉(φ) := {s’∈S | Rs[s’] ∩ φ 6= ∅} and
[Rs](φ) := {s’∈S | Rs[s’] ⊆ φ} (9).
Kripke Coalgebras can be identified with Grothendieck Universes. In
CCAF, the elementary embeddings which are jointly necessary and suffi-
cient for positing the existence of large cardinals can further be identified
with the functors, i.e. transition functions, in modal coalgebraic automata.
Finally, Kripke coalgebras are the dual representations of Boolean-valued
models of the Ω-logic of set theory (cf. Venema, 2007). When identified
with Grothendieck Universes, modal coalgebraic automata are able, then, to
countenance the consitutive conditions of indefinite extensibility. Modal coal-
gebraic automata are capable, e.g., of defining both the generative property
of indefinite extensibility, as well as the notion of definiteness which figures
therein. Further, the category-theoretic definition of indefinite extensibility
is arguably preferable to those advanced in the set-theoretic setting, because
modal coalgebraic automata can account for both the modal profile and the
epistemic tractability of Ω-logical consequence.
The generative property of indefinite extensibility is captured by the fore-
going Kripke functor, σR – i.e., the morphism mapping a Boolean-valued
model to the powerset thereof – and which we have identified with elemen-
tary embeddings, j: A → B, φ〈a1, . . . , an〉 in A if and only if φ〈j(a1), . . . ,
j(an)〉 in B.
The notion of definiteness is captured by the role of modal coalgebraic
automata in characterizing the modal profile of Ω-logical validity. Ω-logical
validity can be defined as follows:
For T∪{φ}⊆Sent,
T |=Ω φ, if for all ordinals a and countable Boolean algebras B, if VBa
|= T, then VBa |= φ (Bagaria et al., 2006). The Ω-Conjecture states that V
|=Ω φ iff VB |=Ω φ (Woodin, ms). Thus, Ω-logical validity is invariant in all
set-forcing extensions of ground models in the set-theoretic multiverse.
The invariance property of Ω-logical consequence can then be character-
ized by modal coalgebraic automata. Mathematical truths are thus said to
be definite in virtue of holding of necessity, as recorded by the functors of
the modal colagebraic automata which are dually isomorphic to the Boolean-
valued algebraic models for the Ω-logic of set theory.
Thus, whereas the Neo-Fregean approach to comprehension for the con-
cept of set relies on an unprincipled restriction of the size of the universe in
order to avoid inconsistency, and one according to which the axioms of ZF
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still cannot all be recovered, modal coalgebraic automata provide a natural
means for defining the minimal conditions necessary for formal grasp of the
concept set. The category-theoretic definition of indefinite extensibility is
sufficient for uniquely capturing both the generative property as well as the
notion of definiteness which are constitutive of the concept. Finally, a further
point adducing in favor of the category-theoretic definition of indefinite ex-
tensibility is that it requires no appeal to a notion of mathematical modality
which problematically endeavors to capture both the epistemic property of
possible interpretations of quantifiers, as well as the metaphysical property
of set-theoretic ontological expansion.
12.4 Concluding Remarks
In this essay, I outlined a number of approaches to defining the notion of
indefinite extensibility, each of which restricts the scope of their character-
ization to set-theoretic languages. I endeavored, then, to define indefinite
extensibility in the setting of category-theoretic languages, and examined
the benefits accruing to the approach, by contrast to the extensional and
modal approaches pursued in ZF.
The extensional definition of indefinite extensibility in ZF was shown to
be insufficient for characterizing the generative property in virtue of which
number-theoretic concepts are indefinitely extensible. The generative prop-
erty of indefinite extensibility in the category-theoretic setting was argued,
by contrast, to be identifiable with the Kripke functors of modal coalgebraic
automata, where the automata model Grothendieck Universes, and Kripke
functors are further identifiable with the elementary embeddings by which
large cardinal axioms can be specified. The modal definitions of indefinite
extensibility in ZF were argued to be independently problematic, in virtue of
endeavoring simultaneously to account for the epistemic properties of indefi-
nite extensibility – e.g., possible reinterpretations of quantifier domains and
mathematical vocabulary – as well as the metaphysical properties of indefi-
nite extensibility – i.e., the ontological expansion of the target domains. By
contrast, the Kripke functors definable in Grothendieck universes-as-modal
coalgebraic automata were argued to circumvent the foregoing conflation,
accounting just for the ontological expansion effected by elementary embed-
dings in the category of sets.
Finally, against the Neo-Fregean approach to defining concepts of num-
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ber, and the limits thereof in the attempt to define concepts of mathematical
objects in other branches of mathematics beyond arithmetic, I demonstrated
how – by characterizing the modal profile of Ω-logical validity and thus the
generic invariance and absoluteness of mathematical truths concerning large
cardinals throughout the set-theoretic multiverse – modal coalgebraic au-
tomata are capable of capturing the notion of definiteness within the concept
of indefinite extensibility.
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Chapter 13
A Modal Logic for Gödelian
Intuition
’The incompleteness results do not rule out the possibility that there is a
theorem-proving computer which is in fact equivalent to mathematical
intuition’ – Gödel, quoted in Wang (1986: 186).1
13.1 Introduction
Gödel’s writings on the epistemology of mathematics number fewer than
twenty pages. He avails, in his remarks, of a notion of non-sensory intuition
– alternatively, ’consciousness’, or ’phenomenology’ (cf. Gödel, 1961: 383) –
as a fundamental, epistemic conduit into mathematical truths.2 According
to Gödel, the defining properties of mathematical intuition include (i) that
it either is, or is analogous to, a type of perception (1951: 323; 1953,V: 359;
1Note however that, in the next subsequent sentence, Gödel records scepticism about
the foregoing. He remarks: ’But they imply that, in such a – highly unlikely for other
reasons – case, either we do not know the exact specification of the computer or we do not
know that it works correctly’ [Gödel, quoted in Wang (op. cit.)].
2Another topic that Gödel suggests as being of epistemological significance is the notion
of ’formalism freeness’, according to which the concepts of computability, demonstrability
(i.e., absolute provability), and ordinal definability can be specified independently of a
background formal language (cf. Gödel 1946, and Kennedy 2013 for further discussion).
Kennedy notes however that, in his characterizations of demonstrability and definability,
Gödel assumes ZFC as his metatheory (op. cit.: 383). Further examination of the foregoing
is beyond the scope of the present essay.
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1964: 268); (ii) that it enables subjects to alight upon new axioms which
are possibly true (1953,III: 353,fn.43; 1953,V: 361; 1961: 383, 385; 1964:
268); (iii) that it is associated with modal properties, such as provability
and necessity (1933: 301; 1964: 261); and (iv) that the non-sensory intu-
ition of abstracta such as concepts entrains greater conceptual ’clarification’
(1953,III: 353,fn.43; 1961: 383). Such intuitions are purported to be both of
abstracta and formulas, as well as to the effect that the formulas are true.3
In this paper, I aim to outline the logical foundations for rational intu-
ition, by examining the nature of property (iii). The primary objection to
Gödel’s approach to mathematical knowledge is that the very idea of rational
intuition is insufficiently constrained.4 Subsequent research has thus endeav-
ored to expand upon the notion, and to elaborate on intuition’s roles. Chud-
noff (2013) suggests, e.g., that intuitions are non-sensory experiences which
represent non-sensory entities, and that the justificatory role of intuition is
that it enables subjects to be aware of the truth-makers for propositions (p.
3; ch. 7). He argues, further, that intuitions both provide evidence for beliefs
as well as serve to guide actions (145).5 Bengson (2015: 718-723) suggests
that rational intuition can be identified with the ’presentational’, i.e., phe-
nomenal, properties of representational mental states – namely, cognitions
– where the phenomenal properties at issue are similarly non-sensory; are
not the product of a subject’s mental acts, and so are ’non-voluntary’; are
qualitatively gradational; and they both ’dispose or incline assent to their
contents’ and further ’rationalize’ assent thereof.6
3The distinction between ’intuition-of’ and ’intuition-that’ is explicitly delineated in
Parsons (1980: 145-146), and will be further discussed in Section 2.
4See, e.g., Hale and Wright (2002). Wright (2004) provides a vivid articulation of
the issue: ’A major — but not the only – problem is that, venerable as the tradition of
postulating intuitive knowledge of first principles may be, no-one working within it has
succeeded at producing even a moderately plausible account of how the claimed faculty of
rational intuition is supposed to work — how exactly it might be constituted so as to be
reliably responsive to basic logical validity as, under normal circumstances, vision, say, is
reliably responsive to the configuration of middle-sized objects in the nearby environment
of a normal human perceiver’ (op. cit.: 158).
5A similar proposal concerning the justificatory import of cognitive phenomenology –
i.e., the properties of consciousness unique to non-sensory mental states such as belief –
can be found in Smithies (2013a,b). Smithies prescinds, however, from generalizing his
approach to the epistemology of mathematics.
6Compare Kriegel (2015: 68), who stipulates that ’making a judgment that p involves a
feeling of involuntariness’ and ’making a judgment always involves the feeling of mobilizing
a concept’.
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Rather than target objections to the foregoing essays, the present discus-
sion aims to rebut the primary objection to mathematical intuition alluded to
above, by providing a logic for its defining properties. The significance of the
proposal is thus that it will make the notion of intuition formally tractable,
and might thus serve to redress the contention that the notion is mysterious
and ad hoc.
In his (1933) and (1964), Gödel suggests that intuition has a constitutively
modal profile. Constructive intuitionistic logic is shown to be translatable
into the modal logic, S4, with the rule of necessitation, while the modal op-
erator is interpreted as concerning provability.7 Mathematical intuition of
set-theoretic axioms is, further, purported both to entrain ’intrinsic’ justifi-
cation, and to illuminate the ’intrinsic necessity’ thereof.8 Following Gödel’s
line of thought, I aim, in this paper, to provide a modal logic for the notion
of ’intuition-that’.9
If rational intuition is identical with cognitive phenomenal properties of
representational states such as beliefs and judgments, then – via correspon-
dence results between modal logic and first-order logic [cf. van Benthem
(1983; 1984/2003)] – a precise translation can be provided between the no-
tion of ’intuition-of’, i.e., the cognitive phenomenal properties of thoughts
whose contents can concern the axioms of mathematical languages, and the
7For further discussion both of provability logic and of intuitionistic systems of modal
logic, see Löb (1955); Smiley (1963); Kripke (1965); and Boolos (1993). Löb’s provability
formula was formulated in response to Henkin’s (1952) problem concerning whether a
sentence which ascribes the property of being provable to itself is provable. (Cf. Halbach
and Visser, 2014, for further discussion.) For an anticipation of the provability formula,
see Wittgenstein (1933-1937/2005: 378), where Wittgenstein writes: ’If we prove that a
problem can be solved, the concept ’solution’ must somehow occur in the proof. (There
must be something in the mechanism of the proof that corresponds to this concept.)
But the concept mustn’t be represented by an external description; it must really be
demonstrated. / The proof of the provability of a proposition is the proof of the proposition
itself’ (op. cit.). Wittgenstein distinguishes the foregoing type of proof with ’proofs
of relevance’ which are akin to the mathematical, rather than empirical, propositions,
discussed in Wittgenstein (2001: IV, 4-13, 30-31).
8Gödel (1964) does not define intrinsic justifications, although he does contrast the lat-
ter with the notion of extrinsic justifications, for which he provides a few defining remarks.
Extrinsic justifications are associated, for example, with both the evidential probability
of propositions, and the ’fruitful’ consequences of a mathematical theory subsequent to
adopting new axioms. See Gödel (op. cit.: 269).
9Cf. Parsons (1979-1980; 1983: p. 25, chs.10-11; 2008: 176).
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modal operators regimenting the notion of ’intuition-that’.10 I argue, then,
that intuition-that can further be shown to entrain property (iv), i.e. con-
ceptual elucidation, by way of figuring as an interpretational modality which
induces the reinterpretation of domains of quantification (cf. Fine, 2005;
2006). Fine (op. cit.) has suggested that the interpretational modality is
imperatival, and that the deontic aspects of the modality might best be cap-
tured by a dynamic logic (p.c.). Following Fine’s suggestion, I argue that
intuition-that can thus be understood to be a species of fixed point dynamic
provability logic, which is equivalent to the bisimulation-invariant fragment
of monadic second-order logic (cf. Janin and Walukiewicz, 1996; Venema,
2014, ms). Modalized rational intuition is therefore expressively equivalent
to – and can crucially serve as a guide to the interpretation of – the entities,
such as mathematical concepts, that are formalizable in monadic first- and
second-order formal languages.
In Section 2, I elucidate the properties of rational intuition, by exam-
ining arguments and evidence adducing in favor of the existence of cogni-
tive phenomenal consciousness. In Section 3, I countenance and motivate a
multi-modal logic, which augments the provability logic, GL, with fixed point
dynamic logic, i.e. the modal µ-calculus. I argue that the dynamic proper-
ties of modalized rational intuition provide a precise means of accounting
for the manner by which intuition can yield the reinterpretation of quan-
tifier domains and mathematical vocabulary; and thus explain the role of
rational intuition in entraining conceptual elucidation. In Section 4, I ex-
amine remaining objections to the viability of rational intuition and provide
concluding remarks.
13.2 Rational Intuition as Cognitive Phenomenol-
ogy
A property of a mental state is phenomenal only if it is the property of be-
ing aware of the state. If the mental state at issue is sensory, then sensory
phenomenal properties will be properties of being aware of one’s perceptions,
where the perceptions at issue will be unique to the subject’s sensory modal-
10This provides a precise answer to the target inquiry advanced by Parsons (1993: 233).
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ities of vision, audition, etc.11 Let cognitive phenomenal consciousness refer
to the properties of being aware of the non-sensory representational mental
states toward which subjects can bear attitudes. Such states can be iden-
tified with, e.g., formulas, φ, in a Language of Thought,12 the syntax for
which mirrors that of natural language sentences, and which can fall within
the scope of various operators such as fully or partially believing that (x, x a
propositional variable/φ), knowing that (x/φ), judging that (x/φ), asserting
that (x/φ), questioning whether (x/φ) has a particular semantic value, et al.
Pitt (2004: 8) provides the following argument for the existence of cog-
nitive phenomenal properties, which – for the purposes of this essay – I will
assume to be sound:
(K1) ’It is possible immediately to identify one’s occurrent conscious
thoughts (equivalently (see below): one can know by acquaintance which
thought a particular occurrent conscious thought is); but
(K2) It would not be possible immediately to identify one’s conscious
thoughts unless each type of conscious thought had a proprietary, distinctive,
individuative phenomenology; so
(P) Each type of conscious thought – each state of consciously thinking
that p, for all thinkable contents p – has a proprietary, distinctive, individ-
uative phenomenology’.
In his examination of the conditions on measuring partial beliefs, i.e., sub-
jective probability, Ramsey (1926) records scepticism about whether subjects
are aware in a non-sensory way of all of their (partial) beliefs.13 For the pur-
11For issues concerning the taxonomy of the sense modalities, see Macpherson (2011).
Bottom-up/exogenous, spatial-based, property-based, and diffuse/focal attention arguably
comprise a necessary condition on the instantiation of phenomenal properties. The condi-
tion is witnessed by the phenomenon referred to as the attentional blink. The attentional
blink holds if and only if shifting attentional allocation from one stimulus to another in-
duces a lack of awareness of the first stimulus to which attention was previously distributed.
See chapter 6 and the essays in Mole et al. (eds.) (2010), for further discussion.
12Cf. Fodor (1975).
13See Ramsey (op. cit.: 169): ’Suppose that the degree of a belief is something per-
ceptible by its owner; for instance that beliefs differ in the intensity of a feeling by which
they are accompanied, which might be called a belief-feeling or feeling of conviction, and
that by the degree of belief we mean the intensity of this feeling. This view would be very
inconvenient, for it is not easy to ascribe numbers to the intensities of feelings; but apart
from this it seems to me observably false, for the beliefs which we hold most strongly are
often accompanied by practically no feeling at all; no one feels strongly about things he
takes for granted’. Contrast Koopman (1940: 271), who argues that intuition can serve
as a guide to veridical judgments concerning the comparison of probability measures [cf.
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poses of this note, it is sufficient that at least some cognitive states are states
of which subjects can be aware – where, again, the properties of awareness
at issue are non-sensory and purported to be unique to distinct cognitive
attitudes, such that being aware of one’s belief that φ will qualitatively dif-
fer from one’s awareness of one’s interrogative state concerning whether φ is
true.
The evidence for the claim that at least some cognitive states are associ-
ated with a unique set of non-sensory properties of awareness has proceeded
via introspective reports.14 In the latter, subjects verbally report upon the
valence of their awareness of their states, where their reports are assumed to
be reliable.15 One phenomenon of awareness of one’s thoughts might, e.g., be
that of inner speech.16 It is an open issue whether inner speech has a sensory
basis (cf. Prinz, 2012). If not, however, and assuming that introspective
report is a reliable method for discerning whether subjects are aware of their
states – irrespective of their being able to ascertain a precise value thereof –
then there might be properties of awareness that are unique to one’s thoughts
and cognitive propositional attitudes.17
de Finetti (1937/1964: ch.1) on the primacy of comparative judgments of probability], as
well as to the axioms – or laws of consistency – of a probability theory.
14The results of the method of introspection are availed of by Pitt (op. cit.), and
discussed in the essays in Bayne and Montague (eds.) (2011). For an excellent survey of
the experimental paradigms endeavoring to corroborate that intuition can be a source of
evidence, see Nagel (2007; 2013a).
15See, however, Schwitzgebel (2011) for an examination of a series of case studies evinc-
ing that introspective report is unreliable as a method for measuring consciousness.
16Cf. Carruthers (1996). Assuming the reliability of introspection, Machery (2005)
argues that awareness of one’s thoughts is nevertheless insufficient for ascertaining the
syntactic structure thereof.
17Nagel (2013) examines an approach to intuitions which construes the latter as a type
of cognition, rather than as a phenomenal property of judgments. She distinguishes, e.g.,
between intuition and reflection, on the basis of experimental results which corroborate
that there are distinct types of cognitive processing (op. cit.: 226-228). Intuitive and
reflective cognitive processing are argued to interact differently with the phenomenal in-
formation comprising subjects’ working memory stores. Nagel notes that – by contrast
to intuitive cognition – reflective cognition ’requires the sequential use of a progression of
conscious contents to generate an attitude, as in deliberation’ (231).
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13.3 Modalized Rational Intuition and Con-
ceptual Elucidation
In this section, I will outline the logic for Gödelian intuition. The motiva-
tion for providing a logic for rational intuition will perhaps be familiar from
treatments of the property of knowledge in formal epistemology. The analogy
between rational intuition and the property of knowledge is striking: Just as
knowledge has been argued to be a mental state (Williamson, 2001; Nagel,
2013b); to be propositional (Stanley and Williamson, 2001); to be factive;
and to possess modal properties (Hintikka, 1962; Nozick, 1981; Fagin et al.,
1995; Meyer and van der Hoek, 1995), so rational intuition can be argued to
be a property of mental states; to be propositional, as recorded by the no-
tion of intuition-that; and to possess modal properties amenable to rigorous
treatment in systems of modal logic.
I should like to suggest that the modal logic of Gödelian intuition is the
bimodal logic combining GL – which is comprised of axioms K, 4, GL, and
the rule of necessitation – with the modal µ-calculus.
Let M be a model over the Kripke frame, 〈W, R〉; so, M = 〈W, R, V〉.
W is a non-empty set of possible worlds. R is a binary relation on W. V is
a function assigning proposition letters, φ, to subsets of W.
〈M,w〉  φ if and only if w∈V(φ).
〈M,w〉  ¬φ iff it is not the case that 〈M,w〉  φ
〈M,w〉  φ ∧ ψ iff 〈M,w〉  φ and 〈M,w〉  ψ
〈M,w〉  φ ∨ ψ iff 〈M,w〉  φ or 〈M,w〉  ψ
〈M,w〉  φ → ψ iff, if 〈M,w〉  φ, then 〈M,w〉  ψ
〈M,w〉  φ ⇐⇒ ψ iff [〈M,w〉  φ iff 〈M,w〉  ψ]
〈M,w〉  ⋄φ iff ∃w’[R(w,w’) and 〈M,w’〉  φ]
〈M,w〉  φ iff ∀w’[If R(w,w’), then 〈M,w’〉  φ].
K states that (φ→ψ) → (φ→ψ); i.e., if one has an intuition that
φ entails ψ, then if one has the intuition that φ then one has the intuition
that ψ. GL states that [(φ → φ) → φ]; i.e., if one has the intuition
that the intuition that φ entails that φ is true, then one has the intuition
that φ. 4 states that φ → φ; i.e., if one has the intuition that φ, then
one intuits that one has the intuition that φ. Necessitation states that ⊢φ→
⊢φ. Because intuition-that is non-factive, we eschew in our modal system
of axiom T, which states that φ→ φ; i.e., one has the intuition that φ only
if φ is the case [cf. BonJour (1998: 4.4); Parsons (2008: 141)].
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In order to account for the role of rational intuition in entraining concep-
tual elucidation (cf., Gödel, 1961: 383), I propose to follow Fine (2006) and
Uzquiano (2015,a) in suggesting that there are interpretational modalities as-
sociated with the possibility of reinterpreting both domains of quantification
(Fine, op. cit.) and the non-logical vocabulary of mathematical languages,
such as the membership relation in ZF set theory (Uzquiano, op. cit.).18
Fine (2005) has taken the interpretational modality to be imperatival,
and has suggested that a dynamic logic might be an optimal means of for-
malizing the imperative to reinterpret quantifier domains. He (op. cit.)
suggests, further, that the interpretational modality might be characterized
as a program, whose operations can take the form of ’simple’ and ’complex’
postulates which enjoin subjects to reinterpret the domains. Uzquiano’s (op.
cit.) generalization of the interpretational modality, in order to target the
reinterpretation of the extensions of terms such as the membership relation,
can similarly be treated.
In propositional dynamic logic (PDL), there are an infinite number of
diamonds, with the form 〈π〉.19 π denotes a non-deterministic program,
which in the present setting will correspond to Fine’s postulates adumbrated
in the foregoing. 〈π〉φ abbreviates ’some execution of π from the present
state entrains a state bearing information φ’. The dual operator is [π]φ,
which abbreviates ’all executions of π from the present state entrain a state
bearing information φ’. π* is a program that executes a distinct program,
π, a number of times ≥ 0. This is known as the iteration principle. PDL
is similarly closed under finite and infinite unions. This is referred to as
the ’choice’ principle: If π1 and π2 are programs, then so is π1 ∪ π2. The
forth condition is codified by the ’composition’ principle: If π1 and π2 are
programs, then π1;π2 is a program (intuitively: the composed program first
executes π1 then π2). The back condition is codified by Segerberg’s induction
axiom (Blackburn et al., op. cit: p. 13): All executions of π* (at t) entrain
18A variant strategy is pursued by Eagle (2008). Eagle suggests that the relation between
rational intuition and conceptual elucidation might be witnessed via associating the fun-
damental properties of the entities at issue with their Ramsey sentences; i.e., existentially
generalized formulas, where the theoretical terms therein are replaced by second-order
variables bound by the quantifiers. However, the proposal would have to be expanded
upon, if it were to accommodate Gödel’s claim that mathematical intuitions possess a
modal profile.
19Cf. Blackburn et al., op. cit.: 12-14. A semantics and proof-theory for PDL are
outlined in Hoare (1969); Pratt (1976); Goldblatt (1987: ch. 10; 1993: ch. 7) and van
Benthem (2010: 158).
198
the following conditional state: If it is the case that (i) if φ, then all the
executions of π (at t) yield φ; then (ii) if φ, then all executions of π* (at t)
yield φ. Formally, [π*](φ → [π]φ) → (φ → [π*]φ).
We augment, then, the provability logic for Gödelian intuition with the
axiom, φ → [π]φ, in order to yield a bimodal, dynamic provability logic
thereof.
Crucially, the iteration principle permits π* to be interpreted as a fixed
point for the equation: x ⇐⇒ φ ∨ ⋄x. The smallest solution to the equa-
tion will be the least fixed point, µx.φ ∨ ⋄x, while the largest solution to
the equation, when π* ∨ ∞⋄, will be the greatest fixed point, vx.φ ∨ ⋄x.
Janin and Walukiewicz (op. cit.) have proven that the modal µ-calculus is
equivalent to the bisimulation-invariant fragment of second-order logic.
Fine’s simple dynamic-postulational modality takes, then, the form:
’(i) Introduction. !x.C(x)’, which states the imperative to: ’[I]ntroduce an
object x [to the domain] conforming to the condition C(x)’.
Fine’s complex dynamic-postulational modalities are the following:
(ii) ’Composition. Where β and γ are postulates, then so is β;γ. We may
read β;γ as: do β and then do γ; and β;γ is to be executed by first
executing β and then executing γ.
(iii) Conditional. Where β is a postulate and A an indicative sentence, then
A → β is a postulate. We may read A → β as: if A then do β. How A → β
is executed depends upon whether or not A is true: if A is true, A → β is
executed by executing β; if A is false, then A → β is executed by doing
nothing.
(iv) Universal. Where β(x) is a postulate, then so is ∀xβ(x). We may read
∀xβ(x) as: do β(x) for each x; and ∀xβ(x) is executed by simultaneously
executing each of β(x1), β(x2), β(x3), . . . , where x1, x2, x3, . . . are the
values of x (within the current domain). Similarly for the postulate
∀Fβ(F), where F is a second-order variable.
(v) Iterative Postulates. Where β is a postulate, then so is β*. We may
read β* as: iterate β; and β* is executed by executing β, then executing β
again, and so on ad infinitum’ (op. cit.: 91-92).
Whereas Fine avails of the foregoing interpretational modalities in order
both to account for the notion of indefinite extensiblity and to demonstrate
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how unrestricted quantification can be innocuous without foundering upon
Russell’s paradox (op. cit.: 26-30), the primary interest in adopting modal
µ provability logic as the logic of rational intuition is its capacity to account
for reinterpretations of mathematical vocabulary and quantifier domains; and
thus to illuminate how the precise mechanisms codifying modalized rational
intuition might be able to entrain advances in conceptual elucidation.
Finally, the computational profile of modalized rational intuition can be
outlined as follows. In category theory, a category C is comprised of a class
Ob(C) of objects a family of arrows for each pair of objects C(A,B) (Venema,
2007: 421). An E-coalgebra is a pair A = (A, µ), with A an object of C
referred to as the carrier of A, and µ: A → E(A) is an arrow in C, referred
to as the transition map of A (390). A coalgebraic model of deterministic
automata can be thus defined (391). An automaton is a tuple, A = 〈A,
aI , C, δ, F〉, such that A is the state space of the automaton A; aI∈A is
the automaton’s initial state; C is the coding for the automaton’s alphabet,
mapping numerals to properties of the natural numbers; δ: A X C → A is a
transition function, and F⊆ A is the collection of admissible states, where F
maps A to {1,0}, such that F: A→ 1 if a∈F and A→ 0 if a/∈F (op. cit.). The
modal profile of coalgebraic automata can be witnessed both by construing
the transition function as a counterfactual conditional (cf. Stalnaker, 1968;
Williamson, 2007), and in virtue of the convergence of coalgebraic categories
of automata with coalgebraic models of modal logic (407). Let
⋄φ ≡ ∇{φ, T},
φ ≡ ∇∅ ∨ ∇φ (op. cit.).
Let an E-coalgebraic modal model, A = 〈S,λ,R[.]〉, such that S,s  ∇Φ
if and only if, for all (some) successors σ of s∈S, [Φ,σ(s)∈E(A)] (op. cit.).
A is then the category of modal coalgebraic automata.
The philosophical significance of the foregoing is that the modal logic of
rational intuition can be interpretable in the category of modal coalgebraic
automata. The foregoing accounts for the distinctively computational nature
of the modal profile of rational intuition.
13.4 Concluding Remarks
In this note, I have endeavored to outline the modal logic of Gödel’s concep-
tion of intuition, in order both (i) to provide a formally tractable foundation
thereof, and thus (ii) to answer the primary objection to the notion as a
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viable approach to the epistemology of mathematics. I have been less con-
cerned with providing a defense of the general approach from the array of
objections that have been proffered in the literature. Rather, I have sought
to demonstrate how the mechanisms of rational intuition can be formally
codified and thereby placed on a secure basis.
Among, e.g., the most notable remaining objections, Koellner (2009) has
argued that the best candidates for satisfying Gödel’s conditions on being
intrinsically justified are reflection principles, which state that the height of
the hierarchy of sets, V, cannot be constructed ’from below’, because, for all
true formulas in V, the formulas will be true in a proper initial segment of
the hierarchy. Koellner’s limitative results are, then, to the effect that reflec-
tion principles cannot exceed second-order universal quantification without
entraining inconsistency (op. cit.).20 Another crucial objection is that the
properties of rational intuition, as a species of cognitive phenomenology, lack
clear and principled criteria of individuation. Burgess (2014) notes, e.g., that
the role of rational intuition in alighting upon mathematical truths might be
distinct from the functions belonging to what he terms a ’heuristic’ type of
intuition. The constitutive role of the latter might be to guide a mathemati-
cian’s non-algorithmic insight as she pursues an informal proof. A similar
objection is advanced in Cappelen (2012: 3.2-3.3), who argues that – by
contrast to the properties picked out by theoretical terms such as ’utility
function’ – terms purporting to designate cognitive phenomenal properties
both lack paradigmatic criteria of individuation and must thereby be a topic
of disagreement, in virtue of the breadth of variation in the roles that the
notion has been intended to satisfy.
The foregoing issues notwithstanding, I have endeavored to demonstrate
that – as with the property of knowledge – an approach to the notion of
intuition-that which construes the notion as a modal operator, and the pro-
vision thereof with a philosophically defensible logic, might be sufficient to
counter the objection that the very idea of rational intuition is mysterious
and constitutively unconstrained.
20The issue of accounting for third-order variables in order to state, e.g., Cantor’s The-
orem and the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis might yet be redressed, if one were to
follow Shapiro (1991: 103-105), and avail of second-order paraphrases for formulas which
concern sets and sequences of sets.
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Chapter 14
An Epistemicist Solution to the
Alethic Paradoxes
This essay targets a series of potential issues for the discussion of, and reso-
lution to, the alethic paradoxes advanced by Scharp, in his Replacing Truth
(2013). I aim, then, to provide a novel, epistemicist treatment of the alethic
paradoxes. In response to Curry’s paradox, the novel, epistemicist solution
that I advance enables the retention of both classical logic and the traditional
rules for the alethic predicate: truth-elimination and truth-introduction. By
availing of epistemic logic, the epistemicist approach permits, further, of a
precise, descriptively adequate explanation of the indeterminacy exhibited
by epistemic states concerning paradoxical sentences such as the liar.
In Section 2, Scharp’s replacement strategy is outlined, and his semantic
model is described in detail. Sections 3-7 examine five, crucial issues for the
approach and the semantic model that Scharp proffers. The five issues target
the following points of contention:
(i) Whether a positive theory of validity might be forthcoming on Scharp’s
approach, given that Scharp expresses sympathy with treatments on which –
in virtue of Curry’s paradox – validity is not identical with necessary truth-
preservation;
(ii) The failure of compositionality in Scharp’s Theory of Ascending and
Descending Truth (ADT) and whether the theory is not, then, in tension
with natural language semantics. The foregoing might be pernicious, given
Scharp’s use of consistency with natural language semantics as a condition
for the success of approaches to the paradoxes. A related issue concerns
whether it is sufficient to redress the failure of compositionality by availing
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of hybrid conditions which satisfy both Ascending and Descending Truth;
(iii) Whether ADT can generalize, in order to account for other philo-
sophical issues that concern indeterminacy;
(iv) Whether Descending Truth and Ascending Truth can countenance
the manner in which truth interacts with objectivity. It is unclear, e.g.,
how the theorems unique to each of Descending Truth and Ascending Truth
– respectively, T-Elimination and T-Introduction – can capture distinctions
between the reality of the propositions mapping to 1 in mathematical inquiry,
by contrast to propositions – about humor, e.g. – whose mapping to 1 might
be satisfied by more deflationary conditions; and
(v) Whether the replacement strategy in general and ADT in particu-
lar can be circumvented, in virtue of approaches to the alethic paradoxes
which endeavor to resolve them by targeting constraints on the contents of
propositions and the values that they signify.
Despite the critical issues that are raised for the approach, I believe that
the theory of ADT can be extended in order to solve several other types of
paradox, beyond the paradoxes of self-reference. Scharp disavows of a uni-
fied approach to all paradoxical phenomena. However, because the theory of
Ascending and Descending Truth appears to be extendible to several para-
doxes, it might repay the attempt to examine the theory’s possible strengths.
In Section 5, I outline, therefore, extensions of Scharp’s ADT theory to the
preface paradox; to the property version of Russell’s paradox in the setting of
unrestricted quantification; to probabilistic self-reference; and to the sorites
paradox.
Finally, Section 8 examines the alethic paradoxes in the setting of epis-
temic logic. My epistemicist theory avoids the series of issues adducing
against the ADT approach. I outline a novel, epistemicist solution to Curry’s
paradox, and provide a precise explanation of the epistemic indeterminacy
expressed by agent’s attitudes toward the liar sentence.
14.1 Scharp’s Replacement Theory
Scharp avers that two main alethic principles target the use of the predicate
as a device of endorsement and as a device of rejection. When the truth
predicate is governed by (T-Out), then it can be deployed in the guise of a
device of endorsement. When the truth predicate is governed by (T-In), then
it can be deployed in the guise of a device of rejection.
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Scharp’s theory aims to replace truth with two distinct concepts. His ex-
plicit maneuver is to delineate the two, smallest inconsistent subsets of alethic
principles; and then to pair one of the subsets with one of the replacement
concepts, and the other subset with the second replacement concept.
Thus, one replacement concept will be governed by (T-In) and not by
(T-Out); and the second replacement concept will be governed by (T-Out)
and not by (T-In).
Scharp refers to one of his two, preferred replacement concepts as De-
scending Truth (henceforth DT). DT is governed by (T-Out).
Scharp refers to the second of his two, preferred replacement concepts as
Ascending Truth (henceforth AT). AT is governed by (T-In).
In his ’Syntactical Treatments of Modality, with Corollaries on Reflexion
Principles and Finite Axiomatizability’ (1963), Montague proved that, for
any predicate H(x), the following conditions on the predicate are inconsis-
tent.
Montague’s (1963) Lemma 3:
(i) All instances of H(φ) → φ are theorems.
(ii) All instances of H [H(φ) → φ] are theorems.
(iii) All instances of H(φ), where φ is a logical axiom, are theorems.
(iv) All instances of H(φ → ψ) → [H(φ) → H(ψ)] are theorems.
(v) Q – i.e., Robinson Arithmetic – is a subtheory.
Scharp notes that Montague’s conditions target only Predicate-Elimination,
and are thus apt for governing DT.
Scharp argues that (v) is necessary, in order for languages that express
the theory to refer to their own sentences. Condition (i) is necessary, because
it captures (T-Out). Condition (ii) is necessary, because denying iterations
of DT entrains a version of the revenge paradox.
Thus, either Condition (iii) or Condition (iv) must be rejected. Condition
(iii) states that all tautologies are Descending True. Condition (iv) is an
instance of closure. In virtue of considerations pertaining to validity (see
Section 3), Scharp is impelled to reject (iv), s.t. DT cannot satisfy closure
(151).
14.1.1 Properties of DT and AT
Scharp argues that the alethic principles, DT and AT, ought to include the
following.
DT ought to satisfy:
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[¬-Exc: D(¬φ) → ¬D(φ)];
[∧-Exc: D(φ ∧ ψ) → D(φ) ∧ D(ψ); and
[∨-Imb: D(φ) ∨ D(ψ) → D(φ ∨ ψ).
However, DT is not governed by:
[¬-Imb: ¬T(φ) → T(¬φ); nor by
[∨-Exc: T(φ ∨ ψ) → T(φ) ∨ T(ψ).
AT ought to satisfy:
[¬-Imb: ¬A(φ) → A(¬φ);
[∧-Exc: A(φ ∧ ψ) → A(φ) ∧ A(ψ); and
[∨-Imb: A(φ) ∨ A(ψ) → A(φ ∨ ψ).
However, AT is not governed by:
[¬-Exc: T(¬φ) → ¬T(φ)]; nor by
[∧-Imb: T(φ) ∧ T(ψ) → T(φ ∧ ψ).
Scharp argues, further:
–that classical tautologies are Descending True;
–that the axioms governing the syntax of the theory are Descending True;
–that the axioms of PA are Descending True, in order to induce self-
reference via Gödel-numbering; and
–that the axioms of the theories for both AT and DT are themselves
Descending True (152).
DT takes classical values, and, in Scharp’s theory, there are no restrictions
on the language’s expressive resources. This is problematic, because ’a’ :=
’¬A(x)’ and ’d’ := ’¬D(x)’ can be countenanced in the language, and thereby
yield contradictions:
Because A(x) is governed by (T-In), ’a’ entails that A(a), although a
states of itself that ¬A(x). Contradiction.
Because D(x) is governed by (T-Out), ’d’ entails that replacing ’d’ for x
in ’d’ is not a descending truth, i.e., ¬D(d)]. So – by condition (ii) – ’D[D(x)]
→ x’ entails that it is not a descending truth that replacing ’d’ for x in ’d’
is not a descending truth [i.e., ¬D(¬d)].
Thus, Scharp concedes that there must be problematic sentences in the
language for his theory, s.t. both the sentences and their negations are As-
cending True, and s.t. the sentences and their negations are not Descending
True (op. cit.).
Scharp endeavors to block the foregoing, by suggesting that DT can be
governed by both unrestricted (T-Out), as well as a restricted version of (T-
In). Similarly, AT can be governed by both unrestricted (T-In), as well as a
restricted version of (T-Out).
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To induce the foregoing, Scharp introduces a ’Safety’ predicate, S(x). A
sentence φ is safe if and only if φ is either (DT and AT) or not AT.
Thus,
S(φ) ∧ φ → D(φ); and
S(φ) ∧ A(φ) → φ.
A sentence φ is unsafe if and only if φ is AT and not DT:
S(φ) ⇐⇒ D(φ) ∨ ¬A(φ).
From which it follows that:
¬S(φ) ⇐⇒ ¬D(φ) ∧ A(φ), s.t.
D(φ) → A(φ);
¬∃φ[D(φ)∧ ¬A(φ)]
A(φ) → ¬D(φ); and
¬A(φ) → ¬D(φ) (153).
Scharp avers too that AT and DT are duals. Thus,
D(φ) ⇐⇒ ¬A¬(φ); and
A(φ) ⇐⇒ ¬D¬(φ) (152).
14.1.2 Scharp’s Theory: ADT/Xeno Semantics
Scharp’s Theory is referred to as ADT. The necessary principles comprising
ADT are as follows (cf. 154):
• Descending Truth
(D1): D(φ) → φ
(D2): D(¬φ) → ¬D(φ)
(D3): D(φ ∧ ψ) → [D(φ) ∧ D(ψ)]
(D4): [D(φ) ∨ D(ψ)] → D(φ ∨ ψ)
(D5): If φ is a classical tautology, then D(φ)
(D6): If φ is a theorem of PA, then D(φ)
(D7): If φ is an axiom of ADT, then D(φ).
• Ascending Truth
(A1): φ → A(φ)
(A2): ¬A(φ) → A(¬φ)
(A3): [A(φ) ∨ A(ψ)] → A(φ ∨ ψ)
(A4): A(φ ∧ ψ) → [A(φ) ∧ A(ψ)]
(A5): If φ maps to the falsum constant, then ¬A(φ)
(A6): If φ negates an axiom of PA, then ¬A(φ)
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• Transformation Rules
(M1): D(φ) ⇐⇒ ¬A¬(φ)
(M2): S(φ) ⇐⇒ D(φ) ∨ ¬A(φ)
(M3): S(φ) ∧ φ → D(φ)
(M4): A(φ) ∧ S(φ) → φ
(E1): If s and t are terms; s = t; and replacing s with t in a sentence p
yields a sentence q; then D(p) ⇐⇒ D(q)
(E2): If s and t are terms; s = t; and replacing s with t in a sentence p
yields a sentence q; then A(p) ⇐⇒ A(q)
(E3): If s and t are terms; s = t; and replacing s with t in a sentence p
yields a sentence q; then S(p) ⇐⇒ S(q).
14.1.3 Semantics for ADT
Scharp advances a combination of relational semantics for a non-normal
modal logic, as augmented by a neighborhood semantics. (A modal logic
is normal if and only if it includes axiom K and the rule of Necessitation;
respectively ’[φ → ψ] → [φ → ψ]’ and ’⊢φ → ⊢φ’.) He refers to this
as xeno semantics.
A model, M, of ADT is a tuple, 〈D, W, R, I〉, where D is a non-empty
domain of entities constant across worlds, W denotes the space of worlds, R
denotes a relation of accessibility on W, and I is an interpretation-function
mapping subsets of D to W. The clauses for defining truth in a world in the
model are familiar:
〈M,w〉  φ iff w∈V (φ)
〈M,w〉  ¬φ iff it is not the case that 〈M,w〉  φ
〈M,w〉  φ ∧ ψ iff 〈M,w〉  φ and 〈M,w〉  ψ
〈M,w〉  φ ∨ ψ iff 〈M,w〉  φ or 〈M,w〉  ψ
〈M,w〉  φ → ψ iff, if 〈M,w〉  φ, then 〈M,w〉  ψ
〈M,w〉  φ ⇐⇒ ψ iff [〈M,w〉  φ iff 〈M,w〉  ψ]
〈M,w〉  φ iff ∀w’[If R(w,w’), then 〈M,w’〉  φ]
〈M,w〉  ⋄φ iff ∃w’[R(w,w’) and 〈M,w’〉  φ]
14.1.4 Further Montagovian Desiderata
Problem 1: Montague (op. cit.) proved that the predicate version of axiom
K is inconsistent with (D1): D(φ) → φ; (D5): If φ is a classical tautology,
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then D(φ); and (D6): If φ is a theorem of PA, then D(φ).
Scharp includes (D7) (159): If φ is an axiom of ADT, then D(φ). However,
while Montague was one of the most precocious philosophers of the twentieth
century, I suspect that Scharp does not mean to be attributing to Montague
an anticipation of his theory.
Problem 2: Montague (op. cit.) proved that the predicate version of
Necessitation is inconsistent with (D1): D(φ) → φ, and (D6): If φ is a
theorem of PA, then D(φ).
Problem 3: The third problem is supposed to concern whether the quanti-
fier domain is constant or variable. Scharp opts for constant-domain models
without argument, so it is unclear precisely what about the quantifier domain
he is targeting as problematic. (Cf. 6.7.7: 172.)
Problem 4: The fourth problem concerns the status of Scharp’s predicates,
AT and DT, in the relational semantics, given that the modalities in the logic
for the semantics are expressed by operators.
14.1.5 Satisfying the Desiderata
To address Problems 1 and 2, Scharp augments his relational semantics with
a neighborhood semantics. M = 〈D, W, R, I〉 is thus enriched with a neigh-
borhood function, N, which maps sets of subsets of W to each world in W.
Necessity takes then the revised clause:
〈M,w〉  φ iff ∃X∈N(w)∀w’[〈M,w’〉  φ ⇐⇒ w’∈X]
Possibility takes the revised clause:
〈M,w〉  ⋄φ iff ¬[∃X∈N(w)∀w’[〈M,w’〉  ¬φ ⇐⇒ w’∈X]]
K and Necessitation need not hold on the neighborhood structure.
A counterexample to K in the neighborhood structure (160): Let Mk be
a neighborhood model, s.t. Wk = {a,b,c,d}; Nk(a) = {{a,b}, {a,c,d}}; Nk(b)
={b}; Nk(c) = {c}; Nk(d) = {d}; Vk(φ) = {a,b}; and Vk(ψ) = {a,c}. Thus,
〈Mk,w〉  φ; 〈Mk,w〉  [φ→ ψ]; but it is not the case that 〈Mk,w〉  ψ.
So, K need not hold on the neighborhood structure. So, Montague’s proof
that the predicate version of K is inconsistent with Montague’s conditions on
predicates (interpreted, by Scharp, as expressing Descending Truth) is not
pernicious.
A counterexample to Necessitation in the neighborhood structure (op.
cit.): Let Mn be a neighborhood model, s.t. Wn = {a,b}; Nn(a) = {{a}};
Nn(b) = {{b}}; and Vn(φ) = {a,b}. Thus, φ can be true in W, while φ is
false in Nn(a).
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So, Necessitation need not hold on the neighborhood structure. So, Mon-
tague’s proof that the predicate version of Necessitation is inconsistent with
the the conditions on Descending Truth is not pernicious.
So, Problems 1 and 2 can be answered.
However, the following rule is valid on neighborhood frames, and it en-
trains a fifth problem:
(L) If ⊢ φ ⇐⇒ ψ, then ⊢ φ ⇐⇒ ψ.
Problem 5:
The problem with regard to replacing modal operators with Descending
Truth predicates hinges on (L).
Scharp writes, e.g., that Gödel’s (1931) Diagonalization Lemma ’guaran-
tees that if our language can express Peano Arithmetic or its own theory of
syntax [. . . ] then it will have a sentence d, s.t. ¬D(d) is provably equivalent
to d’ (161).
Scharp concedes that Gödel’s incompleteness theorem would yield that
⊢ADT ¬D(d). He argues for this as follows: Suppose D(d), so if D(d) then d;
but – by the Lemma – if d, then ¬D(d); so if D(d), then ¬D(d).
Similarly, take another sentence in ADT, ’0 = 0’, then ⊢ADT ¬D(d) and
⊢’0 = 0’. However, assuming (L) and replacing the operators therein with
predicates entails that ⊢ADT D(d) ⇐⇒ D[’0 = 0’]. Given that it is true in
ADT that D[’0 = 0’], then ⊢ADT D(d).
Scharp argues that Problem 5 can be resolved by availing of the structure
built into his xeno semantics.
Let L be a language with Boolean connectives, and the operators ,
⋄, and Σ.  is the Descending Truth operator. ⋄ is the Ascending Truth
operator. Σ is the Safety operator. A xeno model M = 〈F,R,N,V〉 where
F denotes a xeno frame, R is an accessibility relation on wff in L, N is a
function from W to 22w, and V is an assignment-function from wff in L to
the values [0,1].
Truth in a world is defined inductively as above.
The operators take the following clauses:
Descending Truth:
〈M,w〉  φ iff ∀w’∈W[Rφ(w,w’) → ∃X∈N(w’)∀v∈W[〈M,v〉  φ ⇐⇒
v∈X]
Ascending Truth:
P(φ) denotes the neighborhood structure – i.e., the set of subsets of worlds
– at which φ is true.
〈M,w〉  ⋄φ iff ¬[∀w’∈W[R¬φ(w,w’) → P(¬φ)∈N(w’)]
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Safety:
〈M,w〉  Σφ iff ∀w’∈W[Rφ(w,w’)→ P(φ)∈N(w’)] ∨ ∃w’∈W[R¬φ(w,w’) ∧
P(¬φ)¬∈N(w’)]
A reflexive and co-reflexive xeno frame is equivalent to a neighborhood
frame:
(Reflexivity) ∀φ∀w∈W[Rφ(w,w)] ∧
(Co-reflexivity) ∀φ∀w∈W∀w’∈W[Rφ(w,w’) → w = w’]
In order to invalidate (L), Scharp constructs the following xeno model,
M.
W = {a,b}
N(a) = {{a,b}}
N(b) = {{b}}
RS = {(a,a),(b,b)}
RT = {(a,a),(b,b),(a,b)}
P(S) = {(a,b)}
P(T) = {(a,b)}
∀w∈W 〈M,w〉  S iff 〈M,w〉  T. So, S ⇐⇒ T is valid in M.
However, ∀w’[RS(a,w’)] → P(S)∈N(w’), so 〈M,w〉  ¬T.
So, (L) is invalid in M, and Problem 5 can be answered.
A sentential xeno frame is acceptable iff
(i) ∀w∈W N(w) 6= ∅
(ii) ∀w∈W ∀X∈N(w) X 6= ∅
(iii) ∀w∈W ∀X∈N(w) w∈X
(iv) ∀φ∈L∀w∈W[Rφ(w,w)]
(v) if φ and ψ are of the same syntactic type, then Rφ = Rψ
The interest of acceptable xeno frames is that they validate operator
equivalents of (D1) and (D2) in ADT. [(D1): D(φ) → φ; (D2): D(¬φ) →
¬D(φ).]
Suppose that 〈M,w〉  φ, so ∀w’∈W[Rφ(w,w’)→ P(φ)∈N(w’)]. By (iv),
Rφ(w,w), so P(¬φ)∈N(w). By (iii), ∀X∈N(w)[w∈X]. So, w∈P(¬φ). Thus,
〈M,w〉  ¬φ. So, it is not the case that w is in P(φ). By (iv), P(φ) is not
in N(w). By (iii), ¬[∀w’∈W[Rφ(w,w’) → P(φ)∈N(w’). Thus, 〈M,w〉  ¬φ.
Problem 3 concerned whether the domain ought to be variable or con-
stant. Scharp prescinds from targeting any issues with regard (i) to quantifi-
cation and ontology, or (ii) to the interaction between DT, AT, and empirical
sentences (172). He opts for a constant-domain semantics, and thus defines
constant-domain xeno models (166):
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A constant-domain xeno frame is a tuple, F = 〈W,N,Rf ,D〉. A constant-
domain xeno model adds an interpretation-function I to F, s.t. I maps pairs
of F and worlds w to subsets of D, s.t. M = 〈F,RM ,I〉.
A substitution is a function from a set of variables to elements of D. A
substitution v’ is x-variant of v, if v(y) = v’(y) for all variables y.
Thus,
〈M,w〉 v F[(a1), . . . , F(am)], where
ai is either an individual constant or variable iff 〈f(a1), . . . , f(am)〉∈I(F,w),
s.t. if ai is a variable xi, then f(ai) = v(xi), and if ai is an individual constant
ci, then f(ai) = I(ci)
〈M,w〉 v ¬φ iff it is not the case that 〈M,w〉 v φ
〈M,w〉 vφ∧ψ iff 〈M,w〉 vφ and 〈M,w〉 vψ
〈M,w〉 vφ∨ψ iff 〈M,w〉 vφ or 〈M,w〉 vψ
〈M,w〉 vφ→ψ iff, if 〈M,w〉 vφ then 〈M,w〉 vψ
〈M,w〉 vφ⇐⇒ ψ iff [〈M,w〉 vφ iff 〈M,w〉 vψ]
〈M,w〉 v ∀x[φ(x)] iff for all x-variant v’ 〈M,w〉 v′ φ(x)
〈M,w〉 v ∃x[φ(x)] iff for some x-variant v’ 〈M,w〉 v′ φ(x)
〈M,w〉  φ iff ∀w’∈W[Rφ(w,w’) → ∃X∈N(w’)∀v∈W[〈M,w〉  [φ ⇐⇒
v∈X]
〈M,w〉  ⋄φ iff ∃w’∈W[R¬φ(w,w’) ∧ P(¬φ) is not in N(w’)
14.2 Issue 1: Validity
Scharp mentions Field’s (2008) argument against identifying validity with
necessary truth-preservation, although does not reconstruct the argument.
In order to argue against identifying validity with necessary truth-preservation,
Field draws, inter alia, on Curry’s Paradox.
The argument from Curry’s Paradox is such that – by (T-In) and (T-Out)
– one can derive the following. If φ is a false sentence then,
1. φ ⇐⇒ [T(φ) → ⊥]
2. T(φ) ⇐⇒ [T(φ) → ⊥]
3. T(φ) → [T(φ) → ⊥]
4. [T(φ) ∧ T(φ)] → ⊥ (by importation)
5. T(φ) → ⊥
6. [T(φ) → ⊥] → T(φ)
7. T(φ)
8. ⊥
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So, necessary truth-preservation entails contradiction.
However, the argument need not be valid, if one preserves (T-In) and
(T-Out) yet weakens the logic. One can avail of the strong Kleene valuation
scheme, such that |φ| is ungrounded, i.e. maps to 1/2. One can then add a
Determinacy operator, such that it is not determinately true that φ and it is
not determinately true that not φ; so, it is indeterminate whether φ.
Field argues, in virtue of the foregoing, that validity ought to be a prim-
itive. In more recent work, Field (2015) argues that validity is primitive
if and only if it is ’genuine’, such that the notion cannot be identical with
either its model-theoretic or proof-theoretic analyses. As an elucidation of
the genuine concept, he writes that ’to regard an inference or argument as
valid is to accept a constraint on belief [. . . ; s.t.] (in the objective sense of
’shouldn’t’) we shouldn’t fully believe the premises without fully believing
the conclusion’ (op. cit.). (The primitivist notion is intended to hold, as
well, for partial belief.)
Scharp is persuaded by Field’s argument, and endorses, in turn, a primi-
tivist notion of validity, as a primitive canon of reasoning without necessary
truth-preservation. Scharp takes this to be sufficient for the retention of
Condition (iii), in Montague’s Lemma (151). Scharp does not provide any
further account of the nature of validity in the book. In later sections of
the book, he reiterates his sympathy with Field’s analysis, and also avails
of Kreisel’s ’squeezing’ argument (section 8.8), to the effect that the primi-
tive notion of validity extensionally coincides with a formal notion of validity
(i.e., derivation in a first-order axiomatizable quantified logic with identity).
However, one potential issue is that, in a subsequent passage, Scharp writes
that: ’an argument whose premises are the members of the set G and whose
conclusion is p is valid iff for every point of evaluation e [i.e., index], if all
members of G are assigned tM-value [i.e., an AT- or DT-value of] 1 at e, then
p is assigned tM-value 1 at e’ (240); and this would appear to be a definition
of validity as necessary truth-preservation.
The primitivist approach to validity is the primary consideration that
Scharp explicitly avails of, when arguing that closure ought to be rejected
(Condition iv, in Montague’s Lemma), rather than rejecting logical tau-
tologies as candidates for the axioms of ADT (Condition iii, in Montague’s
Lemma) (151). So, further remarks about the nature of validity would have
been welcome. An objection to prescinding from more substantial remarks
about the nature of validity might also be that Scharp exploits claims with
regard to its uses. So, e.g., he writes that ’a valid argument will never take
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one from descending truths to something not ascending true’ (177). How-
ever, that claim is itself neither a consequence of either Kreisel’s squeezing
argument, nor the primitivist approach to validity.
14.3 Issue 2: Hybrid Principles and Compo-
sitionality
• ∧-T-Imb.
D(φ) ∧ D(ψ) → A(φ ∧ ψ)
v.
T(φ) ∧ T(ψ) → T(φ ∧ ψ)
• ∨-T-Exc.
D(φ ∨ ψ) → A(φ) ∨ A(ψ)
v.
T(φ ∨ ψ) → T(φ) ∨ T(ψ)
(cf. 147, 171)
Feferman’s (1984) theory countenances a primitive truth predicate (Feferman-
true, in what follows); a primitive falsity predicate; as well as a Determinacy
operator (op. cit.). This is by salient contrast to Scharp’s approach, on which
truth is replaced with DT and AT. Scharp argues that Feferman overempha-
sizes the significance of the compositionality of his Determinacy operator, at
the cost of not having either logical truths or the axioms of his own theory
satisfy Feferman-truth. By contrast, Scharp believes that he can avail of
hybrid principles, such that it is not a requirement of ADT that Descending
Truth and Ascending Truth obey compositionality (157).
One objection to this maneuver is that AT and DT are separated, in
the hybrid principles, between the antecendent and consequent of the con-
ditional.1 So, it is unclear whether Scharp’s hybrid principles are sufficient
to redress the failure of compositionality in ADT; i.e., there being truth-
conditions for sentences whose component semantic values are, alternatively,
DT and AT.
1Thanks here to Stephen Read.
213
A further objection is that the foregoing might be in tension with Scharp’s
repeated mention of natural-language semantics, in order to argue against
competing proposals. If natural-language semantics were to vindicate princi-
ples of compositionality, then this would provide a challenge to the empirical
adequacy of Scharp’s ADT theory, and thereby the viability of his replace-
ment concepts for the traditional alethic predicate.
14.4 Issue 3: ADT and Indeterminacy
This issue concerns whether ADT might generalize, in order to account for
other philosophical issues that concern indeterminacy. Whether ADT can
be so extended to other issues, such as vagueness and types of indetermi-
nacy, is not a necessary condition on the success of the theory. However, it
might be a theoretical virtue of other accounts – e.g., classical, paracomplete,
intuitionist, and supervaluational approaches – that they do so generalize;
and the extensions of logic and semantics to issues in metaphysics are both
familiar and legion.2
E.g., McGee (1991) suggests replacing the truth predicate with (i) a vague
truth predicate, and (ii) super-truth. The replacement predicates are not
intended for deployment in inferences implicated in reasoning, such as con-
ditional proof and arguments by reductio (155). McGee introduces a Defi-
niteness operator, µ, in order to yield the notion of super-truth relative to
a set of precisifications. There is thus a truth predicate and a super-truth
predicate. Super-truth is governed by (T-In) and (T-Out). Vague truth is
governed by neither.
Thus:
–If µ(p), then µ’T(p)’
(If p is definitely true, then ’p is true’ is definitely true)
–If µ(¬p), then µ¬’T(p)’
(If p is definitely not true, then ’p is true’ is definitely not true)
–If p is vague, then ’T(p)’ is vague
(vagueness here is secured by availing of the strong Kleene valuation
scheme, such that p is ungrounded, i.e. maps neither to true nor false, and
rather to .5)
McGee endeavors to avoid Revenge, by arguing that
2Cf. Williamson (forthcoming), for an argument for the retention of classical logic
despite the semantic paradoxes, based on the abductive strength of its generalization.
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’u’ := ’u is false or u is vague’
collapses to u is vague. So, u is not definitely true, and not definitely
vague. Further, u is not derivable within McGee’s supervaluationist theory,
nor within a separate, fixed-point theory that he also advances.
Scharp raises several issues for the supervaluational approach. One is-
sue is that vague sentences cannot be precisified via supervaluation – i.e.,
rendered determinately true – on pain of Revenge (156).
Scharp argues that Descending Truth and Ascending Truth obey (T-Out)
and (T-In), respectively, whereas – according to McGee – vague sentences do
not. So, McGee’s replacement restricts expressivity, whereas Scharp argues
that there are no expressive restrictions on his proposal. Scharp notes, as
well, that some of the axioms for McGee’s theory are not definitely true –
and are thus vague and not governed by T-Out or T-In – which would appear
to be a considerable objection.
However, Field’s (2008) approach – K3 plus a Determinacy operator,
with a multi-valued semantics for the conditional – would appear to remain
a viable proposal. Extensions of Field’s proposal can be to an explanation
of vagueness (Field, op. cit: ch. 5); to the logic of doxastic states (cf. Caie,
2012); and to the model-theory of metaphysics.
With regard, e.g., to the extension of Field’s treatment of the paradoxes
to the logic of doxastic states, Caie demonstrates that – rather than rejecting
the Liar sentence – it would no longer be the case, by K3 and indeterminacy,
that one could believe the Liar, and it would no longer be the case that one
ought not to believe the Liar. In section 8, I provide an epistemicist approach
to Curry’s paradox and the Liar which is able to retain both classical logic
and the normal truth rules.
With regard to the extension of Field’s treatment of the paradoxes to
the logic and model-theory of metaphysics, consider the following. Given
Curry’s paradox, the validity of an epistemic norm might depend, for its
explanation, on one’s choice of logic. However, one’s choice of logic might
depend for its explanation on considerations from metaphysics. Suppose,
e.g., that one distinguishes between fundamental and derivative metaphysical
states of affairs. The fundamental states of affairs might concern the entities
located in 3n-dimensional spacetime, such as whatever is represented by the
wavefunction. The derivative states of affairs might concern emergent entities
located in lower, 3-dimensional spacetime, such as the clouds. In order to
capture the priority of the fundamental to the derivative, fundamental states
of affairs could take the classical values, [0,1]; by contrast, derivative states
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of affairs could take the value .5 (in K3+indeterminacy), such that – while
fundamental states are always either true or false – it is not determinate
that a derivative state of affairs obtains, and it is not determinate that a
derivative state of affairs does not obtain.
On the supervaluational treatment of the paradoxes, the approach can
more generally be extended in order to account, e.g., for the metaphysi-
cal issues surrounding fission cases and indeterminate survival. Approaches
which avail of a supervaluational response to fission scenarios, and similar
issues at the intersection of nonclassical logic, metaphysical indeterminacy,
and decision theory, can be found, e.g., in Williams (2014).
Thus, while it is not a necessary condition on the success of treatments
to the alethic paradoxes that their proposals can generalize – in order, e.g,
to aid in the resolution of other philosophical issues such as epistemic and
metaphysical indeterminacy – there are viable proposals which can be so
extended. The competing approaches thus satisfy a theoretical virtue that
might ultimately elude ADT.
In his discussion of Priest’s (2006) inclosure schema, Scharp disavows of
a unified solution to the gamut of paradoxical phenomena (Scharp, 2013:
288). Despite the foregoing, I believe that there are at least four positive
extensions of Scharp’s theory of Ascending and Descending Truth that he
does not discuss, and yet that might merit examination.
14.4.1 First Extension: The Preface Paradox
The first extension of the theory of ADT might be to the preface paradox.
A set of credence functions is Easwaran-Fitelson-coherent if and only if (i)
the credences are governed by the Kolmogorov axioms; and it is not the case
both (ii) that one’s credence is dominated by a distinct credence, s.t. the
distinct credence is closer to the ideal, vindicated world, while (iii) one’s
credence is assigned the same value as the remaining credences, s.t. they are
tied for closeness (cf. Easwaran and Fitelson, 2015).3 Rather than eschew of
consistency in favor of a weaker epistemic norm such as Easwaran-Fitelson
coherence, the ADT theorist might argue that consistency can be preserved,
3A credence function is here assumed to be a real variable, interpreted as a subjective
probability density. The real variable is a function to the [0,1] interval, and is further
governed by the Kolmogorov axioms: normality, ’Cr(T) = 1’; non-negativity, ’Cr(φ) ≥ 0’;
finite additivity, ’for disjoint φ and ψ, Cr(φ∪ψ) = Cr(φ) + Cr(ψ)’; and conditionalization,
’Cr(φ|ψ) = Cr(φ ∩ ψ) / Cr(ψ)’.
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because the preface sentence, ’All of the beliefs in my belief set are true, and
one of them is false’ might be Ascending True rather than Descending True.
Because the models in Scharp’s replacement theory can preserve consistency
in response to the Preface, ADTmight, then, provide a compelling alternative
to the Easwaran-Fitelson proposal.
14.4.2 Second Extension: Absolute Generality
A second extension of Scharp’s ADT theory might be to a central issue in
the philosophy of mathematics; namely unrestricted quantification. A re-
sponse to the latter might further enable the development of the property
versions of AT and DT: i.e., being Ascending-True-of and being Descending-
True-of. For example, Fine (2005) and Linnebo (2006) advance a distinction
between sets and interpretations, where the latter are properties; and suggest
that inconsistency might be avoided via a suitable restriction of the property
comprehension scheme.4 A proponent of Scharp’s ADT theory might be able:
(i) to adopt the distinction between extensional and intensional groups (sets
and properties, respectively); yet (ii) circumvent restriction of the property
comprehension scheme, if they argue that R is Ascending True-of yet not
Descending True-of. The foregoing maneuver would parallel Scharp’s treat-
ment of the derivation, within ADT, of the Ascending and Descending Liars
and their revenge analogues (see Section 2.1 above).
14.4.3 Third Extension: Probabilistic Self-reference
A third extension of ADT might be to a self-referential paradox in the prob-
abilistic setting. Caie (2013) outlines a puzzle, according to which:
(1) ’*’ := ¬CrT(*) ≥ .5
that is, (*) says of itself that it is not the case that an agent has credence
in the truth of (*) greater than or equal to .5. As an instance of the T-
scheme, (1) yields: ’T(*) ⇐⇒ ¬CrT(*) ≥ .5’. However, CrT(*) ought to
map to the interval between .5 and 1. Then, ’Cr(φ) + Cr(¬φ) 6= 1’, violating
the normality condition which states that one’s credences ought to sum to 1.
4See Field (2004; 2008) for a derivation of the Russell property, R, given the ’naive
comprehension scheme: ∀u1 . . . un∃y[Property(y) ∧ ∀x(x instantiates y ⇐⇒ Θ(x, u1
. . . un)]’ (2008: 294). R denotes ’does not instantiate itself’, i.e. ∀x[x∈R ⇐⇒ ¬(x∈x)],
s.t. R∈R ⇐⇒ ¬(R∈R) (2004: 78).
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In ADT, the probabilist self-referential paradox might be blocked as fol-
lows. Axiom (A2) states that ¬A(φ) → A(¬φ); so if it is not an Ascending
Truth that φ, then it is an Ascending Truth that not φ. However, (A2) does
not hold for Descending Truth. Thus, in the instance of the T-scheme which
states that ’T(*) ⇐⇒ ¬CrT(*) ≥ .5’, the contraposition from ’¬CrT(*)
≥ .5’ to ’Cr(¬T(*) ≥ .5’ is Ascending True, but not Descending True. So,
if the contraposition from ’¬CrT(*)’ to ’Cr(¬T(*))’ is not Descending True,
then the transition from ’Cr(φ) + ¬Cr(φ) = 1’ to ’Cr(φ) + Cr(¬φ) = 1’ is
not Descending True. Similarly, then, to the status of the Descending Liar
in ADT, the derivation of contradiction from the probabilist self-referential
sentence, (1), is Ascending True, but not Descending True.
14.4.4 Fourth Extension: The Sorites Paradox
A fourth extension of ADT might, finally, be to the sorites paradox. Scharp’s
xeno semanics is non-normal, such that the accessibility relation is governed
by the axioms T (reflexivity) and 4 (transitivity), although not by axiom
K. Suppose that there is a bounded, phenomenal continuum from orange to
red, beginning with a color hue, ci, and such that – by transitivity – if ci
is orange, then ci+1 is orange. The terminal color hue, in the continuum,
would thereby be orange and not red. The transitivity of xeno semantics
explains the generation of the sorites paradox. However, xeno semantics
appears to be perfectly designed in order to block the paradox, as well: The
neighborhood function in Scharp’s xeno semantics for ADT is such that one
can construct a model according to which transitivity does not hold. Let Mk
be a neighborhood model, s.t. Wk = {a,b,c}; Nk(a) = {a,b}; Nk(b) ={a,b,c};
Nk(c) = {b,c}; Vk(φ) = {a,b}. Thus, 〈Mk,a〉  φ; but not 〈Mk,b〉  φ.
So, it is not the case that 〈Mk,a〉  φ; so transitivity does not hold in the
model. Scharp’s semantics for his ADT theory would thus appear to have
the resources both to generate, and to solve, the sorites paradox.5
5Scharp suggests that the truth predicate is contextually invariant, although
assessment-sensitive (9.4). A second means by which the proposal could be extended
in order to account for vagueness is via its convergence with the interest-relative approach
advanced by Fara (2000; 2008).
218
14.5 Issue 4: Descending Truth, Ascending
Truth, and Objectivity
Scharp claims that considerations of space do not permit him to elaborate on
the interaction between Descending Truth, Ascending Truth, and objectivity
(Section 8.3). Suppose that – depending on the target domain of inquiry
– the truth-conditions of sentences might be sensitive to the reality of the
objects and properties that the sentences concern. So, e.g., second-order
implicit definitions for the cardinals might be true only if the terms therein
refer to abstract entities. By contrast, what is said in sentences about humor
might be true, if and only if the sentence satisfies deflationary conditions
such as the T-schema.
Another objection to the replacement strategy, and of Scharp’s candidate
replacements in particular, is that it is unclear how – in principle – either
Descending Truth or Ascending Truth can be deployed in order to capture
the foregoing distinctions.
14.6 Issue 5: Paradox, Sense, and Significa-
tion
One final objection concerns the general methodology of the book. Scharp
proceeds by endeavoring to summarize all of the extant approaches to the
alethic paradoxes in the literature, and to marshall at least one issue adducing
against their favor. However, there are two approaches to the paradoxes that
Scharp overlooks. The first approach targets the notion of what is said by
an utterance, i.e. the properties of sense and signification that a sentence
might express. One such proposal is inspired by Bradwardine (c.1320/2010)
and pursued by Read (2009). According to the proposal, if a sentence such
as the Liar does not wholly signify that it is true, then one invalidates T-
Introduction for the sentence. In a similar vein, Rumfitt (2014) argues that
paradoxical sentences are a type of Scheingedanken, i.e. mock thoughts that
might have a sense, although take no value; so, T-Introduction is similarly
restricted.
Scharp takes it to be a virtue of his account that he can retain the dis-
quotational principles, even though they get subsequently divided among his
replacement concepts. He might then reply to the foregoing proposal by sug-
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gesting that they similarly induce expressive restrictions in a manner that
his approach can circumvent.
However, there are other approaches which avail of what I shall refer
to as the sense and signification strategy, and which eschew of neither T-
Elimination nor T-Introduction. Modulo a semantics for the conditional,
K3 and indeterminacy at all orders ensures not only that hyper-determinacy
– and therefore an assignment of classical values to the paradoxical sen-
tences – is circumvented; but, furthermore, that revenge sentences cannot
be derived either. Against this approach, Scharp reiterates his concern with
regard to restrictions on expression. He writes, e.g., that ’Field avoids re-
venge only by an expressive limitation on his language’ (107). However, a
virtue of the approach is that, as in xeno semantics for ADT, T-Elimination
and T-Introduction are preserved. Against ADT theory, K3+indeterminacy
does not arbitrarily select the alethic principles that the semantic theory
should satisfy. Crucially, moreover, the approach does not say more than
one should like it to, as witnessed, e.g., by the derivability in ADT of both
the DT and AT Liars and their revenge analogues. Rather, the language of
paracompleteness and indeterminacy demonstrates that – without the loss
of the foundational principles governing the alethic predicate – there are
propositions which can satisfy the values in an abductively robust semantic
theory, and thereby exhibit their content, although what they show cannot
ultimately be said.
14.7 Epistemicism and Alethic Paradox
Finally, the second approach that Scharp does not consider is one that has re-
cently been developed by the present author. This approach provides an epis-
temicist solution to the alethic paradoxes, and is able to retain both classical
logic and a univocal, non-replacement, alethic predicate which obeys both
truth-elimination and truth-introduction. In the epistemic modal system at
issue, the box-operator, , is interepreted as ’the agent knows that’ and the
diamond-operator, ⋄, is interepreted as ’the agent believes that’. Belief is the
dual of knowledge: ’Bφ ⇐⇒ ¬K¬φ’. The epistemic system validates axiom
T, which records the factivity of knowledge: ’Kφ → φ’. Curry’s paradox is,
again, the following:6
6Read (2010) notes that there are at least three forms of Curry’s paradox. One form,
attributed to Albert of Saxony, is conjunctive: for any sentence A, ’φ’ := A ∧ F(φ). A
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For any false sentence, φ,
1. φ ⇐⇒ [T(φ) → ⊥]
2. T(φ) ⇐⇒ [T(φ) → ⊥]
3. T(φ) → [T(φ) → ⊥]
4. [T(φ) ∧ T(φ)] → ⊥ (by importation)
5. T(φ) → ⊥ (by contraction)
6. [T(φ) → ⊥] → T(φ)
7. T(φ)
8. ⊥
Rather than weaken the logic in a type-free setting (Field, 2008); eschew
of contraction (Beall and Murzi, 2012); eschew of T-introduction in virtue
of defective properties of signification (Read, 2009); or retain classical logic
for abductive reasons and disband of one of the truth rules (Williamson,
forthcoming), the current approach argues that Curry’s paradox is classicaly
sound; that the normal truth rules can yet be retained; and that the paradox
is problematic only becuase it exhibits an instance of epistemic indetermi-
nacy.
The epistemic indeterminacy entrained by Curry’s paradox occurs be-
cause step 5 invalidates axiom K on its epistemic interpretation: ’K(φ → ψ)
→ (Kφ → Kψ)’. This provides a counter-instance to epistemic closure. To
see this, let φ denote ’T(φ)’ and ψ denote ’⊥’. Then:
(*) K(Tφ → ⊥) → [K(Tφ) → K(⊥)].
Our epistemic modal system validates reflexivity, or axiom T: ’Kφ →
φ’.7 Thus, in (*), K(⊥) is false, because – by reflexivity – only truths can
second form, attributed both to Albert of Saxony and Bradwardine, is disjunctive: for
any sentence A, ’φ’ := A ∨ F(φ). A third form, owing to Löb (1955) is such that, for any
sentence A: ’φ’ := T(φ) → A. Read (op. cit.) argues that T-introduction is the culprit in
the first three forms of the paradox. A fourth variation on Curry’s paradox can be found
in Beall and Murzi (2012), who replace the truth predicate with a validity predicate. A
fifth form is targeted by Field (2008), and is the version at issue in this essay. This form
of the paradox is such that a contradiction has a unique derivation, via the truth rules,
given any false sentence.
7Whether the system validates further axioms is a question which requires separate
treatment. Axioms 4 [Kφ → KKφ]’; G [BKφ → KBφ]; 4.4 [K(φ ∧ BKψ) → K(φ ∨ ψ)];
GL [K[K(φ) → φ] → K(φ)]; and Grz [K[K(φ → Kφ) → φ] → φ], have all been proposed
as plausible axioms of epistemic logic. If one follows Priest (op. cit.) in arguing that the
sorites paradox and the paradoxes of self-reference have the same form, and one believes
that transitivity, i.e. axiom 4 on its epistemic interpretation, is the culprit in the sorites
paradox, then perhaps eschewing of axiom 4 with regard to the paradoxes of self-reference
might be a viable, similarly epistemicist approach. Cf. Williamson (1994; 2002), for the
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be known. However, K(φ) can be known, because it is an instance of T-
introduction. Thus, the conditional in the consequent of (*) has itself a true
antecedent and false consequent, and is thus false. Finally, the conditional in
the antecedent of (*), ’K(Tφ → ⊥)’ is true, in virtue of the proof of Curry’s
paradox. So the instance of K expressed in (*) has a true antecedent and
false consequent, providing a counter-instance to K; and so K is not a valid
axiom in our system of epistemic modal logic. Thus, what is problematic
about Curry’s paradox is that – despite being classically sound and entailing
contradiction via the normal truth rules – at least one of the steps in its
derivation is epistemically indeterminate, by invalidating axiom K.
To complete the epistemicist approach to alethic paradox, we target the
epistemic attitude that one ought to bear toward the liar sentence. As men-
tioned, Caie (2012) generalizes the strong Kleene valuation scheme, as aug-
mented by the determinacy operator, to the doxastic setting. In order to
induce consistency in an agent’s belief set, the belief operator is taken to
be its own dual, ’B(φ) ⇐⇒ ¬B¬φ’. The operator is further governed by
K [B(φ → ψ) → [B(φ) → B(ψ)]], D ’[K(φ) → B(φ)], 4 [B(φ → BBφ), and
E [¬B(φ) → B¬B(φ)]. By contrast to Caie’s approach, we target epistemic
rather than doxastic logic. In our epistemic logic, we avoid validating the
conjunction of axioms 4 and E, because their conjunction would entail that an
epistemic agent’s consistent theorizing is decidable, in conflict with Gödel’s
second incompleteness theorem (cf. Williamson, 2009). Because we should
like epistemic agent’s theorizing to be consistent, we avoid validating both
4 and E. The epistemic logic validates axiom T. However, Curry’s paradox
provides a case of epistemic indeterminacy, by invalidating axiom K. To com-
plete the epistemicist solution to the liar paradox, I believe that the epistemic
attitude toward liar sentences is one of belief, where belief is, again, the dual
of knowledge: Bφ if and only if ¬K¬φ. Thus, where λ is a sentence which
asserts of itself that it is false, the descriptively adequate and normatively
permissible attitude to bear toward the sentence is one of belief, such that
one doesn’t know whether it is not true. To avoid contradiction, we eschew
finally of the D axiom, which records the seriality and safety conditions, ac-
cording to which one ought to believe φ only if φ is known: Kφ→ Bφ. Thus,
the derivation of contradiction in Curry’s paradox is epistemically indeter-
minate, and the attitude of believing the liar sentence comprises a case of
epistemic indeterminacy, as well: for all one knows it is not the case that the
foundations of the latter proposal.
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liar sentence is true.
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Part V: Epistemic Modality, Intention, and Decision Theory
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Chapter 15
Two-dimensional Truthmaker
Semantics
15.1 Introduction
Philosophical applications of two-dimensional intensional semantics have demon-
strated that an account of representation which is sensitive to an array of
parameters can play a crucial role in explaining the values of linguistic expres-
sions (Kamp, 1967; Kaplan, 1979); the role of speech acts in affecting shared
contexts of information (Stalnaker, 1978; Lewis, 1980,a/1998; MacFarlane,
2005); the relationship between conceivability and metaphysical possibility
(Chalmers, 1996); the limits of subjectivism in ethics (Peacocke, 2003); and
the viability of modal realism (Russell, 2010).
In order to circumvent issues for the modal analysis of counterfactuals
(2012,a, 2012,b), and to account for the general notion of aboutness and
a subject matter (2015), a hyperintensional, ’truthmaker’ semantics has re-
cently been developed by Fine (ms,a, ms,b). In this essay, I examine the
status of two-dimensional indexing in truthmaker semantics, and specify the
two-dimensional profile of the grounds for the truth of a formula (Section
2.2). I proceed, then, to outline three novel interpretations of the two-
dimensional, hyperintensional framework, beyond the interpretations of mul-
tiply indexed intensional semantics that are noted above. The first interpre-
tation provides a formal setting in which to define the distinction between
fundamental and derivative truths (Section 3.1). The second interpretation
concerns the interaction between the two-dimensional profile of the verifiers
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for a proposition, subjective probability, and decision theory (Section 3.2).
Finally, a third interpretation of the two-dimensional hyperintensional frame-
work concerns the types of intentional action. I demonstrate, in particular,
how multiply indexed truthmaker semantics is able to resolve a puzzle con-
cerning the role of intention in action (Section 3.3). Section 4 provides
concluding remarks.
15.2 Two-dimensional Truthmaker Semantics
15.2.1 Intensional Semantics
In his (1979), Evans endeavors to account for the phenomenon of the contin-
gent apriori by distinguishing between two types of modality. In free logic,
closed formulas may receive a positive, classical semantic value when the
terms therein have empty extensions (op. cit.: 166). Informative identity
statements – such as that ’Plotinus = the author of The Enneads’ – are thus
taken to be ’epistemically equivalent’ to vacuously true identity statements
– e.g., ’Plotinus = Plotinus’ (op. cit.: 177). The apriority of the vacuously
true identity statement is thus argued to be a property of the informative
identity statement, as well.1 However, the informative identity statement is
contingent. For example, it is metaphysically possible that the author of The
Enneads is Plato, rather than Plotinus.
Evans argues that the foregoing ’superficial’ type of contingency at issue
is innocuous, by distinguishing it from what he refers to as a ’deep’ type of
contingency according to which a sentence is possibly true only if it is made
true by a state of affairs (185). The distinction between the types of modal-
ity consists in that superficial contingency records the possible values of a
formula when it embeds within the scope of a modal operator – e.g., possibly,
x is red and possibly x is blue – whereas deep contingency records whether
the formula is made true by a metaphysical state of affairs. In light of the
approach to apriority which proceeds via the free-logical, epistemic equiv-
alence of vacuous and informative identity statements, a formula may thus
be apriori and yet superficially contingent.2 Evans (op. cit.: 183-184; 2004:
1A premise in the argument is that definite descriptions are non-referring, although –
in free logic – still enable the sentences in which they figure to bear a positive, classical
value. See Evans (op. cit.: 167-169).
2Evans’ approach is defined within a single space of metaphysically possible worlds.
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11-12) goes further and – independently developing work in two-dimensional
intensional semantics by Kamp (1967), Vlach (1973), and Segerberg (1973)
– treats the actuality operator as a rigidifier, such that the value of actually
φ determines the counterfactual value of possibly φ.
Two-dimensional intensional semantics provides a framework for regi-
menting the thought that the value of a formula relative to one parame-
ter determines the value of the formula relative to another parameter. The
semantics assigns truth-conditions to formulas, and semantic values to the
formula’s component terms. The conditions of the formulas and the values
of their component terms are assigned relative to the array of intensional
parameters. So, e.g., a term may be defined relative to a context; and the
value of the term relative to the context will determine the value of the term
relative to an index. For example, according to Kaplan (1979), an utter-
ance’s character is a mapping from the utterance’s context of evaluation to
the utterance’s content. According to Stalnaker (op. cit.; 2004), having dis-
tinct functions associated with the value of an utterance provides one means
of reconciling the necessity of a formula presupposed by speakers with the
contingency of the values of assertions made about that formula. According
to Chalmers (op. cit.), the value of a formula relative to a context, which
ranges over epistemically possible worlds, determines the value of a formula
relative to an index, which ranges over metaphysically possible worlds. Ac-
cording to Lewis (op. cit.), the context may be treated as a concrete situation
ranging over individuals, times, locations, and worlds; and the index may be
treated as ranging over information states relative to the context. Accord-
ing to MacFarlane (op. cit.), formulas may receive their value relative to a
context ranging over two distinct agents; the context determines the value
of an index ranging over their states of information; and the value of the
formula may yet be defined relative to a third parameter ranging over the
However, one may define the value of a formula relative to two spaces: A space of epistemic
possibilities and a space of metaphysical possibilities. By contrast to securing apriority by
(i) eliding the values of informative and vacuous identity statements in a free logic within
a single space of metaphysical possibilties, and then (ii) arguing that apriori identity
statements are superficially contingent because possibly false, an alternative approach
argues that an identity statement is contingent apriori if and only if it is (i) apriori,
because the statement is necessarily true in epistemic modal space, while the statement
is (ii) contingent, because possibly the statement is false in metaphysical modal space (cf.
Chalmers, 2006). However, a point of convergence between the above approaches is that
neither avails of the notion of deep contingency – i.e., truthmaking – in order to reconcile
the apriority of a formula with the possibility of its falsehood.
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states of an independent, third assessor. Finally, in decision theory, the value
of a formula relative to a context, which ranges over a time, location, and
agent, constrains the value of the formula relative to a first index on which
a space of the agent’s possible acts is built, and the latter will subsequently
constrain the value of the formula relative to a second index on which a space
of possible outcomes may be built.
Generally, a proposition, P, is such that P is true in a Model, M, relative
to a context, c, and an index, i:
• M  P iff ∀c∃c’JPKc,c′ = 1 and ∃iJPKc,i = 1.
15.2.2 Truthmaker Semantics
A hyperintensional, ’truthmaker’ semantics has recently been developed by
Fine (ms,a, ms,b).3 Truthmaker semantics has been applied, in order to
explain the verification-conditions which ground the truth of parts of propo-
sitions, rather than of the propositions in their entirety.4
Truthmaker semantics is defined over a state space, F = 〈S, ⊏〉, where
S is a set of states comprising a world, and ⊏ is a parthood relation on S
comprising a partial order, such that it is reflexive (a ⊏ a), anti-symmetric
[(a ⊏ b) ∧ ¬(b ⊏ a)], and transitive (a ⊏ b, b ⊏ c; a ⊏ c) (ms,a: 19).
A proposition P ⊆ S is verifiable if P is non-empty, and is otherwise
unverifiable (20).
s,t ⊏ S are compatible if their fusion s ⊔ t is a possible state of S (op.
cit.).
s overlaps t if ∃u(u ⊏ S), s.t. u ⊑ s and u ⊑ t, denoted s ⊓ t (op. cit.).
A model, M, over F is a tuple, M = 〈F,D,V〉, where D is a domain of
closed formulas (i.e. propositions), and V is an assignment function mapping
propositions P∈D to pairs of subsets of S, {1,0}, i.e. the verifier and falsifier
of P, such that JPK+ = 1 and JPK− = 0 (35).
The verification-rules in truthmaker semantics are then the following:
s ⊢ P if s∈JPK+
3The logic for the semantics is classical. Fine (2014) develops a truthmaker semantics
for intuitionistic logic.
4Anticipations of the theory of partial content are advanced by van Fraassen (1969)
and Angell (1989; cf. Fine, 2015). Intensional interpretations of subject matters, which
anticipate Fine’s hyperintensional approach, are developed in Lewis (1988/1998) and Yablo
(2014).
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(s verifies P, if s is a truthmaker for P i.e. if s is in P’s extension);
s ⊣ P if s∈JPK−
(s falsifies P, if s is a falsifier for P i.e. if s is in P’s anti-extension);
s ⊢ ¬P if s ⊣ P
(s verifies not P, if s falsifies P);
s ⊣ ¬P if s ⊢ P
(s falsifies not P, if s verifies P);
s ⊢ P ∧ Q if ∃t,u, t ⊢ P, u ⊢ Q, and s = t ⊓ u
(s verifies P and Q, if s is the fusion of states, t and u, t verifies P, and u
verifies Q);
s ⊣ P ∧ Q if s ⊣ P or s ⊣ Q
(s falsifies P and Q, if s falsifies P or s falsifies Q);
s ⊢ P ∨ Q if s ⊢ P or s ⊢ Q
(s verifies P or Q, if s verifies P or s verifies Q);
s ⊣ P ∨ Q if ∃t,u, t ⊣ P, u ⊣ Q, and s = t ⊓ u
(s falsifies P or Q, if s is the state overlapping the states t and u, t falsifies
P, and u falsifies Q);
s exactly verifies P if and only if s ⊢ P if s∈JPK;
s inexactly verifies P if and only if s ⊲ P if ∃s’⊏S, s’ ⊢ P; and
s loosely verifies P if and only if, ∀t, s.t. s ⊔ t, s ⊔ t ⊢ P (35-36).
Differentiated contents may be defined as follows.5 A state s ⊑ S is
differentiated only if s is the fusion of distinct parts, s.t. s = s1 ⊔ s2. s is
thereby comprised of three parts: An initial state, s1; an additional state,
s2; and a total state, s. The three states correspond accordingly to three
contents: The initial content s1 ⊢ P1; the additional content, s2 ⊢ P2; and
the total content, s ⊢ P1,2 (ms,b: 15).
The substraction of Q from P, P – Q, is defined such that p – q = p – (q
⊓ p) (17).
Finally, subject matters may be defined as follows.
A positive subject matter, p+, expresses a verifiable proposition, JPK+
(20-21).
A negative subject matter, p−, expresses a falsifiable proposition, JPK−
(21).
A comprehensive subject matter expresses the fusion of the subject mat-
ters both verified and falsified by the fusion of a number of states:
5Fine (op. cit.: 8, 12) avails of product spaces in his discussion of content and subject
matter, though we continue here to work with a single space for ease of exposition.
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p1,+,− = p1,+ ⊓ p1,− = 〈s ⊢ P ∧ s ⊣ P〉;
p2,+,− = p2,+ ⊓ p2,− = 〈s ⊢ P2 ∧ s ⊣ P2〉; such that,
p1,2,+,− = p1,2,+ ⊓ p1,2,− = 〈s ⊢ P1,2 ∧ s ⊣ P1,2〉 (op. cit.).
A differentiated subject matter expresses the fusion of the subject matters
that are either verified or falsified by the fusion of a number of states:
p1,+/− = p1,+ ⊔ p1,− = 〈s ⊢ P ∨ s ⊣ P〉;
p2,+,− = p2,+ ⊔ p2,− = 〈s ⊢ P2 ∨ s ⊣ P2〉; such that,
p1,2,+/− = p1,2,+ ⊔ p1,2,− = 〈s ⊢ P1,2 ∨ s ⊣ P1,2〉 (op. cit.).
Informally, propositions P and Q express the same subject matters, p and
q, when the following conditions hold:
P is exactly about Q if p = q;
P is partly about Q if p and q overlap, such that ∃u⊏S(u ⊢ R); ∀s1,s2⊑S,
s1 ⊢ P, s2 ⊢ Q; and u = s1 ⊓ s2, such that R = P ∩ Q;
P is entirely about Q if p ⊆ q; and
P is about Q in its entirety if p ⊇ q (5).
15.2.3 Two-dimensional Truthmaker Semantics
In order to account for two-dimensional indexing, we augment the model,
M, with a second state space, S*, on which we define both a new parthood
relation, ⊏*, and partial function, V*, which serves to map propositions in
D to pairs of subsets of S*, {1,0}, i.e. the verifier and falsifier of P, such that
JPK+ = 1 and JPK− = 0. Thus, M = 〈S, S*, D, ⊏, ⊏*, V, V*〉. The two-
dimensional hyperintensional profile of propositions may then be recorded by
defining the value of P relative to two parameters, c,i: c ranges over subsets
of S, and i ranges over subsets of S*.
(*) M,s∈S,s*∈S* ⊢ P iff:
(i) ∃csJPKc,c = 1 if s∈JPK+; and
(ii) ∃is∗JPKc,i = 1 if s*∈JPK+
(Distinct states, s,s*, from distinct state spaces, S,S*, provide a two-
dimensional verification for a proposition, P, if the value of P is provided a
truthmaker by s. The value of P as verified by s determines the value of P
as verified by s*).
The foregoing provides a two-dimensional hyperintensional semantic frame-
work within which to interpret the values of a proposition. In order to account
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for partial contents, we define the values of subpropositional entities relative
again to tuples of states from the distinct state spaces in our model:
s is a two-dimensional exact truthmaker of P if and only if (*);
s is a two-dimensional inexact truthmaker of P if and only if ∃s’⊏S, s→
s’, s’ ⊢ P and such that
∃cs′JPKc,c = 1 if s’∈JPK+, and
∃is∗JPKc,i = 1 if s*∈JPK+;
s is a two-dimensional loose truthmaker of P if and only if, ∃t, s.t. s ⊔ t,
s ⊔ t ⊢ P:
∃cs⊔tJPKc,c = 1 if s’∈JPK+, and
∃is∗JPKc,i = 1 if s*∈JPK+.
• JPKc,i is exactly about JQKc,i if f 1−1[pc,i ⇐⇒ qc,i]
(Suppose that the values of P and of Q are two-dimensionally deter-
mined, as above. Then P is exactly about Q if there is a bijection
between the two-dimensionally individuated subject matters that they
express);
• JPKc,i is partly about JQKc,i if p and q overlap, s.t. ∃u⊏S, s.t. u ⊢ R,
and ∀s1,s2⊑S, s1 ⊢ P, s2 ⊢ Q, and u = s1 ⊓ s2 such that Rc,c = P ∩ Q.
A neighborhood function, A, maps u to a state s* in i where s* ⊢ Rc,i.
• JPKc,i is entirely about JQKc,i if pc,i ⇐ qc,i
(Suppose that the values of P and of Q are two-dimensionally deter-
mined. Then P is entirely about Q if there is a surjection from the
subject matter of Q onto the subject matter of P);
• JPKc,i is about JQKc,i in its entirety if pc,i ⇒ qc,i
(Suppose that the values of P and of Q are two-dimensionally deter-
mined. Then P is about Q in its entirety if there is an injection from
the subject matter of P onto the subject matter of Q).
15.3 New Interpretations
The two-dimensional account of truthmaker semantics provides a general
framework in which a number of interpretations of the state spaces at is-
sue can be defined. The framework may accommodate, e.g., the so-called
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’semantic’ and ’metasemantic’ interpretations of the framework. The seman-
tic interpretation targets, as noted, the bearing of contextual parameters
on the values of terms, and provides an account of validity relative to the
spaces defined in the term’s intensional parameters (cf. Kaplan, op. cit.).
The metasemantic interpretation accommodates, by contrast, the update ef-
fects of contingently true assertions, with the necessary propositions of which
speakers’ shared information states might be comprised (cf. Stalnaker, op.
cit.). The framework may further be provided an ’epistemic’ interpretation,
in order to countenance hyperintensional distinctions in the relations between
conceivability, i.e. the space of an agent’s epistemic states, and metaphys-
ical possibility, i.e. the state space of facts (cf. Chalmers, op. cit.).6 In
this section, I advance three novel interpretations of two-dimensional seman-
tics, as witnessed by the new relations induced by the interaction between
two-dimensional indexing and hyperintensional value assignments. The three
interpretations concern (i) the distinction between fundamental and deriva-
tive truths; (ii) probabilistic grounding in the setting of decision theory; and
(iii) the structural contents of the types of intentional action.
15.3.1 Fundamental and Derivative Truths
The first novel interpretation concerns the distinction between fundamen-
tal and derivative truths. In the foregoing model, the value of the subject
matter expressed by a proposition may be verified by states in a first space,
which determine, then, whether the proposition is verified by states in a sec-
ond space. Allowing the first space to be interpreted so as to range over
fundamental facts and the second space to be interpreted so as to range
over derivative facts permits a precise characterization of the determination
relations between the fundamental and derivative grounds for a truth.
Suppose, e.g., that the fundamental facts concern the computational char-
acterization of a subject’s mental states, and let the fundamental facts com-
prise the first state space. Let the derivative facts concern states which verify
whether the subject is consciously aware of their mental representations, and
let the derivative facts comprise the second state space. Finally, let φ be a
formula in an experimental task which expresses that there is a particular
valence for the contrast-level of a stimulus.7 The formula’s having a truth-
6Cf. Author (xx) for further discussion.
7In experimental psychology, stimuli which represent contrast gradients are referred to
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maker in the first space – where the states of which range, as noted, over
the subject’s psychofunctional facts – will determine whether the formula
has a truthmaker in the second space – where the states of which range over
the mental representations of which the subject is consciously aware. If the
deployment of some attentional functions provides a necessary condition on
the instantiation of phenomenal awareness, then the role of the state of the
attentional function in the first space in verifying φ will determine whether φ
is subsequently verified relative to the second space. Intuitively: Attending
to a stimulus with a particular value will constrain whether a truthmaker
can be provided for being consciously aware of the stimulus. If the compu-
tational facts at issue are fundamental, and the phenomenal facts at issue
are derivative, then a precise characterization may be provided of the two-
dimensional relations between the verifiers which target fundamental and
derivative truths.
Note that hyperintensional truthmaker semantics is consistent with a ne-
cessitist modal ontology, according to which necessarily everything is neces-
sarily something. An apparent tension might be thought to arise by aug-
menting a first-order formal language with both a truthmaker principle – to
the effect that a proposition is true only if there is something which entails
it [A → ∃x[∃y(x = y → A)]] – and the principle of the necessary necessity
of being – which codifies the thought that necessarily everything is necessar-
ily something [∀xy(x = y)]. The apparent tension is that conjoining the
truthmaker principle to the necessity of being entails the necessity of truth
(cf. Williamson, 2013: 400). The contingency of truth is belied by there
necessarily being a (possible) object which serves as either a truthmaker or a
falsifier for every proposition. However, the foregoing language is consistent
with there being contingent truths; e.g., formulas comprised of non-logical
vocabulary, such as that there are tigers. Williamson replies by arguing
against the truthmaker principle (op. cit.). He observes, however, that a
hyperintensional version of the truthmaker principle is consistent with the
necessary necessity of being – A → ∃P(A because P) – which is an instance
of the principle of the priority of being to truth: namely, that for all formu-
las πA, [Tπ(A) because A] (400-401). Consistently, then, with the necessary
necessity of being, hyperintensional truthmaker semantics is one means of
interpreting the explanatory relation – A ’because’ B – in the principle of
the priority of being to truth.
as Gabor patches.
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15.3.2 Decision Theory
A second novel interpretation of two-dimensional truthmaker semantics con-
cerns the types of intentional action, and the interaction of the latter with
decision theory. As noted in the foregoing, two-dimensional intensional se-
mantics may be availed of in order to explain how the value of a formula
relative to a context ranging over an agent and time will determine the value
of the formula relative to an index ranging over a space of admissible actions
made on the basis of the formula, where the value of the formula relative to
the context and first index will determine the value of the formula relative
to a second index, ranging over a space of outcomes.
One notable feature of the decision-theoretic interpretation is that it pro-
vides a natural setting in which to provide a gradational account of truth-
making. A proposition and its component expressions are true, just if they
are verified by states in a state space, such that the state and its parts fall
within the proposition’s extension. In decision theory, a subject’s expecta-
tion that the proposition will occur is recorded by a partial belief function,
mapping the proposition to real numbers in the {0,1} interval. The subject’s
desire that the proposition occurs is recorded by a utilitiy function, the quan-
titative values of which – e.g., 1 or 0 – express the qualitative value of the
proposition’s occurrance. The evidential expected utility of a proposition’s
occurrance is calculated as the probability of its obtaining conditional on an
agent’s action, as multiplied by the utility to the agent of the proposition’s
occurrance. The causal expected utility of the proposition’s occurrance is
calculated as the probability of its obtaining, conditional on both the agent’s
acts and background knowledge of the causal efficacy of their actions, multi-
plied by the utility of the proposition’s occurrance.
There are three points at which a probabilistic construal of the forego-
ing may be defined. One point concerns the objective probability that the
proposition will be verified, i.e. the chance thereof. The second point con-
cerns subjective probability with which a subject partially believes that the
proposition will obtain. A third point concerns the probability that an out-
come will occur, where the space of admissible outcomes will be constrined
by a subject’s acts. An agent’s actions will, in the third case, constrain the
admissible verifiers in the space of outcomes, and thus the probability that
the verifier for the proposition will obtain as an outcome.8
8A proponent of metaphysical indeterminacy might further suggest that the verifiers are
themselves gradational; thus, rather than target the probability of a verifier’s realization,
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In order formally to countenance the foregoing, we define a probability
measure on a state space, such that the probability measure satisfies the
Kolmogorov axioms: normality [Pr(T) = 1]; non-negativity [Pr(φ) ≥ 0]; ad-
ditivity [For disjoint φ and ψ[Pr(φ∪ψ) = Pr(φ) + Pr(ψ)]]; and conditional-
ization [Pr(φ|ψ) = Pr(φ∩ψ) / Pr(ψ)]. In order to account for the interaction
between objective probability and the verification-conditions in truthmaker
semantics, we avail, then, of a regularity condition in our earlier model, M, in
which the assignment function, V, maps propositions P∈D to pairs of subsets
of S, {1,0}, i.e. the verifier and falsifier of P, such that JPK+ = {0,1} and
JPK− = 1 – P. In our gradational truthmaker semantics, a state, s, verifies a
proposition, P, if the probability that s is in P’s extension is greater than or
equal to .5:
s ⊢ P if Pr(s∈JPK+) ≥ .5.
A state, s, falsifies a proposition P if the probability that s is in P’s
extension is less than .5 iff the probability that s is in P’s anti-extension is
greater than or equal to .5
s ⊣ P if Pr(s∈JPK−) ≥ .5
iff Pr(s∈JPK+) < .5.
The subjective probability with regard to the proposition’s occurrance
is expressed by a probability measure satisfying the Kolmogorov axioms as
defined on a second state space, i.e., a space whose points are interpreted as
concerning the subject’s states of information. The formal clauses for partial
belief in truthmaker semantics are the same as in the foregoing, save that the
probability measures express the mental states of an agent, by being defined
on the space of their states of information.
Finally, the interaction between objective and subjective probability mea-
sures in hyperintensional semantics may be captured in two ways.
One concerns the interaction between the chance of a proposition’s oc-
the proponent of metaphysical indeterminacy will suggest that a proposition P is made
true only to a certain degree, such that both of the proposition’s extension and anti-
extension will have non-negative, real values. One objection to the foregoing account of
metaphysical indeterminacy for truthmakers is, however, that the metalogic for many-
valued logic is classical (cf. Williamson, 2014). A distinct approach to metaphysical
indeterminacy is proffered by Barnes and Williams (2011), who argue that metaphysical
indeterminacy consists in persistently unpointed models, i.e. a case in which it is unclear
which among a set of worlds is actual, even upon filtering the set with precisifications.
A proponent of metaphysical indeterminacy for probabilistic truthmaker semantics might
then argue both that the realization of a verifier has a gradational value and that it is
indeterminate which of the states which can verify a given formula is actual.
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currance, the subject’s partial belief that the proposition will occur, and the
spaces for the subjects actions and outcomes. The formal clause for the
foregoing will then be as follows:
M,s ⊢ JPKc(c′,a,o) > .5,
where c ranges over the space of physical states, and a probability mea-
sure recording objective chance is defined thereon; c’ ranges over the space of
an agent’s states of information, and the value of P relative to c’ determines
the value of P relative to the space of the agent’s acts, a, where the lat-
ter determines the space of admissible outcomes concerning P’s occurrance,
o. Thus, the parameters, c’,a,o possess a hyperintensional two-dimensional
profile, whereas the space of physical states, c, constrains the verification of
the proposition’s occurrance, without determining the values of the subject’s
partial beliefs and their subsequently conceivable actions and outcomes.
Directly accounting for the relation between c and c’ – i.e., specifying a
norm on the relation between chances and credences – is the second means
by which to account for how objective gradational truthmakers interact with
a subject’s partial beliefs about whether propositions are verified. Following
Lewis (1980,b/1987), a candidate chance-credence norm may be what he
refers to as the ’principal principle’.9 The principal principle states that an
agent’s partial belief that a proposition will be verified, conditional on the
objective chance of the proposition’s occurrance and the admissible evidence,
will be equal to the objective chance of the proposition’s occurrance itself:
Prs(P | ch(P) ∧ E) = ch(P).
15.3.3 Intentional Action
A third novel interpretation of two-dimensional intensional semantics pro-
vides a natural setting in which to delineate the structural content of the
9See Pettigrew (2012), for a justification of a generalized version of the principal princi-
ple based on Joyce’s (1998) argument for probabilism. Probabilism provides an accuracy-
based account of partial beliefs, defining norms on the accuracy of partial beliefs with
reference only to worlds, metric ordering relations, and probability measures thereon. The
proposal contrasts to pragmatic approaches, according to which a subject’s probability and
utility measures are derivable from a representation theorem, only if the agent’s preferences
with regard to a proposition’s occurrance are consistent (cf. Ramsey, 1926). Probabilism
states, in particular, that, if there is an ideal subjective probability measure, the ideality of
which consists e.g. in its matching objective chance, then one’s probability measure ought
to satisfy the Kolmogorov axioms, on pain of there always being a distinct probability
measure which will be metrically closer to the ideal state than one’s own.
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types of intentional action. For example, the mental state of intending to
pursue a course of action may be categorized as falling into three types,
where intending-that is treated as a modal operator defined on an agent’s
space of states of information. One type targets a unique structural content
for the state of acting intentionally, such that an agent intends to bring it
about that φ just if the intention satisfies a clause which mirrors that outlined
in the last paragraph:
• JIntenton-in-Action(φ)Kw = 1 only if ∃w’JφKw′,c(=t,l),a,o = 1.
A second type of intentional action may be recorded by a future-directed
operator, such that an agent intends to φ only if they intend to pursue a
course of action in the future, only if there is a world and a future time
relative to which the agent’s intention is satisfied:
• JIntention-for-the-future(φ)Kw = 1 only if ∃w’∀t∃t’[t< t’ ∧ JφKw′,t′ =
1].
Finally, a third type of intentional action concerns reference to the inten-
tion as an explanation for one’s course of action. In Chapter 16, I regiment
the structural content of this type of intention as a modal operator which
receives its value only if a hyperintensional grounding operator which takes
scope over a proposition and an action, receives a positive semantic value.
The formal properties of the grounding operator follows the presentation
in Fine (2012,c), according to which the operator corresponds to relations
of parthood, which satisfy the logical properties of reflexivity and permit
bijections between the states at issue, namely, actions and intentional de-
scriptions.
The varieties of subject matter, as defined in two-dimensional truthmaker
semantics, can be availed of in order to enrich the present approach. Hav-
ing multiple state spaces from which to define the verifiers of a proposition
enables a novel solution to issues concerning the interaction between action
and explanation. The third type of intentional action may be regimented,
as noted, by the agent’s reference to an intention as an explanation for her
course of action.
The foregoing may also be availed of, in order to provide a novel solution
to an issue concerning the interaction betwen involuntary and intentional
action. The issue is as follows. Wittgenstein (1953/2009; 621) raises the
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inquiry: ’When I raise my arm, my arm goes up. Now the problem arises:
what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that
I raise my arm?’ Because the arm’s being raised has at least two component
states, namely, the arm’s going up and whatever the value of the variable
state might be, the answer to Wittgenstein’s inquiry is presumably that
the agent’s intentional action is the value of the variable state, such that a
combination of one’s intentional action and one’s arm going up is sufficient
for one’s raising one’s arm. The aforementioned issue with the foregoing
concerns how precisely to capture the notion of partial content, which bears
on the relevance of the semantics of the component states and the explanation
of the unique state entrained by their combination.
Given our two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, a reply to Wittgen-
stein’s inquiry which satisfies the above desiderata may be provided. Let W
express a differentiated subject matter, whose total content is that an agent’s
arm is raised. W expresses the total content that an agent’s arm is raised,
because W is comprised of an initial content, U (that one’s arm goes up),
and an additional content, R (that one intends to raise one’s arm).
The verifier for W may be interpreted as a two-dimensional loose truth-
maker. Let c range over an agent’s motor states, S. Let i range over an
agent’s states of information, S*. We define a modal operator for intentional
action on the state space of the agent’s motor actions. The value of the
modal operator for intentional action is positive just if a selection function,
g, is a mapping from the powerset of motor actions in S to a unique state
s’ in S. This specifies the initial, partial content, U, that one’s arm goes up.
An intention may then be defined as a unique state, s*, in the agent’s state
of information, S*. The state, s*, specifies the additional, partial content R,
that one intends to raise one’s arm.
Formally:
s ⊢ U only if ∃s’⊏S, such that g: s→ s’, s.t. s’ ⊢ U,
∃s*, s* ⊢ R, and
W = U ⊔ R.
The two-dimensional loose truthmaker for one’s arm being raised may
then be defined as follows:
∃cs→s′JWKc,c = 1 if s’∈JWK+, and
∃is∗JWKc,i = 1 if s*∈JWK+.
Intuitively, the value of the total content that one’s arm is raised is defined
relative to a set of motor states – where a first intentional action selects a
series of motor states which partly verify that one’s arm goes up. The value
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of one’s arm being raised, relative to (the intentionally modulated) motor
state of one’s arm possibly going up, determines the value of one’s arm being
raised relative to the agent’s distinct intention to raise their arm. The agent’s
first intention selects among the admissible motor states, and – all else being
equal – the motor states will verify the fact that one’s arm goes up. Recall
that the value of a formula relative to a context determines the value of
the formula relative to an index. As follows, the priority of the motor act
to the subsequent intention to raise one’s arm is thus that it must first be
possible for one’s arm to go up in order to determine whether the subsequent
intention to raise one’s arm can be satisfied.10 The fusion of (i) the state
corresponding to the initial partial content that one’s arm goes up, and (ii)
the state corresponding to the additional partial content that one intends to
raise one’s arm, is sufficient for the verification of (iii) the state corresponding
to the total content that one’s arm is raised.
15.4 Concluding Remarks
In this essay, I have endeavored to establish foundations for the interac-
tion between two-dimensional indexing and hyperintensional semantics. I
examined, then, the philosophical significance of the framework by develop-
ing three, novel interpretations of two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, in
light of the new relations induced by the model.
The first interpretation enables a rigorous characterization of the distinc-
tion between fundamental and derivative truths. The second interpretation
evinces how the elements of decision theory are definable within the two-
dimensional hyperintensional setting, and a novel account was then outlined
concerning the interaction between probability measures and hyperinten-
sional grounds. The third interpretation of two-dimensional hyperintensional
semantics concerns the structural content of the types of intentional action.
Finally, I demonstrated how the hyperintensional array of state spaces, rela-
tive to which propositions may be verified, may serve to resolve a previously
intransigent issue concerning the role of intention in action.
10The role of the first intention in acting as a selection function on the space of motor
actions corresponds to the comparator functions stipulated in the contemporary cognitive
science of action theory. For further discussion of the comparator model, see Frith et al.
(2000) and Pacherie (2012).
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Chapter 16
Epistemic Modality, Intention,
and Decision Theory
Formal treatments of imperatival notions have been pursued both logically
and semantically. In the logical setting, deontic claims have been interpreted
as types of a modal operator, where a condition holding across the points
of a space abbreviates the property of obligation, and its dual abbreviates
the property of permissibility.1 In the twentieth century, research in deontic
logic has examined the validity of the rule of necessitation (⊢φ→ ⊢φ) (von
Wright, 1981); modal axiom 4 (φ → φ) (cf. Barcan, 1966); and modal
axiom GL [(φ → φ) → φ] (cf. Smiley, 1963). The semantic approach
has been inspired by the works of Kratzer (1977, 2012), Stalnaker (1978),
and Veltman (1996), arguing that there are modal operaters on a set of
points which are not straightforwardly truth-conditional, instead recording
an update on that set which is taken to be pragmatic (cf. Yalcin, 2012). The
types of obligation have proliferated, as variations on the ’ought’-operator –
e.g., what one ought to do relative to a time and one’s states of information,
by contrast to what one ought to do relative to the facts – have been codified
by differences in the array of intensional parameters relative to which the
operator receives a semantic value (cf. Yalcin, op. cit.; Cariani, 2013; Dowell,
2013; et al).
This essay aims to provide a theory of the structural content of the types
of intention via a similar modal analysis; to explain the role of intention in
1Deontic logic dates from at least as early as the fourteenth century, in the writings of
Ockham, Holcot, and Rosetus. See Knuuttila (1981) for further discussion.
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practical reasoning; and to answer thereby what I will call the unification
problem: i.e., the inquiry into how the various types of intention comprise
a unified mental state.2 The general significance of the present contribution
is that it will provide some foundational structure to the topic, where the
previous lack thereof has served only to exacerbate its intransigence.3 I will
argue that – similarly to the case of deontic judgment – the foregoing types of
intention can be countenanced as modal operators. The defining contours of
the contents of the states may thus be targeted via their intensional-semantic
profile. The types of intention on which I will focus include (i) the notion
of ’intention-in-action’, as evinced by cases in which agents act intentionally;
(ii) the notion of ’intention-with-which’, where an agent’s intentions figure
as an explanation of their actions; and (iii) the notion of ’intention-for-the-
future’, as evinced by an agent’s plans to pursue a course of action at a future
time.
I will argue that the unification problem has at least two, consistent so-
lutions. The first manner in which the operations of intention are unified
is that they are defined on a single space, whose points are states of in-
formation or epistemic possibilities. I argue, then, that the significance of
examining how the state of intention interacts with practical reasoning is that
it provides a second means by which to account for the unity of intention’s
types. Although each type of intention has a unique formal clause codifying
its structural content, the notions of ’intention-in-action’, ’intention-with-
which’, and ’intention-for-the-future’ are nevertheless unified, because each
is directed toward the property of expected utility. Thus, acting intentionally,
acting because of an intention, and intending to pursue a course of action
at a future time, are mental states whose unification consists in that each
type aims toward the satisfaction of the value of an outcome – the value of
2The unification problem is first examined in Anscombe (1963), and has been pursued
in contemporary research by, inter alia, Bratman (1984) and Setiya (2014).
3Compare the aims and methods pursued in the research projects of Fine (1981) and
Williamson (2014): ’The relevance of the undertaking [. . . ] consists mainly in the general
advantages that accrue from formalizing an intuitive theory. First of all, one thereby ob-
tains a clearer view of its primitive notions and truths. This is no small thing in a subject
[. . . ] that is so conspicuously lacking in proper foundations’ (Fine, op. cit.: ); ’The aim is
to gain insight into a phenomenon by studying how it works under simplified, rigorously
described conditions that enable us to apply mathematical or quasi-mathematical reason-
ing that we cannot apply directly to the phenomenon as it occurs in the wild, with all its
intractable complexity. We can then cautiously transfer our insight about the idealized
model back to the phenomenon in the wild’ (Williamson, op. cit.).
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which is the product of a partial belief conditional on one’s acts by the utility
thereof. The dissociation between an agent’s intention to pursue an action
and the causal relevance of the action’s outcome adduces in favor of the
characterization of expected utility in the setting of evidential, rather than
causal, decision theory. The proposal that the content of intention is ex-
pected utility has, furthermore, the virtue of generalizing, in order to explain
the nature of the intentions of non-human organisms. The contents of non-
human organisms’ intentions can here be understood as the value intended
by their actions, as sensitive to both their prediction that the outcome will
occur and the utility of its occurrance. Finally, because the aim of intention
is expected utility, a precise account can be provided of how intention relates
to the notions of belief and desire, while yet retaining its status as a unique
mental state.
In Sections 2-3, I delineate the intensional-semantic profiles of the types
of intention, and provide a precise account of how the types of intention
are unified in virtue of both their operations in a single epistemic modal
space and their role in practical reasoning, i.e., evidential decision theory. I
endeavor to provide reasons adducing against the proposal that the types of
intention are reducible to the mental states of belief and desire, where the
former state is codified by subjective probability measures and the latter is
codified by a utility function. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
16.1 The Modes of Intention
The epistemic modal space of an agent can be defined via a frame, comprised
of a set of points, and a relation of accessibility thereon (cf. Kripke, 1963;
Blackburn et al, 2001). The points in the frame are here interpreted as an
agent’s states of information, while the relation of accessibility can receive
various interpretations. A state of information is possible, just if there is at
least one point relative to which it is true, if and only if it is not necessary for
the formula to be false. One of the states of information is necessary, just if it
is true everywhere, i.e. relative to all the other points in the space, if and only
if it is impossible for it to be false. The distinctly epistemic interpretation
of possibility comes in at least two guises, defined as the dual of epistemic
necessity (’⋄φ’ iff ’¬¬φ’): The truth of a formula is epistemically possible,
just if the formula is believed by an agent, or is conceivable to the agent. The
epistemic interpretation of necessity can itself come in at least two guises:
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The truth of a formula is epistemically invariant or necessary, just if the truth
of the formula is known by an agent, or if it is inconceivable for the formaula
to be false (dually, epistemically necessary), and is thus in one sense apriori.
When an agent intends to φ, their intention may fall into three distinct
types. One type of intention concerns the intentional pursuit, by the agent,
of a course of action. A second type of intention can be witnessed, when the
agent cites an intention as an explanation of her pursuit of a course of action.
Finally, a third type of intention can be witnessed, when the agent intends
to pursue a course of action at a future time.
16.1.1 Intention-in-Action
If the agent acts intentionally, then her intention can be understood as an
operation relative to her states of information. The agent acts intentionally,
just if there is a world and a unique array of intensional parameters relative
to which her intention is realized and receives a positive semantic value.
The array of intensional parameters is two-dimensional, because the value of
intending to φ relative to one of the parameters will constrain the value of
intending to φ relative to the subsequent parameters. Thus, we can say that
an agent intends to φ, if and only if she acts intentionally, only if there is both
a world and array of intensional parameters, relative to which her intention
is realized, i.e. receives a positive value. The intensional parameters include
a context comprised of a time and location, and a pair of indices on which
spaces of the agent’s acts and of the outcomes of her actions are built. So,
the agent’s intention-in-action receives a positive semantic value only if there
is at least one world in her epistemic modal space at which – relative to the
context of a particular time and location, which constrains the admissibility
of the actions as defined at a first index, and which subsequently constrains
the outcome thereof as defined at a second index – the intention is realized.
• JIntenton-in-Action(φ)Kw = 1 only if ∃w’JφKw′,c(=t,l),a,o = 1
16.1.2 Intention-with-which
If the agent refers to an intention, in order to explain her pursuit of a course
of action, then her intention can similarly be understood as an operation
relative to her states of information. In this case, the agent intends to φ, just
if there is a pair of formulas defined at points in her epistemic modal space,
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where one of the states is realized because it holds in virtue the other state
being realized. Informally, the foregoing explanation can be referred to as
the intention-with-which she acts. Thus, we can say that an agent intends
to φ, if and only if her intention is an explanation for her action, only if she
acts in pursuit of ψ because she intends to φ. In order to capture the notion
of one formula holding in virtue, or because, of a distinct formula, we define
grounding operators on the agent’s epistemic modal space. Thus, the agent
intends to φ because, there is an intention in virtue of which her action, ψ
so as to realize φ, receives a positive value.
• JIntention-with-which(φ)Kw = 1 only if ∃w’[JψKw′ = 1 ∧ JG(φ,ψ)K = 1],
where G(x,y) is a grounding operator encoding the explanatory connec-
tion between φ and ψ. Following Fine (2012a,b), the grounding operator can
have the following properties: The grounding operator is weak if and only
if it induces reflexive grounding. The operator is strict if and only if it is
not weak. The operator is full if and only if the intention to φ uniquely
provides the explanatory ground for the action, ψ. The operator is part if
and only if the intention to φ - along with other reasons for action - provide
the explanatory ground for the action, ψ. Combinations of the foregoing
explanatory operators may also obtain: x < y iff φ is a strict full ground for
ψ; x ≤ y iff φ is a weak full ground for ψ; x ≺ y iff φ is a strict part ground
for ψ; x  y iff φ is a weak part ground for ψ; x  y ∧ ¬(y  x) iff φ is a
strict partial ground for ψ; x ≺* y iff x1, ..., xn ≤ y, iff φ is a partial strict
ground for ψ; x ≺’ z iff [φ ≺* ψ ∧ ψ  µ] iff φ is a part strict ground for
some further action, µ.
16.1.3 Intention-for-the-Future
Finally, an agent can intend to φ, because she intends to pursue a course of
action at a future time. In this case, the intensional-semantic profile which
records the parameters relative to which her intention receives a positive
semantic value converges with a future-directed modal operator to the effect
that the agent will φ. Thus, an agent realizes an intention-for-the-future only
if there is a possible world and a future time, relative to which the possibility
that φ is realized can be defined. Thus:
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• JIntention-for-the-future(φ)Kw = 1 only if ∃w’∀t∃t’[t< t’ ∧ JφKw′,t′ =
1].4
This section has endeavored to accomplish two aims. The first was to
provide a precise delineation of the structural content of, and therefore the
distinctions between, the types of intention. Intention was shown to be a
modal mental state, whose operations have a unique intensional profile, and
whose values are defined relative to an agent’s space of states of information.
The second aim was to secure one of the means by which the unity of the
distinct types of intention can be witnessed. Despite that each of the types
of intention has a unique structural content, the contents of those types are
each defined in a single, encompassing space; i.e, relative to the agent’s space
of epistemic possibilities.
16.2 Intention in Decision Theory
In Section 2, I suggested that intention is a unified, modal mental state,
the contents of which are defined relative to an agent’s states of informa-
tion. This section examines the proposal that intentions have a dual profile
(cf. Bratman, op. cit.), because intentions figure constitutively in practi-
cal reasoning. I argue that, because expected utility theories are the only
axiomatized theories of practical reasoning, an account must be provided of
the role that intention plays therein. The account will illuminate a precise
relationship – which I argue is not identity – between the types of intention
and the mental states of belief and desire. The account will furthur serve
to provide a second explanation for the unity of intention’s types, given the
uniform role that the types of intention play in decision theory.
A model of decision theory can be understood as a tuple 〈A,O,K,V〉,
where A is a set of acts; O is a set of outcomes; K encodes a set of coun-
terfactual conditionals, where an act from A figures in the antecedent of the
conditional and O figures in the conditional’s consequent; and V is a function
assigning a real number to each outcome. The real number is a representation
of the value of the outcome. The expected value of the outcome is calculated
4See Rao and Georgeff (1991), for the suggestion that operators in a multi-modal logic
can model the notion of goal-oriented intention. The foregoing intensional semantics is
consistent with the logic that they proffer.
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as the product of (i) the subjective probability – i.e., the agent’s partial be-
lief or credence – that the outcome will occur, as conditional on her act, and
(ii) the value or utility which she assigns to the outcome’s occurance. The
agent can prefer one assignment of values to the outcome’s occurrance over
another. (Which preference axioms ought to be adopted is a contentious
issue, and will not here be examined. Cf. von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944; Savage, 1954; Jeffrey, 1983; and Joyce, 1999.) In evidential decision
theory, the expected utility of an outcome is calculated as the product of the
agent’s credence conditional on her action, by the utility of the outcome. In
causal decision theory, the expected utility of an outcome is calculated as
the product of the agent’s credence, conditional on both her action and the
causal efficacy thereof, by the utility of the outcome. Expected utility can
further be augmented by a risk-weighting function: If the agent’s expected
utility diminishes with the order of the bets she might pursue – such that
expected utility is sensitive to the agent’s propensity to take risks relative
to the total ordering of the gambles – then she might have a preference for
a sure-gain of .5 units of value, rather than prefer a bet with a 50 percent
chance of winning either 0 or 1 units of value (cf. Buchak, 2014).
If intention plays a constitutive role in practical reasoning, and decision
theories provide the most tractable models thereof, then what is the role of
intention in decision theory? The parameters in the axiomatizations of deci-
sion theory encode variables for credences, actions, outcomes, assignments of
utility, background states of information pertinent to the causal relevance of
actions on outcomes, and the agent’s preferences. Expected utility is derived,
as noted, by the interaction between an agent’s credences, actions, and util-
ity assignments. Which, then, of these parameters do an agent’s intentions
concern?
There are dissociations between intention and belief and between inten-
tion and desire. An agent can have a partial belief that the sun will rise,
without intending to pursue any course of action. Conversely, an agent can
intend to pursue a course of action, yet appreciate that there are, unfortu-
nately, reasons for her to disbelieve that the act will obtain. An agent can
desire that the sun rises, without the intention to entrain the sun’s rising as
consequence. Conversely, a vegetarian can intend to consume meat, if it is
the only available source of protein and they are in dire need thereof, while
yet desire a distinct and orthogonal outcome.
There are dissociations between intention and preference. An agent can
prefer the sun’s rising to the prevalence in her life of unprovoked antagonists,
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without either acting intentionally, possessing an intention as an explanation
for some course of action, or intending to pursue any particular course of
action in the future. Conversely, whether an agent’s intention to pursue an
action mandates a preference for the value of the outcome of that action
will depend on one’s preference axioms. One such axiom might be maximin,
according to which the best of the worst outcomes among a set of options
should be preferred, while a distinct rule might be maximax, according to
which one ought to prefer and pursue the maximally vaulable outcome among
a set of options. Thus, intending to φ is not sufficient for determining whether
φ ought to be preferred.
There are, finally, dissociations between intention and action. One might
intend to calculate the value of a formula, yet not be able so to act, because
their attention might be allocated elsewhere.
Acting intentionally, intending to pursue a course of action in the future,
and citing an intention as an explanation for one’s course of action are each,
however, in some way related to the value of a course of action. When an
agent acts intentionally, she acts in such a way so as to obtain an outcome
that she values. When an agent pursues a course of action, and refers to her
intention so to act as the explanation for that action, the intention explains
the value, for the agent, in which the action and its outcomes are supposed
to consist. Finally, when an agent intends to pursue a course of action in
the future, her intention is similarly guided by the value of the outcome
that her action will hopefully entrain. The value of the outcome will not be
her bare assessment of the utility of the outcome, because – in the setting
of decision theory – utility functions codify desires, such that her intention
would thereby be elided with her desire for the outcome.
Because the types of intention are all directed toward the value of an out-
come of a course of action – while being irreducible to, because dissociable
from, the states of belief and desire – the remaining and most suitable candi-
date for the role of the mental state of intention in decision theory is the aim
of expected utility; i.e., the value of an outcome, as arising by the interaction
between the agent’s partial belief or expectation that the outcome will occur
as conditional on her act, and the utility that she associates with the out-
come’s occurrance. Because of the dissociation between an agent’s intention
to pursue a course of action in the future and the action’s occurrance – let
alone the dissociation between the intention to act in future, and the causal
efficacy of the action were it to obtain – the role of intention in practical
reasoning appears to be more saliently witnessed in the setting of evidential
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decision theory.
That the types of intention are each directed toward expected utility
evinces how an agent’s intentions can be sensitive to her beliefs and desires,
without being reducible to them. Crucially, moreover, that the types of inten-
tion are each directed toward expected utility provides a second explanation
of the way that the types of intention comprise a unified mental state.
Theoretical advantages accruing to the foregoing proposal include that
it targets a foundational role for intention in decision theory. The proposal
might be foundational, because it targets a basic role for intention in practical
reasoning, which is consistent with the possible augmentation of the proposal
with other approaches which assume a more cognitively demanding role for
intention’s aims. Such approaches include proposals to the effect (i) that
the most fundamental type of intention is intention-with-which, such that
intention’s role as an explanation can be elided with its causal efficacy (cf.
Anscombe, op. cit.; Davidson, 1963); (ii) that the content of intention is
the diachronic satisfaction of self-knowledge (cf. Velleman, 1989); and (iii)
that the role of intention in practical reasoning ought to be understood as an
evaluative constraint on practical reasoning, as determined by the virtuous
traits of an agent’s character (cf. Setiya, 2007).
16.3 Concluding Remarks
I have argued that the unification problem for the types of intention can
be solved in two, consistent ways. The types of intention can be modeled
as modal operators, where the unity of the operations consists, in the first
instance, in that their values are defined relative to a single, encompassing,
epistemic modal space. The second manner by which the unity of intention’s
types can be witnessed is via intention’s unique role in practical reason-
ing. I argued that each of the types of intention – i.e., intention-in-action,
intention-as-explanation, and intention-for-the-future – has as its aim the
value of an outcome of the agent’s action, as derived by her partial beliefs
and assignments of utility, and as codified by the value of expected utility in
evidential decision theory. A precise account was thereby provided of the role
of epistemic modality in the unification of the types of a unique, modal men-
tal state, whose value figures constitutively in decision-making and practical
reason.
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